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ABSTRACT 
This study serves two aims, to shed light on the rule of ÃarÙra in 
Islamic law and to examine the justification for the Harm Reduction 
Programme in Malaysia using the said rule. In an attempt to fathom 
the real understanding of this rule, I have employed two methods: a 
critical approach to the ÃarÙra theoretical discussions and an analysis 
of ÃarÙra cases presented in fiqhÐ treatises. The study demonstrates 
that the uÒÙliyyÙn have formulated a narrow scope of ÃarÙra theory 
although the applications of the rule in fiqhÐ treatises suggest other 
ways in which the principle can be applied. The jurists tend to apply 
the rule in a much wider sense in the various fiqhÐ  works, either in 
true and factual cases or in hypothetical ones. This research also finds 
that the modern jurists have expanded the application not only to 
protect the necessity of an individual person but to protect the 
necessity of the public at large. It can also be suggested that the rule of 
ÃarÙra has provided measures derogating obligations; however, this 
must only be to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation.  
A rigorous understanding of this rule is crucial for the field of Islamic 
law in order to avoid any possible abuse. Based on the above 
understanding of ÃarÙra, this study finally investigates whether ÃarÙra 
can justify the Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia. This 
programme has been promulgated to reduce HIV/AIDS cases by 
providing drug users with methadone, syringes and needles. The 
programme was assessed thoroughly using the legal requirements and 
preconditions of ÃarÙra. Having examined the philosophy, its modus 
operandi and jurists' attitude towards drugs, the study concludes that 
this programme is justified from a sharÝÐ perspective on the basis of 
necessity. However, strict precautions and regulations need to be 
continuously employed throughout this controlled programme to avoid 
any abuse which might impair its legality. The research also aims to 
enhance the public's understanding of the rule of ÃarÙra and to 
improve the collaboration between Malaysian government and 
religious groups in minimising HIV/AIDS and drug cases in Malaysia. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter is divided into several sections and provides an 
overview of the study. It comprises the study’s background, the importance 
of the research, the literature review, the research questions posed and the 
methods used. The aims of the research presented in this thesis are twofold: 
firstly, I aim to examine the rule of ÃarÙra in Islamic law and secondly, I 
will study the possibility of its application to justify the Harm Reduction 
Programme to control the spread of HIV/AIDS in Malaysia. As the rule of 
ÃarÙra functions mainly to alter an established SharÐÝa law in order to avoid 
imminent harm, it is important for a person to possess the basic tools-a 
sound knowledge of what is stated in the SharÐÝa regarding a particular 
ÃarÙra matter. As that person may decide for himself when to derogate from 
the standard rule, he has to be able to distinguish between necessity and 
non-necessity cases. At the same time, the situation of ÃarÙra requires 
verification by adhering to strict criteria in order to prevent people from 
abusing this principle. This rule can be abused by a person who deliberately 
intends to break the SharÐÝa law without valid reason. The abuse of the 
darÙra rule includes cases where the requirements of darÙra are not met. 
Examples include omitting an obligatory prayer because of mild sickness, or 
eating an unlawful foodstuff before seriously looking for a lawful 
alternative. Such abuse has several legal effects including the deliberate 
abandonment of SharÐÝa obligations such as prayers and depriving others 
from their rights such as illegal possession of property. Hence, a proper 
understanding of the rule is imperative in order to ensure it is correctly 
applied according to SharÐÝa standards. 
 
2. Background of research 
Being a Muslim demands a person not only believe in God theologically, 
but it also demands he or she fulfil certain obligations and to refrain from 
certain acts. Muslim jurists believe that Islamic law governs and regulates 
all human life, ranging from personal daily activities and ritual obligations 
to business transactions and political affairs. These human activities are 
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divided into several categories, namely wÁjib (obligatory), mandÙb 
(recommended), ÎarÁm (forbidden), makrÙh (disapproved) and mubÁÎ 
(indifferent)1. However, in certain pressing situations, some of the 
commands in the mandatory categories (wÁjib and ÎarÁm) need not be 
obeyed as the act of obeying the command can impose a severe threat to 
Muslims.  
 
As a divinely-inspired law, Muslim jurists generally view Islamic law as 
having special characteristics designed to satisfy human needs2. It is a 
flexible (murÙna) law which can be adapted for Muslims in almost every 
situation. For instance, forms of worship can change according to the 
situation and circumstances in order to avoid difficulties. This example 
demonstrates that Islamic law promulgates the notion of avoiding hardship 
and promoting easiness. The burden of fulfilling religious commandments 
does not necessarily mean a Muslim has to suffer physically or mentally in 
performing the religious act. Certain rules can be delayed because of 
unavoidable impediments. For example, if a Muslim is starving, the eating 
of pork is permitted. Another popular reason for a suspension of the Sharia 
law is travelling. It is widely accepted by Muslim jurists that travelling is 
suitable legal grounds for breaking the fast during the month of Ramadan 
and for shortening prayers, for example. 
 
There are many forms of flexible rules in Islamic law.  These include the 
concepts of ÃarÙra (the rule of necessity), rukhÒa (concessionary law), 
maÒlaÎa (public interest), istiÎsÁn (juristic preference), istiÒÎÁb 
                                                 
1 However, the ÍanafÐs have divided Îukm taklÐfÐ into seven kinds. The absolute demand 
to fulfil an act on the basis of decisive evidence is called farÃ, and on the basis of probable 
evidence is called wujÙb. Similarly, the absolute demand to refrain from a prohibition on 
the basis of decisive evidence is called taÎrÐm and on the basis of probable evidence is 
called karÁhat al-taÎrÐm. See Gimaret, D. “TaklÐf (a.).” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition. P. Bearman;  Th. Bianquis;  C.E. Bosworth;  E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs 
(eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-7344>  
According to Gimaret, taklÐf  is a term of the theological and legal vocabulary denoting the 
fact of an imposition on the part of God of obligations on his creatures, of subjecting them 
to a law. The corresponding passive participle mukallaf is used of someone who is 
governed by this law and in this connection, in legal language. It denotes every individual 
who has at his disposal the full and entire scope of the law.  
2See YÙsuf al-QaraÃÁwÐ, SharÐÝa al-IslÁm ÒÁliÎa li al-taÔbÐq fi kullÐ zamÁn wa makÁn, Cairo: 
Maktaba Wahbah, 1997, pp. 38-40, Muhammad Ismail Abu al-Rish, al-TÁrÐkh al-tashrÐÝ al-
IslÁmÐ, Alexandaria: University of El-Azhar, 1996, pp. 9-13  
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(presumption of continuity), maÒÁliÎ mursala (unrestricted interest). This 
flexibility, whereby commands are eased based on necessity, comes under 
the rubric of ÃarÙra. Muslim jurists believe that this rule can be applied 
when a religious command cannot be fulfilled due to imminent harm to 
one's necessity3. For instance, when a person is at risk of death from 
starvation, unlawful meat is permitted to be consumed to alleviate hunger. 
Another example is demonstrated when a person under duress is forced by 
an oppressor to damage another’s properties. Although permission to break 
the rule is granted, the person under duress is responsible for minimising the 
damage he might cause. It is also important to note that ÃarÙra is not a free 
license to change the law as the permission is only given temporarily. Once 
the temporary cause is no longer applicable, the established rule must once 
again be complied with. This research presents an in-depth analytical review 
of the function of ÃarÙra rule in Islamic law to remove any doubts and 
misconceptions that might lead to the abuse of the law. Both theoretical and 
practical aspects of this rule are investigated in this research.   
 
At the same time, I have chosen the Harm Reduction Programme in 
Malaysia as a case study for ÃarÙra application4. The Malaysian government 
has implemented this specific programme to control the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, especially among intravenous drug users (IDUs). Illegal drug 
addiction has become the main cause of the spread of HIV/AIDS in this 
country. This programme however is not without challenges as it involves 
several controversial means such as providing alternative drugs and 
distributing clean injecting kits to the patients. Some Muslims view this 
programme as one which promotes and condones illegal behaviour. They 
further argue that more conservative methods, either the punitive approach 
or total abstinence, are still the best means of reducing illegal drug use. 
However, despite the strict law and severe punishments for drug use, illegal 
drug consumption continues to rise and it is also causing a rise in the 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4The Malaysian government has used the American spelling for the term ‘programme’. 
However, for consistency purpose, I have used the English spelling throughout this study. 
See the speech by Dato’ Sri Liow Tiong Lai, Minister of Health Malaysia, at the Malaysia 
National Conference on HIV/AIDS In conjunction with world AIDS day 2009, Hard Rock 
Hotel, Penang, 3rd December 2009. See 
www.moh.gov.my/MohPortal/DownloadServlet?id=4059&type=2 
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number of HIV/AIDS cases. The government believes that the 
conservatives methods have failed to control illegal drug consumption 
through law enforcement and rehabilitation programmes. Therefore, the 
Malaysian Ministry of Health has adopted an innovative approach by 
implementing this Harm Reduction Programme.  
 
Collaboration with religious leaders, particularly Muslims is imperative in 
reducing the number of HIV/AIDS cases. Although the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in Malaysia is not as serious as in many African countries, this is 
the time for Muslim leaders to act as the majority of drug users in Malaysia 
are Muslims. Despite the reality that HIV/AIDS has become a national 
pandemic, the Muslims are still divided on the issue of the Harm Reduction 
Programme. This research therefore also aims to educate Malaysian 
Muslims about the facts concerningHIV/AIDS. It also aims to create a 
better understanding among Malaysian Muslims to determine the best 
possible programme that suits the local Muslim setting.  
 
 
Malaysia as a Muslim country and the issue of HIV/AIDS 
Malaysia gained its independence from Britain in 1957 and has a current 
population over 23 million with the Muslim population being more than 
50% of the general population. Although Malaysia is a secular country, 
Islam is constitutionally recognised as the official national religion.  Islamic 
law is a matter falling within the state list; it is a matter over which the state 
legislature has jurisdiction and not the Federal Legislature5 and Islam is a 
powerful force in the lives of the majority of Malaysian Muslims6. 
Malaysian Muslims disregard their political inclinations are extremely 
sensitive to religious matters especially when it involves the ‘Îalalness’ of 
                                                 
5 Malaysian Federal Constitution, Article 74, Ninth Schedule 
6 For further information regarding Islamic revivalism in Malaysia see Hussin Mutalib, 
Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990. Under 
Mahathir’s administration, the government’s supports for Islam were overwhelming and he 
himself has initiated the government’s Islamisation policies. However, Mutalib argued that 
this government’s general patronage towards Islam does not indicate that Mahathir has 
been both an ardent supporter of Islam and an astute politician. As Mahathir was also aware 
of the non-Muslims fear of his Islamisation programmes, he explicitly ruled out 
impositions of Islamic law to allay such fears. He stated clearly “Malaysia’s multi racial 
society ruled out Islamic laws being imposed”,  pp. 133- 145 
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consumer products such as food, cosmetics and medicines. Consequently, 
the Malaysian government always treats religious issues seriously as such 
issues can easily create public tension. The Malaysian government therefore 
adopts a supportive approach to cater for Muslim needs. As with other 
secular Muslim countries, there is always a growing need for fresh ijtihÁd 
(legal solutions) for new emerging cases in Malaysia. The most demanding 
cases are those concerning food consumption, medical practices, financial 
transactions and consumers products.  The Malaysian Department of 
Islamic Development (JAKIM) is a Government institution that has been 
responsible for ascertaining policies pertaining to the development and the 
advancement of Islamic affairs in Malaysia. JAKIM has also been relied 
upon to enact and standardise laws and procedures, and also to co-ordinate 
their implementation in all the states. Among its responsibilities is the 
issuing of ÎalÁl certificates for products and services. Food manufacturers, 
including traders, sub-contract manufacturers, food premises and slaughter 
houses can apply for a ÎalÁl certificate from this department. The ÎalÁl 
certificate7 will only be conferred when there is no reasonable doubt that the 
production processes, ranging from preparation, slaughtering (if applicable), 
processing, handling, storage, transportation, cleaning, disinfection and 
management practices are SharÐÝa compliant. 
In the midst of Muslim sensitivity, the issue of the Harm Reduction 
Programme ignites controversy due to its controversial methods to combat 
HIV/AIDS cases. Malaysia has witnessed deaths due to HIV and AIDS. The 
first reported case of HIV was reported in Malaysia in late 1986, and the 
number of deaths has increased dramatically in the past ten years with the 
latest figure standing at about 15 people dying every day. Until December 
2008, a total 84,630 cases had been reported, of which 14,576 had 
developed AIDS and 12,589 had died. 77% of the reported cases are among 
those aged between 20 to 39 years old8. According to the current Malaysian 
Health Minister, Dato’ Sri Liow Tiong Lai,  the number of HIV and AIDS 
                                                 
7Some Halal certifications are issued by State Religious councils (HDC/JAIN/MAIN). 
HDC  is an acronym for Halal Industry Development Corporation. 
8 See the speech by Dato’ Sri Liow Tiong Lai, Minister of Health Malaysia, at the Malaysia 
National Conference on HIV/AIDS in conjunction with world AIDS day 2009, Hard Rock 
Hotel, Penang, 3rd December 2009. See 
www.moh.gov.my/MohPortal/DownloadServlet?id=4059&type=2 
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cases has  increased due to the increase in drug addiction and also  and also 
to more young people having multiple sexual partners. Up to December 
2008, HIV transmission in Malaysia was demonstrated to be contracted 
mainly through sharing of needles among drug users (71%). Another 18.5% 
acquired the infection through sexual intercourse with 0.9% contracted by 
babies born to HIV-positive mothers. The government also discovered that 
over the past few years Malaysia has experienced a gradual “feminisation” 
of its HIV epidemic, with an increasing trend of newly reported HIV 
infections being transmitted sexually. This is evident from the rise in the 
percentage of reported HIV cases through sexual transmission, from 18.9% 
in the year 2000 to 29.8% in 2008. Over the same period, the percentage of 
women among HIV reported cases had increased from 9.4% to 19.1%. It 
was the high proportion of HIV infections among injecting drug users 
(IDUs) that prompted the Ministry of Health to introduce the Harm 
Reduction Program in 2005 /2006. The government believes that the harm 
reduction is not about legalisation of illicit drugs. It is about providing 
internationally-proven health services for injecting drug users to prevent 
them from transmitting HIV and other blood infections among themselves 
and their partners through unsafe practices9. 
The Harm Reduction Programme is not the government’s first attempt to 
prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS cases in Malaysia. In 1993, the 
government took serious action including forming the AIDS/STD section 
and the PROSTAR programme (Programme Sihat Tanpa AIDS Remaja). 
Among the strategies adopted were the dissemination of information and 
education to the public, promoting healthy lifestyle practices and 
monitoring of the situation through HIV surveillance and epidemiogical 
measures. The government has spent millions of Malaysian Ringgit on these 
programmes,  including RM6.8 million on the PROSTAR programme 
alone. Even though the number of annually reported  HIV cases decreased 
slightly from 6978 in 2002 to 6756 in 2003 and 6427 in 2004, the number of 
HIV cases among women, babies and children has increased. The 
transmission is believed to have been carried out from their respective drug-
addicted fathers. A special survey conducted by the Ministry of Health 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
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revealed that 71.5% of drug users ever share and 68% of them always share 
needles. The same survey also showed that the consistency of condom 
usage among sex workers and drug users is still low. Malaysia already has a 
number of 15,000 AIDS orphans. Recent data indicated that 75% of all HIV 
infections in Malaysia could be due to needle sharing. A study of 326 
clients at 26 drug rehabilitation centres found that 65% still inject drugs, 
77% are sexually active, and only 19% used condoms. 
Due to all the reasons above, the former Minister of Health, Datuk Dr. Chua 
Soi Lek announced that the government would set up a needle exchange and 
free condom pilot programme in October 2005 involving 1200 drug addicts 
in an effort to curb the spreading of HIV/AIDS in the country10. The 
previous Prime Minister,  Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was reported 
to have approved the programme by saying that if these people were not 
given syringe and condom aid they might spread the disease to their wives 
or partners. Indeed, the statistics managed to convince the Prime Minister to 
take action and recently, he launched the programme. Research conducted 
by the World Health Organization (2004) showed that similar programmes 
were able to reduce the number of drug users and reduce the frequency in 
drug taking. In Australia, the same programme has managed to reduce the 
government’s expenditure by about USD 1.8 billion. However, the 
Malaysian programme, which will cost about $39.5 million, is facing 
opposition not only from Muslim clerics, but from Hindus, Christians and 
also Buddhists.  They have criticised the plans by saying that it would 
encourage promiscuity.  
  
Therefore, this study has to be undertaken to determine the best possible 
programme for the local Malaysian Muslim setting. The Islamic perspective 
is crucial as any unsupportive response from Islamic authorities and groups 
will only create tension among Muslims. On this basis, this research 
considers ÃarÙra to be the most suitable justification for this programme. 
However, an important question that needs to be answered is whether this 
programme meets the entire requirements for ÃarÙra application.  In order to 
answer this crucial question, an in-depth understanding of the ÃarÙra rule in 
                                                 
10 The Star, 17th June 2005 
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Islamic legal discourse is required. Surprisingly, no such examination has 
been carried out to date in the primary or secondary sources. I believe such 
an objective can be achieved by critically analysing the theoretical and 
practical aspects of the rule. Finally, this research will present a conclusion 
that determines the legality of the Harm Reduction Programme.   
 
3. The aim of research and the hypotheses of the research 
This research mainly aims to examine critically the theoretical and practical 
aspects of ÃarÙra. It is hoped that the findings of this research will broaden 
the understanding of the true notion of ÃarÙra in Islamic law and will 
eliminate any possible abuse of the rule11. The true understanding of this 
rule is not only important to assist any individual Muslim in practising 
SharÐÝa commandments but also to aid the policy makers in Malaysia. It is 
indeed important for the policy makers to set government policies that suit 
diverse Muslim situations. At the same time, this study also aims to justify 
the government efforts of controlling HIV/AIDS cases via the 
implementation of the Harm Reduction Programme. The legality of this 
programme is assessed by the rule of ÃarÙra.  
 
There are two hypotheses of this study: Firstly, the theory of darÙra was 
developed gradually by the jurists. To test this hypothesis, the development 
of the said theory is traced back from the time of the Prophet. The 
discussions found in Qur'anic exegesis, ÎadÐth literature, Islamic legal 
maxims and fiqh literature are analysed to see how this theory worked in the 
jurist's mind during that specific period. The second hypothesis is that the 
Harm Reduction Programme is justified by the rule of ÃarÙra. The gradual 
treatment and prevention methods applied in the programme are deemed 
crucial to the public at large and most importantly to protect the life and the 
health of the patients. The precautionary measures taken in this Harm 
Reduction Programme (HRP) also meet the preconditions of ÃarÙra.  
 
 
4. Research methodology 
                                                 
11 The rule can be easily abused by a person who does not have valid reason to break a rule, 
for example, having mild headache as a reason for not to pray. 
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In order to comprehend the real meaning of ÃarÙra, both deductive and 
inductive approaches have been applied. By using the deductive approach, 
the concept of ÃarÙra is presented through the theoretical discussions of 
ÃarÙra formulated by Muslim jurists. The theoretical approach is primarily 
concerned with the exposition of theoretical doctrines as generally offered 
in the works of uÒÙl al-fiqh and Islamic legal maxims. A set of standard 
criteria of ÃarÙra is expected to be met in almost all new fiqhÐ cases. 
However, the general guidelines for ÃarÙra cases are sometimes not 
applicable in all cases. This is due to the fact that there is a difference over, 
where in most cases, different treatments and considerations should apply. 
The verification of a necessity case takes into consideration the subjective 
feelings of the person in such a situation (muÃtarr), the harm predicted and 
the changing situation. All these subjective elements in the case of ÃarÙra 
require unique treatments by the jurists.   
 
Therefore, as each ÃarÙra case is unique, an inductive approach is also 
adopted throughout this research. In order to acquire a clear understanding 
of the complex ÃarÙra issues, I believe that the study of ÃarÙra through an 
examination of the theoretical study (uÒÙl) is insufficient. The furÙÝ (the 
elaborated precepts of positive law) must also be explored vis-à-vis the 
examination of fiqhÐ cases. This is due to the fact that the uniqueness of 
each ÃarÙra case depends on various factors. Some Sunni jurists 
theoretically believe that ÃarÙra only operates in a limited fashion, whereas 
the application in the fiqhÐ suggests otherwise. A different set of rules is 
also applied in different cases.  Although the cases presented in the 
literature are mainly of an exemplary type, the reasoning made by the jurists 
in each case is vital. The different reasonings and different verdicts given 
imply that the jurists treat the cases differently. Although they believe the 
standard rule of ÃarÙra should apply, the muÃtarr has the liberty to 
determine the case by himself. This variety of reasoning and verdicts can 
further increase our understanding of the ÃarÙra application. The task to 
investigate the application of ÃarÙra rule in fiqhÐ literature, however, is not 
without challenges. The main problem is that the term ÃarÙra is 
interchangeable with other terms such as ÝumÙm al-balwÁ (necessitated 
prevelation), rukhÒa (concessionary law) and maÒlaÎa (interest). Some 
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classical and modern Muslim writers have applied the ÃarÙra term for non-
necessity cases such as the permission given to women entering a mosque 
during her menstrual period. This example is actually not of a necessity 
case; rather it is classified as the case of mashaqqa (difficulties and 
hardship).  The rule of ÃarÙra can only operate in extreme situations such as 
life threatening situations.  
 
With regard to the implementation of the Harm Reduction Programme, the 
research mainly depends on newspaper reports and academic research. The 
official statements from the Ministry of Health were taken from media 
conferences and press releases. The current report regarding the programme 
was obtained via the internet source from the official General Auditor's 
Report for 2008. I also conducted several interviews with the Harm 
Reduction staff, Malaysian AIDS Council (MAC) volunteers and former 
drug users. Their informative inputs are very significant in helping me to 
assess the role of the Harm Reduction Programme. At the same time, I 
attempted to obtain official statements from religious authorities. However, 
out of 20 letters sent, I only received two responses. 
 
With regard to the translation of technical Arabic terms, I have, to some 
extent, followed the transliteration used in Brill's publication, such as the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Arab Law Quarterly and Brill Online. The table of 
translation is also presented in this study.  
 
5. The Problems 
There were several impediments to a study of this type. The first problem 
encountered was the limited comprehensive study on this rule particularly 
during the medieval era. Although Muslim jurists have contributed a 
separate work on ÃarÙra in Islamic legal maxims (qawÁÝid fiqhiyya) under 
the sub-heading al-ÃarÙra tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙra (necessity permits a prohibited), 
this contribution is insufficient as the discussion in legal maxim works does 
not give ÃarÙra a general license that applicable to other cases. Most Sunni 
jurists agreed that qawÁÝid fiqhiyya are only predominantly valid and not 
generally valid unlike the study of uÒÙl al-fiqh.  The predominant 
(aghlabiyya) notion of qawÁÝid fiqhiyya is because of the existence of 
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irrefutable exceptions to the qawÁÝid 12. Hence, according to many jurists, a 
legal maxim is not valid as a piece of legal reasoning, legal evidence or 
basis for legal jurisdiction. The other legal terms, however, such as rukhÒa 
(concessionary law), maÒlaÎa (public interest), istiÎsÁn (juristic preference), 
istiÎsÁb (presumption of continuity), and maÒÁliÎ mursala (unrestricted 
interest) receive more wide-ranging treatment in the uÒÙl al-fiqh works. 
ÂarÙra on the other hand is left relatively undiscussed.  
 
The second problem encountered was the interchangeable usage of this term 
by Muslim jurists. For example, some writers in their fiqh works explicitly 
applied the term ‘ÃarÙra’ in non-necessity cases. This has led to some 
confusion among readers. In order to avoid confusion, I only analysed cases 
that involve serious harm to any of five human necessities, namely religion, 
life, lineage, reason and wealth. Any non-necessity cases were eliminated 
even if the jurists explicitly employed the ÃarÙra term in the said cases.  
 
The third problem concerned the implementation of the Harm Reduction 
Programme in Malaysia. As this programme is relatively new, statistical 
data and current findings about the programme are somewhat limited. 
However, I managed to collect the latest data until the 2008. It is also 
important to highlight that as this programme is controversial among 
Malaysian Muslims, the official statements from religious authorities were 
quite difficult to obtain. Official statements from the government and 
religious authorities regarding this programme are generally not accessible. 
I also received a low response from religious officers regarding this issue.  
 
6. Literature review  
For the purpose of this study, I have referred mainly to Sunni fiqh sources 
and literatures. Sources within four major Sunni schools of Law, Íanafis, 
MÁlikÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs are given priority in this study. With due 
respect to other schools such as the ShÐÝas and ÚÁhirÐs, the reason for this 
limitation is due to the fact that the majority of Malaysian Muslims are 
Sunni. Malaysian fatwÁ (plural fatÁwÁ), enactments and the religious 
                                                 
12 Further critical reading on QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya can be found in Wolfart Heinreichs, 
"QawÁÝid as a general legal literature", in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, Bernard G. 
Weiss (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp. 365-384.                                                                            
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education curriculum are totally based on the Sunni school of law13. 
However, in some sections of the study, I cite other sources for comparison 
purposes.  
 
The literatures are divided into four categories. The first category comprises 
literatures in fiqhÐ cases. The classical work on ÃarÙra can be found in the 
various fiqhÐ literatures such as in the al-MabÒÙÔ14, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ15, al-
MuntaqÁ sharÎ  al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ16, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib sharÎ RawÃ al-ÓÁlib17, al-
MajmÙÝ SharÎ al-Muhadhdhab18, SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt19, ÍÁshÐya al-
ÑÁwÐ20 and MughnÐ lÐ Ibn QudÁma21. The reason for this choice of 
literatures is due to the fact that these books are highly recognised and they 
occupy a special position among Sunni jurists. These books are highly 
referred to by classical and modern scholars. 
 
Concerning the Íanafis literatures, the two great books of al-SarakhsÐ’s,  al-
MabÒÙt and SharÎ al-Siyar al-KabÐr, were referred to22. The former book is 
a commentary on the al-MarwazÐ book (d.334/945)23. This book is 
                                                 
13 The Sunni Islam of the ShafiÝi School is the official legal form in Malaysia. The 
Malaysian authorities have strict policies against other Islamic sect including ShÐÝa. See 
"Rights Group Says Six Malaysians Detained for being ShÐÝa Muslim" in 
http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2001-02/10/article7.shtml. Although Malaysia's 
constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief, it also says that laws in individual states 
"may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons 
professing the religion of Islam". See http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/malaysia.htm. 
Each State in Malaysia has Majlis (Council of Religion and Malay Custom) issuing fatÁwa 
(sing. fatwÁ) generally in keeping with ShÁfiÝÐ tenets except where such may conflict with 
public interest. Councils, with approval of State authorities, may follow minority ShÁfiÝÐ 
views or interpretations from other three major Sunni madhÁhib (sing. madhhab). See also 
cases in SharÐÝa courts in Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in the ShariÝah Court 
in http://lib.iiu.edu.my/mom2/cm/content/view/view.jsp 
14 MuÎammad bin AÎmad bin AbÐ Sahl al-SarakhsÐ, Cairo: MatbaÝa al-SaÝÁda,1906-13. 
This ÍanafÐ fiqhÐ treatise consists of 30 volumes. I also used another publication of al-
MabÒÙt in my study.  
15 ÝAlÁ al-DÐn AbÐ Bakr bin MasÝÙd al-KasÁnÐ, BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ  fÐ TartÐb al-SharÁiÝ, Beirut: 
DÁr Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1986, 7 volumes. 
16 SulaymÁn bin Khalaf al-BÁjÐ, no place: DÁr KitÁb al-IslÁmÐ. This commentary work on 
al-MuwattÁÞ consists of 7 volumes. 
17 ZakariyyÁ MuÎammad bin ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, no place: DÁr KitÁb al-IslÁmÐ. This 
ShÁfiÝÐ fiqh work consists of four volumes 
18 YahyÁ  bin Sharf al-NawawÐ, Cairo: ZakariyyÁ ÝAlÐ YusÙf, 1966-1969, 18 volumes 
19 ManÒÙr bin YunÙs al-BuhÙÔÐ, no place: ÝÀlam al-Kutb, 3 volumes. This is a ÍanbalÐ book 
of fiqh. 
20 AbÙ al-ÝAbbÁs AÎmad al-ÑÁwÐ, ÍÁshÐya al-ÑÁwÐ ÞalÁ SharÎ al-ÑaghÐr, no place: DÁr al-
MaÝÁrif. This MÁlikÐ fiqh work consists of four volumes.  
21 Muwaffaq al-DÐn ÝAbd AllÁh bin AÎmad (Ibn QudÁmah), Cairo: DÁr IÎyÁÞ TurÁth al-
ÝArabÐ, 1985. This ÍanbalÐ treatise consists of 10 volumes.  
22 MuÎammad bin AÎmad bin AbÐ Sahl AbÙ Bakr al-SarakhsÐ (d. 490/1096) 
23 MuÎammad bin MuÎammad al-MarwazÐ 
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recognised as a remarkable achievement of juristic literature in which the 
rules of ShaybanÐ are explored (d. 187/803)24 and information is 
incorporated related to local ÍanafÐ tradition25. Most importantly, this book 
is a great reference for fiqh study as it comprehensively covers legal cases 
and juristic disputes and arguments are presented throughout. Meanwhile, 
al-SarakhsÐ’s second book (SharÎ al-Siyar al-KabÐr) is a commentary on the 
book of al-Siyar by al-ShaybÁnÐ (d. 189). As Calder argued, this book 
demonstrates an overall concern for comprehensive coverage, the 
development of rules and is considered a hermeneutical argument26. This 
book was also chosen because it is one of Íanafis books dealing 
specifically with political matters and state affairs such as war and relations 
with non-Muslims.  
 
FatÎ al-QadÐr, by KamÁl al-DÐn MuÎammad bin ÝAbd al-WÁÎid al-IskandÁrÐ 
who is also known as Ibn al-HumÁm, (d. 861/1456). This is a well-
recognised fiqh book in the ÍanafÐ school and  is a commentary on a legal 
compedium, BidÁya al-MubtadÁ by al-MarghinÁnÐ (BurhÁn bin AbÁ al-
Hasan ÝAlÐ bin AbÐ Bakr al-MarghinÁni d. 593/1197). Al-MarghinÁnÐ's work 
is based on al-QudÙri's  MukhtaÒar and al-JÁmiÝ al-ÑaghÐr by al-ShaybÁnÐ.  
 
TabyÐn al-ÍaqÁÞiq SharÎ Kanz al-DaqÁÞiq by Fakhr al-DÐn ÝUthmÁn Bin ÝAlÐ 
al-ZailaÝÐ (d. 743/1342). I also refered to this ÍanafÐs fiqh literature where it 
represents the Íanafis ruling in legal cases.  
 
I also made a reference to another book entitled al-Mudawwana. This is one 
of the great manuals and major references in the MÁliki school. This book 
was written by MuÎammad bin SaÎnÙn b SaÝÐd bin ÍabÐb al-TanÙkhi (d. 
256/870), a jurist consult from Qayrawan. In this manual, he compiled the 
views of ImÁm MÁlik bin Anas (d. 179/796) and his successors. He also  
followed the methods of Qayrawan jurists. There are almost 6200 legal 
                                                 
24AbÙ ÝAbd AllÁh MuÎammad bin al-Íasan al-ShaybanÐ. There is a dispute in his year of 
death. It is either 187/803 or 189/805 
25  See Calder, N. “al-SarakhsÐ, MuÎammad b. AÎmad b. AbÐ Sahl AbÙ Bakr” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman; , Th. Bianquis; , C.E. 
Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2010. Brill Online. EXETER 
UNIVERSITY. 24 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-6620>  
26 Ibid. 
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problems in this treatise which have been divided into different topics and 
consequently, this  book has gained a significant place in the study of 
MÁliki fiqh.   
 
Al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ by SulaymÁn bin Khalaf al-BÁjÐ (d. 
474/1081) is an important reference in the MÁlikÐ School as it explains the 
text of al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ by ImÁm MÁlik. MÁlik's MuwattaÞ is a very concise fiqh 
book27 that only presents evidence of legal cases without going into the 
details of the ijtihÁd process, whereas the al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ 
analyses the rulings made by prominent MÁliki scholars. Legal disputes 
(ikhtilÁf) and hermeutical arguments are also presented in this book.  
   
I also made a reference to al-Madkhal  by MuÎammad bin MuÎammad al-
ÝAbdarÐ who also known as Ibn al-ÍÁjj (d. 737/1336). In this book, Ibn al-
ÍÁjj put a great emphasise on the importance of a view which is supported 
with strong and valid evidence. The innovation (bidÝa) in legal cases, 
especially in devotional acts (ÝibÁda), should be avoided by all Muslims.  
 
Another book that was chosen is SharÎ MukhtaÒar KhalÐl 28, MuÎammad bin 
ÝAbd Allah al-KharshÐ (d. 1101h/1690H). This is one of the major 
references in the MÁliki school in which the writer mainly presents the legal 
opinions of MÁlikÐ scholars. Where disputes arises, he always gave 
preference to the widely accepted views of the Maliki scholars. However, in 
some places the writer did not provide sufficient evidence for his 
arguments.  
 
Al-Umm was also chosen for the study as this is the treatise of the founder 
of the ShÁfiÝÐ school, Muhammad bin IdrÐs al-ShÁfiÝÐ (d. 204/ 820). The 
                                                 
27 For further reading about the transmission of al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, see Schacht, J. “MÁlik bin 
Anas”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman;  Th. Bianquis; C.E. 
Bosworth;  E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill Online. EXETER 
UNIVERSITY. 24 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-0649>  
28 MukhtaÒar, a term denoting a handbook or an abridged manual, usually condensed from 
a longer work. See Arazi, A. " MukhtaÒar" Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. 
Bearman,  Th. Bianquis,  C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.) Brill, 
2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-0792 
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’new doctrine’ (qawl jadid) of al-ShÁfiÝÐ is elaborated on and recorded in al-
Umm29. However, there are not many darÙra cases in this treatise. I also 
referred to al-ShÁfiÝÐ’s AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, a treatise dealing with the legal 
statutes present in the QurÞÁn.  
 
I also chose another ShÁfiÝÐs fiqh book entitled AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib sharÎ RawÃ 
al-ÓÁlib. This book by ZakariyyÁ bin MuÎammad bin ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁri 
(d. 926/1520) is a commentary on the book RawÃ al-ÓÁlib. This book was 
chosen because the rulings and legal disputes within the madhhab are 
executed extensively. The explanations of the rulings are clear and the cases 
are systematically organised under particular headings. I also referred to 
another book by the same author entitled Gharar al-Bahiyya fÐ SharÎ al-
Bahja al-Warda, a commentary on al-Bahja by Ibn al-Wardiy. This book is 
an important reference in the ShÁfiÝÐ school as it analyses rulings and 
arguments made by ShÁfiÝÐ scholars. Like any other madhhab specific 
books, this work does not discuss legal rulings executed by other schools of 
law. 
 
A treatise by Ibn Íajar al-HaitamÐ (d. 974/1567), TuÎfa al-MuÎtÁj was also 
chosen for this study. This is a commentary work on the text of al-MinhÁj 
al-ÓalibÐn by  al-NawawÐ (d.676-1277), a prominent ShÁfiÝÐ scholar. This 
work not only deals with the main fiqh issues but also revolves around furÙÝ 
cases where the ijtihÁd of the jurists are briefly analysed.   
                  
Another book entitled Al-MajmÙÝ, is a legal compendium written by YahyÁ 
bin Sharf al-NawawÐ. The writer did not only deal with rulings made by 
ShafiÝi scholars but he also presented and compared views from different 
schools.  This book was chosen as it is a significant book for the study of 
comparative fiqh. The legal discussions are presented along with relevant 
evidence from Qur'anic and ÍadÐth. The ÎadÐth evidence used by other 
jurists was clarified by al-NawawÐ according to the genuineness of the 
                                                 
29 See Chaumont, E. "al-ShÁfiÝÐ." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman , Th. 
Bianquis; , C.E. Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs (eds). Brill, 2010. Brill 
Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 24 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-1020>  
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ÎadÐth and the trustworthiness of the narrators. In this work, al-NawawÐ 
gave preference to the views accepted by the majority30.  
 
I also made a reference to a treatise, SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt. This ÍanbalÐ 
fiqh book written by MansÙr bin YÙnus al-BuhÙtÐ (d. 1051h/ 1641) was 
chosen as it presents legal discussions within the ÍanbalÐ school. Another 
ÍanbalÐ fiqh book chosen in this study is MaÔÁlib AwlÁ al-Nahy fÐ SharÎ 
GhÁya al-MuntahÁ. This book, by MuÒÔafÁ bin SaÝÐd bin ÝAbda al-RaÎÐbÁnÐ 
(d. 1243/1827), is an important legal reference in the ÍanbalÐ school. One of 
the important aspects is the status of the evidence used by the jurists in each 
legal case. the writer clarified the status of the evidence used in fiqhÐ 
problems. Similar to other ÍanbalÐ writers, the writer gave preference to the 
view which is supported by stronger and higher ranking evidence.  
 
Al-MughnÐ, this book can be classified as a fiqh encyclopaedia. This treatise 
was written by Muwaffaq al-DÐn AbÙ MuÎammad ÝAbd AllÁh bin AÎmad 
bin MuÎammad who also known as Ibn QudÁma (d. 620/1223). Like the 
book of al-MajmÙÝ by al-NawawÐ, the writer comprehensively discussed the 
varied opinions of leading schools regarding legal cases. The methodology 
for extrapolating rules from revelation used by the jurists was discussed 
extensively in this treatise. Like any other fiqh treatise, the cases were 
analysed according to the specific topic. However, unlike the book of al-
MajmuÝ that gave preference to ShafiÝi’s methodology, the writer in this 
book did not show an affiliation with any particular school. The preference 
was given to any view that has stronger evidence (according to his own 
standard).  
 
Al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ by TaqÐ al-DÐn AÎmad bin Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
728/1328). He was a Íanbali theologian and a jurist consult31. Although this 
is a fatÁwÁ collection, his rulings were not limited to legal matters. Ibn 
                                                 
30 Al-NawawÐ however did not complete this treatise as he died at a young age. This book 
was later completed by TaqÐ al-Din al-SubkÐ and several other scholars including al-
ÍadramÐ, al-ÝIraqÐ and Muhammad Najib al-MuÔÐÝi 
31  See Laoust, H. “Ibn Taymiyya”. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. 
Bearman; , Th. Bianquis; , C.E. Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 
2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 24 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-3388>  
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Taymiyya also articulated his opinions regarding the philosophy of religion, 
Qur'Ánic exegesis, ÎadÐth and taÒawwuf.  However, he gave preference to 
the Íanbalis methodology in his rulings.  
 
 
Reference was also made to another work of Ibn TaymÐyya, entitled al-
SiyÁsa al-SharÝiyya fÐ IÒlÁÎ al-RÁÝÐ wa al-RÁÝiyya. This book was chosen as 
it represents an analysis of legal cases regarding state affairs and relations 
between a ruler and his people. The importance of this book is its discussion 
of the responsibility of both the ruler and the people. When the cases were 
not treated specifically in the Qur'Án and Sunna, the writer emphasised that 
the judgment of the action should be made wisely.  
 
I also chose IÝlÁm al-MÙqiÝÐn by ÝAbdullÁh MuÎammad bin AbÐ Bakar bin 
AyyÙb who is also known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 711/1350). This 
book was specifically chosen as it analyses and explores the ijtihÁd and 
ikhtilÁf of the jurists in legal matters. Important legal issues such as ribÁÞ 
(usury) and the three pronouncements of divorce were discussed. The 
methods used by jurists such as qiyÁs, sadd al-dharÁÞiÝ and ÎÐla (legal 
stratagems) were also analysed by the writer.  
 
 
The second category of literature concerns discussions of ÃarÙra in the 
QurÝÁn and ÎadÐth. The ÃarÙra discourses were found in Qur’Ánic 
commentaries such as KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn 32 and AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án lÐ 
Ibn al-ÝArabÐ33. The treatment of ÃarÙra cases in these books are extensive, 
particularly regarding verses Q2.171, Q5.3, Q6.119, Q6.145 and Q16.115. 
The treatment of ÃarÙra issues is more comprehensive in these two books as 
compared to other fiqh treatises. The discussions include the legal effect of 
ÃarÙra rule, its limits and the preconditions of the rule. The arguments 
between madhhabs are also presented.  Although both writers differed in 
certain particular aspects of ÃarÙra, they basically agreed with the 
                                                 
32 AÎmad Ibn ÝAlÐ al-RÁzÐ al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Istanbul: MatbaÝa al-AwqÁf 
al-IslÁmiyya, 1916. This classic commentary work on al-QurÞÁn by a ÍanafÐ jurist consists 
of three volumes. 
33 MuÎammad Ibn ÝAbd AllÁh Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Cairo: ÝIsÁ Al-BÁbÐ al-
ÍalabÐ, 1967. This MÁlikÐtafsÐr contains four volumes. 
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fundamental concept of the rule. This rule is legally applicable only in 
necessity cases and there is no other lawful means available. Similarly, al-
ShÁfiÝÐ also explained the general concept of ÃarÙra in his tafsÐr work34. The 
discussions of ÃarÙra verses in these Qur'Ánic commentaries are significant 
as they are the bases for the formulation of ÃarÙra rule in Islamic law.  
 
The translation of the Qur'anic passage which occurs in the text is based on 
M.A.S Abdeel Haleem35. This translation was specifically chosen because 
the translator has avoided using archaisms which are commonly found in 
other QurÝÁnic translations.  
 
References have also been made to ÎadÐth literatures regarding legal 
matters. The work entitled MuÒannaf  by Ibn AbÐ Shaybah, AbÙ Bakr ÝAbd 
AllÁh bin MuÎammad bin IbrÁhim (d. 235H/849) has been chosen in this 
study for two reasons. Firsty, it presents ÎadÐth related to legal matters 
(ahÁdith al-ahkÁm) and secondly, it presents legal rulings and decisions 
made by earlier scholars (the salafÐ in particular). ÍadÐth related to legal 
cases, opinions of the companions and tÁbiÝÐn (successors of the companions 
of the Prophet) are presented in this book. This is one of the earliest works 
in Islamic legal study that has survived and it is also used as a text book for 
jurists36. The issues were written according to specific topics as with any 
other classical fiqhi book. This book is regarded as one of the most 
important sources for studying the earliest fatÁwÁ of the Prophet's 
companions and their successors. 
 
The third category of literature consists of uÒÙl al-fiqh and Islamic legal 
maxim works. ÂarÙra has also received an exclusive treatment in the works 
of Islamic legal maxims, such as al-AshbÁh wa al-NaÛÁ’ir37, written by al-
ÑuyÙÔÐ (d. 911/1505) and al-AshbÁh wa naÛÁir by Ibn Nujaym (d. 
970/1563), and its commentary work, Ghamz ÝUyÙn al-BaÒÁ'ir fÐ SharÎ al-
                                                 
34 MuÎammad bin IdrÐs al-ShÁfiÝÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Beirut: DÁr al-Qalam, c. 1990. Two 
volumes. 
35 The QurÝÁn, M.A.S. Abdeel Haleem (tran.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2004 
36 See Ch. Pellat, "Ibn AbÐ Shayba" in Brill Online, www.brillonline.nl. Access date 
23/07/2010 
37 JalÁl al-ÂÐn al-SuyÙÔÐ, Cairo: MuÒÔafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ, 1959, p. 85 
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AshbÁh wa NaÛÁ'ir38. ÂarÙra has been defined in these classical books as: “a 
situation in which one reaches a limit where if one does not take a 
prohibited thing, one will perish or be about to perish”39. One of the Islamic 
legal maxims is that necessity permits prohibitions or necessity knows no 
laws. This concept also illustrates how difficulties and harm can be 
mitigated through the legalisation of a prohibited act. This work on ÃarÙra 
in the books of Islamic legal maxims gives general guidelines for ÃarÙra 
application. However, as each ÃarÙra case is unique, some exemplary cases 
given by jurists in these books may not be applicable in all situations. 
 
Compared to the Islamic legal maxim works, ÃarÙra does not receive a 
similar comprehensive treatment to uÒÙl al-fiqh works. Only one entry can 
be found in the work of a ÍanbalÐ’ legal theorist (uÒÙlÐ), ÝAlÐ ibn ÝAqÐl bin 
MuÎammad bin ÝAqÐl40(d.513/1119). The general definition of al-ÃarÙra is 
described as an inevitable situation facing a Muslim (al-fiÝl al-ladhÐ la 
yumkin al-takhalluÒ minhu). Even though a special heading for al-ÃarÙra is 
included in this uÒÙl al-fiqh work, ÃarÙra is defined only generally. Thus it 
fails to picture the true capacity of ÃarÙra to alter an original rule in an 
extreme circumstance. However, this work can be regarded as one of the 
earliest preliminary works on ÃarÙra. It can be further assumed that the non-
availability of comprehensive uÒÙl al-fiqh treatment on ÃarÙra is due to the 
fact the medieval jurists have contributed a lengthy work on rukhÒa, a legal 
term that is closely related to ÃarÙra.  
 
The final category of literature contains the contemporary sources used in 
this study. As ÃarÙra was not exclusively treated in medieval jurists' works, 
some modern Muslim writers managed to contribute a separate 
comprehensive study on ÃarÙra. Examples include NaÛariyÁt al-ÃarÙra al-
sharÝiyya by Wahbah al-ZuhailÐ and a PhD thesis entitled "Necessity in 
Islamic Law” by Mansour al-Mutairi. ZuhailÐ's work can be described as 
one of the most significant modern works on ÃarÙra. He elaborated in detail 
on the principles of ÃarÙra in Islamic law. He also argued that this principle 
                                                 
38 AÎmad bin MuÎammad al-ÍamawÐ, no place: Âar al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1985, p. 277 
39 See AÎmad bin MuÎammad al-ÍanafÐ al-ÍamawÐ, Ghamz ÝUyÙn al-BaÒÁ'ir fÐ SharÎ al-
AshbÁh wa NaÛÁ'ir, no place: DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1985, Vol. I, p. 277 
40 Al-WÁÃiÎ fÐ UÒÙl al-Fiqh, George Makdisi (ed.), Beirut: Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996-99, vol.  
I,  p. 99 
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gains its validity from various explicit QurÞÁnic verses and the ÎadÐth 
literature. He also added some contemporary elements in his work, by 
analysing some ÃarÙra applications in Syrian law. However, there is some 
confusion in this work as the necessity cases are combined with the non-
necessity cases.  For example in his book, ZuhailÐ contended that 
forgetfulness (nisyÁn)  can be considered a case for darÙra.  However, I 
believe that forgetfulness cannot be categorised as a necessity case. 
Forgetfulness, like ignorance and idiocy (al-naqÒ al-ÔabÐÝÐ), are 
circumstances that affect the legal capacity in general (ÝawÁriÃ al-ahliyya). 
The capacity of the person to fulfil the religious command is impaired by 
these excuses. The person is not obliged to comply with the rule because he 
is not regarded as a mukallaf, and thus he is exempted from any religious 
command. Furthermore, there is no serious harm in this case. On the other 
hand, the person in a necessity case is still regarded as a mukallaf, a 
competent Muslim that is obliged to fulfil the religious commands. 
However, he is exempted from following the original rule because of the 
possible harm subjected to one of five necessities; religion, life, reason, 
lineage and wealth. As a result, he has to deviate from the rule to eliminate 
any possible harm. 
 
Another modern work on ÃarÙra that I referred to is a thesis by Mansour al-
Mutairi. Like ZuhailÐ, he also added few contemporary elements in his 
work.  For example, he discussed modern contracts that are affected by 
force majeure (quwwa al-qÁhira) which is one of ÃarÙra situations41. Both 
al-MutairÐ and ZuhailÐ developed a much wider application of ÃarÙra that is 
not only applicable to personal individual cases, but to wider social, 
economic and political legal cases. This concept is actually recognised by 
other Muslim writers such as MuÎammad BiltÁjÐ and ÝÀÔif AÎmad 
MaÎfÙÛ42. They categorised ÃarÙra as a rule used to preserve the benefits of 
individual necessities and the necessities all human beings and the 
community. This definition can be illustrated in the case of the need to 
change the law temporarily by the ruler to achieve certain significant 
                                                 
41 Mansour Z. al-Mutairi, Necessity in Islamic Law (PhD thesis), Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh, 1997, pp. 153-154 
42 ÝÀÔif AÎmad MaÎfÙÛ, RafÝ al-Íaraj fÐ TashrÐÝ al-IslÁmÐ, Mansoura: MaÔbaÝa JÁmiÝa Al-
ManÒÙra, p. 65 
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targets, for example imposing extra taxes43.  This is the major distinction 
between the traditional and modern approach to ÃarÙra. The classical works 
mainly apply ÃarÙra in a limited way to personal life, while the modern 
works extend the application more broadly. It is an understandable fact that 
modern life is more complicated than that in the early Islamic period. This 
does not mean the early scholars purposely omitted the application of ÃarÙra 
rule to situations other than personal life. Rather they tend to discuss the 
issue in relation to a situation that is close to the reality of where they live. 
In other words, in the period when life was simple and the divine rule 
basically concerns personal matters and uncomplicated situations. The 
application of ÃarÙra in a wider public sphere is mentioned in classical 
works, but in a limited fashion and not as comprehensively as in the 
personal cases.  
 
Apart from theoretical modern discourse on ÃarÙra, there are few works 
examining the application of ÃarÙra in new emerging problems. The modern 
cases include human transplantation, cosmetic surgery and abortion44. One 
important source used in this study is a work by Franz Rosenthal entitled, 
The Herb-Hashish versus Medieval Muslim Society45. Rosenthal offered an 
insightful critical work on the use of the most popular hallucinatory drug 
known as ÎashÐsh among Arab Muslims during the medieval era. He 
discovered the historical use of this plant among Sufis, high society and 
lower middle-class groups. This controversial use of ÎashÐsh has called for a 
new legal discourse among medieval jurists. The most important part of this 
book is his analytical discussion on the legal issues regarding the drug. 
Modern Muslim jurists, muftis and writers prohibited the usage of illegal 
drugs by the analogy of al-khamr. However, they did not provide their 
verdicts with a complete analytical discussion. Rosenthal, on the other hand, 
provided informative discussions for modern readers especially on 
situations dealing with drugs. He discussed the extensive discussions made 
by the medieval jurists who attempted to solve the issue of ÎashÐsh. The 
                                                 
43 The original rule is it is illegal for a ruler to take property from his people unless it is 
proven necessity to do so for the benefit of the state.  
44 For instance, see Birgit Krawitz, “ÂarÙra in modern Islamic law: The case of Organ 
Transplantation”, in R. Gleave and R. Kermeli, Islamic Law – Theory and Practice, 
London, New York: IB Tauris Publishers, 1997, pp. 185-191 
45 Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971 
 29 
jurists examined the relevant textual evidence and applied their own 
reasoning. It can be concluded that although many Muslim jurists agreed 
that ÎashÐsh, like al-khamr, is forbidden and it does not carry a total 
prohibition like al-khamr. Hence, it can be used in limited ÃarÙra cases, 
especially for medical purposes or to alleviate pangs of hunger unlike al-
khamr. As this research also aims to investigate the legality of drug 
substitution in the Harm Reduction Programme, this book contributes a 
number of distinctive insights that are useful for the completion of this 
study. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
It is hoped that this research will bring benefits to academics and the public 
at large especially in developing awareness and a better understanding of 
the current issues highlighted. The real understanding of how ÃarÙra works 
is very important to avoid any abuse of the application. Although necessity 
is a valid accepted grounds for a person under obligation to set aside an 
established rule, it is not a free license to change a rule based on personal 
whim. As far as the Harm Reduction Programme is concerned, it is also 
hoped that this study assists policy makers in developing a special model 
suitable for the Malaysian Muslim setting. By discussing the HRP’s positive 
and negative effects, the issue’s broader context can be explored. It is a 
matter of great importance to understand the underlying SharÐÝa reasons 
justifying this solution as the best alternative in controlling and reducing the 
number of HIV/AIDS cases, not only in Malaysia but also in other Muslim 
countries.  
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CHAPTER ONE: ÂARØRA IN ISLAMIC LAW: THE TEXTUAL 
EVIDENCE AND THE DEFINITIONS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the philosophy of ÃarÙra is traced back to the era of the 
Prophet by examining the relevant textual evidence. This evidence is not 
only valued as a piece of history, but most importantly it had been used by 
Sunni jurists as the legal basis for legitimising the principle of ÃarÙra. It is a 
well-known tradition in Islamic legal discourse that any principle 
formulated by the jurists should have its foundation from any of the divine 
sources before the principle gains its place in the legal discourse. This 
chapter serves as an essential preparation for the extended ÃarÙra discussion 
throughout this research.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, the nuÒÙÒ (textual sources/evidence) 
regarding ÃarÙra are brought forward to be examined. This evidence is 
extremely significant as the Sunni jurists had relied upon it to formulate a 
systematic concept of ÃarÙra, including the formulation of its definition, the 
rules and the limits. Although there were differences between jurists in 
determining the practical legal details of ÃarÙra, these differences do not 
affect the fundamental concept of ÃarÙra. These legal disputes originally 
stemmed from various interpretations of textual evidence pertaining to 
ÃarÙra cases. For instance, there was a dispute among jurists whether a 
criminal has a right to exercise ÃarÙra as stated in the Qur’Án. This is 
because the jurists differed in defining two terms 'ghayr bÁghin' and 'walÁ 
ÝÁdin'. However, that this dispute did not become a hindrance for the jurists 
to achieve a unanimous conclusion that ÃarÙra can be a mitigation element 
for a Muslim from adhering to a strict rule. Hence, this situation can justify 
a Muslim to choose a lenient temporary rule in order to avoid greater harm.  
 
The second section of this chapter examines the definitions of ÃarÙra 
formulated by the Qur’Ánic commentators, the jurists and the modern 
scholars.  Although these definitions differ slightly from each other, the 
contents are generally the same. Some Sunni jurists formulated a narrow 
definition of ÃarÙra, while some of them formulated a more comprehensive 
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definition covering a wider application of the principle. In addition, both 
classical and modern scholars agreed that this principle can only be applied 
in certain pressing circumstances. A standard set of maxims, regulations and 
rules of ÃarÙra must also be applied in each case.  
 
1.2 Textual evidence concerning ÃarÙra 
As far as the legal texts are concerned, there are approximately 500 hundred 
verses46 with explicit legal verses prescribed in the Qur’Án that govern the 
life of Muslim society and the individual47. These legal and quasi-legal 
stipulations include rituals, alms tax, property, intoxicants, marriage, 
adultery and homicide. However, most Qur'Ánic and ÎadÐth literature related 
to legal matters is mainly incidental and hence, their response to legal cases 
in is not comprehensive. The Muslim jurists believed that the principle of 
ÃarÙra gains its legality from certain explicit textual evidence. Although 
these sources only deal with life and death situations, namely the case of 
starvation, the jurists argued that this specific permission to eat mayta and 
other unlawful meals can be extended to other emergency cases.  
 
The basic understanding of the legal excuse stated in Qur'Ánic and ÎadÐth 
literature led to the formation of a comprehensive and a systematic ÃarÙra 
philosophy by the jurists. They formulated its definition, rules, regulations 
and conditions that have to be met for every ÃarÙra case. The importance of 
the study of ÃarÙra is its power to delay an established rule. In ordinary 
situations, Muslims are obliged to follow the SharÐÝa laws in all matters 
including personal matters, social relations and religious obligations. These 
established rules, which are also called ÝazÐma, have to be observed by a 
                                                 
46 See the discussion on Qur'Án and Islamic law in Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic 
Legal History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 3-7.   
47 Meanwhile Coulson argued that there are not more than 80 legal verses deal in the 
Qur'Án. See C. G. Weeramantary, Islamic Jurisprudence- An International Perspective,  
London: Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 32. Kamali on the other hand argued that there are 
about 350 legal verses in the Qur'Án. He further added that there are approximately 140 
verses on devotional acts, 70 verses are devoted to marriage and family matters, 70 more 
on commercial transaction, 30 verses on crimes, 30 verses on equality and 10 on 
economics. Regarding the disagreement over the actual legal verses in the Qur'Án, I agree 
with Kamali's view that the calculations differ according to one's understanding of the 
Qur'Án. See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ShariÝa Law: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2008, pp. 19-20 
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mukallaf (legally commissioned person) in his daily normal activities48. The 
legal rules (al-aÎkÁm al-sharÝiyya) are divided into two categories, non-
amendable and amendable. The non-amendable category of rulings includes 
the obligations of prayer, Îajj (pilgrimage), fasting in the month of 
RamaÃÁn and almsgiving. Other non-amendable activities are the 
prohibitions of adultery, drinking alcoholic beverages and eating swine. 
These rulings remain until the Hereafter. The second category of legal 
rulings that is amendable, is derived from the ijtihÁd of jurists on the basis 
of maÒlaÎa49, Ýurf, istiÎsÁn, istiÒÎÁb and the collective understanding of 
jurists of the legal texts. Muslims are also required to abide by these rulings.  
 
However, Islam does recognise that in certain extreme situations it is 
impossible for a mukallaf to fulfil his daily religious obligations either the 
non-amendable or the amendable categories. For example, when the 
accomplishment of a religious activity might result in a great harm to one of 
his five necessities.  Hence, some exceptional rules are granted. This 
exception is clearly marked in the Qur’Án. These extreme situations 
imposing threats to one’s life, religion, wealth, reason or lineage are legally 
recognised factors for a person to set aside the original Îukm temporarily. 
The darÙra can extenuate not only amendable rulings but also some non-
amendable rulings. This is different to other legal concepts, such as maÒlaÎa 
and Ýurf, which can only amend the non-mandatory rulings formulated via 
the ijtihÁd of the jurists.  
 
1.2.1 ÂarÙra in the QurÞÁn 
The QurÞÁnic verses dealing directly with ÃarÙra cases are in six verses. 
The first verse is Q2.173: 
“He has only forbidden you carrion, blood, pig’s meat, and 
animals over which any name other than God’s has been invoked. 
                                                 
48See Gimaret, D. “TaklÐf (a.).” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman;  Th. 
Bianquis;  C.E. Bosworth;  E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill 
Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-7344>  
According to Gimaret, taklÐf  is a term of the theological and legal vocabulary denoting the 
fact of an imposition on the part of God of obligations on his creatures, of subjecting them 
to a law. The corresponding passive participle mukallaf is used of someone who is 
governed by this law and in this connection, in legal language; it denotes every individual 
who has at his disposal the full and entire scope of the law.    
49  See previous chapter for the definition of these terms 
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But if anyone is forced to eat such things by hunger, rather than 
desire or excess, he commits no sin: God is most merciful and 
forgiving50.” 
 
 A similar context of ÃarÙra  is invoked in verse Q5.3: 
“You are forbidden to eat carrion; blood; pig’s meat; any animal 
over which any other name than God’s has been invoked; anything 
strangled, a victim of violent blow or fall, gored or savaged by a 
beast of prey, unless you still slaughter it (in the correct manner); or 
anything sacrificed on idolatrous altars. You are also forbidden from 
allotting shares (of meat) by drawing marked arrows- a heinous 
practice- the disbelievers have already lost all hope that you will 
give up your religion. Do not fear them, fear Me. Today I have 
perfected your religion for you, completed my blessing upon you, 
and chosen as your religion Islam, total devotion to God; but if any 
of you are forced by hunger to eat forbidden food, with no intention 
of doing wrong, then God is most forgiving and merciful.51” 
 
There are another two verses concerned with the state of necessity 
mentioned in Q6.119 and Q6.145: 
“Why should you not eat such animals when God has already fully 
explained what He has forbidden you, except when forced by 
hunger? But many lead others astray by their desires, without any 
true knowledge; your Lord knows best who oversteps the limit52.” 
 
“(Prophet) says, ‘In all that has been revealed to me, I find nothing 
forbidden for people to eat, except from carrion, flowing blood, 
pig’s meat- it is loathsome- or a sinful offering over which any 
name other than God’s has been invoked.’ But if someone is forced 
by hunger, rather than desire or excess, then God is most forgiving 
and most merciful.53” 
 
The last verse concerning ÃarÙra in food related case is Q16.115: 
“He has forbidden you only these things: carrion, blood, pig’s meat, 
and animals over which any name other than God’s has been 
invoked. But if anyone is forced by hunger, not desiring it nor 
exceeding his immediate need, God is forgiving and merciful 
towards him.54” 
 
The only non-food ÃarÙra case is mentioned in Q16.106, where AllÁh 
warned that: 
"With the exception of those who are forced to say they do not 
believe, although their hearts remain firm in faith, those who reject 
                                                 
50 The QurÞÁn, M. A. S. Abdel Halem (tran.), New York: Oxford University Press, p. 19 
51 The QurÞÁn, M. A. S. Abdel Halem (tran.), pp. 67-68 
52 The QurÞÁn, M. A. S. Abdel Halem (tran.), p. 89 
53 The QurÞÁn, M. A. S. Abdel Halem (tran.), p. 91 
54 The QurÞÁn, M. A. S. Abdel Halem (tran.), p. 173 
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God after believing in Him and open their hearts to disbelief will 
have their wrath of God upon them and a grievous punishment 
awaiting them." 
 
These are six QurÞÁnic injunctions dealing specifically with ÃarÙra cases. 
Five verses deal with food cases while only one refers to the case of 
disbelief. In the beginning of each verse, the established rule is explained to 
educate Muslims as to what is ÎalÁl and what is not. As far as the legal 
discourse is concerned, the above verses, which are regarded as al-ayÁt al-
aÎkÁm (legal QurÞÁnic citations), intend to explain to Muslims the firm 
rulings of eating and the act of non-belief. However, the QurÞÁn explicitly 
verifies that an abnormal situation known as ÃarÙra is accepted as a legal 
reason for a Muslim to deviate temporarily from the original ruling where 
the forgiveness of God is granted for the sinful act committed (in the case of 
eating the unlawful or uttering the word  kufr). The jurists, however, 
contended that the deviation of the rule must be based on necessity. This 
understanding was derived from the term 'famaniÃturra'. This means any 
reasons other than necessity cannot be accepted. The early jurists also 
believed that the rule can only be applied in the case of life and death, either 
when one’s life is endangered by hunger and starvation or when life is 
threatened by death or serious injury from an oppressor to do whatever 
SharÐÝa prohibits.  
 
In the five verses regarding food, the QurÞÁn explains that the unlawful 
foods are animals which are not slaughtered by reciting the name of God, 
food offerings to other creature than God, blood and swine. However, it is 
also imperative to note that in the same verses a special permission is given 
to consume the unlawful. The Qur'Án also briefly explains that there are 
conditions that have to be met by the person (muÃtarr) in such a dire 
situation before eating the unlawful food.  One of the conditions is that the 
person must not be a bÁghin or ÝÁdin. The majority of jurists argued that 
these terms (bÁghin or ÝÁdin) refer to a person who is a sinner and deviates 
from SharÐÝa rules. According to the verses, a sinner or a criminal is not 
allowed to exercise ÃarÙra. The Hanafi jurists, however, claimed that the 
sinners have the same rights as obedient people to exercise the rule, as the 
Hanafis interpreted bÁghin or ÝÁdin as the person who violates the ÃarÙra 
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limits55. They further elucidated that bÁghin or ÝÁdin means ‘a person who 
eats more of the unlawful food than is necessary to sustain life’. There is no 
indication in these verses that a sinner is prohibited from eating unlawful 
foods. This dispute will be elaborated upon later under the subheading of 
the preconditions of ÃarÙra.   
 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ in his tafsÐr work56 defined al-muÃtarr (a person in the case of 
necessity) as a person who has no lawful meal that can sustain his life and 
save him from hunger. He further elaborated that ‘hunger’ that permits the 
consumption of unlawful foods is hunger that might lead to death or severe 
illness or weaken his movement. The permission to eat or drink unlawful 
items according to al-ShÁfiÝÐ is what can sustain his life or give him energy 
to walk.  The two basic requirements for any ÃarÙra case are that there are 
no lawful means and when there is a great danger to the person’s life. This 
means ÃarÙra is not a free license for any ordinary person to tamper with an 
established rule. The jurists believed the preconditions of ÃarÙra are clearly 
marked in the words “if a person is forced by necessity, without wilful 
disobedience, nor transgressing due limits, thy Lord is Oft-forgiving, Most 
Merciful” and “then is he guiltless. For Allah is Oft-forgiving Most 
Merciful”. 
 
Similarly, in the only non-food verse, Q16.106, the exception is given for 
those who are forced to profess kufr. In the beginning of this verse, AllÁh 
has warned that for those who choose to be a non-believer after embracing 
Islam, he will be sentenced to God’s wrath and will be subjected to severe 
punishment in the Hereafter. This established rule prohibits Muslims from 
converting to other religions. This also means the acts of disbelief either 
through the form of actions, verbal utterance or heart wills are all 
prohibited. However, a special exception is given for those under 
compulsion where the QurÝÁn clearly marks that the punishment is lifted for 
those who uttered the word of disbelief in such a situation. On the basis of 
this verse, the jurists also acknowledged compulsion and coercion (ikrÁh) as 
                                                 
55 Al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, pp. 126-127 
56 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, AÎkÁm Al-QurÞÁn, Vol. II, pp. 88-89 
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legal excuses that will lift the punishment57. Even though the act of disbelief 
is one of the deadly sins believed by Muslims to be subjected to God's 
wrath, forgiveness is there for those who utter the words of disbelief 
unwillingly.   
 
Having examined these Qur'Ánic cases of ÃarÙra, one may ask, why did God 
choose the case of hunger and professing kufr for the representation of 
necessity situations? It is assumed that during the early days of the 
formation of Islam, problems such as lack of food and water were common 
among Arab travellers and the poor. Another case of ÃarÙra is threats from 
non-believers. During the early revelation period, especially in Mecca, low 
class Muslims received severe threats from non-believers, forcing them to 
leave Islam and hide their status. Some of them, who could not bear the 
abuse pretended to utter the words of kufr and disguised themselves as non-
believers58. The Qur’Án has acknowledged this situation and thus, a special 
rule is granted.  According to Q16.106, the jurists made a decision that any 
other case imposing threat to a Muslim's life, (not only coercion and food 
cases) is valid on the grounds of necessity59.  
 
These verses of ÃarÙra had also been used by the Qur’Ánic commentators to 
define darÙra in their tafsÐr work. However, many Qur’Ánic commentators 
(mufassirÙn) confined their definition of ÃarÙra to matters pertaining only to 
food and drink as these verses above are only concerned with the food. For 
example, AbÙ Bakr al-JaÒÒÁÒ60 (d. 981/370) defined al-ÃarÙra as "a fear of 
harm (Ãarar) and destruction (halak) to one's life, or a part of one’s body 
because of one’s refusing to consume the (ÎarÁm) food". In this situation, a 
Muslim is compelled to consume ÎarÁm food because that is the only 
available option. Al-JaÒÒÁÒ further asserted that there are two situations that 
are considered as the states of necessity, namely coercion or compulsion. A 
                                                 
57 Al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, pp. 126-127. Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-
QurÞÁn, vol. I, p. 57 
58 See IsmÁÝÐl bin ÝUmar Ibn KathÐr, The Life of the Prophet; a translation of al-Sira al-
nabawiya,  Trevor J. Le Gassick (tran.), Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000,  pp. 311-322. 
Some of the early Muslims were chained and roasted in the sun. Many Muslims receiving 
the torture gave away under this treatment except BilÁl. Even the Prophet's companion AbÙ 
Bakr received bad treatment from the polytheist when he called people to God and to His 
Messenger. He was beaten and was badly injured.  
59 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 57 
60 Al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol. I, p. 129 
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MÁlikÐ QurÝÁnic interpreter, Ibn al-ÝArabÐ (d. 1148/543)61, explained that the 
term ÃarÙra literally comes from the word Ãarar which means something 
that opposites a benefit. According to Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, the "muÃtarr" refers to a 
person who fears al-talaf  (destruction) or harm to his body or bodily 
organs. The ÍanafÐ exegetes, ÝAbd AllÁh bin AÎmad bin MaÎmÙd al-NasafÐ 
(d.1310/710)62 and  IsmÁÝil HaqqÐ al-BurÙsawÐ (d. 1127/1715)63, limited the 
definition of ÃarÙra to a  compelling situation that permits a Muslim to 
consume a ÎarÁm meal.  
 
The definitions of ÃarÙra provided by Muslim exegetes reveal something 
about the functioning of ÃarÙra in their minds, namely a valid case for the 
suspension of a ruling because of a fear for one’s life. However, they 
limited the application to food and coercion cases. In this case, a Muslim is 
forced to break the law unwillingly. “Unwillingly” means he has no option 
other than choosing the prohibited acts in order to save life. This concept 
differs from the concept of ÎÐla (legal stratagem).64  Íila is permitted to 
circumvent an existing rule or to alter it so as to arrive at a result that the 
law did not intend to achieve. In this case, when a Muslim cannot arrive at 
the means by ordinary legal ways, he chooses to do some legal trick to 
legalise the act. Likewise, ÃarÙra is not a legal trick but it is a straight legal 
infringement. This definition will be further elaborated upon in the 
definition section in this chapter. 
 
Another point to ponder is regarding factors leading to ÃarÙra. It can be 
argued that implicitly the mufassirÙn recognised there are external and 
internal factors lead to darÙra situations65. The external factors cause the 
pressing situation is known as human factor. For example, the case of an 
oppressor forces a person (muÃtarr) to commit a prohibited act. In this case, 
the Muslim under duress has to commit the prohibited act such as drinking 
                                                 
61 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol.I, p. 54-55 
62 ÝAbd AllÁh bin AÎmad bin MaÎmÙd al-NasafÐ, TafsÐr al-NasafÐ, Beirut: DÁr Ibn KathÐr, 
1998,  vol. II, p.151 
63 See IsmÁÝil ÍaqqÐ bin MuÒÔafÁ al-ÍanafÐ al-KhulwatÐ al-BurÙsawÐ, RÙÎ al-BayÁn fÐ 
TafsÐr al-QurÞÁn, Beirut: DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 2003, Vol. I, p. 280 
64 See al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt and Wael B. Hallaq, The History of Islamic Legal 
Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997, p. 186  
65 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol.I, p. 54-55, al-BurÙsawÐ, RÙÎ al-BayÁn fÐ TafsÐr al-
QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 280 
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wine, as he fears the oppressor is likely to execute his threat. Meanwhile, 
the internal factors are natural causes, which fall beyond human control. 
Situations such as famine, starvation or choking on food call for the 
breaking of the original law. These situations can be regarded as life 
threatening situations which permit one to break the law in order to avoid 
major harm to his life.  
 
The Qur’Án clearly remarks on some preconditions for ÃarÙra application. In 
Q2.173, Q5.3, Q6.145 and Q16.115, the conditions for the recognition of 
necessity are stated only for those who are not transgress due limits and 
have no wilful disobedience or inclination to transgression (ghayr bÁghin 
walÁ ÝÁdin).  However, there are some disputes among the jurists in the 
interpretation of the terms bÁghin and ÝÁdin. The majority of Muslim jurists 
agreed with MujÁhid66 (d. 104/722) who held these terms mean that a 
person who executes his journey with bad intention is not allowed to eat 
mayta. This means only an obedient Muslim can exercise the rule. Ibn al-
ÝArabÐ (d.543/1148) who was also influenced by MujÁhid's view, further 
added that ghayr bÁghin also means a person who does not intend to commit 
a sin (ghayr ÔÁlib sharran). Examples of criminals or disobedient Muslims 
(bÁghin and ÝÁdin) were given by the Qur’Ánic exegetes, such as highway 
robbers or terrorists against a Muslim ruler. In both cases, they are 
prohibited from eating mayta to alleviate hunger. The majority also believed 
that a sinner is only allowed to enjoy the dispensation after he/she repents. 
They argued that if a sinner is allowed to exercise ÃarÙra, this will only 
assist him/her in accomplishing his unlawful plan.  
 
The Íanafi jurists did not agree with above interpretation of bÁghin and 
Ýadin that excludes sinners from exercising ÃarÙra.  In this sense, they 
rejected MujÁhid's opinion and gave preference to the interpretation made 
by SaÝÐd bin Jubayr (d. 95/714) and MuqÁtil bin Íayyan67 (d. 135/753) who 
said that the terms  ghayr bÁghin walÁ Ýadin (without wilful disobedience) 
                                                 
66 See Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir (abridged), abridged by a group of scholars under the 
supervision of Shaykh Safi-ur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, Riyadh: Darussalam, 2000, vol. I,  
p. 472-474, see also MuÎammad Ibn JarÐr al-ÓabarÐ, JÁmiÝ al-BayÁn fÐ TafsÐr al-QurÞÁn, 
Beirut: DÁr al-MaÝrifa, 1972, Vol. II, pp. 51-52 
67 See Tafsir Ibn Kathir (abridged), vol. I, p. 472-474, see also al-ÓabarÐ, JÁmiÝ al-BayÁn, 
Vol. II, p.52 
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literally mean that a person committed the sinful act (eating mayta) without 
a belief that such an act  is permissible. He/she only consumes mayta in the 
case of an emergency and he/she knows that permission is not usually 
granted.  Conversely, "bÁghin" is a person who consumes the unlawful with 
desire (shahwa) and he/she enjoys breaking the law68. This interpretation 
was reaffirmed by a ÍanafÐ jurist, al-NasafÐ (d. 710/1310) stipulating that 
bÁghin is someone who eats mayta because of shahwa (merely lust)69. 
QatÁda (d. 118/736), however, argued that a bÁghin is a person who chooses 
to eat the unlawful while the lawful is actually available70. IsmÁÝÐl ÍaqqÐ al-
BurÙsawÐ (d. 1127/1715) further elaborated that the ÃarÙra situation allows 
a Muslim to eat mayta when there is no lawful food to consume and the 
muÃtarr fears that there is a great harm to his life or some of his bodily 
organs if he refrains from eating (the mayta)71. However, Ibn ÝAbbÁs (d. 
69/688) contended that the two phrases ‘ghayr  bÁghin walÁ ÝÁdin’ refer to a 
situation where a person does not continue eating the unlawful when the 
cause of necessity has gone. This interpretation implies that the ghayr  
bÁghin walÁ Ýadin are those people who only eat the unlawful limitedly or to 
what can sustain life.  
 
It can be seen that the majority of jurists except the ÍanafÐs have accepted 
MujÁhid's interpretation of ghayr bÁghin walÁ Ýadin, which excludes a sinner 
from eating mayta or other unlawful foods 72. The ÍanafÐ jurists strongly 
rejected this requirement on two concrete bases. Firstly, if this is the 
requirement for the validity of ÃarÙra, why is the same rule not applied in 
the tayammum case? In the case of tayammum for a muqÐm (a person 
residing in one place), all jurists agreed that whether a sinner or a pious 
person, a muqÐm can resort to tayammum. Secondly, the ÍanafÐ jurists 
argued that the requirement does not have any legal basis from either 
QurÞÁnic or Prophetic traditions. Hence, the condition only originated from 
the jurists' individual interpretation of the said law of ÃarÙra thereby raising 
the question as to why the rule is limited only to pious people. ÍanafÐ jurists 
                                                 
68 Al-ÓabarÐ, JÁmiÝ al-BayÁn, vol. II, p. 52 
69 Al-NasafÐ, TafsÐr al-NasafÐ, vol. I, p. 151 
70 See Tafsir Ibn Kathir, vol. I, p. 473 and JÁmiÝ al-BayÁn, vol. II, p. 52 
71 See al-Burūsawī, RÙÎ al-BayÁn fÐ TafsÐr al-Qur’Án, vol. I, p. 280 
72 See discussion in al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol. I, pp. 127-128 and Ibn al-
ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol. I, p. 57 
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also argued that if a good Muslim is obliged to protect his life by eating the 
unlawful, so is a sinner. Both have the same obligations to preserve their 
necessities. If a sinner is not allowed to eat mayta and he dies because of not 
eating the unlawful, he has committed further sin by causing harm to his 
life. The Íanafis also argued that restraining a sinner from exercising ÃarÙra 
will only make him commit another sin, that is causing probable death by 
not eating mayta.   
 
However, the majority of the jurists disagreed with above arguments. They 
argued that a sinner can consume the mayta after he repents. They further 
added that the dispensation rules such as ÃarÙra and rukhÒa are God's 
bounties and designed not to assist people to commit sin73. A hungry sinner 
on his journey is still permitted to consume mayta on the condition that he 
repents. This applies not only to eating the unlawful, but also to exercising 
other dispensations such as shortening prayer or breaking fast. The jurists 
strongly believed that the dispensation is only meant for obedient people 
and cannot be exercised by sinners. The majority of jurists further clarified 
the case of tayammum for a muqÐm.  They argued that the specific 
requirement of being a pious person is only applied in the case of a musÁfir. 
A musÁfir is required to have a good intention during his journey. A non-
traveller (a resident) on the other hand is a different case, for example a 
disobedient wife or a disobedient slave. The dispensation of shortening 
prayer or eating mayta has nothing to do with their status of being 
disobedient.  This is why the jurists maintained that the dispensation of 
tayammum, unlike eating mayta, is granted without discrimination for 
residents. Modern Muslim writers also disputed this issue. For example, 
MuÎammad ÝAlÐ al-ÑÁbÙnÐ74 was inclined to choose the majority’s view 
while MuÎammad ÝAbdÙh and his successor RashÐd RiÃÁ chose to support 
the ÍanafÐs’ position75.  
 
While the term ghayr bÁghin has led to a huge disagreement between 
Qur'Ánic exegetes, the term walÁ ÝÁdin is less controversial among jurists. 
                                                 
73 Ibn al- ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, vol. I, p. 58 
74 See MuÎammad ÝAlÐ al-ÑÁbÙni, Ñafwat al-TafÁsÐr, Beirut: DÁr al-Qur’Án al-KarÐm, 1981, 
vol. I, p. 115  
75 Rashid RiÃÁ and MuÎammad ÝAbduh, TafsÐr al-Qur’Án al-ÍakÐm al-MashhÙr bÐ TafsÐr al-
ManÁr, Beirut: DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1999, vol. II, p.79 
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The most popular interpretation is that the consumption of an unlawful meal 
cannot exceed its limit, namely, eating only what sustains life (the view 
adopted by most except for MÁliki jurists) and eating only when unlawful 
meal is not available. The MÁliki jurists', however, argued that a person is 
allowed to eat until full as there is a report stating that AbÙ Ubayda and 
some companions ate until full out of necessity76.  
 
It is clear that the functioning of ÃarÙra in the Muslim Qur'Ánic exegetes’ 
and interpreters' minds is limited and confined to certain cases, especially 
food and coercion. However, in the next chapter we will learn how the 
jurists have expanded this notion to a much wider sense. The jurists built the 
philosophy of ÃarÙra in a more comprehensive and systematic manner, 
which can be applied to other fiqhÐ cases.  As discussed before, the 
theoretical discussion of the principle of ÃarÙra (as a rule that can set aside 
an established rule) gains its legality from textual evidence. This is one of 
the unique aspects of the rule of ÃarÙra compared to other rules and sources 
in Islamic law, as this rule gains its validity directly from textual evidence. 
Conversely, the other rules such as Ýurf (custom or customary law)77, 
maÒlaÎa (public interest)78, istiÎsÁn (juristic preference)79, saÃÃ al-dharÁiÝ 
(blocking the means)80 are general principles derived from collective 
understandings of Islamic principles. There may be some textual evidence 
as the basis for the validity of these rules, but unlike the darÙra cases there 
is no specific case invoked. In other words, these rules do not gain their 
                                                 
76 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, pp. 55-56 and the complete discussion is 
discussed in  Chapter Three under the subtopic of ÃarÙra in food cases.  
77 See F. H. Stewart, G. Libson, "Urf". Encyclopaedia of Islam", Second Edition, P. 
Bearman et al. (Eds.), Brill, 2010, Brill Online, EXETER UNIVERSITY, O8 February 
2010,  www.brillonline.nl, see related discussion in Wahbah al-ZuhailÐ, UÒÙl al-fiqh al-
IslÁmÐ, ÓehrÁn: DÁr IÎsÁn, 1997, vol. II, pp. 828-835 
78 See Madjid Khadduri, "Maslaha", Encyclopaedia of Islam", Second Edition, P. Bearman 
et al. (eds.), Brill, 2010, Brill Online, EXETER UNIVERSITY, O8 February 2010,  
www.brillonline.nl, see related discussion in Wahbah al-ZuhailÐ, UÒÙl al-fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, vol. 
II, pp. 752-819 
79 See R. Paret, "IstiÎsÁn and istiÎlÁÎ", Encyclopaedia of Islam", Second Edition, P. 
Bearman et al. (eds.), Brill, 2010, Brill Online, EXETER UNIVERSITY, O8 February 
2010,  www.brillonline.nl . Some modern writers such as Hashim Kamali translated 
istiÎsÁn as juristic preference, see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, SharÐÝah Law- An 
Introduction, Oxford: One World, 2008, p. 324, see also Wahbah al-ZuhailÐ, UÒÙl al-fiqh 
al-IslÁmÐ, vol. II, pp. 735-748 
80 See M.Y. Izzi Dien, " saÃÃ dharÁiÝ",  Encyclopaedia of Islam", Second Edition, P. 
Bearman et al. (eds.), Brill, 2010, Brill Online, EXETER UNIVERSITY, O8 February 
2010,  www.brillonline.nl, see also Kamali, SharÐÝah Law- An Introduction, p. 326 
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legality explicitly from textual evidence but rather they emerge as the 
understanding of concepts derived by Muslim jurists.   
 
There are several important points that can be deduced from these ÃarÙra 
verses. First, Muslim mufassirÙn believed that in certain pressing situations, 
namely food and coercion, God forgives eating of the unlawful and 
professing kufr to avoid a greater harm to a person’s life. The punishment is 
therefore lifted. Secondly, the mufassirÙn also agreed that the verses have 
clearly demarcated some basic requirements for the verification of ÃarÙra 
situations. According to the verses, the muÃtarr is only allowed to exercise 
ÃarÙra if he is not among 'bÁghin’ or ÝÁdin'.  
 
1.2.2 The Prophetic traditions regarding ÃarÙra  
 
A life threatening situation that puts a person in severe hardship has also 
been recognised in the ÎadÐth literature. As compared to the Qur’Ánic 
injunctions discussed above, the ÎadÐth traditions clearly illustrate that this 
rule applies not only to matters pertaining to food and drinking, but to other 
matters such as self-defence. Some conditions are stipulated in these ÎadÐth 
for the recognition of necessity. Like the Qur’Án, the ÎadÐth’s preoccupation 
with ÃarÙra matters are generally incidental and the responses to ÃarÙra are 
limited to specific factual cases.  
 
ÍadÐth one81: 
From JÁbir bin Samura: A man arrived at Íarrah with his wife and children. 
A man said (to him): "My camel went astray, if you find it, detain it." The 
man found it but he could not find the owner. The camel was sick and the 
wife said, "Kill it," but the husband refused and apparently, the camel died. 
His wife said (to the husband) "Skin it to dry out the fat and flesh so we can 
eat them". He said, "Let me ask the Messenger of Allah.” Therefore, he 
went to him (the Prophet) and asked him. He (the Prophet) said, “Do you 
have something enough to fulfil your needs?” He replied, “No”. He then 
said, “Then eat it”. Then its owner came and he told him the story. He said, 
                                                 
81 ÍadÐth no 3818 in the chapter of al-muÃtarr  ilÁ al-mayta in AbÙ DawÙd SulaymÁn Ibn 
al-AshÝath,  Sunan AbÐ Dawud, vol. II, p. 645, Vaduz Leichestein: JamÝiyya al-Maknaz al-
IslÁmÐ, 2000. See also ÎadÐth number 3807 in AbÙ DawÙd SulaymÁn Ibn al-AshÝath, Sunan 
Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984, vol. III, p. 
1074. According to AÎmad Íassan, there is no defined limit of necessity as it differs from 
man to man. 
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“Why did you not slaughter it?” He replied, “I would have been 
embarrassed in front of you.”  
 
 
ÍadÐth two82: 
Al-FujayÞ al-ÝÀmirÐ said that he came to the Messenger of AllÁh (and 
asked), “Is carrion unlawful for us?” He said, “What are your eating 
habits?” We said, “Some food in the evening and some in the morning”. 
AbÙ NuÝaym said, ÝUqba explained it (the situation) to me saying, “(only) a 
cup (of milk) in the morning and a cup in the evening". (The Messenger 
replied), "This does not satisfy the hunger". So, he made the carrion lawful 
for them in this situation.   
 
 
This ÎadÐth indicates that it is permitted to consume mayta (dead meat) if a 
man does not have sufficient food to alleviate hunger. It is also evident that 
there is no need to wait until a near-death situation to consume mayta.  
 
ÍadÐth three83:  
Samurah bin Jundub reported the Prophet of Allah as saying, “If any of you 
come across cattle, he should seek permission from their master if he is 
there. If he permits, he can milk (the animals) and drink. If he is not there, 
he should call (for the owner) three times. If he responds, he should seek his 
permission; otherwise, he may milk and drink, but should not make 
provisions [by saving the milk].” 
 
 
ÍadÐth four84:  
ÝAbbad bin ShuraÎbÐl said: I suffered from hunger so I entered a garden in 
Medina, and rubbed an ear-corn. I ate and carried it in my garment. Then its 
owner came, he beat me and pulled my garment. He brought me to the 
Messenger of Allah who said to him, "You did not teach him when he was 
ignorant; and you did not feed him when he was hungry". The Messenger of 
AllÁh ordered him, so he released my garment, and gave me one or half a 
wasq (sixty or thirty sÁÝs) of corn.  
 
 
                                                 
82 ÍadÐth no 3819 in the chapter of fÐ al-muÃtarr ilÁ al-mayta, vol. II, p. 645 in Sunan AbÐ 
Dawud, Vaduz Leichestein: JamÝiya al-maknaz al-Islami, 2000 
83ÍadÐth no. 2621 in the chapter of fÐ ibn sabÐl yaÞkul min al-tamar wa yashrab min al-laban 
idhÁ marra bihÐ, Sunan Abi Dawud, vol. II, p. 447. See also ÎadÐth number 2613 in Sunan 
Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Vol. II, p. 724.  
84ÍadÐth no. 2622 in the chapter of fÐ ibn sabÐl yaÞkul min al-tamar wa yashrab min al-laban 
idhÁ marra bihÐ, Sunan Abi Dawud, vol. II, p. 447. See also ÎadÐth number 2614 in Sunan 
Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Vol. II, p. 724 
 44 
The previous ÎadÐths three and four in Sunan AbÙ Dawud are slightly 
different from ÎadÐths one and two. Having examined the first two ÎadÐths, 
it is apparent that the Prophet himself investigated the genuineness of the 
state of necessity of the person before granting the permission to consume 
the unlawful meal. The permission in ÎadÐths three and four on the other 
hand were given without any interrogation by the Prophet. Hence, what is 
the difference between these ÎadÐths? The special requirement in ÎadÐths 
three and four was given especially for a traveller or for those who were on 
the way to jihÁd85. The Prophet granted the permission to eat any hanging 
fruit or to milk an animal they passed by without asking the traveller's state 
of hunger. It can be anticipated that the traveller's need for food is self-
evident and commonly perceived as compared to those who are not 
traveling. In addition, a person who stays in his residential area has a wider 
option to look for a lawful meal as compared to a person on a journey. This 
also applies to tayammum. A traveller who lacks water is given general 
permission to exercise tayammum or shorten prayer. Unlike his muqÐm 
counterpart, the traveller is not required to meet strict conditions of ÃarÙra. 
It is also important to note that although hadiths three and four imply a 
general permission to eat what is not owned by a Muslim, some jurists86 
insisted that this permission is only for those who are genuinely helpless 
and dying of hunger and thirst. The permission to take another’s property 
cannot be generalised to anything other than a necessity situation.  
 
Another ÎadÐth reaffirming the permission to eat hanging fruits belonging to 
others was narrated by TirmizÐ, AbÙ DawÙd, NasÁ’Ð and Ibn MÁjah from the 
authority of ÝAmrÙ bin ShuÝaib from his father and from his grandfather, the 
Prophet was asked about hanging fruits and answered, “Who is in dire need 
can take it but he cannot make provision from it”87. This ÎadÐth again is 
evidence that the permission is only for a mudtarr and such consumption is 
limited to what can satisfy hunger. This limit is clearly indicated by the 
Prophet's words "he cannot make provision from it."   
 
                                                 
85 All these ÎadÐth were placed under the chapter of Þibn sabÐl in Sunan AbÙ DawÙd. Hence 
the permission is only for Þibn sabÐl and not for ordinary people. 
86 See Sunan Abu Dawud above.  
87See Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, vol. I, p. 473  
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The general guidelines for the verification of the state of necessity are 
remarked on in all the above ÎadÐths. The guidelines are that the permission 
(to modify the rule) is only granted for those who face a severe threat to 
their life. The muÃtarr must also believe that committing the prohibition is 
the only way to prevent imminent harm. The state of necessity needs to be 
verified to exclude any possibilities impairing the muÃtarr's eligibility to 
apply the rule. Such permission is only granted on a temporary basis to 
eliminate harm. The temporary permission only operates during the specific 
ÃarÙra period and it ceases when the harm is removed. However, the period 
varies depending on the intensity of the case.  
 
In another ÎadÐth88:  
QabÐÒa b. MukhÁriq al-HilÁlÐ  said, “I was in debt and I came to the 
Messenger of AllÁh and begged him”. He said, “Wait till we receive Òadaqa 
(gifts or charity), so that we can ask for (the donation) to be given to you”. 
He again said, “QabÐÒa, begging is not permissible except for one of these 
three people: for one who has incurred debt, begging is permissible till he 
pays the debt off, after which he must stop (begging); for  one whose 
property has been destroyed by a calamity which has hit him, begging is 
permissible till he can support himself; and for one who has been hit by 
poverty, the genuineness of which is confirmed by three trusted members of 
his people, begging is permissible till he can support himself. Besides these 
three (reasons), QabÐÒa, begging, is forbidden, and anyone who engages in 
such [activity] consumes what is forbidden.” 
 
 
This is a straightforward explanation of ÃarÙra made by the Prophet which 
firmly indicates that begging is prohibited. The Prophet also made it clear 
that in certain situations when one is helpless, has no food and has run out 
of alternatives, he can beg. The Prophet also gave the permission to beg for 
a person in severe debt, or when his property is destroyed by calamity or a 
person is smitten by poverty. These three cases would result in harm to 
one’s wealth and life, thereby justifying the act of begging. However, the 
permission to beg ceases either when the target is achieved, when the debt is 
paid, or when the hunger is eliminated. This limit indicates that the 
prohibited act is only permitted temporarily and once the cause of necessity 
                                                 
88ÍadÐth no.  no. 2451 in the book of zakÁt, AbÐ al-Íusayn Muslim Ibn al-ÍajjÁj al-
QushayrÐ al-NisÁbÙrÐ, SaÎÐh Muslim, Vaduz Leichestein: JamÝiya al-maknaz al-Islami, 
2000, Vol. I, p. 409 
 
  
 46 
has gone, the original rule is restored. At the same time, a careful measure 
to prevent the abuse of the rule and to confirm the genuineness of one’s 
state of necessity is required. The Prophet did not blindly accept a mere 
statement from poor people but he required a testimony from three trusted 
people in the community to prove the state of a person’s poverty. Although 
the permission to beg is given, a meticulous investigation should be made in 
order to prevent any abuse of ÃarÙra rule.  
 
Other ÃarÙra cases which are not related to food and drink are also found in 
the ÎadÐth literature. For example, the act of burying more than one body in 
a grave, which is usually prohibited.  
 
HishÁm bin ÝÀmir reported,89 “We have been afflicted (with wound and 
fatigue) on the day of UÎÙd. The Messenger of Allah said, "Dig graves, 
make them wide, and bury two or three (of the dead persons) in a single 
grave. He was asked, "Which of them should be put first? He replied, 
"Those of them who knew most of the Qur’Án." 
 
This ÎadÐth indicates that it is permissible to bury more than one dead 
person in a grave when the circumstances demand it.  
 
Another ÎadÐth representing ÃarÙra shows how a man is permitted to cause 
injury to others who tried to assault him. Permission is granted on the basis 
of necessity to defend the victim's life and his property.  
 
The ÎadÐth, from the authority of Abu Hurairah, states90:  
Someone came to the Prophet asking, “O Prophet, what do you think if a 
man came to me in order to take my possessions?” He (the Holy Prophet) 
said, “Don’t give your possessions to him”. He (the inquirer) said, “And 
[what] if he attacks me?” He (the Holy Prophet) remarked, “Then fight back 
                                                 
89 ÍadÐth no. 2019 in AÎmad Ibn ShuÝayb al-NasÁÞÐ, Sunan NasÁÝÐ, MuÎammad Iqbal 
ÑiddÐqÐ (tran.), vol. II, p. 515. 
90ÍadÐth no. 377 in the chapter of  al-dalÐl ÝalÁ anna man qaÒada akhdha mÁli ghayrihi bi 
ghayri Îaqqin kÁna al-qÁÒidu muhdarra al-dammi fÐ Îaqqihi in  ÑaÎÐÎ Muslim, Vaduz: 
Leichestein JamÝiya al-Maknaz al-IslÁmÐ, vol. I, p. 71-72. See also another  hadÐth no. 378 
and 379 from the authority of ÝAbd AllÁh bin ÝAmr and Ibn Jurayh respectively, vol. I, p. 
72. See also HadÐth Muslim 259, SaÎÐÎ Muslim Abdul Hamid Siddiqi (tran.), vol. I, p. 80, 
in the chapter of faith (the chapter concerning the fact that violable blood of one who 
makes an attempt to take possession of the property of another without any legitimate right, 
is such a man is killed his abode is fire and he who dies in protecting his property is a 
martyr).  
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against him” He (the inquirer) said again, “What do you think if I were to be 
killed?” He (the Holy Prophet) replied, “You would be a martyr.” He (the 
inquirer) said, “What do you think would happen to him if I killed him?” He 
(the Holy Prophet) said, “He would be in Hell.” 
 
 
This ÎadÐth unequivocally states that property is held sacred in Islam and it 
is one of the established five essential elements of human existence that 
should be protected alongside religion, life, lineage and reason. If one dies 
resulting from his attempt to protect his right of ownership, he is regarded 
as a martyr. A Muslim is permitted to defend his property even if his act of 
self-defence results in injury or harm to others who attack him. The 
permission to cause harm to the attacker is given on the grounds of 
necessity. This is called difÁÝ sharÝÐ, lawful defence. In this case of duress, 
the liability is also lifted, which means the person who killed to protect 
himself will not face any punishment.  
 
To conclude, the ÃarÙra rule was not developed comprehensively and 
systematically from the QurÞÁnic and ÎadÐth texts. God's and the Prophet's 
responses in all cases were merely incidental and the permission to deviate 
from an original rule was given on a case-by-case basis. No explicit general 
permission on the basis of necessity is found in both sources. On this basis, 
it is can be argued that the capacity of ÃarÙra as a general legal excuse is not 
established from these sources.  However, although the available evidence 
only accommodates specific issues, the Sunni jurists unanimously agreed 
that the rule can be extended to other emerging cases91. Such evidence was 
treated as the origins for ÃarÙra doctrine and has been interpreted by the 
jurists as general permission extendable to other cases where one of five 
necessities is at stake.  It is also important to highlight that both Qur'Ánic 
injunctions and the ÎadÐth literatures demonstrate that the ÃarÙra rule is not 
a free license to change the SharÐÝa rules. It is apparent that in almost all 
ÃarÙra verses, God has stated the preconditions of necessity cases, that is 
                                                 
91Ibn al- ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, vol. I, p. 58, al-BurūsawÐ, RÙÎ al-BayÁn fÐ TafsÐr al-
Qur’Án, vol. I, p. 280, al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb al-AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, vol. I, pp. 127-128, MuÎammad 
ÝAlÐ al-ÑÁbÙni, Ñafwat al-TafÁsÐr,  vol. I, p. 115, Rashid RiÃÁ and MuÎammad ÝAbduh, 
TafsÐr al-Qur’Án al-ÍakÐm al-MashhÙr bÐ TafsÐr al-ManÁr, vol. II, p.79 
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“ghayr bÁghin walÁ ÝÁdin”. Similarly, some conditions were also stipulated 
by the Prophet with his requirement for three trusted persons to verify the 
state of wealth of a person who wants to beg for money. This illustrates that 
a detailed examination must be performed prior to resorting to ÃarÙra rule. 
The ÎadÐths above also show us that the Prophet himself investigated the 
intensity and the genuineness of the situation. The permission to consume 
unlawful meat either mayta or meat belonging to other is not simply 
executed by the Prophet. He himself inquired as to the state of the person in 
need and at the same time, the Prophet firmly stated that the original rule 
must be observed. Finally, it can be concluded that the evidence above has 
become the basis for the formulation of certain ÃarÙra maxims by the jurists, 
for instance,   al-ÃarÙra tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙra (necessity permits prohibition) and 
al-ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadriÎa (necessity estimated by the extent thereof). 
 
 
1.3 Definition of ÃarÙra 
1.3.1 ÂarÙra from the perspective of Arabic terminology 
The Arabic word ÃarÙra comes from the lexical root word Ãarar (Ãh-r-r) and 
it means damage, injury, harm or hardship that cannot be avoided 92. It also 
literally means ‘something that is opposite to benefit’93.  However, pain or 
bitterness associated with medicine is not considered as Ãarar because it has 
benefit. The word ÃarÙra, on the other hand, means pressing necessity. The 
state of necessity, or iÃtirÁr, is a state where someone is compelled to do 
something or is in the state of dire need. This situation makes someone free 
to do the prohibited acts. The word muÃtarr can also refer to a person who 
tries to eliminate harm or a person who is suffering from harm. According 
to Ibn al-ÝArabÐ94, the word muÃtarr also means a person who fears 
destruction (al-talaf ) or harm to his body or any of his bodily organs. 
  
                                                 
92 MuÎammad Ibn Mukarram Ibn ManÛÙr, LisÁn al-ÝArab, Beirut: DÁr IÎyÁÞ al-TurÁth al-
ÝArabÐ, MuassasÁt al-TurÁth al-ÝArabÐ, 1996, vol.VIII, p. 46, Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm Al-
Qur’Án, vol.1, pp.54-55, see also BuÔrÙs al-BustÁnÐ, KitÁb QuÔr al-MuÎÐÔ, Beirut: Maktabat 
LubnÁn, 1996, vol. II, p. 1191. Âarar also means Ãayyiq, see also Arne A. Ambros, A 
Concise Dictionary of Koranic Arabic, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2004, p. 168, Aisha Bewley, 
Glossary of Islamic Terms, London-Ta-Ha Publsiher, 1998. Al-Ãarar means harm, 
meanwhile al-iÃÔirÁr is compelling situation which made someone free to do the prohibited 
acts, p. 117 and p. 120.  
93 Al-BustÁnÐ, KitÁb QuÔr al-MuÎÐÔ, vol. II, p. 1191  
94 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm Al-Qur’Án, vol.1, pp. 54-55 
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Some linguists influenced by the QurÁnic discourse of ÃarÙra have defined 
ÃarÙra in a limited sense.  For instance, the linguist, Ibn ManÛÙr95 (d. 
711/1311) limited the legal definition of al-muÃtarr (person in dire need or 
under duress) to a person who is forced or compelled to eat mayta or any 
muÎarramÁ when a lawful meal is unavailable. He also explained that the 
consumption of ÎarÁm meal is limited to what can prolong life (mÁ yasudd 
al-ramaq) which means the legality of the consumption of unlawful food 
ceases when one gains his energy. It can be seen that his understanding of 
ÃarÙra application in legal cases is only limited to food related cases. 
 
In his thesis, Manzur al-Mutairi has concluded the meaning of ÃarÙra in the 
Arabic terminology as 96: 
a) Dire need for something (shiddat al-ÎÁja) 
b) The state in which one is being forced to do something (al-iljÁ') 
c) The intensity of darar which is injury or harm 
 
To conclude, the term ÃarÙra in Arabic literally means an emergency 
situation a person faces. This situation makes a person compelled to commit 
something in order to avoid serious harm or threat. The jurists have 
recognised this situation as legal grounds for someone to depart from an 
original ruling or to deviate from it. The Arabic usage of the ÃarÙra term has 
been recognised by the jurists to further formulate the legal consequences of 
this situation. 
 
1.3.2 ÂarÙra from jurists' perspectives 
It is evident that medieval Muslim jurists did not offer a precise definition 
of ÃarÙra as compared to the modern jurists. The classical definitions deal 
mainly with certain individual cases. The types of interests protected were 
not found in these classical definitions.  The early section of this chapter 
discussed how some Muslim interpreters such as a HanafÐ, al-JaÒÒsÁÒ, and a 
MÁlikÐ, Ibn al-ÝArabi, defined ÃarÙra in their tafsÐr work. Al-JaÒÒÁÒ defined 
                                                 
95 Ibn ManÛÙr, LisÁn al-ÝArab, vol. VIII, p. 46.  
96 Mansour al-Mutairi, Necessity in Islamic Law (PhD thesis), University of Edinburgh, 
1997, p.8 
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al-ÃarÙra as "a fear of harm (Ãarar) and destruction (halak) to one's life, or a 
part of one’s body because of one’s refusal to consume (ÎarÁm) food"97.  
 
However, some other ÍanafÐ jurists formulated a more general definition of 
ÃarÙra. ÂarÙra is defined as an excuse (Ýuzr) that can legitimate a forbidden 
act 98. In other words, certain prohibitions become legitimate in order to 
avoid imminent harm. However, this definition does not cover the meaning 
of ÃarÙra comprehensively. The term ‘excuse’ (Ýuzr) used above does not 
precisely represent the situation of ÃarÙra. Excuse (Ýuzr) has a broader 
meaning than ÃarÙra, as it includes both necessity and non-necessity cases. 
A ÍanbÁlÐ uÒÙlÐ, ÝAlÐ ibn ÝAqÐl bin MuÎammad bin ÝAqÐl (d. 513/1119) also 
defined ÃarÙra as an inevitable situation facing a Muslim (al-fiÝl al-ladhÐ la 
yumkin al-takhalluÒ minhu)99. This general definition however does not 
indicate the intensity of the case that permits a prohibition. In addition, the 
HanafÐs’ and ÍanbalÐs' definitions above do not clearly outline the type of 
interests protected in necessity cases. Only al-JaÒÒÁÒ suggested that ÃarÙra is 
utilised in order to save life. 
 
 
The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists’ prescription of ÃarÙra can be found in some fiqhÐ 
treatises100. They offered a different approach in defining darÙra as 
compared to other schools. They did not offer a technical definition like 
other schools but rather they provided certain hypothetical circumstances to 
describe the case. They explained that the situation of ÃarÙra is when one 
fears death or serious illness, or fears prolonging one's sickness, delaying 
the cure, fears losing one’s friends (when looking for alternative lawful 
food) and when one fears incapable to walk or to ride on transport. These 
fears, which impose threats to a person’s life, are the legal cause for ÃarÙra 
application. Similarly, in the case of ablution with sand (tayammum), al-
                                                 
97 Al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm Al-Qur’Án, vol. I, p. 129 
98 ÞAlÐ Íaidar, Durar al-Íikam fÐ SharÎ Majalla al-AÎkam, no place: DÁr al-JÐl, 1991, vol.I, 
pp. 96-7, ÃarÙra has been defined as al-Ýuzr al-ladhÐ yajÙz bisababihÐ ijrÁÞ  al-shayÞ al-
mamnÙÝ   
99 Al-WÁÃiÎ fÐ UÒÙl al-Fiqh, Beirut Stuttgart : Steiner, 1996-99, vol. I, p. 99 
100 MuÎammad al-SharbÐnÐ ÝAlÐ KhÁÔÐb, MughnÐ MuhtÁj IlÁ MaÝrifa MaÝÁnÐ AlfÁÛ al-
MinhÁj, Cairo: MuÒÔafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ, 1957, vol. IV, p. 306. In this case the ShÁfiÝÐ 
jurists are of the view that it is wÁjib for a person under this situation to eat the unlawful in 
order to protect himself from destruction. Further discussion can be found in the very next 
chapter.  
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NawawÐ (d. 676/1277) for instance described the necessity state to use sand 
is "when it is feared the patient may die as a consequence of ablution with 
water, or may lose the use of a limb"101. This rule can be extended to the 
case where ablution with sand is inevitable if the use of water might retard 
the cure of a serious illness, or disfigure some part of the body. This 
description implies that ÃarÙra might be utilised not only when one fears 
death but other serious illness. For al-NawawÐ, the permission to delay an 
established rule can clearly be granted on the account of necessity where 
one faces harm.  
 
The problem of a poor legal definition of ÃarÙra was raised by Mawwil Izzi 
Dien in his book on Islamic Law102. He recognised the fact that the jurists 
tend to define the concept of ÃarÙra by providing examples rather than 
offering hypothetical definitions. This approach, he argued, has led to the 
disagreement between jurists on the practical question of ÃarÙra. However, 
it can be argued that the jurists’ differences and disagreements in the 
practical aspect of ÃarÙra did not necessarily stem from the ambiguity of the 
definitions offered by the jurists. These disagreements resulted from 
different interpretations and reasonings made by the jurists. This is evident 
in the case of the interpretation ‘ghayr bÁghin walÁ ÝÁdin’ as discussed 
before. The jurists agreed on the fundamental concept of ÃarÙra, but 
disputed the technical details of the rule. The effort made by some ShÁfiÝÐ 
jurists to define ÃarÙra by offering exemplary cases is necessary because 
each ÃarÙra case is unique. Hence, separate treatment has to be made 
according to the intensity of each case.  
 
A more comprehensive meaning of the concept of ÃarÙra can be found in 
the legal maxims works, such as al-AshbÁh wa al-NaÛÁ’ir103, written by a 
ShafiÝÐ jurist, al-SuyÙÔÐ (d.911/1505) and al-AshbÁh wa NaÛÁir  by a ÍanafÐ 
jurist, Ibn Nujaym (d.970/ 1563) and its commentary work (sharÎ), Ghamz 
                                                 
101 Mahiudin Abu Zakaria Yahya Ibn Sharif al-Nawawi, Minhaj et talibin : a manual of 
Muhammadan law according to the school of Shafii,  trans. to English from the French 
edition [of the Arabic] of L.W.C. Van den Berg by E.C. Howard. Lahore: Law Publishing 
Company, 1978, p. 12 
102 Islamic law - from historical foundations to contemporary practice, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2004, pp. 82-85 
103 JalÁl al-DÐn al-SuyÙÔÐ, Al-Ashbah wa al-NaÛÁÞir fÐ al-QawÁÝid wa FurÙÝ Fiqh al-
ShÁfiÝiyya, Cairo: MuÒÔafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ, 1959, p. 85 
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ÝUyÙn al-BaÒÁ'ir fÐ SharÎ al-AshbÁh wa NaÛÁ'ir104. The ÃarÙra has been 
defined in these classical books as follows: "a situation in which one 
reaches a limit where if one does not take a prohibited thing, one will perish 
or be about to perish." As with other classical definitions, this definition 
implies that this circumstance legalises a prohibited action in order to avoid 
harm. Although the definition is limited, the practical aspect of ÃarÙra has 
been comprehensively discussed in these legal maxims works. We can also 
find that the classical definitions above limit the application only to the 
protection of life.  
 
A modern scholar, Wahbah ZuhailÐ detected several lacunae in the classical 
definitions of ÃarÙra 105. He offered a new definition of ÃarÙra, which he 
believed is more comprehensive and accurately presents the exact notion of 
ÃarÙra. He contended that ÃarÙra is a compelling situation resulting in fear 
of injury to one’s life, organs, lineage, reason or his property. The 
preservation of these five necessities as the key element in a ÃarÙra situation 
broadens the scope of ÃarÙra. This means the protection of all five 
necessities have been taken into account in any ÃarÙra situations. According 
to ZuhailÐ, ÃarÙra should be interpreted as a license which not only allows a 
Muslim to commit a prohibited act but to omit an obligation as well, or 
delay an obligation. For example, selling weapons is permitted but selling 
weapons to an enemy during war is prohibited in order to prevent harm to 
Muslim society.  
 
It is important to note that, apart from ZuhailÐ, many modern Muslim 
writers have also broadened the definition of ÃarÙra to include the 
protection of the necessities of the public and the state. This new concept of 
ÃarÙra was reaffirmed by MuÎammad BiltajÐ and ÝÀÔif AÎmad MaÎfuÛ106. 
They contended that ÃarÙra is a rule used to preserve the benefits of 
individual necessities and the necessities of all human beings and the 
community.  
 
                                                 
104 P.277 
105 NaÛariyÁt al-ÂarÙra al-SharÝiyya, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1997, p. 63-65.  
106 ÝÀÔif AÎmad MaÎfuÛ, RafÝ al-Íaraj fÐ TashrÐÝ al-IslÁmÐ, Mansoura: MaÔbaÝa JÁmiÝÁ al-
ManÒÙra, no date, p. 65 
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It can be concluded that the expansion of the darÙra definition from a 
merely individual-centered definition to a wider application has a close 
relationship with the changes in Muslim socio-history. In the Prophetic era 
and the early caliph’s times, issues concerning Muslims were less 
complicated and more self-centered. Although there were ÃarÙra cases 
concerning state administration and social relations, the numbers were 
relatively minimal. As times have changed, with a growing Muslim 
population and the expansion of Muslim territory, Muslims have faced more 
complicated issues107. Hence, a wider definition of ÃarÙra should apply. For 
example, the importance of protecting the state from enemy and the 
importance of raising taxes on the basis of necessity.  
 
1.4   Historical development of the theory of ÃarÙra 
Before we embark on the question of the history of ÃarÙra, it is important 
for us to understand the juristic methods in developing theories and rules in 
Islamic law. As discussed earlier, it is a well-known tradition in Islamic 
legal discourse that any principle formulated by the jurists should have its 
foundation in any of divine sources before the principle gains its place in the 
legal discourse. The jurists will firstly explore the Qur'Án, the bedrock of 
Islamic jurisprudence to ensure that argumentation and the deductive 
process have not detracted from its foundation. It also important to note that 
the various injunctions and exhortations contained in the Qur'Án are not to 
be read as individual but as parts of one integral whole. Although some of 
the verses were incidental responses to one individual case, the rule can be 
applied to any other similar case. However, in a matter where the QurÝÁn is 
silent in certain cases, the jurists will refer to the second primary source in 
Islamic law, the ÎadÐth108. Jurists will refer to ÎadÐth looking for the 
Prophet's adjudication in legal matters. However, when the issue was not 
expressed explicitly in the QurÞÁn and the Sunna, the jurists will have to 
                                                 
107 For example, during the Umayyad period, the main concern of the caliphs was political 
administration. See Joseph Schacht, "Pre Islamic Background", in Majid Khadduri and 
Herbert J. Liebesny (eds.), Law in the Middle East,  New York, Arm Press, pp.36-38.  The 
administration of the Umayyad concentrated on waging war against external enemies, on 
collecting revenue from the subject population, and on paying subventions in money.  
108  Some people may use the term ÎadÐth and sunna interchangeably. Sunna literally means 
a manner of acting, a rule of conduct, a mode of life, applied to the life of the Prophet. 
Meanwhile ÎadÐth refers to the report of a particular occurance. See C. G. Weeramantary, 
London: Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 34 
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resort to ijtihÁd. The jurists strove by deep and devoted study to derive an 
appropriate rule by logical inference and analogy. Logical reasoning, known 
as qiyÁs, was the subject of much philosophical inquiry in sorting out the 
underlying principle and separating it from particular facts of the past and 
present cases109. Similarly as G. Weiss argued, reasoning by analogy is a 
method of argument that by its very nature leads to assimilation of like 
cases and thus to more generalised statements of the law110. In this process, 
the jurists tried to reveal the reason behind the revelation. The Ýilla (ratio 
decidendi) of legal cases inferred in the QurÞÁn and the Sunna were figured 
out. The jurists managed to extract the general principles underlying legal 
texts in both sources and applied them to the analogous new cases. As a 
result, discrete cases have given rise to broad categories and a more general 
principle has been formulated. 
 
This similar method of reasoning by qiyÁs was applied by the jurists to 
formulate the rule of ÃarÙra111. Although the term ÃarÙra in the QurÞÁn and 
Sunna concerns matters of food, drink and compulsion, Sunni jurists 
acknowledged that the ÃarÙra rule can be extended to other cases. They 
extended the rule to the case of wine drinking, eating slaughtered meat for 
muÎrim and even eating human flesh112. These exemplary cases discussed 
by jurists demonstrate that the rule of ÃarÙra is not limited to what has been 
explicitly explained in the texts but that the explicit text should be read in a 
broad manner. To some extent, Ibn al-ÝArabÐ in his QurÞanic commentary 
even discussed the issue of using the unlawful ingredients for medication. 
This means, he did not confine the rule of ÃarÙra to matters pertaining only 
to food and drink113. In this process, the jurists strived to understand the 
wisdom behind the rule, for example, to decide whether the permission to 
consume the unlawful is limited to alleviating hunger or can be extended to 
                                                 
109 See C. G. Weeramantary, London: Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 40 
110Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 
1998, p. 9  
111  The method of reasoning by analogy is firmly established by Sunni School although it 
is not recognised  by the ShiÝis. See Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, Georgia: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 10 
112  See al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 126 and Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-
QurÞÁn, Vol.I, p. 56 
113 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol.I, p. 59 
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medicinal purposes. This process of extension of the rule is evident in many 
ÃarÙra cases in the fiqh literatures. 
 
As stated previously, the textual evidence concerning ÃarÙra had been used 
by the jurists to formulate their basic understanding of this rule. Various 
definitions of ÃarÙra were formulated by mufassirÙn (QurÞÁnic interpreters), 
fuqahÁÞ (jurists) and uÒÙliyyÙn (legal theorists). I divide the application of 
ÃarÙra into several categories. The first category of ÃarÙra application is 
limited to food cases. This application was adapted by Qur'Ánic interpreters 
who are influenced by the discussion of ÃarÙra found in the Qur’Ánic 
discourses which deal specifically with food cases114. As a result, some 
Qur'Ánic interpreters and jurists had limited ÃarÙra application to cases 
pertaining to food and drink. The second category is where the application 
has been extended to cases other than food. However, the application is still 
limited to certain individual interests: life and property. This concept was 
adapted by the majority of classical jurists. The hypothetical cases of ÃarÙra 
found in Sunni fiqh literature demonstrate that the jurists had widely applied 
the rule to other cases rather than only food and drinking115. In the third 
category of ÃarÙra, the rule is applied in a much wider sense to also include 
the protection of society, the economic system and the political 
administration116.   
 
As stated earlier, there are differences in practical question of ÃarÙra 
between jurists. The differences in the technical details are common in the 
discussion of Islamic law. As Bernard G. Weiss argued, Muslim scholars 
disagreed with each other from time to time on points of detail in Islamic 
law, and where the differences could not be resolved, toleration seems to 
have prevailed117. This was also the case in the process of formulating the 
                                                 
114 Ibn ManÛÙr, LisÁn al-ÝArab, vol. VIII, p. 46, ÝAbd AllÁh bin AÎmad bin MaÎmÙd al-
NasafÐ, TafsÐr al-NasafÐ, vol. II, p.151 and IsmÁÝÐl ÍaqqÐ bin MuÒÔafÁ al-ÍanafÐ al-KhulwatÐ 
al-BurÙsawÐ, RÙÎ al-BayÁn fÐ TafsÐr al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 280 
115 Wider application of ÃarÙra is presented in Chapter Four and Five 
116  See Wahbah ZuhailÐ, NaÛariyÁt al-ÂarÙra al-SharÝiyya, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1997, p. 63-
65, ÝÀÔif AÎmad MaÎfÙÛ, RafÝ al-Íaraj fÐ TashrÐÝ al-IslÁmÐ, Mansoura: MaÔbaÝa JÁmiÝÁ al-
ManÒÙra, no date, p. 65 
117  Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, Georgia: The University of Georgia 
Press, 1998, p. 9 
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rule of ÃarÙra. The fundamental point that is agreed upon by all jurists is 
that the unlawful foods can be consumed because of necessity118.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Having examined the textual evidence concerning ÃarÙra cases, it is evident 
that the comprehensive notion of ÃarÙra is not established from these 
sources. The Qur'Ánic and prophetic responses are merely incidental and this 
is the common characteristic of legislation in the revelation period. As Said 
Ramadan119 argued, the characteristics of legislation basically establish 
general rules without indulging in much detail, as from the very beginning 
these texts were directly meant to deal with actual events. This was also the 
case for the concept of ÃarÙra, with the formulation of ÃarÙra rule being 
developed in a comprehensive manner by jurists in a later period. As 
Islamic law is characterised as a living organism, it develops and evolves 
over time. The complete theory and principles of Islamic law do not emerge 
in one complete piece. The basic understanding of ÃarÙra derived from the 
relevant nuÒÙÒ was gradually developed into a systematic theory of law 
which functions to amend and change the character of certain established 
rules. Although SharÐÝa laws are something that cannot easily be amended, 
the jurists believe that under certain pressing circumstances, a change in the 
law is unavoidable to prevent a greater danger to people's basic needs. This 
chapter also shows us that ÃarÙra was narrowly defined by some earlier 
uÒÙliyyÙn and jurists.  However, the jurists actually applied this rule in a 
much wider sense in fiqhÐ treatises; these cases will be presented in 
Chapters Three and Four. In the next chapter, the maxims, preconditions of 
ÃarÙra and the relations of ÃarÙra with other Islamic legal terms will be 
examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118  See al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 126 and Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, 
Vol.I, p. 56, al-ShÁfiÝi, al-ÞUmm, Vol. II, p.276 
119 See Said Ramadan, Islamic Law- Its Scope and Equity, Geneva, 1970,  p. 71 
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CHAPTER TWO:  THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF ÂARØRA IN 
ISLAMIC LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter outlined how the Muslim jurists believed that the 
notion of ÃarÙra originated from several pieces of textual evidence. The 
discourse of ÃarÙra cases in these Qur’Ánic and ÍadÐth literatures led to the 
formation of a more comprehensive ÃarÙra rule by the Muslim jurists and 
uÒÙliyyÙn. It is important to note that the provisions for derogation are 
available for those who are genuinely incapable of fulfiling an obligation. 
The incapability is not because of being a minor or mental states such as 
forgetfulness or ignorance but because of severe danger or threat to one of 
the five human necessities. This means that the ability of ÃarÙra to alter the 
rule is only granted when the mukallaf strongly believes that the fulfilment 
of a SharÐÝa rule causes a great harm to his life or other necessities. The 
provision for derogation by the rule of ÃarÙra is applicable in almost all 
human activities, including devotional acts of worship (ÝibÁda) and personal 
relationships (muÝÁmala). It is important for a person to possess a sound 
knowledge of what is stated in the SharÐÝa regarding a particular ÃarÙra 
matter. The muÃtarr (a person under duress) is responsible for his own 
actions during this ÃarÙra period and he may decide for himself when to 
derogate from the standard rule. Therefore, he must be able to distinguish 
between necessity and non-necessity cases. The verification by adhering to 
strict preconditions is essential in order to prevent people from abusing this 
principle. For instance, if someone is on the brink of starvation and the only 
food available is the unlawful, then he has to decide when to consume the 
ÎarÁm meat in order to survive, and thereby derogate from the standard. The 
jurists have generally listed the preconditions for the verification of ÃarÙra 
rule that should apply in each case. This chapter will provide a critical 
review of these standard preconditions and the theoretical discussion on 
ÃarÙra.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, the 
connection of ÃarÙra and other legal terms is examined. The common 
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problem concerning the ÃarÙra application is the interchangeable use of the 
term with other legal terms. The significance of this examination is to 
highlight the differences between these terms and to minimise confusion. 
For example, some jurists used ÃarÙra to justify certain cases which are not 
categorised as a necessity, but it is practically a need (ÎÁja) or a public 
interest (maÒlaÎa) case. Put in another way, ÃarÙra is sometimes used to 
justify cases which do not entail grievous harm to human’s necessities, but 
to accommodate a lesser degree of harm (for instance removing bearable 
hardship which cannot be categorised as a serious harm). This consideration 
in the application of SharÐÝa rule cannot be classified as ÃarÙra, but rather a 
case of ÝumÙm al-balwÁ (common plight) or mashaqqa (hardship). These 
two cases do not relate to avoiding a great harm but rather to eliminating 
inconvenience, difficulty and hardship for a mukallaf (a person under 
obligation) to fulfil a religious obligation. In such a case, there is no 
deviation of any original rule; rather the rigid interpretation of the rule is 
compromised due to the practicality and suitability of the subject of the law. 
This will be further elaborated in the relevant section below.  
 
In the second section of the chapter, the discussion continues with the 
discourse of the preconditions of ÃarÙra set by the jurists. The genuineness 
of the situation must be verified using these preconditions. Some of the 
explicit conditions are clearly mentioned in the Qur’Ánic verses and 
prophetic traditions as discussed in the previous chapter, while the rest of 
the conditions were developed, based on the ijtihÁd of the jurists. It is not 
obvious that the many modern cases have relied upon these conditions in 
contemporary new darÙra cases. These preconditions of ÃarÙra have been 
widely discussed, mainly in the books of legal maxim often entitled al-
ashbÁh wa al-naÛÁÞir. However, it is crucial to bear in mind that as each 
darÙra case is unique, some cases may have different requirements or 
conditions which are not required generally. Although many jurists have 
attempted to outline a standard set of ÃarÙra requirements, some cases under 
review may have some distinct particulars that require further examination 
in order to clarify their level of necessity. These issues will also be 
elucidated later.  
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The final part of this chapter is the classification of ÃarÙra situations. Efforts 
to classify ÃarÙra cases have been made by modern jurists depending on the 
cause of the case. The situations and causes of ÃarÙra fall under two general 
categories; ÝawÁrid samÁwiyya (the work of provision) and ÝawÁriÃ 
muktasaba (the work of human beings). The cases under ÝawÁriÃ samÁwiyya 
category include severe illness and starvation. Meanwhile, in the category 
ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba, the cases include coercion and duress and legitimate 
defence. In this section, the doctrine of compulsion and duress will also be 
analysed.  
 
2.2 ÂarÙra and its connection with other legal terms 
2.2.1. RukhÒa 
One of the speculative reasons as to why the early jurists did not compose 
independent works on ÃarÙra is because they had contributed lengthy works 
on rukhÒa, a term which occasionally has been used interchangeably with 
ÃarÙra. The ÃarÙra rule indeed has a close relationship with rukhÒa as both 
seek to suspend an original rule. However, there are some differences 
between these two concepts that are worthy of examination. The rule of 
ÃarÙra is frequently referred to as a rukhÒa. The two terms are closely 
related as both are concessionary laws aiming at removing difficulties from 
a Muslim. The dispensation is granted as long as the valid cause exists and 
when the preconditions are met. Some jurists such as al-ShÁÔibÐ stipulated 
that the rule of rukhÒa is merely indifferent (mubÁh) with no obligation 
imposed120.  This means that in a rukhÒa case, a Muslim has a choice either 
to adhere to the original rule or to choose the dispensation. ÂarÙra, on the 
other hand, might impose an obligation like eating mayta to prevent death. 
In this case, a hungry Muslim who fears for his life is obliged to eat the 
unlawful. ÂarÙra might also impose a choice of acts, for instance in the case 
of professing the word kufr where a Muslim has freedom either to bear the 
threat or choose to utter the word kufr121. In both cases, the sin is 
                                                 
120 AbÙ IsÎÁq IbrÁhim bin MÙsÁ al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Beirut: Dār al-
Fikr lil-ṬibÁÝa wa-al-Nashr wa-al-TawzÐÝ,1990 , Vol. I, pp. 210-215 
121 In a case where a Muslim is threatened by death to utter the unbelief words (kufr)  the 
jurists differed. The majority of scholars permit uttering the word of unbelief in order to 
save his life as this is the case of necessity. However, the permission to utter the word 
unbelief is not as an obligation as the rule of eating mayta during starvation. See al-
SarakhsÐ, UÒÙl al-SarakhsÐ, Beirut: Dār al-MaÝrifa, 1973, Vol. I, p. 117 
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eliminated. However, not all jurists render rukhÒa as merely indifferent or 
permissible like al-ShÁÔibÐ. Some ShÁfiÝÐ jurists, for instance, divided rukhÒa 
into several different categories; wÁjib, sunna, mubÁÎ and makrÙh. For 
ShÁfiÝÐ jurists, acting upon a rukhÒa in some cases might be an obligation or 
merely a choice (mubÁh) or reprehensible (makrÙh).  
 
There are many similarities between ÃarÙra and rukhÒa. Both are legal 
dispensations for a Muslim to depart temporarily from established rules 
because of certain recognised hardships and difficulties. Thus, both differ 
from naskh (abrogation) and takhÒÐÒ (specification), as both work to alter 
the rule permanently.  In the case of naskh, the previous ruling is abrogated 
although in some cases the abrogated rulings still remain textually. 
According to Kamali122, naskh is the suspension or replacement of one 
ruling by another, provided that the latter is of a subsequent origin, which 
means the two rulings are enacted separately from each other. That means, 
the new rulings in naskh and mansÙkh cases are enacted textually and 
specifically and it remains forever, but in a ÃarÙra case the change of rule is 
temporary. Furthermore, in many cases of ÃarÙra, the change of rule is 
permitted by general textual evidence.  
 
RukhÒa has been used in contrast with the term ÝazÐma. While ÝazÐma 
indicates the original and established rules like praying and eating mayta, 
the rukhÒa is an exemption from the original rule. Literally, rukhÒa means 
ease and convenience (al-yasr  wa al-suhÙla). In its original meaning it is 
used for giving permission (ibÁÎa) by way of facilitation providing ease, 
lenience and convenience123. Below the notion of rukhÒa will be discussed 
according to the four SunnÐ Schools of law. 
 
 
ÍanafÐ 
According to Ibn al-HumÁm (d. 861/ 1456)124, rukhÒa means a latitude 
(freedom of action) given to a person under obligation (mukallaf) in its 
action for an excuse, which he is unable to perform, despite the existence of 
                                                 
122 Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991, p. 149 
123 al-SarakhsÐ, UÒÙl al-SarakhsÐ, Beirut: Dār al-MaÝrifa, 1973, Vol. I, p. 117 
124 KamÁl al-DÐn MuÎammad bin ÝAbd al-WÁÎid bin ÝAbd al-ÍamÐd aka Ibn al-HumÁm, al-
TaÎrÐr fÐ UÒÙl al-Fiqh, Cairo: MusÔafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-Íalabi wa AulÁduhu Bi MiÒr, 1933, pp. 
258-259.  
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a prohibitive cause, to save life or bodily injury.  This includes a person 
under duress to utter the words of kufr, not to fast during the month of 
Ramadan, or to take another's property. 
 
The ÍanafÐ jurists stipulated that rukhÒa replaces the general rule when the 
mukallaf (legally commissioned person) is unable to perform the action 
(demanding rule). This rule is established on account of an excuse. RukhÒa 
is also a transformation from a strict rule to a more lenient rule. Examining 
Ibn HumÁm’s definition, we can conclude that rukhÒa is only allowed in 
cases of necessity, like causing harm to life or bodily organs. Hence, his 
strict definition of rukhÒa can also be regarded as ÃarÙra.  
   
Al-BazdÁwÐ (d. 482/1089)125, al-SarakhsÐ (d. 490/1096)126 and al-BukhÁrÐ 
(d. 730/1330)127 agreed that rukhÒa128  is an exemption given to a person to 
do something prohibited while the prohibition remains. This term is used for 
giving permission (ibÁÎa) by way of facilitation providing ease, lenience 
and convenience. The other definition offered is that rukhÒa is what is 
legalised to ease the burden of the rule while the prohibition remains 
because of excuse, fear of losing life, or fear of losing part of his bodily 
organs. Al-SarakhsÐ and al-BukharÐ provided a clear explanation that only 
acts classified as commands and prohibitions may involve rukhÒa.129 
Therefore, the indifferent category (mubÁÎ) of acts is exempted from the 
discussion of rukhÒa as there is no leniency request in this case. For 
instance, there is no case of rukhÒa for eating and drinking lawful food, as 
these acts do not impose any obligation or prohibition in ordinary situations.  
 
However, rukhÒa, like ÃarÙra, does not permit a prohibited act on a 
permanent basis. The permission to commit a sinful act or omit an 
obligation is only available for a person with a valid reason during a 
permitted period. For ÍanafÐ jurists, some rukhÒa demand an obligation 
                                                 
125 ÝAlÁ’ al-DÐn ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz bin AÎmad al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf al-AsrÁr SharÎ UÒÙl al-
BazdawÐ, DÁr al-KitÁb al-IslÁmÐ,  Vol. II, p. 300. 
126 al-SarakhsÐ, Usul al-SarakhsÐ, Vol.1, p. 117.  
127 al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf al-AsrÁr, Vol.II, p. 300. See Ahmad Hassan, The Principle of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, New Delhi: Adam Publishers and Distributors, 2005, pp. 154-160. 
128 RukhÒa comes from word rakhaÒa meaning ease and convenience, and this principle 
develops from the notion of removing hardship and burden from a Muslim. 
129 al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf al-AsrÁr, Vol. II, p. 300 
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where, for instance, the case under review entails grievous harm, such as 
eating the unlawful to alleviate pangs of hunger. RukhÒa can also be an 
option for a Muslim when acting upon the original law would not cause 
harm - for instance shortening prayer or wiping shoes for a traveller. In this 
matter, acting upon rukhÒa is merely mubÁh (indifferent)130. Therefore, we 
can conclude the classification of the rukhÒa rule, according to the ÍanafÐ 
jurists, is based on the type of the exceptions to the rule. The higher the 
degree of the interests protected, the higher the demand for the command.  
 
The ÍanafÐ jurists, however, disputed whether a non-necessity case should 
be included in rukhÒa, for example, the case of salam (future trading). Ibn 
al-HumÁm, for instance, confined rukhÒa only to necessity cases, and thus 
salam would not included. However, some ÍanafÐ jurists have included 
salam as a rukhÒa on the basis that this contract is deemed necessity to 
protect the needs of society. For some jurists, public interest should be 
regarded as important as individual necessities, hence, public interest is also 
considered a necessity.  
 
There was some dispute among Íanafi jurists as to which act is better for a 
Muslim, an ÝazÐma or a rukhÒa? According to al-SarakhÒÐ, if a sick person 
believes that fasting will not affect his health, it is better for him to fast and 
the fasting is counted 131. In this case, he gave preference to the ÝazÐma rule 
(Òawm) although the sick person is entitled to exercise the dispensation 
(breaking the fast). He argued that it is easy for a Muslim to fast in the 
month of RamaÃÁn rather than making it up in other months. He further 
argued that it is preferable for a Muslim to fast as this act proves his 
steadfastness, sincerity, courageousness and determination in performing 
the religious obligation. However, he argued that if a person strongly 
believes that fasting could cause severe illness or death, he is obliged to 
break the fast. Fulfilling a religious obligation that entails grievous physical 
harm is condemned as the jurists believed that worship is not supposed to 
cause physical harm. On the other hand, if he is forced by someone to break 
his fast, it is better for him to refuse even if it will lead to his death, 
                                                 
130 Ibn al-HumÁm, al-TaÎrÐr fÐ UÒÙl al-Fiqh, p. 260 
131 al-SarakhsÐ, UÒÙl al-SarakhsÐ, Vol. I, pp. 119-120. 
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although it is still permitted to break his fast. We can see that the ÍanafÐ 
jurists distinguished the causes of rukhÒa into two categories, human force 
and natural elements. A case involving coercion has a lesser degree of 
necessity than a natural case such as starvation. This is an interesting case 
study, as although both cases result in grievous physical harm, the jurists 
produced different rulings. 
 
The permission to break the fast because of coercion is similar to the rule of 
professing kufr. In the latter case, if a compelled person refuses to utter the 
words of kufr  and he dies, he is not regarded as a sinner. The Íanafi jurists 
contended that he gains a reward for his perseverance. Conversely, a hungry 
person who dies refusing to eat the unlawful is condemned as he caused his 
own death. According to the jurists, the perseverance by refraining to eat the 
unlawful is useless as the protection of a part of the body (by not eating the 
unlawful) cannot be realised by the loss of the whole (i.e. by death) in a 
darÙra case. In this case, abstinence from taking unlawful food or drink will 
cause the loss of life without achieving the object aimed at by the 
prohibition. Thus, the person will be obedient to God, but will destroy his 
life by omitting the dispensation.  
 
 
MÁlikÐ: 
The majority of MÁlikÐ jurists like the ÍanafÐs were of the view that rukhÒa 
may become an obligation (wÁjib) or may become an option to choose 
(mubÁÎ). They argued that acting upon a rukhÒa sometimes becomes wÁjib 
(eating maytah in extreme situations), and sometimes it becomes a mere 
permission (shortening one's prayer during a journey). However, a majority 
view (mashhÙr) among MÁlikÐ jurists is that rukhÒa is a recommended act 
(sunna). The rulings differed according to different cases and reasons.  If 
fasting would not affect a traveller’s health, breaking the fast is considered 
merely indifferent (mubÁÎ). If the fasting weakens him/her, breaking the 
fast is better (sunna), and if fasting would cause his/her death, the fasting is 
forbidden.  Having analysed these cases, the latter case of rukhÒa can be 
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categorised as ÃarÙra, as action would result in death. Breaking the fast in 
this situation is an obligation (wÁjib) in order to protect a person’s life132.  
 
The view of the majority of MÁlikÐs regarding rukhÒa contradicts the view 
of al-ShÁÔibÐ, who argued that the legal value of rukhÒa is totally permissible 
(ibÁÎa). He also argued that this dispensation is granted because of dire need 
and does not include ÎÁjat types (salam and ÝÁraya). In al-ShÁtibÐ’s view, 
RukhÒa is not a choice between commission and omission133. Therefore, for 
him if a command in a rukhÒa case is treated as a regular command (wÁjib 
or ÎarÁm) it ceases to be a dispensation and it becomes an ÝazÐma. Al-
ShÁÔibÐ, meanwhile, thought that the permission found in the textual 
injunctions does not give a permission to perform the sinful act. For him, 
the textual evidence permitting a Muslim to act in contradiction to a general 
rule is merely a sign of forgiveness of God and does not render the act 
permitted in reality.  The sin of the act is forgiven but the act is still 
forbidden.  He adduced the following Qur'anic verse: "But whoever is 
forced by necessity, not desiring, nor exceeding the limit, no sin is upon 
him."134 This verse clearly indicates that one is not punished for 
contravening the regular injunctions in such situations. Someone’s guilt and 
sin are removed because they have to do it because of necessity as 
mentioned in Q2.236 and Q2.198. Secondly, the grant of a dispensation by 
the Lawgiver aims to provide “ease” to the people and remove hardship. 
This can be realised by giving them a choice between acting upon regular 
injunctions or utilising the dispensation. Thirdly, if dispensations are treated 
as regular commands, like obligatory duties and recommended acts, they 
will cease to be dispensations (rukhÒa) but ‘azÐma rules instead. According 
to al-ShÁÔibÐ, the combination of dispensations and regular commands is the 
combination of two contradictory elements, as the regular commands imply 
demand and dispensations imply exception. On this basis, he built his 
argument by saying that rukhÒa cases should be treated as ibÁÎa and have no 
obligation at all. 
                                                 
132 In another cases, the MÁlikis also regarded salam and Ýaraya as kind of rukhÒa.  
133 AbÙ IsÎÁq IbrÁhim bin MÙsÁ al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Beirut: Dār 
al-Fikr lil-ṬibÁÝa wa-al-Nashr wa-al-TawzÐÝ,1990 , Vol. I, pp. 210-215. See Ahmad  Hasan, 
The Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 172-173 
134 Can be found in  Q2.173, Q5.3, Q4.101 and Q6.106 
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He also excluded any non-necessity case from the rukhÒa category.  For al-
ShÁÔibÐ, rukhÒa is a kind of dispensation, an exception from a general rule 
(ÝazÐma) because of severe excuse (Ýuzr shÁqq). He contended that cases like 
musÁqÁt, salam and qirÁÃ should not be treated as rukhÒa as these cases are 
of the need type135. This view contradicts the majority view. However, he 
recognised the fact that sometimes the word rukhÒa has been used more 
widely than its original meaning, as in the case of salam136. His view 
contradicts other views especially those of the ShÁfiÝÐs who divided rukhÒa 
into several categories wÁjib, mandÙb and makrÙh. For them rukhÒa implies 
on certain occasions. For al-ShÁÔibÐ, implying any obligation with rukhÒa 
will clearly make it not permission but an obligation, hence, it becomes an 
ÝazÐma. Ahmad Hassan is of the view that the disagreement between al-
ShÁÔibÐ and other jurists on this point seems to be a terminological one 
only.137 According to the jurists, the obligation and recommendation in 
respect of rukhÒa lie in the authority which allows rukhÒa. Meanwhile, in 
the opinion of ShÁÔibÐ, they are based on some other authority outside of 
rukhÒa.   
 
 
ShÁfiÝÐ: 
The ShafiÝÐ jurists defined rukhÒa as something that is normally forbidden 
but is made permissible because of need138. The ShÁfiÝÐ, ÍanafÐ and MÁlikÐ 
jurists were all in an agreement that rukhÒa is a legal exemption to eliminate 
difficulties.  
 
RukhÒa from the viewpoint of al-RÁzÐ (d. 606/1209) is “Something that is 
permitted though the prohibition exists”139. We can find that al-RÁzÐ did not 
                                                 
135 He distinguished between Ýuzr shÁqq and Ýuzr ÞaÒl, the case of qirÁÃ here is regarded as 
Ýuzr 'aÒl like a difficulty for a capital provider to invest his money.  
136 al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Vol. I, pp. 210-215 
137 See AÎmad Hassan, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 173 
138 AÎmad bin Naqib al-MiÒrÐ, Reliance of the Traveller, Nuh Ha Min Keller (tran.), p. 37 
139 This definition can be found in Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ’s book, al-MahÒÙl fÐ ÝIlm al-UÒÙl,  
Beirut: DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1988, p. 29. The majority of Muslim scholars such as al-
QarÁfÐ, al-ZarkashÐ, TÁj al-DÐn al-SubkÐ, al-BaiÃawÐ and and al-ArmawÐ are of the opinion 
that rukhÒa is a kind of hukm  rather than a kind of act. This view contradicts the view of 
al-ÀmidÐ, al-RÁzÐ and Ibn al-ÍÁjib suggesting that rukhÒa is kind of act. See Ahmad 
Hassan, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 170 
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include the element of “extreme need” in his definition of rukhÒa. This 
means rukhÒa can be applied to eliminate difficulties which are not severe. 
 
Meanwhile, al-GhazÁlÐ (d. 505/1111) defined rukhÒa  as: : “a term 
applied to anything that excuses the mukallaf  (subject of law) from 
performing (prohibited) action on the basis of excuse even though the 
prohibition continues to be in force”. 140 
 
Like the Hanafi jurists, Al-GhazÁlÐ also divided rukhÒa into ÎaqÐqÐ and 
majÁzÐ types. The examples of the first include a person who is forced to 
utter the words of unbelief or when a Muslim is forced to drink wine. 
Another case of ÎaqÐqÐ is a traveller who is excused from fasting in the 
month of RamaÃÁn. Meanwhile, the majÁzÐ category applies to laws which 
were revealed to the past peoples and have already been abrogated for the 
Muslim. Al-GhazÁlÐ also made a fine distinction between ÝazÐma and rukhÒa. 
The latter case only exists if there are two choices of acts. When there is no 
choice, the act is called ÝazÐma. He said when there is a lack of water, 
tayammum is not called a rukhÒa, but it is rather an ÝazÐma. On the other 
hand, in a situation where tayammum has had to be performed for a sick 
person or in a case when water is expensive, tayammum is regarded as a 
rukhÒa, because a Muslim can choose between two actions, performing 
wuÃÙ or performing tayammum.  
  
The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists contradicted al-ShÁÔibÐ on the issue of the classification of 
the rukhÒa.  As indicated earlier, al-ShÁÔibi strongly argued that rukhÒa is 
merely an ibÁÎa assessment and demands neither prohibition nor obligation. 
Meanwhile for the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists, the lawfulness of rukhÒa comprises 
obligation, recommendation, permission, and a divergence from what is 
preferable. The ShÁfiÝÐs,  for example, divided rukhÒa into three kinds141: 
firstly, obligatory (wÁjib) such as drinking wine if one's throat is choking or 
to eat carrion, when no other alternative means to save life are available; 
secondly, recommended (mustaÎabb), such as shortening prayer during a 
                                                 
140 MuÎammad AbÙ ÍÁmid al-GhazÁlÐ, al-Mustasfa fÐ Ilmi al-Usul, Beirut: Dar al-Kutb al-
Ilmiyya, 1996, pp. 78-79.  
141 WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, Al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Vol. 
XXII, pp. 155-156 
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journey, or  omitting to fast when one feels severe hardship. Finally, the 
negligence of the rukhÒa is preferable, such as wiping one’s shoes during 
ritual purification, and performing tayammum in a case when water is sold 
at an exorbitant rate. This means acting upon rukhÒa is considered as 
makrÙh.  It is interesting to find that the ShÁfiÝÐs included the makrÙh 
division for rukhÒa.  
 
The division of the rukhÒa according to ShÁfiÝÐ rules are as follows. Eating 
carrion is prohibited, however, it is considered an obligation to eat carrion 
for a man who is dying of hunger and has no alternative means of saving his 
life. This case can also be regarded as ÃarÙra. In other cases, a Muslim is 
required to observe the complete prayer, but it is recommended for a 
traveller to shorten the prayer during a journey. Shortening prayer is not 
obligatory. In sale transactions, the availability of goods is an essential 
element for the validity of the contract. However, in the salam contract, it is 
permissible (mubÁÎ) for the buyer to pay the price of the article in advance 
and receive the article after an appointed term. The case of shortening 
prayer and future trading can be regarded as rukhÒa but are not ÃarÙra cases. 
 
Under ShÁfiÝÐ classifications of rukhÒa, we can find that the rule of ÃarÙra is 
a part of rukhÒa. If the rule changes because of the necessity to protect one’s 
life, wealth, offspring, religion and reason (as in the case of breaking the 
fast because of medical reason) the case is classified as both rukhÒa and 
ÃarÙra. However, when someone breaks the fast not because of necessity, 
like the case of a traveller, the dispensation is called a rukhÒa. This case is 
not ÃarÙra as there is no fear that harm would be inflicted on the person.  
  
ÍanbalÐ: 
The ÍanbalÐ jurists, like the other schools, also agreed that rukhÒa can be 
categorised as either an obligation to act or merely a permission to commit a 
prohibited act (ibÁÎa). Al-ÓÙfÐ (d. 716/1316) defined rukhÒa as follows142: 
"Something that is established against a proof of the SharÐ'a on account of 
an over-ruling impediment." 
                                                 
142 See Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Abdul ÝAzÐz al-FatÙÎÐ  aka Ibn NajjÁr, SharÎ Kawkab 
al-MunÐr, Al-QÁhira: MatbaÝa Sunna al-MuÎammadiya, 1953, p. 150 
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This means that if the rule is not against a proof of sharÐÝa (dalÐl) it cannot 
be recognised as a rukhÒa. A “credible impediment” above means that any 
impediment that has strong evidence143. According to this definition, if the 
impediment has the same or a lower level of proof than the original rule, a 
case cannot be made for a rukhÒa. In this case where there are two 
contradictory proofs that belong to the same level, the act is delayed until 
the credibility of the proofs is highlighted by the jurists. If the impediment 
has a weaker proof than the established dalÐl, the act is considered invalid. 
Therefore, according to al-ÓufÐ, the rukhÒa can only be exercised if the 
evidence supplied is stronger than the original rule. This definition of al-
ÓufÐ also implies that every single act of rukhÒa requires separate divine 
permission, for instance, the rule of tayammum and shortening prayers. On 
the other hand, the ÃarÙra case does not require separate ‘divine permission’ 
as most jurists believed that the general permission for ÃarÙra case is 
granted through the evidence concerning the permission to eat mayta.  
Another definition offered by the ÍanbalÐ jurists is144: "The legalisation 
(decriminalisation) of a prohibited act though the cause of the prohibition is 
still present."  
 
Remarks on rukhÒa and ÃarÙra 
It can be concluded that all ÃarÙra cases can be regarded as rukhÒa but not 
all rukhÒa cases are ÃarÙra, especially when the rukhÒa deals with non-
necessity cases. Furthermore, a rukhÒa case gains its permission individually 
either from the QurÞÁn or ÎadÐth. The hardship in rukhÒa can be a necessity 
or a need. The example of a necessity case is eating mayta, while the 
examples for need cases are wiping shoes or shortening prayers. It is 
important to note that the rule of ÃarÙra can only be applied in necessity 
cases. The rule is granted to remove severe harm, and ordinary difficulties 
are not considered ÃarÙra. Furthermore, unlike rukhÒa cases, the ÃarÙra does 
not necessarily have its own specific exemption through textual evidence. 
The rule can be applied to any new case that imposes a grievous threat to a 
                                                 
143 See for more details Ahmad Hassan, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 170 
144 SulaimÁn bin ÝAbd al- QawÐ al-ÓÙfÐ fÐ al-Sarsara al-ÍanbÁlÐ, al-Bulbul fÐ UÒÙl al-Fiqh 
ÝalÁ madhhÁb ImÁm AÎmad, Beirut: Dar-Al Kutb al-Ilmiyya, 2003, p. 32 
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Muslim. Jurists extended the permission of eating mayta in the Qur’an to 
many other cases and so this should be treated as a general permission for 
those who are in dire need.   
 
It can also be concluded that rukhÒa refers to all cases of need or necessity. 
The definition includes all types of legal dispensation regardless of the 
degree of harm. A significant difference between rukhÒa and ÃarÙra is that 
rukhÒa  is a special excuse granted on the basis of ÎÁja (need) or dire need. 
Meanwhile ÃarÙra is an excuse granted only for extreme situations. 
However, some jurists strictly confined rukhÒa to necessity cases because 
they feared that some might deliberately break the rule to fulfil their desires.  
 
Another point to ponder is that the jurists unanimously agreed that travelling 
is valid grounds for leniency in performing a religious duty and a traveller 
has more privileges than a muqÐm (non-travelling resident). Jurists agreed 
that travelling is regarded as an Ýilla (ratio decidendi) for rukhÒa without 
stipulating the level of harm a traveller bears. Hardship and difficulties 
while travelling can only be regarded as the wisdom (Îikma) behind a 
rukhÒa. The traveller can exercise rukhÒa even if the journey does not affect 
the preservation of his five fundamental principles. Hence, this case is 
treated as a rukhÒa rather than a ÃarÙra. For example, the permission to 
shorten one's prayer or break an obligatory fast during a journey is 
considered when the obligations do not pose threat to his life. However, if 
fasting is proven to weaken the traveller, then the act is darÙra.   In this 
latter case, sometimes acting in contravention of the original rule is an 
obligation if acting upon the original rule would result in serious harm, 
death or major injury.  
 
The dispensation sometimes becomes an obligation (wÁjib) when it involves 
performing some of the religious acts or when the illegal act has to be 
performed to save one of the five necessities. However, both rukhÒa and 
ÃarÙra work to suspend an original Îukm temporarily while for some the 
prohibition remains, and for others the prohibition is lifted. Having analysed 
the meaning of rukhÒa offered by the jurists, I have found that some jurists 
have recognised the theory of "ease" in the SharÐÝa to remove the burden of 
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a Muslim in performing religious rituals or conducting daily activities in the 
case of discomfort. They classified the reasons for the change of the rule 
whether it is a need or necessity type.  
 
 
2.2.2 RafÝ al-Îaraj  
ÂarÙra is also a part of the principle of rafÝ al-Îaraj145 (lifting a burden) as 
both operate to prevent a Muslim being harmed. While raf' al-Îaraj is a 
basic notion in Islamic law that denies the heavy burden on the Muslim, 
ÃarÙra concentrates on the removal of hardship which would result in the 
loss of the five necessities or result in a great harm to any of these five 
fundamentals.  As far as the jurists are concerned, the SharÐÝa embodies the 
notion of rafÝ al-Îaraj. This notion is derived from several Qur’anic 
injunctions, such as Q2.185 (God desires ease for you and desires not 
hardship), Q94.6146, Q65.7147, Q65.4148, Q18.88149 and Q94.28150. Despite 
formidable trials and obligations, AllÁh comforts Muslims, reassuring them 
that He desires ease not hardship. On the grounds of these verses, jurists151 
believed that the most important and stringent obligations ordained are easy 
to undertake and within a Muslim’s capacity to fulfill. Religious obligations 
and prohibitions have been graded and these are considered easy to 
accomplish, i.e. prayer, fasting and almsgiving. However some duties, like 
the Îajj (pilgrimage) is only obligatory for those who have sufficient means 
to do so.  
Virtually all religious commands, obligations and prohibitions entail 
hardships and difficulties. However, the difficulties in fulfilling religious 
obligations can be categorised as unbearable burdens and bearable burdens. 
The unbearable burdens are recognised as factors which prevent a Muslim 
completing his task. Therefore, these burdens are omitted and excused. For 
instance, cleanliness is a precondition for the validity of prayer and a 
                                                 
145 Íaraj in Arabic means Ãayyiq or hardship. It also means ithm  or blamefulness.   
146 Truly with hardship comes ease 
147 God will assuredly appoint, after difficulty; easiness 
148 Whose fears God, God will appoint for him, of His command easiness 
149 We shall speak to him, of our command, easiness 
150 God desires to lighten things for you, for the human being has been created weak. 
151 See MaÎfÙÛ, Raf‘ al-Íaraj fÐ TashrÐ‘ al-IslÁmÐ, p. 3 
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Muslim is required to be in a religiously clean state. However, it is almost 
impossible for a Muslim to ensure he is free from minor unnoticeable 
impure elements, such as being free from a spot of blood. Those unbearable 
burdens are legally recognised as impediments to a mukallaf completing his 
obligation; therefore, they are removed and forgiven. Another regularly 
discussed case of rafÝ al-Îaraj is the exposure of one's Ýawra during prayer. 
Although covering Ýawra is one of the preconditions for the validity of 
prayer, the case is forgiven if the part of the body revealed during prayer is 
unnoticeable. Muslim jurists differed over the limit. Some argued that the 
limit for the Ýawra being revealed is a quarter of the body that should be 
covered152, and some did not permit any exposure of the Ýawra153.  
It can be argued that the jurists agreed that emphasising meticulous 
precautions for cleanliness is not necessary and it only creates hardship for 
people.  In fact, it may well have the effect of leading Muslims away from 
AllÁh, rather than making them better Muslims154. However, it is imperative 
to bear in mind that the notion of rafÝ al-Îaraj only tolerates the 
abandonment of certain particular details in performing religious acts. This 
is due to the belief that the abandonment of some particular details does not 
invalidate the act of worship. However, RafÝ al-Îaraj allows no compromise 
concerning harmful acts such as eating unlawful food, wine drinking, 
causing damage to other's properties, neglecting prayers or fasting. 
Meanwhile the notion of ÃarÙra is granted permitting a Muslim an act which 
bears grievous harms like eating pork and drinking wine and it only 
operates during extreme circumstances.  
There are two major distinctions between these two notions. First, the level 
of harm of the act committed: rafÝ al-Îaraj only compromises the acts which 
jurists believe to be harmless. The act is permitted when it does not have a 
significant effect on a Muslim. A spot of blood or a tiny bit of dirt is 
harmless and forgiven but not a pint of blood. Similarly, the exposure of a 
small area of Muslim Ýawra is excused but not the whole body, which 
                                                 
152 See al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, DÁr al-MaÞrifa, 1989, Vol. I, p. 198 
153 The ShÁfiÝÐ School is the strictest in this matter as the jurists do not recognise slight 
revealing of Ýawra during prayer. See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, DÁr al-MaÞrifa, 1990, Vol. I, p. 
110. Meanwhile Ahmad bin Íanbal and AbÙ  ÍÁnifa were lenient in this matter. See also 
Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Cairo: DÁr IÎyÁÞ TurÁth al-ÞArabī, 1985, Vol. I, p. 338 
154 ‘ÀÔif Ahmad MaÎfÙÛ, Raf‘ al-Íaraj fÐ TashrÐ‘ al-IslÁmÐ, p. 3 
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should be covered. ÂarÙra, on the other hand, does not deal with such 
meticulous details of SharÐÝa, but rather it deals specifically with cases of 
deadly sin or adjustments to the fundamental aspects of the law. The second 
distinction lies in the period of operation. RafÝ al-Îaraj can operate in a 
limited way or on a regular basis while ÃarÙra only operates during a limited 
period. As a necessity case is something that rarely happens, it is almost 
impossible for it to operate on daily basis in ordinary situations. However, 
in certain cases, ÃarÙra can operate for a long period of time, for instance, 
during famine or natural disasters.     
Although there are significant differences between these two notions, it is 
interesting to note that Muslim writers can be found using both terms 
interchangeably. This certainly leads to confusion among readers. For 
example, some writers used the word ÃarÙra to illustrate a case of minor 
hardship like the case of using a container licked by dogs or the case of 
bird’s droppings. This switching of usages of the said two terms is 
commonly found in the cases of worship and purification. The 
interchangeable use of these two terms was also found in ÝÀÔif AÎmad 
ÝÀÔif’s work on "RafÝ al-Íaraj". He classified the permission for a woman in 
her menstrual period to enter a mosque as a ÃarÙra type155. Analysing this 
case, one can simply regard this case as a need type rather than a necessity, 
as there is no major harm involved and no loss of any of the five necessities. 
In another example, ÝÀÔif used ÃarÙra as a reason to justify a case where 
someone is permitted to clean their genitals with a stone after urinating156. 
Explicitly in this second case, there is no fear of losing any of the five 
necessities. ‘AÔif's work provides no startling findings as he inherits the 
habit of using the term interchangeably from classical writers.  
 
 
2.2.3 MaÒlaÎa 
The study of the ÃarÙra has a relationship with the study of maÒlaÎa 
(interests). The relationship can be pictorially displayed as below:  
 
                                                 
155 P.81 
156 P.86 
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Muslim jurists agreed that the objectives of SharÐÝa law are not only to 
protect human necessities but also human interest, as long as the interests do 
not conflict with the textual evidence. MaÒlaÎa literally means a cause or 
source of something good and beneficial and it is frequently translated as 
public interest, although Felicitas Opwis argued that it is much closer in 
meaning to wellbeing, welfare and social wealth157. In general, Muslim 
jurists classified maÒlaÎa into three categories 158; the necessity type (five 
essential elements for human existence), the need type and the luxury types. 
In other words, if the maÒlaÎa to be protected is of the necessity type, it 
should be treated as a ÃarÙra case, but if it is of the need and luxury types, it 
is not regarded as a ÃarÙra case. 
 
MaÒlaÎa constitutes all categories of human's interest disregard the level of 
the interest. Meanwhile, the ÃarÙra is the highest level of maÒlaÎa. 
However, these human interests (maÒÁliÎ) are not all recognised by the 
SharÐÝa. There are three classifications of interest with regards to the legal 
recognition: maÒlaÎa muÝtabara (recognised interests), maÒlaÎa mulgha 
(unrecognised interests) and maÒlaÎa mursala (interests which are free from 
textual evidence).The jurists unanimously agreed that maÒlaÎa muÝtabara is 
                                                 
157 Felicitas Opwis, “Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of MaÒlaÎa in classical 
and contemporary Islamic Legal Theory”, in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel, Sharia-
Islamic Law in the Contemporary Contect, Stanford: Stanford University Pressd, 2007, p. 
62. MuÎammad SaÝÐd RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎa fÐ SharÐÝa Islamiya, DÁr al-
Fikr, pp. 152-154 
158 It can be suggested that al-GhazÁlÐ's categorisation of  maÒlaÎa has been widely accepted 
by modern writers than the others' .  See WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-
Kuwait, al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Kuwait: al-AwqÁf al-Kuwaitiyya, Vol. XXVIII, p. 210. 
However some jurists differed the terminology used, al-QarÁfÐ for instance used the term 
tamÁmiyat instead taÎsÐnÐyÁt . See AÎmad bin IdrÐs al-QarÁfÐ, AnwÁr al-BurÙq fÐ AnwÁÝ al-
FurÙÝ , ÝÀlam al-Kutub,Vol. III, p. 291. Meanwhile some ShÁfiÝÐ jurists like ÝIzz al-DÐn 
ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz bin ÝAbd al-Salam categorised the worldly and religious interests into four 
different categoris; ÃarÙrÁt, ÎÁjÁt,  tatimmÁt  and takmilÁt. See al-QawÁÝid al-AÎkÁm fÐ 
MaÒÁliÎ al-AnÁm, DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, Vol. II, p. 72. 
• ÃarÙra • maÒlaha 
 74 
recognised in the law making process159. This type of interest has been 
recognised through textual evidence and must be protected. Meanwhile the 
other type of interest known as maÒlaÎa mulghÁ (unrecognised interests) 
should be ignored. However, the jurists disputed the question of maÒlaÎa 
mursala. MaÒlaÎa mursala is designed to protect the needs of human being 
and the community. Some jurists gave preference to maÒlaÎa mursala, or as 
some call it istiÎsÁn, in their decision making. When compared to darÙra, 
maÒlaÎa mursala (public interest) should not go against textual evidence 
(QurÞÁn and sunna) and qiyÁs160. However, non-necessity cases can be 
justified under this notion according to some. The notion of maÒlaÎa 
mursala is applicable to a non-necessity case if it goes against the general 
rules of ShÁrÐÝa but not the explicit evidence. The jurists, however, were not 
in agreement in accepting maÒlaÎa mursala as a source of law.  
 
Although early Muslim jurists differed in defining the capacity of maÒlaÎa 
to become a ratio legis in determining legal rulings, they unanimously 
agreed that this concept can be used as a vehicle for legal change. Some 
jurists like al-GhazÁlÐ accepted maÒlaÎa as a basis of legal judgment as long 
as the maÒlaha serves the purpose of protecting the five fundamental 
elements of human existence 161. The strictness of his concept has made this 
concept of maÒlaha no different from the concept of ÃarÙra. He accepted a 
maÒlaÎa only when the benefit is certain and not merely based on 
assumption. He further elaborated that a maÒlaÎa is only recognised when it 
has benefits for the public in general and not only the individual.  It can be 
concluded that al-GhazÁlÐ's concept of maÒlaÎa is more or less identical with 
the concept of ÃarÙra. He also did not recognise the ÎÁja and taÎsÐn types of 
maÒlaÎa. He made an example of the maÒlaÎa case: is it permitted to kill a 
                                                 
159 There are lengthy arguments between scholars regarding maÒlaÎa especially in the 
discussion on maÒÁliÎ mursala. It is important to note that maÒÁliÎ mursala slightly differs 
from what we have discussed here. For further reading on maÒÁliÎ mursala, see YHM 
Safian, “Masalih Mursalah and Its Application in Islamic Banking Finace-A Case Study on 
BBA”, Prosiding Seminar Kebangsaan Usul Fiqh, Kuala Lumpur: Kolej Universiti Islam 
Malaysia, 2004. Izzi Dien, M.Y, "MaslaÎa in Islamic Law: A Source or a concept?" Studies 
in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth, I.R. Netton (ed.), Leiden; Boston : Brill, 2000,  
Vol. I, pp. 345-356.  
160 al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎa fÐ SharÐÝa IslÁmiyya, pp. 152-154. 
161 See al-GhazÁlÐ, al-MuÒtaÒfÁ, p. 174, See also WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya 
bi Þl-Kuwait, al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Vol. XXVIII, p. 248 
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Muslim that is being used as a shield by the enemies?162 Having looked at 
his example, we can summarise that the concept of maÒlaÎa according to al-
GhazÁlÐ is only when it involves a dire need of the society. For him, the 
need to go against the proof of ShÁrÐÝa on the basis of maÒlaÎa occurs only 
when it aims to fulfil an essential public need, not individual interest nor 
general public interest.  
 
However, other jurists like MÁlik, al-QarÁfÐ and al-RÁzÐ widened the scope 
of maÒlaÎa that need to be recognised, to include matters pertaining to 
ÎÁja163. They argued that maÒlaÎa that are known at a level less than 
certainty can still be accepted in decision making. According to this view, 
valid maÒlaÎa were expressed in the Qur’Án and Sunna. Both al-GhazÁlÐ’s 
and al-RÁzÐ’s concepts of maÒlaha have been widely accepted by modern 
scholars like RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ and Yūsuf al-QaraÃāwī164. Many Muslim 
jurists allowed the strict usage of maÒlaÎa without losing its traditional 
character. They agreed that maÒlaÎa can be used to determine evidence in 
cases where no explicit textual text exists and where it pertains to a matter 
of necessity. That means maÒlaÎa can only be a valid basis of judgment 
when it does not contradict textual evidence or ijmÁÝ (the consensus of the 
ÝulamÁ’). MÁlik was also reported approving the idea of maÒlaÎa mursala 
but on three conditions :165 first, the case under review should be one 
pertaining to matters of transactions and should not relate to worship; 
Secondly, that the interest should be in harmony with the spirit of the law 
and should not be in conflict with any of its sources; thirdly, the interest 
should be of an essential type. It can be seen here that the MÁlikÐ version of 
maÒlaÎa mursala is prompted by necessity similar to the al-GhazÁlÐ’s theory 
of maÒlaha. Hence, they only accepted the maÒlaha that falls under the 
category of necessity as a valid source of Îukm.  
                                                 
162 See WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Vol. 
XXVIII, p. 210 
163 See also WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, 
Vol. XXVIII, p. 248. Meanwhile al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-JuwainÐ and majority of the ÍanafÐs viewed 
that maÒlaÎa that is free from textual evidecence can be a valid legal basis if the interests 
protected is close to dire need type. The concept of maÒÁliÎ mursala was actually proposed 
by MÁliki, while the rests objected its application. See also Sayf al-DÐn AbÐ al-Íasan ÝAlÐ 
bin AbÐ AlÐ bin Muhammad al-ÀmidÐ, al-IÎkÁm fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Beirut: DÁr al-Kutb al-
ÝIlmiyya, 1985, Vol. IV, p. 393 
164 al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎa fÐ SharÐÝa IslÁmiyya, pp. 152-154.  
165 WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Vol. 
XXVIII, p. 210 
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Analysing this argument, a maÒlaÎa case is also treated as a ÃarÙra case 
when it comes to the question of preserving the five necessities. This is 
evident in the case of refraining from chopping off the hand of a thief who 
steals food during a famine. Muslim scholars have argued that ÝUmar's 
decision to refrain from cutting off a thief’s hand during famine is actually 
not a contradiction of the textual evidence, but is actually an exemption case 
which is known as shubahÁt in Islamic penal law. The act of ÝUmar was to 
preserve the maÒlaÎa of the hungry one and at the same time the objective 
of the law is upheld. The public interest (maÒlaÎa) can be seen as a concept 
that facilitates the needs of the society, it takes into account the change of 
society, time and place. The rule that governs society will change 
accordingly. According to the majority of jurists, including al-GhazÁlÐ, 
maÒaliÎ mursala is only valid as a source of Îukm when it serves to protect 
the interest of the community, not the personal interest. This is because the 
individual interests vary and a Muslim may cling to maÒlaÎa to fulfill his 
worldly interests.  
 
Another controversial concept of maÒlaÎa is promulgated by al-ÓÙfÐ, who 
promoted the application of maÒlaÎa in a much wider sense. He argued that 
this concept is applicable disregarding the type of the interest protected as 
long as it benefits human being. He even went further by approving the 
concept of maÒlaÎa which contradicts explicit textual evidence. His main 
argument is that the concept of maÒlaÎa in protecting human interests is the 
main objective of divine law. In other words, all rulings are created to serve 
human interests. On this basis, it can validate any act that benefits human 
beings. However, he also put a limit by stating that this general concept 
cannot be applied in certain areas such as particular worship matters and 
legal penalties such as ÎudÙd.  These laws remain immutable, hence, it does 
not leave any room for the maÒlaÎa considerations. Al-ÓÙfÐ went much 
further when he indicated that that maÒÁliÎ mursala is a valid source of law 
and it supersedes the explicit provision even of the revealed text166.  
 
                                                 
166 See Mohammad Muslehudin, Islamic Jurisprudence and the Rule of Necessity and 
Need, Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, p. 55 
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However, this concept fails to attract the attention of modern Muslim jurists. 
It can be stipulated that this rejection results from a fear that Islamic law 
will lose its character and the jurists fear that al-ÓÙfÐ’s concept of maÒlaÎa 
will easily be abused. Another discussion of maÒlaÎa also continues about 
the validity of this concept as a source of Îukm.  The first group insisted 
that this concept is only applicable in a limited way, and only to protect the 
five fundamental necessities, hence, it cannot be made a source of Îukm. 
The second group argued that this concept should apply in a much wider 
sense, and they have legalised maÒlaÎa as a source of the Îukm. It can cover 
both necessity and need cases. The basis for their argument is that the 
protection of human interests recognised in the Qur’Án include all types of 
interest.  
 
The distinction between the application of necessity and maÒlaÎa was 
briefly mentioned by M. Muslehudin.  He argued167:  
if a necessity type of interest comes into conflict with the 
established law, the latter must give the way to the former 
because necessity knows no law. But if the interest has nothing 
to do with necessity, it should not be in conflict with any of 
SharÐÝa sources or the spirits of Islamic laws. 
 
 
2.3 MaqÁÒid al-SharÐÝa  and the rule of ÃarÙra 
The study of maqÁÒid (the objectives of the law) stemmed from the belief 
that the divine law is revealed with the purpose of protecting human 
interests, including the protection of the five necessities (ÃarÙriyyÁt). These 
necessities are also known as the “five fundamental elements of human 
existence.” The five are the protection of religion (dÐn), life (nafs), reason 
(Ýaql), wealth (mÁl) and to protect lineage (nasab)168. In promulgating the 
divine law, all these necessities must be protected. The maqÁÒid are said to 
describe the purpose of the law and the wisdom behind specific laws. 
MaqÁÒid, then, are a group of divine intents and moral concepts upon which 
Islamic law is based169.  
                                                 
167 Ibid. 
168 See al-ShÁÔibÐ,  al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Vol. II, p. 4, MuÎammad ÓÁhir Ibn 
‘ÀshÙr, MaqÁÒid al-SharÐ‘ah al-Islamiyya, DÁr As-SalÁm. Al-ShÁÔibÐ believes that the law 
is revealed to protect human's interests and God knows what is best for human being.  
169 MaqÒid means purpose and it is an alternative expression for people's interest (maÒaliÎ). 
Al-Juwayni (d. 478) used maqÁÒid and maÒÁliÎ ÝÁmma interchangeably. See Jasser Auda, 
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Interestingly, these objectives of SharÐÝa (the protection of life, property, 
progeny, mind and religion) as argued by Wael B. Hallaq do not have 
explicit attestation in any particular piece of conclusive or textual 
evidence170. Hallaq argued that the subject of maqÁÒid al-SharÐÝa is 
enshrined with certainty in the collective mind of the Muslim community, 
as well as in Muslim individuals. This certainty is engendered by virtue of 
the fact that these principles have been established by a wide variety of 
types of evidence, which in their totality, lead to certitude.  However, when 
taken individually, the pieces of evidence do not rise above the level of 
probability. The task of cultivating the evidence in constructing the theory 
of maqÁÒid al-SharÐÝa was pioneered by al-ShÁÔibÐ171. Hallaq observed that 
all substantive rules which are based on particular pieces of evidence are 
developed to preserve either one or other of the five fundamentals. The 
theory of the roots on the other hand, is grounded in such an extensive body 
of evidence that although the particular pieces of this evidence may be 
probable, they result in certainty due to their mutual corroboration. Thus 
once the five fundamental universals are established, law must be 
interpreted according to them, and any particular, hitherto not considered, 
must be either subsumed under these universals or as al-ShÁÔibÐ argued,  it 
must be left out and classed as a non-conforming particular. However, such 
particulars must be accounted for, since they could not have been decreed 
purposelessly172.   
 
The protection of the five necessities not only involves involve religious 
obligations but should be applied to worldly affairs like social relationships 
and business transactions173. When several categories are at stake, al-ShÁÔibÐ 
argued that almost in all situations, protecting one’s religion is of the utmost 
                                                                                                                            
Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, London, Washington: The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008, p. 2 
170 Wael B. Hallaq, The History of Islamic Legal Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1997,  pp. 166-167. Wael B. Hallaq has called this process as inductive 
corroboration on a large scale that draws the line between legal theory- dealing with what 
has been characterised as "the roots of the law" and "substantive law" 
171 Wael B. Hallaq, The History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 196 
172 See also MuÎammad ÓÁhir Ibn ‘ÀshÙr, MaqÁÒid al-SharÐ‘ah al-Islamiyya, p. 11. The 
belief that AllÁh does not create something purposely is based on the chapter al-DukhÁn; 
38-39, and chapter al-Mu'minÙn: 115. 
173 al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Vol. II, pp. 25-26 
 79 
importance. This gains priority over the other necessities. In addition, he 
gave preference to life over property174. However, he stated that mafÁsid 
(harm) and manÁfiÝ (benefit) vary depending on the situation and the person 
involved.   
 
As far as the study of the maqÁÒid is concerned, the protection of universal 
interests is also divided into three different groups on the basis of strength. 
In descending order, first, the category of necessity (ÃarÙriyya), then need 
(ÎÁjiyya), and then luxuries (taÎsiniyya). The first group receives the utmost 
importance in the law making process. Into this category fall the necessities 
preserving religion, life, offspring, mind and some jurists added the 
preservation of honour. Any failure to protect this ÃarÙriyya type will lead 
to total or major disorder. Human existence largely depends on these five 
elements. The next category is the category of “need”, for example the rules 
of salam175 and Ýariya176. This need type is important for human beings to 
avoid difficulties and hardships though it is not fundamental for the life of 
the human being. The final category is that of luxuries and this category is 
designed for the betterment of living, such as decorating one’s house or 
having a feast. The rulings in this category are mainly "indifferent" (mubÁÎ) 
or permissible unless the item in question leads to excess or it is shown as 
an act of greediness. In his book, Jasser Audah found that these three levels 
of necessities are reminiscent of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs177. 
Human needs, according to Maslow, range from basic physiological 
requirements and safety, to love and esteem and to self-actualism. It can be 
said that the Islamic hierarchy of necessities is not so different from these 
natural human needs that are required for a safe and well-balanced life. In 
Islam, the perfect system of life and a complete civilisation can only be 
achieved through the protection of these maqÁÒid.  
 
                                                 
174 al-ShÁÔibÐ, al-MuwÁfaqÁt fÐ UÒÙl al-AÎkÁm, Vol. II, p. 26 
175 It is used to designate a particular contract classifiable as a contract of sale  and 
synonymous.   Regarded as a category of transaction in its own right, salam has as its 
fundamental principle prepayment by a purchaser (al-musallim) for an object of sale (al-
musallam fÐhÐ) i.e merchandise constituting the subject-matter of the contract) to be 
delivered to him by the vendor (al-musallam ilayhi) on a date at the end of a specified 
period. See http://www.brillonline.nl 
176 Fresh dates on trees intended to be eaten, which it is permitted to exchange in small 
quantities for dried dates  
177 Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, p. 4. 
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The important question is, then, what is the relation between the study of 
maqÁÒid and the study of the rule of ÃarÙra?  The study of maqÁÒid reveals 
the intention of the Law-maker in the law making process. As a result, the 
scholars of maqÁÒid believed that SharÐÝa law is revealed to protect five 
essential elements of human beings. The divine rulings should be 
categorised according to their level of necessity. The mandatory category of 
rules, namely the obligation (wÁjib) and the forbidden (ÎarÁm) are meant to 
protect the ÃarÙriyaÔ type of human interests, hence, the wÁjib and ÎarÁm 
categories receive the most attention from the jurists. It can be assumed that 
modern writers studying the principle of ÃarÙra, such as Wahbah ZuhailÐ, 
Mutairi and BiltajÐ, have been influenced by the study of maqÁÒid.  Al-
ShÁÔibÐ’s list of necessities influenced their formulation of the new doctrine 
of ÃarÙra rule. While the medieval jurists theoretically limited the 
application of ÃarÙra to the protection of life and property, modern scholars 
have expanded this rule covering all categories of necessities formulated by 
al-ShÁÔibÐ. It can also be suggested that the new formulation of ÃarÙra 
theory only emerged after al-ShÁÔÐbi's theory of maqÁÒid was widely 
accepted in the Islamic legal community. Hence, as far as the purpose of 
law is concerned, any harm (mafÁsid) to one of these fundamental elements 
should be avoided. In extreme ÃarÙra situations, where harm is believed to 
occur to any of five necessities, one is permitted to break a rule whether by 
delaying an obligation or committing a sin.  
 
2. 4 ÂarÙra in the Islamic legal maxims 
In this part of the writing, the principle of ÃarÙra discussed in the study of 
qawÁÝid fiqhiyya will be analysed178. Within any classical work of qawÁÝid, 
the rule of ÃarÙra is treated in a more comprehensive and decipherable 
manner. The definition, the preconditions and relevant ÃarÙra cases have 
been extensively expounded in the study of Islamic legal maxims (qawÁÝid 
fiqhiyya). TÁj al-DÐn al-SubkÐ (d.756/1370) stated that qawÁÝid fiqhiyya is 
the "collection of principles (qÁÝida) that are the generally valid principles 
with which many particular cases (juzÞiyyÁt) agree, whose legal 
                                                 
178 For this particular discussion, I only limit myself to the study of qawÁÝid fiqhiyya within 
the ShÁfÝÐ and ÍanafÐ schools and I chose the work of ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn bin AbÙ Bakr bin 
MuÎammad al-ÑuyÙtÐ, al-Ashbah wa al-NaÛÁÝir , DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya,1983 and AÎmad 
bin MuÎammad al-ÍamawÐ, Ghamz al-ÝUyÙn al-BaÒÁÞir, DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya, 1985 
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determinations can be understood from (the qÁÝida)"179. However, there is a 
great distinction between the study of qawÁÝid fiqhiyya and uÒÙl al-fiqh. 
Most Muslim scholars agreed that qawÁÝid fiqhiyya are only predominantly 
valid and not generally valid, unlike the study of uÒÙl al-fiqh.  The 
predominant (aghlabiyya) notion of qawÁÝid fiqhiyya is due to the existence 
of irrefutable exceptions to the qawÁÝid180. The study of uÒÙl al-fiqh is a 
hermeneutical principle, language-oriented, and is not about immediate 
legal substance. Meanwhile the study of qawÁÝid concerns about the 
principles of general rules which consecutive rules agree upon. In addition, 
W. Heinrichs181 is unsure about the implication of qawÁÝid in the 
development of uÒÙl al-fiqh but as the uÒÙl al-fiqh has developed without 
any input from the qawÁÝid, both should be kept apart.  
 
It can be said that the study of legal maxims is an effort put forward by 
Sunni jurists to extract simple statements or principles from the vast fiqhÐ 
literature. As Islamic law developed gradually under various headings and 
subheadings, the legal maxims were created later to help jurists remember 
the particular rulings for each individual case182. The underlying structures 
and patterns of the rulings have been derived from primary sources, thus 
creating the general rules which the consecutive rules normally agree upon. 
Kamali argued that legal maxims express the goals and the objectives of the 
sharÐÝa183. While some of the legal maxims are basically a reiteration of 
Qur’Án and Sunna like the maxim of al-umÙr bi maqÁÒidihÁ, some are 
derived from the consensus of the scholars, such as the maxim of lÁ ijtihÁd 
maÝa an-naÒÒ (there is no ijtihÁd with the availability of text). Many 
prominent early scholars created maxims including AbÙ ÍanÐfa; “kullu mÁl 
aÒluhu amÁna” (all property is originally regarded as a trust), al-ShÁfiÝÐ; “al-
rukhaÒ lÁ tunÁlu bi al-maÝÁÒÐ” (the dispensation is not meant for a sinner) 
                                                 
179 See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ShariÝah Law – An Introduction, Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2008, p. 143 
180 Further critical reading on QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya can be found in Wolfart Heinreichs, 
"QawÁÝid as a general legal literature", in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory,  Bernard G. 
Weiss (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp. 365-384.                                                                            
181 Ibid. 
182 Wahbah ZuhailÐ argues that the study of legal maxim emerged in the second century of 
Hijri. See al-QawÁÝid al Fiqhiyya bayna Ta’ÒÐl wa TaÔbÐq, “ÚuhÙr al-QawÁÝid al-Fiqhiyya 
min ManÛÙr al-MuqÁran”, p. 6 
183 Mohamamad Hashim Kamali, QawÁÝid al-fiqh, The Association of Muslim Lawyer, p. 
1, http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/usul/Kamali_Qawaid_al-Fiqh.pdf 
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and MÁlik; “mÁ yufsid al-thawb fa lÁ yufsid al-mÁ’” (what damages clothes 
cannot damage the purity of water)184. These are the examples of the early 
legal maxims extracted by scholars illustrating their reasoning and 
methodology, therefore, the maxims seemed more madhhab specific 
according to some. Kamali further argued that the early ÍanafÐs like AbÙ 
Íasan al-KarkhÐ (d. 200/815) were believed to be the first who compiled 
and formulated legal maxims.185 He compiled about 37 maxims from AbÙ 
ÓÁhir al-DabbÁs and most of these are madhhab centered. The earliest 
collection of ÍanafÐ legal maxims included the main five leading maxims:  
1. al-umÙr bi maqÁÒidihÁ  (acts are judged according to the intention)  
2. al-yaqÐn la yazÙl bi al-shakk  (certainty is not overruled by doubt)  
3. al-Ãarar yuzÁl  (harm must be eliminated) 
4. al-mashaqqa tajlib al-taysÐr  (hardship begets facility) 
5. al-ÝÁdat muÎakkama (custom is to be the basis of judgment)  
 
Many later scholars from other madhhab have added to the literatures and 
the collection exceeds twelve hundred maxims. For instance, al-QarÁfÐ (d. 
684/1285) managed to create 274 legal maxims186 while a ÍanbalÐ jurist, 
Ibn Rajab (d. 795h/1392) formulated sixty qawÁÝid187. Another ShÁfiÝÐ jurist, 
al-ZarkashÐ (d. 794/1391) managed to list the legal maxims 
alphabetically188. As the study developed over time, the above five leading 
maxims were agreed between all schools of law. It is clearly understood that 
legal maxims are inductively derived from existing rulings that have been 
explicitly derived from primary sources. Rulings that have been derived 
using primary sources cannot be undone using legal maxims. In other 
words, qÁÝida al-fiqh cannot overrule a Îukm derived from primary sources 
i.e Qur’Án and Sunna. It is also important to bear in mind that the study of 
qawÁÝid fiqhiyya is a shortcut to reach a judgment already made by previous 
scholars and not a tool to reach new solutions.  Therefore, it is not a source 
                                                 
184 See al-QawÁÝid al Fiqhiyya bayna Ta’ÒÐl wa TaÔbÐq, “ÚuhÙr al-QawÁÝid al-Fiqhiyya min 
ManÛÙr al-MuqÁran”, p. 8 
185 See al-QawÁÝid al-Fiqhiyya bayna Ta’ÒÐl wa TaÔbÐq, “ÚuhÙr al-QawÁÝid al-Fiqhiyya min 
ManÛÙr al-MuqÁran”, p. 8, Mohamamad Hashim Kamali, QawÁÝid al-fiqh, The Association 
of Muslim Lawyer, p7, http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/usul/Kamali_Qawaid_al-Fiqh.pdf 
186 AÎmad bin IdrÐs al-QarÁfÐ, AnwÁr al-BurÙq fÐ AnwÁÝ al-FurÙÝ ,ÝÀlam al-Kutub 
187 Abd al-RaÎmÁn bin AÎmad al-ÍanbalÐ, al-QawÁÝid lÐ Ibn Rajab, DÁr al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya 
188 See Badr al-Din bin MuÎammad Bahadur al-ZarkashÐ, al-ManthÙr fÐ al-QawÁÝid al-
Fiqhiyya  
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of law. However, some argued that legal maxims can be a source of Îukm if 
the qaÝÐda is derived explicitly from the Qur’Án and Sunna, like the maxim 
of al-umÙr bimaqÁÒidihÁ and al-mashaqqa tajlib al-taysÐr. It can be 
speculated that the authority of these two maxims, whereby they became 
sources of law, actually originated from the textual evidence, and their legal 
maxim status in itself does not give them any authority to solve new 
problems. This is why the majority of jurists did not accept legal maxims as 
sources of aÎkÁm189.  
 
In the discussion of the maxim “necessity permits prohibited things”, 
Muslim jurists generally agreed that the maxim, under certain cases which 
are considered as necessity, implies that an obligation can be delayed or a 
sin can be committed. The permission to break the rule, however, is 
temporary as long as the cause exists. The preconditions to exercise ÃarÙra 
rule in extreme situations have been extracted from the various fiqhÐ cases 
and include eating mayta and ikrÁh (duress).  These accumulated 
preconditions extracted from scattered cases then became the preconditions 
for any additional ÃarÙra cases. Several maxims relate to ÃarÙra situations, 
including al-mashaqqa tajlib taysÐr (difficulties permit facilities), darÙra 
tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙra (necessities permits prohibitions), al-ÃarÙra tuqaddar 
biqadarihÁ (necessity estimated by the extent thereof) and al-ÃarÙra la tubÁÎ 
Îaqq al-ghayr (the necessities does not invalidate the rights of others).  
 
The maxim related to ÃarÙra study is necessities permits prohibitions (al-
ÃarÙra tubiÎ al maÎÛÙra): This maxim states that in an extreme situation, 
Muslims are generally permitted to perform a prohibited action. However, 
the jurists categorised the prohibited acts in term of the level of the sin and 
moral guilt into three categories190: 
First, in such a situation, the prohibited act is permitted and no sin is 
committed, for instance the consumption of unlawful foodstuffs or drinking 
wine. The jurists agreed that the consumption of muÎarramÁ especially for 
reasons of hunger is permitted and the Muslim is allowed to eat whatever 
prolongs his life. The permission includes drinking wine to stop choking. 
                                                 
189 See ShihÁb al-DÐn al-QarÁfÐ, al-FurÙq, Vol. I-IV, Beirut: ÝÀlam al-Kutub, 1985 
190 ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz MuÎammad ÝAzÁm, QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya, 1998, pp. 150-151 
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The jurists also included life-threatening situations, i.e. being forced to 
commit a prohibited act. Only complete compulsion (ikrÁh tÁmm) permits 
the consumption of muÎarrama. Complete compulsion means that the 
person who is being forced is helpless and falls completely under the power 
of the oppressor. This includes the act to force someone to act or to say 
something without or against his will. Consequently, the victim is 
compelled to perform the act unwillingly. In other words, he would not do 
such an act if he was left alone. However, in this kind of extreme situation, 
the person under duress is still socially liable for the act (ÃamÁn). For 
example, the permission to eat another’s meal during famine does not 
negate the owner’s right to have the price of the meal. In other words, the 
hungry person has to pay the price when he is capable of doing so.  
 
Secondly, there are acts which remain prohibited but the sin is removed, 
like uttering the word of unbelief or damaging another’s properties. The act 
is permitted in order to protect a Muslim from the greater harm, for 
example, in the case of uttering the word of unbelief. It is allowed to recite 
the word kufr while the heart remains with God, but the uttering of such 
words remains a prohibition. It is only that the person is not rendered guilty.  
 
Thirdly, there are the deeds, which under no circumstance are allowed, 
whether the compulsion was “complete” or not. These acts remain 
prohibited and sinful. The situation would not change the status of 
prohibited acts. The acts are killing, damaging a limb, beating parents or 
committing adultery. All these acts are prohibited in whatever the situation. 
That means if someone is forced to kill another person, is not acceptable for 
him to do so. There are lengthy discussions on the issue of the punishment 
for those committing a sin under compulsion.  For example, the jurists 
disputed in the case of the murderer who was forced to murder as to 
whether he should be punished by qiÒÁÒ or  not? However, the jurists agreed 
on the point that compulsion becomes a mitigating element in some ÎudÙd 
cases, i.e. adultery cases. The person who commits zinÁ will not be 
punished by the Îadd punishment as the compulsion is treated as shubÎa, 
which can lift the original punishment. From the foregoing explanation, it 
can be concluded that in necessity cases, some prohibited acts change to 
 85 
being totally permitted, some acts only lift the sin, while some prohibited 
acts remain prohibited in every situation. This leads one to the conclusion 
that necessity cases should not be treated as absolute principles, as the 
prohibited acts themselves vary in terms of the degree of the prohibition. To 
some extent, the people under duress also vary and one must assess his own 
situation before he can easily adapt the rule of necessity. However, the 
jurists only acknowledged life-threatening situations as valid causes in a 
necessity case. This includes compulsion cases where only complete 
compulsion can legalise a prohibited act.  
 
In terms of the harm that can be caused under necessity, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists 
concluded that, “the harm in the prohibited act must not exceed the harm in 
the act”. This maxim states that any harm in a prohibited act must not 
exceed the degree of the danger. For example, in the case of dafÝ al-sÁ’il 
(legitimate defence), where one has to defend oneself from attack or 
oppression, Islam permits one to cause harm to others. However, the actual 
act of defence must be in proportion to the degree of the danger and 
repelling the danger must be by the least harmful means available. For 
example, when a man is oppressed by someone who is attacking his family 
and his property, he is allowed to cause harm to the attacker on the 
condition that he does the least harm possible. If the oppressor can be 
stopped by threatening to call the police for instance, he has to do so, or in 
other words, he has to choose the lesser evil191. If he can stop the oppressor 
by beating without killing, he has to choose to do that. In Islam it is 
permitted to kill a Muslim who is trying to kill another Muslim. However, 
the jurists disputed this case. Some said the act of the oppressor has to be 
repelled even if he has to be killed as there is a ÎadÐth saying: “who kills (or 
was killed) to protect his property is a martyr192”. Some said it is not 
permitted to kill the oppressor and the lesser harm has to be chosen. In 
another example, the jurists also approved of the demolition of an 
intervening house to prevent the spread of fire to adjacent buildings just as 
they approved of dumping the cargo of an overloaded ship overboard to 
prevent danger to the life of the passengers.  
                                                 
191 ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz MuÎammad ÝAzÁm, QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya, p. 176 
192 This ÎadÐth is mentioned in  Chapter One 
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This maxim of al-ÃarÙra tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙra is closely related with another 
maxim: “necessity is measured in accordance to its true proportion” (al-
ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadarihÁ). For example, if a court orders the sale of assets 
of a negligent debtor to pay to his creditors, it must begin with the sale of 
his moveable goods, if this would suffice to clear his debt before selling his 
real property. Likewise, eating mayta is only for the sustenance of life and 
no provisions can be taken from it. This maxim is based on a verse in 
Q6.119193. The maxim includes the case of consuming alcohol, professing 
kufr and damaging property of another. The prohibited act can only be 
committed during the period of necessity. However, when the case occurs 
during a famine, it is permitted to take provision from it. The case of food 
will be further discussed in the next chapter. The case also includes the case 
of taking meals in non-Muslim countries, which is permitted until he 
reaches home.  
 
Another important maxim related to necessity is the maxim al-Ãarar yuzÁl 
(harm must be eliminated). This important principle states that whatever 
harm occurs should be minimised as much as possible. This maxim is 
closely related with the maxim that no harm should be inflicted or 
reciprocated (lÁ Ãarar walÁ ÃirÁr), which means that in any situation, one 
cannot cause harm to another or cannot return the injury which has been 
already received. These maxims derived from a ÎadÐth of lÁ Ãarar walÁ ÃirÁr 
also related to other similar maxims. For example, a specific harm is 
tolerated in order to prevent a more general one (yutaÎammul al-Ãarar al-
khÁÒ li dafÝ Ãarar al-ÝÁmm), harm is eliminated to the extent that is possible 
(al-Ãararu yudfaÝ bi qadr al-imkÁn) and a greater harm is eliminated by 
means of a lesser harm (yuzÁl Ãarar al-ashadd bi al-Ãarar al-akhÁf)194. These 
relevant maxims illustrate that in any ÃarÙra case, when there is more than 
one option, the lesser harm must be chosen. An assessment of the harm of 
the acts will be discussed in the case study in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
193 “Why should you not eat such animals when God has already fully explained what He 
has forbidden you, except when forced by hunger? But many lead others astray by their 
desires, wtihout any true knowledge; your Lord knows best who oversteps the limit”  
194 ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz MuÎammad ÝAzÁm, QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya, p. 202 
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It can be concluded that the study of legal maxims has revealed the 
important preconditions of ÃarÙra. ÂarÙra cannot be labelled as an absolute 
permission to commit an act as it does not always allow all kinds of 
prohibition (such as marrying one’s own sister or murdering others). The 
limits of ÃarÙra have been precisely put forward by the jurists in the 
discussion of Islamic legal maxims. The harm done in times of necessity 
should be limited and minimised as much as possible and if there are two 
options of evil acts, one has to choose the lesser evil act. The jurists have 
also agreed that in a situation where two interests are at risk, one can 
tolerate incurring specific harm to a specific person or property to avoid a 
more general harm. 
 
2.5 Preconditions of ÃarÙra 
From ongoing legal discussions, modern writer Wahbah ZuhailÐ has made 
an effort to extract certain valuable preconditions for ÃarÙra, which can be 
summarised as follows195: 
1. The extreme situation is certain. The harm or the damage, or the 
casualty will definitely materialise in the religion (dÐn), property 
(mÁl), life (nafs), reason (Ýaql) and lineage (nasb). The ratio of 
certainty to probability that harm will materialise is described as 
ghalba al-Ûann (something that we confirm within the general 
customs, probably pre-dominance, pre-tested by experience). Hence, 
if the Ãarar (harm) is believed to materialise, the ruling of exception 
(dispensation) is permitted to take place. 
2. It is certain that the muÃtarr (the person under duress) has to perform 
something illegal in order to prevent a greater harm. In other words, 
he/she has no other alternative action in order to preserve religion, 
property, life, reason or lineage. For instance if he/she cannot find 
any ÎalÁl food, he/she is permitted to consume unlawful food. 
However, if there is ÎalÁl food, even though it belongs to others, the 
person can take it without permission as the owner is obliged to give 
the meal to him. It is therefore accepted that an obligation is omitted 
if a person is under duress. 
                                                 
195 NaÛariyÁt al-ÂarÙra al-SharÝiyya, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1997, p. 65-68 
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3. However, sometimes a prohibited act is still permitted even if there 
are other lawful alternatives. This is the case of coercion. For 
instance, if a Muslim is forced to eat something ÎarÁm and at the 
same time there is ÎalÁl food in front of him, it is permitted for him 
to consume the ÎarÁm meal. In this case, the ShafiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs 
are of the opinion that whatever reasons permit a Muslim to turn to 
tayammum, are also reasons to consume a ÎarÁm meal.  
4. However, as noted earlier, the ÃarÙra rule does not permit a Muslim 
to cause harm to others, for example, if he is forced to rape or 
murder other people. The ÃarÙra rule does not justify killing or 
raping. Hence, it is obvious that necessity does not permit a Muslim 
to cause grievous harm to others.  
5. The prohibited things can only be committed within certain 
limitations and the harm caused must be minimised as much as 
possible. The consumption is permitted only at a minimum level or 
at the level of sufficiency, yet at amounts enough to prevent harm. 
6. The prohibited acts can only be committed by the verification of the 
specialist or experts. In this case, ZuhailÐ provided the case of using 
muÎarrama for medical purposes. According to him, only the view 
of a pious, experienced Muslim doctor can be taken into account to 
verify the situation. It is obvious that ZuhailÐ did not give full license 
to individuals to assess their own extreme situation as he stresses 
that a reliable second opinion is needed in this case.  
7. The capability to refrain from ÎarÁm acts in ÃarÙra differs and varies 
according to personal capacity. For instance, Ibn Íazm (d. 
456/1063) from the ÚÁhirÐ School suggested that a person under 
duress has to wait for at least one day and one night before eating a 
ÎarÁm meal196. However, many Sunni jurists contended that this is 
not an absolute requirement as cases vary according to different 
persons and places. The prevalent view is that it is not necessary to 
wait for a certain time. 
8. In matters concerning public needs and safety, the walÐ al-amr (the 
ruler) has to verify and determine whether the situation is really a 
                                                 
196 ÞAlÐ bin AÎmad bin SaÝÐd bin Íazm, al-MuÎallÁ bi al-Àthar, DÁr al-Fikr, Vol. VI, p. 105 
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necessity or not, meaning that it might incur huge damage that could 
not be rectified.  
9. The jurists agreed that the prohibited act committed under ÃarÙra 
must be in proportion to the harm incurred. For example, a person in 
a case of legitimate defence is permitted to defend himself from an 
attack and thus he is permitted to cause harm to the attacker as 
previously discussed. Similarly, in the case of taking money from a 
reluctant debtor, the lender is only allowed to confiscate what is 
equivalent to the debt.  
Having examined these conditions, it can be concluded that ZuhailÐ had 
formulated the conditions above from relevant classical legal maxims and 
ÃarÙra cases in fiqh literature. These requirements can be seen as the general 
guidelines that can be applied to new emerging cases. He has provided 
many classical and modern cases of ÃarÙra. However, one does find some 
non-necessity cases which have been included in this writing, such as the 
case of ignorance and forgetfulness. He treated these cases as darÙra cases, 
whereas actually they are not. It might be speculated that ZuhailÐ has mixed 
the case of lifting an obligation and the case of life threatening situation that 
demands one to put aside a temporary rule. The first case he mentioned 
relates to the ÎadÐth of the Prophet saying: there are three exceptions in 
Islam, when one is asleep, when one is in ignorance and when one is still 
minor. The Prophet recognised ‘ignorance’ and a ‘sleeping person’ as 
rendering a person incompetent to fulfil his religious duty. These cases are 
not necessity cases as the deviation from the standard rule is granted, not 
because of the harm directed to any of human's necessities but due to the 
incompetency of the mukallaf. 
There is another condition of ÃarÙra which was discussed extensively by the 
medieval jurists, the condition of being a pious Muslim. Some jurists 
insisted that only a pious person has the right to exercise ÃarÙra. Part of this 
discussion has been presented in the previous chapter under the subheading 
concerning the evidence of ÃarÙra and the discussion of rukhÒa. There is a 
difference among SunnÐ schools regarding a person who is eligible to 
exercise ÃarÙra and rukhÒa. The majority of Muslim jurists agreed that the 
right to act according to necessity is not granted to a disobedient person, 
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while some jurists did not differentiate between these two groups of 
Muslims. According to ShÁfiÝÐ jurists197, ÍanbalÐ jurists198 and a ÍanafÐ; al-
SarakhÒÐ199, only a traveller with a good purpose is permitted to eat dead 
meat (mayta) when there is no other alternative. Meanwhile, a traveller on a 
journey with a morally bad purpose is not allowed to consume a muÎarrama 
(unlawful meal). The basis of their argument is that the principle of ÃarÙra 
is a facility exclusively dispensed to necessitate and help a Muslim avoiding 
hardship. They are not meant to be used to assist a Muslim in committing a 
crime, such as declaring war against a Muslim ruler or launching an attack 
on other Muslims. For them, allowing a criminal to exercise ÃarÙra only 
further assists him in committing a sin. The basis of their argument is the 
Qur’Ánic verse “famaniÃturra ghayr bÁghin walÁ ÝÁdin” (without willful 
disobedience nor transgressing limit)200. According to this view, this verse 
should be read as the condition to act upon ÃarÙra that is only applied to 
those who are   pious persons and do not act outside of the SharÐÝa (such as 
declaring war on a Muslim ruler or going out to commit a robbery)201.  
However, the ÍanafÐ jurists and ImÁm MÁlik ruled that the permission to 
eat mayta is for all, both sinners and righteous people202. This means that 
the intention in the journey does not affect the right to utilise a dispensation 
(such as eating mayta).  Although acknowledging the term ghayr bÁghin 
walÁ Ýadin as the condition that should be met in ÃarÙra situations, the 
jurists (ÍanafÐ jurists and ImÁm MÁlik) interpreted the verse differently203. 
This means the muÃtarr should not exceed the limit to commit a prohibited 
act. In other words, the Muslim should not have the worldly desire to 
transgress the rule but merely acts out of necessity.  
 
                                                 
197 MuÎammad bin IdrÐs al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. II, p. 276 and ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ 
al-MaÔÁlib SharÎ Raudh al-Óalib, Vol. I, p. 571 
198 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 333  
199 See al-SarakhsÐ, al-MuÎarrar fÐ UÒÙl al-fiqh, Vol.I, Beirut: DÁr Kutb ÝIlmiyya, 1996, p. 
60. Al-SarakhsÐ as the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists regarded rukhÒa is a kind of dispensation exclusively 
given to a pious non sinner people and it is classified as a niÝma (bounty) from God that 
only can be enjoyed by non-sinner. This is also the opinion of MujÁhid and SaÝÐd bin 
Jubayr. See al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn lil-JaÒÒÁÒ, Vol. I, p.178 
200 Q6.145 and Q16.115 
201 Ibn al-ÝArabi, AÎkÁm al-Qur’an, Vol.I, p. 57, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 333 
202Al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn lil-JaÒÒÁÒ, Vol. I, p. 178 
203 See MuÒÔafÁ al-ÍanafÐ, RÙÎ al-QurÞÁn FÐ TafsÐr al-BayÁn, Vol.I, p. 281 
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2.6 Situations and reasons that lead to ÃarÙra  
Different writers have their very own categorisation of ÃarÙra 
circumstances. For example, ZuhailÐ has listed 14 categories of situation 
which he deems ÃarÙra. The lists include the situations of food and drink, 
complete compulsion, forgetfulness, ignorance, al-Ýusr and ÝumÙm al balwÁ 
(hardship and hard-to-remove difficulties), travelling, sickness, al-naqÒ al-
ÔabÐÝÐ (natural defect), legitimate defence, istiÎsÁn (juristic preference), 
maÒlaÎa (custom), Ýurf (legal custom), sadd al-dharÁiÞ (blocking the means) 
and capturing one’s property. Meanwhile, in his thesis, MutairÐ listed only 
four causes of necessity which are compulsion, legitimate defence, illness 
and change in circumstances204.  
Having examined both works, neither can be regarded as giving a 
comprehensive list of darÙra situations. It can be assumed that such 
categorisations are mainly based on exemplary cases in classical jurist 
works or fiqh treatises. However, Mutairi added a new case of necessity, 
that is, a change in circumstances. Although Zuhaili's categorisation may 
seem quite comprehensive, he has actually mixed the necessity cases with 
the non-necessity cases, for example, the cases of ignorance and 
forgetfulness. Ignorance and forgetfulness are not ÃarÙra cases as there is no 
serious harm inflicted and no human necessities to be protected. However, 
these cases of ignorance and forgetfulness are excuses which destroy or 
impair the legal capacity of a person or change the injunctions applicable to 
him during the circumstances205. The same is the case of naqÒ al-ÔabÐÝÐ 
(natural defect). A person who has a natural defect is not considered as a 
mukallaf, hence, he has no religious obligation to fulfil206. In a ÃarÙra 
                                                 
204 See ZuhailÐ NaÛariyÁt al-ÂarÙra al-SharÝiyya   and and Mansour al-Mutairi, Necessity in 
Islamic Law,  pp. 78-165 
205 For instance, a man has not been legally obliged to perform an act unless detailed 
knowledge and information about it has been provided.  See Ahmad Hassan, The Principle 
of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 257. There are also two main conditions for the application of 
the command to a person under obligation; they are reason and legal capacity. The legal 
capacity of a man for legal command is realised by intelligence. Circumstances that affect 
legal capacity include lunacy, infancy, idiocy, forgetfulness, sleep, fainting, slavery, death 
illness, menstruation, childbed and death. See pp. 308-332 
206 See Gimaret, D. “TaklÐf (a.).” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman;  Th. 
Bianquis;  C.E. Bosworth;  E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill 
Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-7344>  
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situation, the person under duress is considered to be a complete mukallaf,   
but the pressing situation is an impediment to him following the strict rule.  
2.6.1 ÝAwÁriÃ samÁwiyya (the work of providence) and ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba 
(human symptoms affecting legal capacity)  
Having examined the nature of circumstances of necessity, I tend to classify 
ÃarÙra cases into two general categories; ÝawÁriÃ samÁwiyya and ÝawÁriÃ 
muktasaba. This categorisation is originally adapted from the jurists' 
classifications for ÝawÁrid al-ahliyya, impediments to legal capacity207.  In 
the discussion of ÝawÁrid al-ahliyya, Muslim jurists agreed that there are 
several legal impediments exempting a person from religious obligations. 
The impediments of legal capacity fall into two classes, the work of 
providence (ÝawÁriÃ samÁwiyya) and those which are created by man 
(ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba). However, these impediments are general and comprise 
all situations, including both non-necessity and necessity. It includes 
ignorance, being a minor, sleeping, forgetfulness, duress and necessity. As 
necessity is also part of legal impediments, the cause for necessity case can 
also be divided into the two same causes, causes created by human and 
causes created by God.   
The ÃarÙra cases which are classified as ÝawÁriÃ samÁwiyya are 
circumstances which are beyond human control. These include hunger, 
thirst, famine, natural disaster, shipwreck, plague, lack of water for prayer 
and severe illness. The discussion of this category will be discussed in the 
next chapter. On the other hand, the examples for ÃarÙra situations that fall 
under the category of ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba, are duress, compulsion, war and 
legitimate defence. Jurists unanimously agreed that duress and compulsion 
are both ÃarÙra situations, as discussed in the interpretation of Q2.173. 
Explicitly in Q16.106, God has remarked that who utters the word unbelief 
because of compulsion is forgiven. In this matter, I have chosen the case of 
duress to illustrate the case of ÃarÙra that is caused by human factors.   
                                                                                                                            
According to Gimaret, taklÐf  is a term of the theological and legal vocabulary denoting the 
fact of an imposition on the part of God of obligations on his creatures, of subjecting them 
to a law. The corresponding passive participle mukallaf is used of someone who is 
governed by this law and in this connection, in legal language; it denotes every individual 
who has at his disposal the full and entire scope of the law.   
207 See al-QarawÐ, al-ÂiyÁÝ al-LÁmiÝ , Vol. I, pp. 164-173 
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2.6.2 Compulsion and duress  
The theoretical study of compulsion and duress has been discussed at great 
length in the classical works. In this section, I examine this issue, including 
its definition, its classifications and conditions. Some common examples of 
duress cases will also be presented.   
 
Compulsion seems to apply where one person physically forces another 
person to commit an act by the application of direct force208. IkrÁh is also a 
legal term denoting duress. The jurists classified duress into two kinds, 
unlawful and lawful. Unlawful duress may be of two degrees, being grave 
(ikrÁh tamm or muljÐÞ) or slight (ikrÁh nÁqiÒ or ghayr muljÐÞ).  The former 
involves severe bodily harm while the latter only involves verbal or minor 
threats. The majority of Muslim jurists recognised most forms of duress but 
insist on proportionality between the type of duress and the type of act. 
Islamic law requires an investigation (subjective inquiry) designed to 
ascertain whether in fact the person felt compelled, due to a present fear, to 
oblige the coercer. But, can there be an objective standard of a brave or 
constant person? 
 
The case in Q4.29 concerning professing kufr  under compulsion was 
recognised by Muslim jurists. This case is also classified as ÃarÙra as it 
involves serious threat to the compelled person. Many interpreters of the 
Qur’Án agreed that duress is part of ÃarÙra when the compelled person 
receives a deadly or severe threat to his body, limbs, or other necessities. In 
this case, the compelled person has to weigh up the rights of others and his 
own right. Abou El-Fadl209 argued that the Islamic legal discourse on duress 
is particularly lengthy on the importance of balancing the rights of God and 
society against the right of the coerced individual. Furthermore, he 
suggested that Islamic law emphasises the nature of the injured rights while 
at the same time accommodating the subjective feelings of the coerced210. In 
this case of duress, Islamic law is more flexible as certain punishments are 
lifted and the victims are not held liable for their actions. The jurists also 
                                                 
208 Khaled Abou el fadl, Arab Law Quarterly, "The Common and Islamic Law of Duress" 
in Arab Law Quarterly, Leiden: Brill, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 121-159, can be found at 
http://.www.jstor.org/stable/3381833. Accessed on 07/07/2008 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
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discussed at great length the types of duress which can be considered as 
necessity cases and which cannot. In other words, what type of duress can 
mitigate an established ruling and which cannot.  
  
The cases of ikrÁh have been discussed extensively in almost every chapter 
in fiqh literature. Muslim jurists generally agreed that ikrÁh is a special 
situation that might affect human activities. However, in some cases, ikrÁh 
does not have any consequences for the legality of the act. Muslim jurists 
also distinguished the consequence of ikrÁh to religious obligations and 
worldly affairs. Some jurists defined ikrÁh as forcing a person to act or to 
utter something without his consent and against his will. The Mejelle in 
article 948 defines ikrÁh as “without right, compelling a person to do a thing 
without his consent by fear”211. The act under duress is committed because 
of others212. The compelled in this situation has to conform to the 
compeller’s order/wish so as to avoid the threatened harm. Meanwhile, 
ÍanafÐ jurists also required that in such situations the victim must believe 
that the compeller has the ability and is powerful enough to execute his 
threat if he disobeys his order. It is apparent from the definitions of ikrÁh 
above, that they cover the general meaning of duress that includes a 
compulsion with both minimal and severe threat. However, the jurists only 
considered the severe threat case to be a duress that can compromise a 
sharÐÝa ruling. On this basis, the jurists offered a precise definition of ikrÁh 
that is related to necessity. According to them, ikrÁh means fear of talaf 
(destruction) if the person does not submit to the wish of the compeller213. 
The term talaf here denotes that the threatened harm results in severe 
destruction and not only minor damage or injuries, whether to one’s body or 
effects on one’s wealth.  
 
                                                 
211 The Mejelle, trans. C.R. Tyser, D.G. Demetriades, Ismail Haqqi Effendi, Lahore: Law 
Publishing Company, 1980, p.149 
212 See AbÙ Bakr MuÎammad bin ÝAlÐ al-ÍaddÁdÐ, Jawhara Nayyira, no place: MaÔbaÝa al-
Khayriyya, 1322H. Vol. II, p254. See also al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. XXI, p. 60.See also 
ÝAbd al-QÁdir ÝAwda, al-TashrÐÝ al-JinÁ’Ð al-IslÁmÐ, Cairo: DÁr al-TurÁth, 1985, Vol. I, pp. 
563-580. ÝAwda in particular elaborated the effect of duress in criminal cases whether it 
lifts penalty and liabilities.  
213 See al-SarakhÒÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, vol. XXIV, p. 77.  
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The ÍanafÐ jurists divided compulsion into two main categories, the 
compelling or constraining (ikrÁh muljÐÞ)214  compulsion and less than 
compelling or constraining (ghayr muljÐÞ) compulsion. In the first category, 
the situation nullifies consent and vitiates free choice. The victim in this 
case cannot freely consent and the victim is really left with no choice at all. 
According to Hanafi jurists, this situation relates to where a person is 
threatened with death or severe damage, so he cannot escape from doing 
what he has been told to. Although he has the choice not to oblige the 
compeller, this choice is regarded as an invalid choice. This kind of 
compulsion or duress is regarded as a necessity case, which becomes a valid 
reason for a Muslim to deviate from a general ruling. 
 
The second category comprises situations that are not so compelling and 
where the victim is normally left with a choice. This category is not 
regarded as an urgent situation which negates consent and choice, hence, it 
does not create necessity. Unlike the first category of compulsion, the 
victim in the second category is not allowed to break a rule in order to avoid 
the threaten harm. The examples cited include the case of a threat of a light 
beating or short term imprisonment. Therefore, only the first category is 
regarded as a necessity situation. The second category does not have any 
major effect except in matters pertaining to taÒarrafÁt (deals) which the 
legality of the act is pending. Some ÍanafÐ jurists also included a threat to a 
third party as a second category of duress, which cannot be considered as 
duress. The ÍanafÐs offered a more comprehensive and detailed discussion 
pertaining to the categorisation of compulsion and duress. Other schools 
while not suggesting any kind of specific categorisation, also recognised a 
compelling threat as duress and necessity.  
 
Examining the classical doctrine of duress and compulsion, there are several 
important elements in compulsion. First, regarding the threat received by 
the victim, the jurists unanimously agreed that only a compelling threat that 
would result in killing or severely damaging the victim is considered as 
                                                 
214 Some jurists classified these situations as ikrÁh tÁmm (complete compulsion) and ikrÁh 
nÁqiÒ (incomplete compulsion). The MÁlikis also stated that mukrah muljÁÞ  is a person who 
is forced by someone where he has no will nor power to control his action. In this sense he 
has no choice. See al-QarawÐ, al-ÂiyÁÝ al-LÁmiÝ , Vol. I, p. 169 
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necessity215. The jurists elaborated comprehensively on the types of threat 
that can be considered. This includes beating, imprisonment and public 
humiliation. Some argued that 40-80 lashes would create a necessity (based 
on the amount required in Îadd punishment) which means a light beating 
does not create a compelling situation. With regards to imprisonment, only 
long imprisonment is accepted by some jurists, while some others do not 
consider imprisonment as duress. Some jurists took into consideration the 
condition of the prison and the length of the sentence. A long imprisonment 
in bad conditions could be compelling duress. However, jurists disputed 
whether the threat to one’s wealth can be considered as justified duress or 
otherwise. Some Hanafi jurists did not consider a threat to one's wealth as 
duress or a compelling case and hence it is not, for them, a legitimate 
coercion. MÁlik, ShÁfiÝÐ and AÎmad contended otherwise216. They ruled that 
if the amount of money involved in a threat constitutes all of the wealth of 
the one being threatened, the threat of its usurpation counts as coercion. The 
amount of property that is considered as a duress case depends on the status 
of the victim217. As only a seriously terrifying threat is considered, the 
threats by name calling, false accusation, provocations, and damaging an 
insignificant amount of property are not regarded as duress in Islamic law.  
 
One should also distinguish between a legitimate compulsion and 
illegitimate compulsion218. Lawful duress which has no legal effects may 
take the form of a judge exerting duress on a debtor to discharge his debt by 
selling property surplus to his personal needs. Similarly, a person who is 
forced to pay maintenance to his wife is not considered to be under duress, 
hence his act is deemed valid. Another example is someone who is forced to 
face a penalty, like jail, because of his previous crime.  This is also not an 
illegal threat even though the victim's consent and choice is vitiated. To sum 
up, the compulsion imposed by authority or superior is not a compulsion (in 
this case a punishment or an order by court).  
                                                 
215 Al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, vol. XXI, p. 60, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ,  Vol.VII, p. 292. 
Jurists have put the level of threats either by death or by beating is of same level. As for 
them, the serious beating will also leads to death. 
216 MuÎammad bin AÎmad bin ÝArfa al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ SharÎ al-KabÐr, al-
Cairo: DÁr IÎyÁÞ Kutub al-ÝArabiyya,Vol.II, p. 368  and Ibn QudÁma, al-Mughni, Vol.VII, 
p. 120 
217 See ÝAwda, TashrÐÝ al-JinÁÞÐ al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, pp. 566-567  
218 See al-BukhÁrÐ,  Kashf al-asrÁr, Vol. IV, p. 397 
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Additionally, the threat can be explicit or implicit. For example, al-SarakhsÐ 
contended that if the coercer is well-known for his notorious behaviour, no 
explicit threat is required. Similarly, an order from a superior (Þamr al-
sulÔÁn) is deemed as duress where the victim already realised that the 
consequences of failing to fulfill his order are fatal. In this case, a verbal 
order with no explicit threat is sufficient to create duress. AÎmad bin 
Íanbal, on the other hand, did not consider a mere verbal threat to be 
sufficient. For him, part of the order must be already executed like beating 
or torture219. The majority of jurists strongly disagreed with this point. As 
the aim of the necessity rule is to avoid severe harm, when the harm is 
already executed, there is no longer need for rukhÒa as the harm is already 
inflicted.  
 
The second element is the oppressor. The oppressor must be able and have 
the power to execute the threat, like a ruler or a notorious criminal. Al-
ShÁfiÝÐ,220 for example, explained that the oppressor must be more powerful 
than the victim, such as a ruler or a thief. Technically, a threat from a minor, 
weak and disabled person is not considered as a real threat. Although 
classical jurists did not mention the assistance of a third party as the 
accomplice, we can also assume that threats from weak people should be 
considered if he is able to get help from an accomplice.  Hence, the power 
of the oppressor can be known either by his superiority, well-known 
criminal records and the availability of assistance from notorious third 
parties.  
 
The third element is fear of danger. The compelled or the victim must 
believe and be aware that the compeller is likely to execute the threatened 
harm. In other words, the compeller has created a state of fear in the victim's 
mind by threat of death or severe harm. The preponderance of the thought 
of the victim and what he has felt is central in this calculation. Although, 
each individual has a different level of fear, the jurists tried to reduce the 
                                                 
219 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol.VII, p. 29. The basis of his argument is the ÎadÐth of 
ÝAmmar bin Yassar who received severe threat by the Quraish. He only uttered the word of 
disbelief after he was almost drowned.  
220 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. VII, p. 120 
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ambiguity by drawing some guidelines. A weak person may find a couple of 
beatings to be unbearable, and it is considered a real danger, which a brave 
person might not worry about. The jurists rule that only a fear of severe 
threat is considered.  
 
It is also important to note that some jurists, such as al-SarakhÒÐ contended 
that the formation of fear can only be created if the threat is immediate221. 
Similarly, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists also maintained that the threat must be 
immediate, leaving little opportunity for escape. The MÁlikÐ jurists, 
however, argued that the real issue is the formation of fear in the victim’s 
mind222 and that there is no need for the threatened danger be immediate. 
For example, if the threatened harm is going to occur after a month and the 
victim is terrified by this, it is then considered to be compelling duress. 
Another issue raised by jurists is the requirement that such an act under 
duress must be performed in the presence of the coercer. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists, 
added that such a formation of fear can be created if the oppressor is 
stronger and more powerful, such as a ruler or a thief or when the threat 
takes place in a locked house leaving the victim no room to escape223. The 
ÍanbalÐ jurists required another condition that the compeller should have 
actually started executing his threat. 
 
As the matter of fear is subjective, the jurists stated that we should inquire 
into whether the victim believed that he was faced with a necessity that left 
him no alternative. It is important to note that feeling mere fear is 
insufficient, the victim must feel terror and helplessness in such a situation. 
This point leads us to the fourth element that is the non-availability of an 
alternative or any help. In such a situation, there must not have been any 
alternative to survive the threat other than submission to the order of the 
compeller. Although in almost all cases of compulsion and duress, the 
victim can choose between perseverance and submission, such an 
alternative or choice is spoiled. Since the choice is spoiled, the victim is 
normally forced to do what is required by the oppressor. 
                                                 
221 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, vol. XXI, p. 60  
222 See Khalad Abou el Fadl, "The Common and Islamic Law of Duress" in Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1991,  p.131. This article can be found online in www.jstor.org 
223 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. VII, p. 120 
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It is understood from the above discussion that the jurists required an 
investigation in order to ascertain whether fear really existed and the harm 
was compelling in nature. The jurists also recognised that the feeling of the 
threat is a subjective matter and it depends on the level of brevity and 
perseverance. A weak person for example feels several slaps as a dangerous 
threat to him, whereas a stronger person might not. However, the jurists 
only considered the threat by serious injury to one's limbs and threat to one's 
life or property as recognisable causes in necessity case. Similarly, in the 
case of a threat to one's property, the jurists have given the liberty to the 
victim to verify the case according to his needs. For instance, if the threat to 
his property results in a huge loss to his wealth where he is left penniless, 
this is a case of duress. However, the threat to one’s property differs 
according to one’s status. For example, a threat of the loss of 1000 Ringgit 
Malaysia would not be seen as a real threat for a wealthy person but it is a 
significant threat for a needy person. Another example is the destruction of 
a family home or work place. Again, the matter depends on a person's 
personal wealth. We can suggest that a threat to destroy one's business is not 
considered a threat for a multi-billionaire and a conglomerate, while this is 
real destruction for the victim who has no other business to survive224. We 
can conclude that only threat that can damage one's wealth significantly and 
make him suffer is considered.  
 
As in any other necessity case, the important principle employed by jurists 
with regard to duress is that the victim’s response to the threat must be 
proportional. The victim’s act to avoid harm must not cause more damage 
than the threat he received. For example, a man is not allowed to murder 
others if he received a threat by severe beating. Similarly, he is not allowed 
to destroy one whole town if he received a threat to his car. Another 
important principle relates to the case where one of two choices of 
prohibited acts has to be made and one must choose the lesser evil he faces. 
At the same time, the victim bears the responsibility of minimising the 
damage and the oppression. If he can stop the injustice by burning down 
                                                 
224 However, the permission is given only in necessity case, where a man under duress has 
a choice between damaging a business of a wealthy man and a business of a poor man. 
However, the consideration may vary according to the intensity of the case.  
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only one house, he is not allowed to burn more than that. Similarly, if he 
can stop the oppression by beating the oppressor, he is not allowed to 
murder him. This is in accordance with the maxim that one should not repel 
injustice by committing injustice. Some also asserted that the victim has to 
resist committing acts which violate the rights of others. On this basis, 
murder and rape are not allowed to be committed even when necessities are 
threatened.  
 
Although classical jurists elaborated extensively on the notion of 
compulsion and duress, they did not elaborate in detail on the case of threats 
to third parties. The Íanafis, for instance, did not recognise a threat to third 
parties. Therefore, according to this rule, a victim is not allowed to submit 
to the order of the oppressor if it is his father or his son who is threatened 
with imprisonment225. However, some Íanafis recognised a threat to father 
and children. Another case to be examined is for example, a threat to 
murder one's wife unless the husband is willing to damage the property of 
others. Should he be allowed to do that in order to save his wife?  If the 
Íanafis view is accepted, the husband cannot save his wife as the jurists 
only considered the threat to father and children. Meanwhile, some jurists 
have extended the rule to dhawÐ al-arÎÁm 226. MÁlikÐ jurists also considered 
a threat to an ajnabÐ (foreigner) as duress227. It can be assumed that the 
refusal of certain jurists to consider harm to third party is due to the issue of 
the duty of care and protection, and whether the victim is responsible for 
protecting the third party's life. This explains why only the harm directed to 
close family members is considered. However, as altruistic behaviour is 
recommended in Islam, fulfilling the oppressor’s demand can be tolerated 
even if the threat is subjected to a third party. However, this case needs 
further investigation by the victim, and whether he believes that the threat to 
                                                 
225 ÝAlÐ  Íaidar, Durar al-ÍikÁm, DÁr al-JÐl, 1991, Vol. II, p. 270 
226 See ÝAwda, TashrÐÝ al-JinÁÞÐ al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, p. 566. DhawÐ al-arÎÁm refers to those 
who are related in blood especially by the female side   
227 AjnabÐ in the case of duress here refers to people who are not related with the person 
under duress. Ahmet T. Karamustafa views that ajnÁbi generally means foreigners who are 
away from their usual place of residence and find themselves among people who view them 
as outsiders. See Karamustafa, Ahmet T. "Strangers and Foreigners." Encyclopaedia of the 
QurÞÁn. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), Georgetown University, Washington DC. Brill, 
2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=q3_SIM-00405>  
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the third party is genuine. It can be suggested that if the third party is an 
obviously innocent and fragile person, such as a pregnant woman, a 
harmless child or an older person, such a threat should be considered 
heavily in the calculation.  However, it should also be noted that there is 
also the possibility of a fake threat. A compeller can collaborate to 
counterfeit a threat, especially if they know that the victim would not 
consider any threat. For example, if the oppressor knows that a dying victim 
will not change his will even if he is threatened by death, the oppressor can 
try to threaten his family or close relative to soften the victim. There are two 
possibilities here, whether the threat to his family is real or whether the 
family member has collaborated with the compeller. Hence, a careful 
examination must be carried out. 
 
Classical jurists also discussed widely the effects of duress on one's act and 
several cases have been examined. These include compulsion in religious 
observances, compulsion in committing a crime, compulsion in converting 
to other religions and compulsion in marital contracts and business 
transactions. These acts can also be divided into verbal and non-verbal acts. 
Although the jurists unanimously agreed that compulsion lifts the sin, some 
penalties and liabilities are still to be borne by the person (like the case of 
taking another's meal in a famine). It is also important to note that not all 
forbidden acts are permissible on the basis of necessity. Compulsion is 
where a person is forced to do or say something without his consent and 
against his free choice, meaning that he would not do such an act if he was 
left alone.  
 
Finally, I would like to offer some critical reviews on compulsion cases 
found in classic literature, which are compulsion of conversion, compulsion 
in selling, compulsion regarding marriage and divorce, and compulsion in 
the case of worship. 
 
 
Compulsion in business transaction 
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Jurists have already comprehensively discussed the issues of transactions 
made by a person under duress and compulsion228. These include buying 
and selling, hire (ijÁra) and investment (muÃÁraba).  In the case of sales 
under coercion, the majority of ÍanafÐs ruled that any contracts that take 
place under coercion are defective contracts (fÁsid), since they eliminate 
mutual agreement which is a condition of contract validity as stated in 
Q4.29229. The coerced person therefore has the right to break or to 
implement the contract. However, as in all defective contracts, the buyer 
obtains ownership at the time of receipt of the price by the seller. The 
ShafiÝÐ and ÍanbalÐ jurists were of the opinion that such a contract cannot be 
concluded230. MÁlikÐ jurists decided that a coerced sale is not binding. 
However, in some cases, coercion to enforce rights does not prevent the 
completion of a contract because of religious law supersedes the trader’s 
consent: for example, the forced sale of a seller’s property to pay his debts, 
alimony or family maintenance.  
 
 
Compulsion to convert to other religions 
As discussed before, a Muslim is allowed to profess the words of unbelief 
under coercion and he is still considered as a Muslim231. This means his 
conversion to another religion does not affect his marriage, and if he dies, 
his children can inherit from him232. However, in this case, perseverance is 
                                                 
228 Wahbah ZuhailÐ, Financial Transaction in Islamic Jurisprudence, Mahmoud A. El-
Gamal (tran.), Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 2003, Vol. I, p. 18. See al-SarakhÒÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. 
XXIV, p. 55 
229 See al-SarakhÒÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. XXIV, p. 55 
230 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al- Umm, vol. IV, p. 120 and YahyÁ  bin Sharf al-Nawawī, al-MajmÙÝ 
SharÎ al-Muhadhdhab, no place: MaÔbaÝa al-MunÐriyya, no date, Vol. IX, p. 184 
231 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, Vol. I, p. 225, see also al-JaÒÒÁs, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, 
Vol. III, p. 283. al-SarakhÒÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. X, p. 124. See also Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, 
Vol. IX, p. 31 
232 The issue of professing kufr is closely related with the issue of taqiyya. This notion 
denotes dispensing with the ordinances of religion in cases of constraint and when there is a 
possibility of harm. It also refers to the practice of precautionary dissimulation whereby 
believers may conceal their faith under certain pressing circumstances. It has the origin 
from QurÞÁn, Q5.156. According to Strothmann, this notion is simply permitted alleviation 
through God’s indulgence or a duty, if it is necessary in the interest of the community. This 
case of taqiyya was reflected in the case of ÝAmmar bin YÁsir. In certain circumstances, e.g. 
threat of death, a Muslim who cannot live openly professing his faith may have to migrate 
“since God’s earth is wide”. However, Sunni jurists are all in agreement cannot be 
practised unless in necessity. This notion however is a special significance for the ShiÝÐs.  
Indeed, it is considered their distinguishing feature and concealment is a regular feature. In 
any case, because of their attachment to taqiyya, the ShiÝÐs have devoted numerous works 
to it. See R. Strothmann-[Moktar Djebli]. "Taqiyya (a.)." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
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better than uttering the word of unbelief. The jurists have also discussed the 
case of a Muslim forced to convert to another religion in the dÁr al-Îarb233. 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ for instance, ruled that if two witnesses saw a person who was 
forced to convert to another religion, eating pork and drinking wine but he 
does not say whether he is still a Muslim or not, he is still considered as a 
Muslim234. However, if he went back to his Muslim country and was 
reluctant to declare his status, he is then considered a non-Muslim. 
Similarly, a non-Muslim (a dhimmÐ or a mustaÞmÁn) cannot be forced to 
convert to Islam235. If they were forced and died, they are still considered as 
non-Muslim and will not be buried as a Muslim. 
 
Compulsion in marriage 
 
The jurists differed in the effect of duress and compulsion in solemnising 
marriage and in its annulment. The MÁlikÐs236, ShÁfiÝÐs and Íanbalis237 
contended that marital contracts such as nikÁÎ, ÔalÁq, rujÝ and zihÁr  are not 
concluded, while the ÍanafÐs maintained otherwise238. They maintained that 
such conduct would not be affected by compulsion. Hence, it should be 
regarded as valid conduct. The basic argument for ÍanafÐ jurists is the  
ÎadÐth stating that there are three things that would be treated seriously 
whether they are undertaken seriously or in jest; marriage, divorce and 
                                                                                                                            
Edition. P. Bearman; Th. Bianquis;  C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs 
(eds). Brill, 2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 27 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-7341>  
233 Literally dÁr al-harb means the land of war.  It  can be interpreted as those countries 
where the Muslim law is not in force. Abel, A. “DÁr al-Îarb”. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
Second Edition. P. Bearman; , Th. Bianquis;  C.E. Bosworth;  E. van Donzel; and W.P. 
Heinrichs (eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. 27 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-1700>  
234 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol.VI, p. 176 
235 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. IX, p. 30. This is also the view of AbÙ ÍanÐfa and al-
ShÁfiÝÐ. However, Muslim jurists agreed that a ÎarbÐ can be forced to convert to Islam. See 
al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. IX, p.187 and al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf al-asrÁr, Vol. IV, p. 397 
236 SahnÙn, al-Mudawwana al-KubrÁ lÐ ImÁm DÁr al-Hijrah al-ImÁm MÁlik bin AnÁs , 
Beirut: DÁr  al-Kutb al-ÝIlmiyya,1995, Vol. I,  p. 48, Vol.II, p. 80  and p.310. See also 
MuÎammad bin MuÎammad bin ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn al-ÍiÔÁb, MawÁhib al-Jalil,  DÁr al-Fikr, 
1992, Vol.IV, p.4 
237 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. VII, p. 291 
238 See al-JassÁs, Vol.VI, p. 177. See the Hanafis discussion on hazal (jest) in MasÝÙd bin 
ÝUmar al-TaftÁzÁnÐ, SharÎ al-talwÐÎ ÝalÁ tawÃÐÎ, Cairo: Maktaba ÑabÐÎ, Vol. II, p. 380. See 
also al-BÁbartÐ, al-ÝInÁya SharÎ al-HidÁya, Vol. III, p. 489 
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taking back a wife239. Compared to any other contract where intention and 
consent play a crucial part in the validity of the acts, these three particular 
contracts are different. Verbal pronouncement is sufficient in order to make 
the contract valid.  The ÍanafÐ jurists also believed that the intention and 
consent are not essential elements in such a conduct. The conduct (nikÁÎ, 
ÔalÁq, rujÝ or zihÁr) is liable to be established either by acting in jest or 
seriously240. It is apparent that the jurists did not include duress as an 
impediment to the validity of such contracts. Furthermore, the provision in 
the QurÞÁn stating that the rule of divorce which makes the wife no longer 
lawful for the previous husband should be applied to any case of divorce 
either if such a divorce was undertaken seriously or otherwise. They also 
used another ÎadÐth to support this view. According to this ÎadÐth, the only 
divorce pronouncement that is not treated seriously is the pronouncement 
made by a maÝtÙh (incompetent) person, hence according to this ÎadÐth, the 
pronouncement from a compelled person is valid241.  
 
However, the other schools strongly opposed this view and they maintained 
that marriage contracts undertaken under duress are not valid and not 
concluded242. There is no similarity between compulsion and joking.  The 
evidence for their arguments is the ÎadÐth “there is no divorce in case of 
ighlÁq (duress)243”. Although jurists differed in the interpretation of 
interpreting the term ÞighlÁq' that was mentioned in the ÎadÐth, (whether it 
means anger, drunkenness, insane, compulsion, or madness) the majority of 
jurists agreed that divorcing a wife under threat is not valid. Their argument 
was based on a ÎadÐth saying that Allah has forgiven people from mistakes, 
                                                 
239 The ÎadÐth mentioning about three things that are taken seriously whether they were 
uttered during jest or seriously was narrated by ÝAbd RaÎman bin ÍabÐb from ÝAÔÁÞ from 
YÙsuf bin MÁhak and from the authority of AbÙ Hurayra 
240 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙt, vol.VI, p.177 
241 al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-Qur'Án, Vol. I, p. 333, see also al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabsÙt, Vol. VI, p. 
177 
242 See SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, vol. II, p. 80 and p. 310. MÁlik said such contracts are not 
concluded and not permitted (lÁ yajÙz)  while al-ShÁfiÝÐ says it is bÁÔil (void). AÎmad also 
says such contracts are not concluded (lÁ yaqaÞ),  see Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, vol.VII, p. 
291. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, IÝlÁm al-MÙqiÝÐn, Beirut: DÁr al-JÐl, Vol.IV, p50-51 
243 Ibid. 
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forgetfulness and compulsion244. They firmly viewed that this ÎadÐth should 
also be applied in the cases of nikÁÎ, ÔalÁq, rujÝ and zihÁr.  
 
Examining both arguments, it is apparent that both views have their very 
own interpretation of jest. The HanafÐ jurists reaffirmed that jest means that 
it is an act with no real intention, and this act is no different from acting 
under threat. However, the other schools regarded acting under duress as an 
impediment to contracting a marriage or a marriage annulment, as one has 
no right to force others to perform such an act. Furthermore, it can be 
assumed that the ÎadÐth regarding the contracts that would be taken 
seriously should be seen as a warning from the Prophet that these contracts 
are serious matters and people cannot make them frivolously. However, a 
compulsion is different, as the person does not intend to mock the contract 
but rather was compelled to pronounce it under threat.  On this basis, this 
view is closer to the real meaning of SharÐÝa.  However, it is important to 
note that the some ShÁfiÝÐs also ruled that if a compelled person divorces his 
wife under threat and at the same time has the real intention to do so, the 
marriage is ended245. This is similar to the case of a person who utters the 
word of unbelief but would not be punished as long as he remains faithful in 
his heart. Both cases depend on the intention of the Muslims. 
 
Compulsion in zinÁ (adultery) and rape cases 
 
Even though duress is a valid cause for permitting a forbidden act, some 
cases are excluded, such as murder and zinÁ (adultery)246. The majority of 
jurists maintained that compulsion does not give a person a license to 
commit murder or zinÁ247. This is because both victims (the compelled 
person) and the person to be killed or to have sex with are at the same level 
                                                 
244 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ,  Vol. VII, p. 291. The first ÎadÐth was narrated by AbÙ 
DawÙd, Athram while the latter was narrated by Ibn MÁjah. HÁdÐth no. 2188 vol. II  in 
Sunan AbÙ DawÙd. See  Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, IÝlÁm al-MÙqiÝÐn, Vol.IV, p. 50 
245 al-Nawawi, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. VI, p. 354 
246 ZinÁ can also be translated as premarital sex or extra marital sex. Meanwhile the modern 
term for rape is ‘al-ightiÒÁb’. This Arabic word refers to taking something wrongfully by 
force. It now is used exclusively to refer to transgression against the honor of women by 
force. The word ghasb denoting rape can also be found in some medieval work, see 
SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. IV, p. 509 
247 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ , vol. IX, p. 60, see al-JaÒÒÁÒ, al-AhkÁm al-Qur'Án, vol. X, p.203, 
see also Ibn Taymiyya, FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ, Vol. I, p. 451, al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf al-asrÁr, Vol. IV, 
p. 397 
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of legal protection. Some like Khalid Abou Fadl might argue that between 
committing zinÁ and murder, one should choose to commit zinÁ as the 
worldly punishment for zinÁ is of a lesser degree than murder. However, in 
this case harm cannot be eliminated by incurring harm to another person.248.  
 
The jurists differentiated the punishment for a man and a woman who were 
being forced to commit zinÁ. The jurists were in agreement that a woman 
who was forced to commit zinÁ249 (or is raped) is not subjected to Îadd 
punishment250. On the other hand, a man who was forced to have sex is 
subjected to the Îadd penalty. The basis for the jurists' argument is that the 
capability of the man to commit zinÁ implies his desire to have the sexual 
activity251. The jurists argued that the man’s penis only becomes erect in 
response to sexual arousal and excitement. This excitement (which makes 
the man able to have intercourse) denies the element of force; hence, the 
man is subjected to the Îadd punishment. However, the jurists still gave a 
room for leniency in this case. If a man is forced to have sex while he is 
being tied up and at the time he had an erection, the punishment is lifted. 
The jurists made the analogy between this issue and the case of 
involuntarily swallowing during the month of RamadÁn. In the latter case, 
the fasting is not void as the act was against his will252. In other issues, the 
jurists were divided whether the rapist is liable to pay mahr to the woman or 
not. ÍanafÐ jurists ruled that the man is not required to pay the mahr to the 
woman, while the ShÁfiÝÐ and MÁlik jurists maintained otherwise253.  
 
Compulsion in murder 
Like adultery, murder is also forbidden, even under compulsion or duress. 
However, jurists disputed over a punishment for a person committing a 
murder under duress. In Islamic criminal law, the punishment for 
                                                 
248Khalad Abou el Fadl, "The Common and Islamic Law of Duress" in Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1991  
249 As stated before, there is no term ‘rape’ in classical jurists work. However, some jurists 
have used the term sex by force (zinÁ bil ikrÁh) indicating rape. 
250 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. VIII, p. 217, al- JaÒÒÁÒ, AhkÁm al-qur'Án, Vol. III, p. 382  
251 The capability of man is indicated by his erection that makes the sexual intercourse 
possible. The jurists argued that erection is only possible when man has the intention and 
desire to have sex 
252 Involuntary here means having no control of the will 
253 al-JaÒÒÁÒ, KitÁb AhkÁm al-Qur'Án, Vol. IX, p. 52 and p. 60. See also SaÎnÙn, al-
Mudawwana, Vol. IV, p. 509 
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committing murder is qiÒÁÒ, where the killer may also be killed. MÁlik, 
ShafiÝÐ and AÎmad ruled that the liability of qiÒÁÒ is on the mubÁshir (the 
compelled) rather than the Ámir (the compeller). However, the Ámir is 
punished by other than qiÒÁÒ. Another view says both should be subjected to 
the qiÒÁÒ penalty. When the Ámir has the authority over the compelled254, 
there are three views: 
1) DawÙd and Abu ÍanÐfa, and one opinion among ShafiÝÐs – it is the 
Ámir who is subjected to qiÒÁÒ and not the mubÁshir (the compelled), 
but the compelled is still punished by taÝzÐr255. The jurists argued 
that the ikrÁh situation waives the punishment as he committed the 
murder unintentionally. In such a case, the murderer is regarded as 
an instrument for the compeller to accomplish his evil mission. 
Jurists applied qiÒÁÒ to the person who does not act directly consider 
the term “murderer” applicable to him (the compeller) 
metaphorically.  
2) The coerced is subjected to qiÒÁÒ and not the Ámir. This is one view 
of the ShÁfiÝÐ’s. Those who upheld qiÒÁÒ for the coerced applied the 
rule of a person with a free will and this is because the coerced 
person resembles, from one aspect, a person having free will, while 
he resembles from another aspect a person dominated and under 
duress like one falling from a height, or swept by the wind from 
place to place.  
3) Both the oppressor and the compelled persons are subjected to qiÒÁÒ. 
This was the opinion of MÁlik, AÎmad and the chosen opinion 
among ShÁfiÝÐ jurists. This view does not hold coercion as an 
obstacle (in the way of punishment) for the compelled, nor do the 
jurists consider the absence of direct causation an obstacle for the 
Ámir. The killer must be punished and the situation is not considered 
as a valid duress (ikrÁh muljÐÞ). In this case, the killer (the 
compelled) he has an option not to kill. The oppressor on the other 
hand has to be killed because he is the cause of the murder256. The 
basis of this argument is that, by virtue of consensus, that if a person 
                                                 
254 For instance, the ruler forces his people to kill someone unlawfully 
255 TaÞzÐr punishment can be defined as a punishment, usually corporal that can be 
administered at the discretion of the judge (qÁÃÐ) 
256ÝAwda, al-TashrÐÝ al-JinÁÝÐ al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. II, p. 131 
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is close to death due to starvation, he has no right to kill a human 
being and consume him257.  
 
Compulsion to damage other properties 
A person is allowed to destroy another’s property if he is threatened 
severely.258 However the damage has to be paid for. The reason for this 
ruling is that the property of others is permissible to him under necessity as 
is eating another’s meal. In this case, the oppressor is the one who has to 
bear the liability for the damaged property. Similarly, if a victim is forced 
by severe threat to steal another’s property259, the oppressor has to pay the 
price and not the victim. However, if the threat received is not severe, such 
as imprisonment or binding, the victim has to bear the civil responsibility. 
For ÍanafÐ jurists, the liability of the compelled is only lifted if the harm 
threatened is severe. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists were reported as having the same 
view. However, some jurists ruled that both the victim and the oppressor 
have to bear the responsibility.  
 
To conclude, the doctrine of coercion, compulsion and duress have been 
widely discussed in Islamic legal tradition. Jurists also recognised these 
cases as ÃarÙra cases, particularly when the duress involves a severe threat 
to the person. In such a situation, the victim believes that his life is in clear 
danger. As a Muslim loses his freewill under duress, the punishments in 
certain acts are lifted260. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists ruled that necessity and duress 
are impediments to punishment in certain circumstances with the existence 
of prohibition of the act, and of the legal obligation to abstain from it, but in 
other circumstances they are the cause of lawfulness of the act. According 
to them, necessity and duress nullify the free will of man and this is the 
basic condition of taklÐf (legal obligation). 
 
2.7  Conclusions 
 
                                                 
257 See The Distinguished Jurist's Primer, Vol. II, p. 480. See also ÝAwda, al-TashrÐÝ al-
JinÁÝÐ al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. II, p. 131. "The blood of the Muslim is equal (in status) among them, 
the lowest of them creates an equal liability for them, but they are superior to those beside 
them" recorded by AbÙ DawÙd 
258 Jawhara al-nayyira, Vol. II, p. 254.   
259 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. XXIV, p. 79 
260 Ahmad Hassan, The Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 171-173 
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It can be suggested that ÃarÙra has the highest degree of capacity to 
temporarily cancel an established rule when compared to other legal rules. 
This is due to the fact that ÃarÙra can operate without having a specific 
permission either from textual evidence, ijtihÁd of the jurists or a fatwÁ from 
the muftÐ. The person himself can verify his own situation. The jurists also 
agreed that the general permission granted in some textual evidence gives 
the freedom to a man in a situation of necessity to derogate from the 
standard sharÐÝa rule. The permission to drink liquor, eat mayta and other 
prohibited acts illustrate the ability of ÃarÙra to cancel a Îukm. An 
established doctrine in certain schools of law can also be cancelled by this 
rule. This chapter also shows that there are many legal affects under this 
rule, for example the removal of sin, the penal sanction and the liability. J. 
Schacht contended that under the theory of duress, its effect is not only to 
remove the penal sanction, but to make the act itself allowed. Still wider is 
the scope of the doctrine that necessity dispenses Muslims from observing 
the strict rules of the law261. It is important to bear in mind that though the 
act is temporarily allowed, the negativity of the act remains and in many 
cases the person under duress holds certain liability caused by ÃarÙra acts. 
However, the jurists unanimously agreed that the sin is forgiven as the 
verses clearly indicate that God is Forgiving and Merciful. However, in 
some cases, the person acts out of necessity, and still has to bear the legal 
effect of the duress.  For example, when eating another’s meal, one still has 
to pay the price.  
 
 
One of the most important preconditions of ÃarÙra is that the harm in a 
ÃarÙra case must be predicted to materialise. Several measures to assess the 
harm have been put forward by the jurists according to different cases. As 
each ÃarÙra case is unique, a different set of preconditions may be set up, 
but it is not impossible for readers to draw general guidelines on ÃarÙra 
matters. For example, some people may find praying in full is not a problem 
while travelling, whereas other travellers find it difficult to pray in full. 
Another example is that one may find that he can be without food and drink 
for more than one day and night, thus, it is not necessary for him to switch 
                                                 
261 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 199-200 
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to non-ÎalÁl food before the end of this period. Others may find it is too 
difficult to abstain from food and drink for more than 12 hours, and 
therefore he needs to have food and recourse to ÎarÁm food earlier. The 
jurists outlined several restrictions and preconditions for ÃarÙra cases, but 
only the person under duress knows his situation best. In determining the 
harm and the benefit of an act in a necessity situation, the jurists gave a set 
of examples guiding a Muslim to “self assess” their own situation.  
 
Even though the preconditions of ÃarÙra were listed comprehensively by 
modern Muslim writers, one has to acknowledge that these efforts had 
already been made by previous scholars in the early classical fiqh works in 
which they have treated the cases individually. It might be speculated that 
modern scholars deduced the guidelines from these various fiqhÐ cases and 
from works on legal maxims as their basic guidelines in their attempt to 
develop the study of ÃarÙra.  
 
Having examined the theoretical discussion of ÃarÙra within the classical 
sources and works on ÃarÙra, some points can be deduced. Firstly, it can be 
argued that there is no independent comprehensive writing on this rule in 
classical works when compared to the extensive discussions in modern 
writings. Secondly, some classical applications of ÃarÙra are limited to 
particular matters, especially food and drinking and limited to personal 
cases. Thirdly, some jurists and legal theorists, both classical and modern, 
applied the rule of ÃarÙra interchangeably with other legal rules. Finally, it 
can also be suggested that the theoretical discussions on ÃarÙra are not 
complete - which means discussion evolves as the times change. The basic 
understanding and fundamental issue of ÃarÙra remains but the details of the 
practicality of this rule might be disputed and vary between scholars. It is 
clear that modern writers have contributed a more specific, independent and 
comprehensive set of works on ÃarÙra. However, it should be noted that 
these modern works acquire their material mostly from the scattered 
classical formulation on ÃarÙra, which derived this principle from the 
relevant divine sources. To sum up, the formulation of this principle can be 
illustrated as a large jigsaw puzzle, in which the basic rules were set up 
during the formation period and the completion of the rest was made by the 
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later jurists. This jigsaw puzzle will continue to expand in the future time, as 
human needs and necessity change. In the next chapter, I attempt to analyse 
the ÃarÙra rules and regulations vis-à-vis fiqhÐ cases.  How did the jurists 
determine harm and how does this principle work in practical matters? From 
this set of examples given by jurists, it is hoped that a general guideline of 
the rules of ÃarÙra can be drawn and the rules can be applied to new 
emerging modern cases.  
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CHAPTER THREE: ÂARØRA CASES VIS-À-VIS FIQHI  LITERATURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presents a general theoretical framework concerning 
the principle of ÃarÙra in Islamic legal discussions and a critique of 
prevalent perspectives that exercise influence on the study of ÃarÙra in 
Muslim academies. Theoretically, standard rules and relevant maxims need 
to be employed in each ÃarÙra case. However, the study of ÃarÙra through 
examination of the theoretical study (uÒÙl) is insufficient to acquire an 
adequate understanding of the complex ÃarÙra issues. The furÙÝ (the 
elaborated precepts of positive law) must also be explored vis-à-vis 
examination of fiqhÐ cases. This is because each ÃarÙra case is unique and 
depends on various factors, including the intensity of the harm, the ability of 
the person under duress and the alternatives available. Having examined 
these fiqhÐ cases, it is clear that Muslim jurists treated these cases quite 
differently. The combination of the theoretical and case study approaches is 
important in an attempt to justify the application of the Harm Reduction 
Programme in Chapter Five. At the same time, the results are expected to 
offer a better understanding for those who need to extend the application of 
ÃarÙra to new emerging cases. 
  
Examining several ÃarÙra cases in fiqhÐ literature, it can be seen that the 
diverse problems of ÃarÙra cases treated by Islamic jurisprudence may be 
viewed as tightly interwoven. The fiqhÐ texts ironically present a holistic 
consistency and an integrated system262. Consistency is found in terms of 
the maxims applied and the rules the texts follow. It can be suggested that 
Islamic jurisprudence applies the same standard rules for ÃarÙra application 
such as “the Ãarar must be eliminated”, “choosing the lesser harm” and 
“necessity does not invalidate the right of others”. However, apart from a 
seemingly standard set of ÃarÙra rules and legal maxims applied by the 
jurists, the possibility of disagreement among jurists is not precluded. Not 
                                                 
262 Ze'ev Maghen argued that the relationship between uÒÙl and furÙÝ study in Islamic 
jurisprudence are strongly related to each other. See " Close encounters: Some preliminary 
observations on the transmission of impurity in early SunnÐ Jurisprudenc " in Islamic Law 
and Society", Vol.VI, No. 3 Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999, p. 351. Accessed date 25/12/2009. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399502 
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only have disputes emerged between the different schools, but also within 
the same school of law. However, as far as Islamic law is concerned, there 
is no genuine requirement that the logic or conclusions of different experts 
commenting on the same subject be consistent with one another, even if 
they use the same tools and rules. It again depends on the different 
interpretations, logic and analogy made by the jurists for each ÃarÙra case. 
Therefore, it is vital to highlight some important ÃarÙra cases in fiqhÐ 
literature to understand how the principle really works.  Limits, rules and 
special conditions set by jurists in each fiqhÐ case are examined. Although 
disputes among jurists are inevitable, it is believed that the jurisdiction of 
the cases which set the important precedents can be extended to new ÃarÙra 
issues.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section deals with food 
and drink cases. In Chapter One, we discovered that the origin of ÃarÙra 
came from textual cases pertaining to food and drink. Accordingly, the 
jurists and the uÒÙliyyÙn developed a systematic theory of ÃarÙra in Islamic 
law. The limits and regulations of ÃarÙra were also extracted from these 
nuÒÙÒ.  In this section, we will examine how the maxims and preconditions 
of ÃarÙra were applied by the jurists in food related cases. We will also 
examine how the same standards were used by the jurists in other cases. The 
second section of this chapter deals with the issue of consuming muÎarrama 
for medical reasons. There are two questions to be answered. First, is 
sickness regarded as necessity? And second, is the permission to consume 
the unlawful for medical reasons only limited to life and death cases? We 
can find that not all jurists regarded sickness as a “necessity” case which 
can allow the consumption of the unlawful medication. In this chapter, it 
can also be seen how the jurists distinguished between the use of al-khamr, 
alcohol, drugs and other unlawful items. Interestingly, some of the unlawful 
items possess a higher degree of prohibition than others such that it cannot 
be consumed even in a necessity case. How did the modern jurists treat the 
cases of alcohol and drugs? Do they have the same characteristics as al-
khamr? This discussion is important as it relates to the discussion of the 
Harm Reduction Programme in Chapter Five.  
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The third section of this chapter examines some ÃarÙra cases in business 
transactions. Some cases which are allowed under the rule of necessity are 
explored. Some businesses that do not meet the legal requirement of Islamic 
rules of transaction are permitted, such as the buying and selling of impure 
items. Jurists generally agreed that items that are temporarily allowed under 
necessity cannot be traded as the profit is unlawful. Finally, the fourth 
section of this chapter deals with some ÃarÙra cases pertaining to marriage, 
divorce and polygamy. Various cases presented will help gain an 
understanding of how the jurists employed the rule of ÃarÙra as an 
exemption tool for legal cases. It can also be argued that this tool was 
applied systematically and consistently according to the approved standards.  
 
3.2 ÂarÙra application in food and drink cases 
As a basic human need and human right, food has been recognised in 
numerous instruments and declarations including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adapted by the United Nations263. The need for food is 
self evident, and that is why Islam recognises the importance of food for 
human beings. The state of hunger is unanimously recognised by the jurists 
as a legal reason for a ÃarÙra case. With regard to food cases, I will analyse 
several important discussions made by Muslim jurists. Some major issues 
raised by jurists concerning food include the questions of determining and 
predicting harm, assessing harm between two unlawful meals, the question 
of consuming al-khamr and the limits of consuming the unlawful.   
 
Hunger is defined as a state of lack of food, especially for a long period of 
time that can cause illness or death and is therefore a severe threat to a 
person’s life. Hence, on this basis, the need to consume food even if it is 
unlawful is permitted when no lawful meal is available. This undoubtedly 
represents ÃarÙra as reflected in Qur’Án, Q2.173, Q5.3, Q6.119, Q6.145 and 
Q16.115 as have been discussed in Chapter One. It can be argued that these 
                                                 
263 See Amitava Mukherjee, Hunger, Theory, Perpsectives and Reality, Hants.Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2004. p. 62. This online book can be found at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Fzv9V3dosycC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=predicting
+danger+hunger&source=bl&ots=Xm0mPIyAX4&sig=7pqJJ8AmUAjfW3atoCVIRyyTFd
I&hl=en&ei=RJRASueoDImMjAeW1-
COCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1, see also Universal Declaration of 
Human Right, United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 217 a(III) dated 1oth 
December 1948. Accessed date 12/10/2009 
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Qur’Ánic verses have led to the significant development of the ÃarÙra 
principle by the uÒÙliyyÙn and the jurists. Muslim scholars also believed the 
above Qur’Ánic concessions are of utmost importance for the sanctioning of 
other ÃarÙra cases. However, before we embark on problems other than 
those related to food, it is important for us to analyse the jurists’ reasoning 
in food-related cases. Their reasoning and interpretations can be used as the 
basic guidelines and parameters that may be extended to other cases.  
  
It is important to note that Sunni jurists agreed that several conditions 
should be met in a ÃarÙra case. Firstly, that such an act is the only means of 
removing the grievous harm and there is no other (lawful) alternative. 
Secondly, the harm is directed to one of five human necessities. Thirdly, 
acting according to necessity must be proportional and the act should not 
result in a similar or greater injury. The jurists also required the person in 
such a situation to have a preponderant opinion that he is in a great danger. 
In this matter, what the person believes takes precedence over the reality 
concerning matters and qÁÃÐ cannot verify the case independently.  
 
One of the main conditions in ÃarÙra cases is that the person should have a 
strong belief that there is no food for survival. In this matter, practically the 
only person who can justify and verify the situation is the hungry person 
himself. However, the classical Muslim jurists had already set several 
parameters to enable him to justify the action. Some jurists, for instance, 
required that the person should be able to examine his surroundings and 
look for alternatives and the prospects of a new situation in which the 
consumption of the unlawful is not permitted. These verifications are 
required in order to verify that the danger he faces is real. The person needs 
to identify precisely the situation of hunger which allows mitigation. The 
jurists also held that such a fear must be based on certainty or a strong 
probability.  
 
The jurists agreed unanimously that consuming unlawful food is only 
permitted when one fears one’s life is at stake and there is fear of loss of 
life. The fear must be certain and not merely a suspicion. In other words, 
the loss of one’s life must certainly or most likely be the result of the 
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current pressing circumstance that is in opposition to a mere suspicion 
(waham). Muslim jurists divided the level of certainty into four levels, 
namely yaqÐn (knowledge gained with 100 per cent certainty), Ûann 
(knowledge gained with 75 per cent certainty), shakk (knowledge gained 
with 50 per cent certainty) or waham (knowledge gained with only 25 per 
cent certainty)264. Necessity cases that can justify a person deviating from 
an original ruling must be based on a genuine reason either of certainty 
(yaqÐn) or strong probability (Ûann). A weak assumption based on whim 
and fancy is not accepted. This is the view of the majority of SunnÐ 
scholars, including the ShÁfiÝÐs265 and ZarkashÐ from the ÍanafÐs. However, 
as far as food and drink is concerned, the importance of food is self-evident, 
and no human will survive without food for a certain period of time. 
 
Another important question regards the period of ÃarÙra. When is a person 
permitted to consume the unlawful? Do they have to wait for a specific 
period of time before they can lawfully eat the muharrama? For example, 
the ÚÁhirÐ jurists required a person to wait for one whole day, but if he/she 
fears death before the passing of the one-day waiting period, he/she can eat 
a limited amount of the unlawful food. The basis of their argument is the 
saying of the Prophet prohibiting Òawm al-wiÒÁl (fasting continuously for 
one day and a night)266. For the ÚÁhirÐs, this ÎadÐth implies that the ability 
of a person to bear hunger is one whole day.  Therefore, in necessity cases, 
a hungry person must wait for this specific period of time.  
 
                                                 
264 I have formulated the ratio of certainty by examining the definition of yaqÐn, shakk, 
waham and Ûann provided by the jurists.  In the book of al-MabÒÙt, vol. III, p. 63 it is stated 
that the definition of shakk is when the level knowledge and ignorance about something is 
similar, ‘wa maÝnÁ al-shakk al-yastawiya Ôarf al-Ýilm wa Ôarf al-jahl bi shayÞ. See also al-
MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhaddhab, vol. I, p. 220; al-ManthÙr fÐ al-QawÁÝid al-Fiqhiyya, vol. II, 
p. 255; al-Jawhara al-Nayyira, vol. I, p. 79; al-Durar al-Íikam sharÎ Gharar al-aÎkÁm, vol. 
I, p. 150; al-QalyÙbÐ wa ÝUmaira, vol.I, p. 40. K. Reinhatt has observed that in ritual, shakk 
signifies uncertainty over the effective performance of an act. In epistemology, it is part of 
an epistemic ranking from yaqÐn (certainty) to ghalaba al-Ûann (likelihood), to Ûann 
(presumption), to shakk (uncertainty), to shubha. In epistemology, shakk refers to a state of 
uncertainty resulting from the equipollence of beliefs or evidence. See Reinhart, A.K. and 
Netton, I.R. "Shakk." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman;  Th. Bianquis; 
C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Brill, 2010. Brill Online. 
EXETER UNIVERSITY. 26 July 2010 
<http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-1030>  
265 ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib,  Vol. I, p.570, See also  al-Nawawī, Al-MajmÙÝ , 
Vol. IV, p. 44 
266 ÞAlÐ bin AÎmad bin SaÞīd bin Íazm, Al-MuÎallÁ bi Þl-AthÁr, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, Vol. XI 
, p. 105 
 117 
However, the majority of jurists did not support this position as they 
acknowledged the different capability of humans to bear hunger and thirst. 
Examining the above case, we can say that although Muslim jurists did not 
specify a waiting time, they provided general guidelines for a hungry 
person such as when the hunger is unbearable, when no other person is 
available to feed them and certainly when no lawful food is available. It can 
be stipulated that the reason why SunnÐ jurists did not put a specific waiting 
time for a hungry person is because people have different strengths and 
capabilities, some people can wait for one or two days without foods and 
some can wait less than 24 hours without food. However, a person’s 
subjective feelings cannot transform a non-necessity case to a necessity 
case. For instance, an obese person may find it is difficult to stay hungry for 
more than 12 hours, whereas ordinary thinner person might be able to.  
 
With the advent of modern technology and scientific research, can Muslims 
rely on medical reports or scientific research to determine the period in 
which people can survive without food? In this case, jurists need up-to-date 
information about the actual nature of human survival without food. 
Missing a few meals can cause a host of undesirable complications,267 
although a human will not starve while going without food for several days 
or even week. Some research indicates healthy individuals should be able to 
survive without food for forty days. According to this data, should a 
Muslim wait to consume an unlawful meal until he is starving or is it valid 
when there is a sign of weakness, such as irritability, confusion and 
lethargy? When is a valid time for one to consume an unlawful meal? 
3.2.1 The case of undernourishment 
The discussion gets more complicated when the case under review involves 
the question of nourishing foods, such as when the unlawful is needed not 
for saving life but for nourishment. Even though “nourishment” was not 
acknowledged explicitly by the jurists as a necessity case which permits the 
consumption of the unlawful, this issue is actually a ÃarÙra case as well.  
This is because undernourishment is considered a real danger to the body.  
                                                 
267 See http://www.survivaltopics.com/survival/how-long-can-you-live-without-food/ see 
also http://www.professorshouse.com/food-beverage/ 
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Some jurists acknowledged ‘the state of being unable to walk or move 
properly’ as a valid sign to permit one to consume mayta. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ, for 
example, permitted the consumption of the unlawful when the situation 
means a man on his journey cannot reach his destination, or makes a person 
incapable of riding his transport268. This danger has been defined as 
something that brings grievous harm and weakens the muÃtarr. Hence, it 
can be said that it is not necessary to wait until a near death situation before 
consuming the unlawful and that unbearable weakness is sufficient to allow 
the person to eat the muÎarrama. The ÍanafÐs, such as al-BurÙsawÐ, defined 
ÃarÙra as a situation when one fears one’s health is in danger. Examining 
the above cases, we can reach three important conclusions. Firstly, it is not 
necessary for a man to wait until a specific time before consuming an 
unlawful meal, as the jurists agreed that a sign of weakness is sufficient. 
Many ÎadÐths269 indicate that the Prophet did not require a person to wait 
until this point. It is sufficient for a person to have a fear of starvation, and 
hence consumption of an unlawful meal is essential. Secondly, the 
capability of the person to bear hunger differs from one to another. Thirdly, 
under nourishment should also be regarded as a real danger that permits the 
consumption of the unlawful. Undernourishment, that weakens the human 
body is a serious health problem and can be life-threatening. This unhealthy 
state, resulting from consuming not enough food over a period of time leads 
to a reduction in mental and physical efficiency, a lowered resistance to 
disease in general and leads to deficiencies in the body. It is a common 
cause of death in the developing world. Thus, under-nourishment should be 
taken into consideration in the hunger case.  
The jurists highlighted the importance of searching for alternative food 
before one can consume a ÎarÁm meal270. Some of the jurists made this a 
precondition that should be met before an unlawful meal can be consumed. 
However, some jurists contended that the act of searching for a lawful meal 
is not necessarily essential for a hungry person as an assumption of the 
                                                 
268  al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. II, pp. 276-277 
269 Please refer to Chapter One, where the Prophet permitted the consumption of mayta for 
companions who did not have sufficient food.  
270 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ,  1985, Vol. XIII, pp. 332-333, see also MÙsÁ bin AÎmad bin 
MÙsÁ bin SÁlim AbÙ al-NajÁ al-ÍijÁwÐ al-MaqdasÐ, al-IqnÁÝ lÐ ÓÁlib al-IntifÁÝ,  Riyadh: DÁr 
ÝÀlam al-Kutub, 1999, Vol. IV, p. 309. 
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unavailability of foods is sufficient in this case. For the first view, that of 
the ÍanbalÐs, it is an obligation for a person, especially for those who are 
not travelling (muqÐm), to seek a lawful meal before they are permitted to 
consume mayta. In this case, the jurists analysed the situation one faces, 
either in the case where food is normally accessible or not271. Meanwhile, 
other jurists contended that it is not necessary for a person to look for an 
alternative before he/she is permitted to eat the unlawful272. 
 
3.2.2 The limit of the unlawful to be eaten 
Another important issue concerns the quantity of unlawful food or drink 
that may be consumed under duress and whether taking extra provision is 
permitted in such a case. The limit of consuming unlawful food is clearly 
perceived from the legal maxim ‘ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadariha’ meaning 
“necessity is measured in accordance with its true proportion”. However, 
the jurists differed in determining the volume of food that can be consumed. 
The Muslim jurists divided the circumstance into two categories; the case of 
makhmaÒa (continuous state of hunger) and nÁdir (unusual) case. In the first 
case of makhmaÒa, the Muslim scholars had no doubt that it is permissible 
to eat or drink until one is full273. This case resembles a famine, where there 
is no hope for food or water to maintain lives for a long period of time or 
where one is far from any residential area. The majority agreed that the 
unlawful can be eaten without limit during this period. However, the 
scholars disputed over the rare case (nÁdir) when there is a possibility of a 
ÎalÁl meal in a near future. They disputed whether eating as much as 
possible is permitted or whether there should be limits. It is reported that 
ImÁm MÁlik  permitted the muÃtarr (person under duress)274 to eat as much 
as he likes and he may even take provision from it. However, he ruled that 
when he found something lawful, he has to throw away the unlawful 
meal275. Other MÁlikÐ jurists reaffirmed this position by arguing that the 
                                                 
271 ibid. 
272 However, in the case of wuÃÙÞ, majority of jurists required a Muslim traveler to search 
for clean water before applying tayammum.  
273 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án,Vol. I, p. 55 
274Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án,Vol. I, p. 55. See also Ibn Íazm al-MuÎalla, Vol. VI, p. 
105. See also al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. IX, p. 42. Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist's 
Primer- Bidayat al-Mujtahid,  Vol. I, p. 577. 
275 MÁlik bin Anas, Al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Ya'qub Johnson and 'A`isha 'Abdarahman Bewley 
(Trans.), Norwich : Diwan Press, 1982,  p. 227 
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ÃarÙra situation begins with the non-availability of a ÎalÁl meal and lasts 
until one can find a ÎalÁl one. This period permits the person to eat the 
unlawful without limit regardless of whether there is a promise or hope for 
a lawful meal in a near future.  In other words, as long as the lawful meal is 
not visibly available, the person is permitted to consume as much of the 
unlawful meal as is necessary.  The MÁlikÐs further argued that whatever it 
is permissible to eat in a limited fashion to sustain life (mÁ yasuddu al-
ramq) can also be eaten until one is full. The basis of their argument is a 
ÎadÐth narrated by JÁbir bin Samrah, where the Prophet permitted an ÝArabÐ 
(a Bedouin) to eat camel meat which did not belong to him. The Prophet in 
this case did not limit the consumption276. The MÁlikÐs used this ÎadÐth as 
the basis for their argument permitting the consumption of an unlawful 
meal without limits, even in a nÁdir case. 
 
However, the second view, upheld by the ShÁfiÝÐs277, ÍanbalÐs278, AbÙ 
ÍanÐfa and the jurists in his school279, some MÁlikÐs like Ibn MÁjishun280  
agreed that a person can only eat in a limited fashion (mÁ yasuddu al-ramq) 
in such a rare (nÁdir) situation. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ,281 for instance, preferred a 
Muslim to consume the muÎarrama bit by bit, meaning he preferably eats 
only what can sustain his life. However, if the circumstances continue, he 
can eat until full or make extra provisions. However, according to al-ShÁfiÝÐ, 
the muÎarrama must be thrown away once he finds the lawful. This is 
because the ÃarÙra situation only permits Muslims to eat within limits (al-
ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadriha). In such cases, the person is not allowed to eat 
more than is enough to sustain life. This is the most accepted view of the 
jurists. It may be speculated that this strict view, adapted by the majority of 
jurists, stems from a fear of the abuse that might arise among those who 
have no genuine reason to consume an unlawful meal. Furthermore, it may 
be reasoned that some people might be tempted to consume more of an 
                                                 
276  See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 331. This hadÐth is also mentioned in  
Chapter Two 
277 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. IX, p. 44 
278 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, 330 
279 See al-ÍamÁwī,  Ghamz ÝUyÙn al-BaÒÁÞir, Vol. I, p. 277, see also al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-
QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 179  
280 Ibn al-ArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, Vol. I, p. 55. See also Ibn Íazm, al-MuÎallÁ, Vol. VI, p. 
105. Al-MuznÐ and Ibn ÍabÐb are also reported supporting this view. 
281 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. II, pp. 276-277 
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unlawful meal they actually need. In this case, the consumption ceases to 
protect the necessity but rather to satisfy his greed. It is also important to 
note that some jurists282 also forbade a Muslim from selling an unlawful 
meal, as the permission is limited only for consumption but not for making 
profit.  
 
Although the majority of jurists contended that it is a requirement that a 
hungry man should eat in a limited fashion, some jurists gave a more 
flexible rule. They distinguished the situations precisely according to the 
intensity of the cases. AÎmad bin Íanbal, for instance, argued that if one 
fears self-destruction, either due to starvation or for other reasons, or he 
fears becoming weak and unable to walk or move, he is permitted to 
consume mayta or any other prohibited meal without limit283. ImÁm al-
Íaramain al-JuwaynÐ also gave permission for a person to eat mayta until 
he feels no more hunger, especially when he is far from a residential area. 
Similarly, this is the view of al-GhazÁlÐ, who states if a person fears no food 
will be available at some future time he can eat until full. Some ShÁfiÝÐ 
scholars also had this opinion284. It can be concluded that this view gives 
liberty to the muÃtarr to verify his own situation depending on his ability to 
bear hunger. A person who can stand hunger for more than one day may not 
have the same rule as a person who can stand hunger for two days. Each 
case has to be decided individually. However, it can be assumed that 
although the subjective feeling is acknowledged, only a genuine hunger is 
considered. In other words, the subjective feelings cannot transform a non-
compelling case to a compelling case. The case of food craving, for 
instance, which does not lead to severe bodily weakness, cannot be 
regarded as a necessity case. 
 
 
3.2.3 Between two unlawful meals 
                                                 
282 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. II, pp. 276-277. The prohibition of selling what is only 
permitted under necessity can also be found in the case of dog selling. The majority of 
jurists contended that training and keeping dogs for hunting is permitted because of 
necessity, but dogs can not be traded. Such a sale is considered void as the price of dog is 
prohibited.   
283 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 330 
284 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ , Vol. IX, p. 44 
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The jurists have set parameters in a case where more than one unlawful 
meal is available during the period of necessity. In this case, the applied 
rule is that a less harmful meal should be chosen285. The harmful element of 
the food is assessed from various perspectives, including the degree of 
filthiness, the degree of worldly punishment, social perception and social 
liabilities. It can be argued that the case is not so complicated if the choices 
are of different levels. For instance, in the case of choosing donkey meat 
and dog meat, there is no question that donkey meat should be chosen by a 
starving man. Likewise, in the case of choosing between donkey meat and 
human flesh, the donkey should be chosen.  
 
However, the case is complicated when the alternative meals constitute the 
same level of harm. For example, a starving man in his iÎrÁm state 
(muÎrim) may have a choice between mayta or slaughtered meat286. Both 
meals are prohibited to him. A slaughtered animal is unlawful for a person 
in his iÎrÁm state, as is the mayta.  The majority of jurists287 held that for a 
hungry hÁjj, he has to eat mayta rather than the ordinary ÎalÁl slaughtered 
meat. The reason for choosing mayta according to the ÍanafÐs288, MÁlik and 
the ShÁfiÝÐs is that eating hunted animals during Îajj is punishable by a 
fidya compensation. However, there is no compensation for consuming 
mayta for a ÎÁjj. Hence, the punishment is taken into consideration in 
determining the level of harm of the act. 
 
Although the ÍanbalÐs held the same view that the mayta should be chosen 
over a slaughtered animal, they proposed a different reasoning for their 
position. They argued that the permission to eat mayta during extreme 
situations is granted by textual evidence (the general Qur’anic concessions 
of consuming mayta), while the permission to go hunting during Îajj (due 
to starvation) is granted through ijtihÁd,289 which ranks lower than the 
Qur'Án. Hence, eating mayta should be prioritised. What we can see is that a 
different argument was put forward by both groups although the solution is 
similar. The first group gave a preference to an act which does not entail a 
                                                 
285 ÝAzÁm, QawÁÝid Fiqhiyya, p. 202. See more discussion at the previous chapter.  
286 Meat that was gained from hunting during the state of iÎrÁm 
287 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 338 
288 Ibid.  
289 Ibid. 
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legal punishment, while the second group gave the preference over an act 
that gains permissibility from a stronger level of evidence.  
 
However, in this case, some ShÁfiÝÐs held that a starving hÁjj has to choose 
the slaughtered meal although he has to pay the fidya (compensation). They 
argued in this case that a ÎalÁl meal (the slaughtered meat) is preferable to a 
mayta because the latter is filthy290. This view gave a preference to a choice 
that is more religiously clean.  
 
Another case discussed was between mayta and ÎalÁl meals belonging to 
other person. The majority of jurists agreed that taking the mayta is 
preferable. According to the ÍanbalÐs, if there is a choice between mayta 
and a meal belonging to an unknown owner, the person has to choose the 
mayta291. This was also the view of MÁlik. The jurists, and particularly the 
ÍanbalÐs, argued that the permissibility of eating mayta is granted through 
textual evidence while the permissibility to eat another person's meal for 
necessity is only granted through ijtihÁd. In a similar case found in Al-
MuwaÔÔa`, MÁlik responded to the issue of whether a man who is forced by 
necessity to eat carrion when at the same time he also found the fruit, crops 
or sheep of other people. MÁlik said292; 
 If he thinks that the owner of the fruit, crops or sheep will believe his 
necessity so that he will not be deemed a thief and have his hand cut 
off, then I think he should eat from whatever he finds that which will 
remove his hunger but he should not carry any of it away. I prefer he 
does that than he eat carrion. If he fears that he will not be believed, 
and will be deemed a thief for what he has taken, then I think that it is 
better for him to eat the carrion, and he has leeway to eat carrion in 
this respect. Even so, I fear that someone who is not forced by 
necessity to eat carrion might exceed the limits out of a desire to 
consume other people's property, crops or fruit 
 
The second reason for choosing mayta over a ÎalÁl meal belonging to an 
unknown person is that the former act relates to the right of AllÁh (ÎuqÙq 
AllÁh) whilst the latter relates to the rights of other Muslims. Many agreed 
that AllÁh's rights are generally based on facilitating ease for Muslim, but  
                                                 
290 However, if there is no choice except hunting, the game does not have to be slaughtered 
as it is already unlawful because it was killed during the state of iÎrÁm. This is the view of 
ShÁfiÝÐs. Meanwhile the ÍanbalÐs said that the game should be slaughtered. See al-MughnÐ , 
Vol. XIII, p. 337 
291 Ibid.  
292 MÁlik, al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ,  p. 27 
 124 
human's rights are relatively stricter. The other reason to choose mayta is 
the fear of Îadd punishment because of stealing another person's meal.  
 
The second view, held by the ShÁfiÝis, is that the muÃtarr must choose ÎalÁl 
meal which belongs to an unknown person, because ÎalÁl meal is 
available293.  It can be speculated that this view gave preference to 
consuming a ÎalÁl meal even if the act leads to a punishment, as they 
considered eating mayta to be worse than stealing.  
 
Examining these two cases, we arrive at a conclusion that the majority of 
jurists preferred the eating of mayta even if a ÎalÁl meal is available. The 
legality of the lawful meal in both cases is impaired because of the 
punishment associated with the meal. In this case, the lawful is considered 
unfit to be consumed. It can be concluded that the majority of jurists had 
taken into consideration not only the moral consequence of the act, but also 
the legal punishment aspect as a parameter in determining the harmfulness 
of the act.  
 
The majority of jurists also held that a muÃtarr is permitted to take, by 
force, a meal belonging to others if the owner refuses to sell it. The 
ÍanbalÐs argued that the muÃtarr can seize the meal, but that he has to pay 
the price294. However, the muÃtarr is forbidden to do so if the owner is also 
in the same state of necessity. The reason for the permission to seize 
another’s meal is the responsibility of others to feed the hungry.  However, 
the owner is allowed to sell the meal but not at a premium price295. The 
ShÁfiÝÐs also held that eating a meal which belongs to another is permissible 
in necessity cases, even if the owner does not give his permission. The 
ShÁfiÝÐs, like the ÍanbalÐs, also ruled that the muÃtarr is still liable to pay 
the price296. The jurists also ruled that it is forbidden to kill a person 
fighting for meal. If the muÃtarr is killed in the course of getting his food, 
the killer will have to face qiÒÁÒ (law of equality) and the murderer will be 
                                                 
293 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. IX, p. 44 
294 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 339 
295 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. IX, p. 44 
296 Ibid.  
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considered among those who rebel (bÁghÐ). Ibn Íazm has stressed the 
obligation of the public to feed the hungry297:   
It is not lawful for a Muslim to eat these unlawful things even in a 
helpless condition when his Muslim or DhimmÐ neighbours or 
members of society have more lawful food and drink than they 
require, since it is obligatory (farÃ) for such people to feed the 
hungry298 
 
Ibn Íazm’s consistency in applying the notion of altruistic behaviour in this 
case is to be expected as he also held that the policy of brotherhood 
between Muslims becomes the basis for recognising threats directed at 
strangers299. He further argued that a Muslim is even allowed to perform a 
prohibited act in order to save another's life, a position which not all jurists 
agree with, especially the ÍanafÐs300. In this matter, I support the position of 
Ibn Íazm that the society bears the responsibility to feed the hungry. The 
hungry is not allowed to steal, as the situation of necessity does not lift the 
liability. In the case of stealing to alleviate hunger, I choose the opinion of 
MÁlik who forbade stealing the meal of others. If it occurs, the thief will be 
punished by the Îadd punishment. Most importantly, if the right to seize 
other’s property during ÃarÙra is given without proper control, it can cause 
chaos to the society. The person himself should go to the authority 
declaring his state of emergency and let the authority decide for him. 
Stealing can be regarded as the last alternative if other resorts have failed. It 
is clear that MÁlik did not simply give permission to steal, even in necessity 
cases, as he realised the consequences of the rule. The public may abuse the 
permission to steal without properly verifying the intensity of the case. The 
permission to steal given by some jurists above can be interpreted as linked 
to whether people go unnoticed in the act of stealing or whether people 
already recognise his dire need. It is important to note that stealing another's 
property is not something that can be generalised to all situations.  
                                                 
297 Abdul Rahman I. Doi, SharÐÝah-The Islamic Law, London: Ta-ha Publishers, 1984, p. 
218 
298 Islam lays great stress on the relief of poverty by the rich and it is a duty of the wealthy 
man to ake part in the economic uplift of the poor. The system of zakÁh was introduced 
during the Prophet time and the Prophet has made no distinction between Muslims and 
non-Muslims and he helped many Jews in Medina. See also p. 392 
299 His position in the case of coercion can be found in Chapter Two. See also Khalad Abou 
el Fadl, "The Common and Islamic Law of Duress" in Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2, 
p. 152 
300 The discussion of compulsion and treat directed to third party has been discussed in the 
previous chapter under the subtopic of compulsion and duress.  
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A further question to be discussed is whether a person in need is also 
obliged to feed another person in need. The ÍanbalÐs ruled that if a muÃtarr 
only has a limited stock of food to feed himself and his family, for example, 
during a journey or during famine, he is not obliged to feed another muÃtarr 
as he is also in the same state of emergency. This means that the other 
muÃtarr is not allowed to take another person’s meal (who is in the same 
situation as him) as this will bring harm to the owner301. The issue of eating 
one's own flesh or other human flesh had also been debated by the jurists. 
The ÍanbalÐs ruled that it is not permitted for him to cut off and eat part of 
his organ, as it leads to harm and will cause his death. Furthermore, there is 
no certainty that he will survive by eating his own flesh302. The ÍanbalÐ303 
and ShÁfiÝÐ scholars304  held that it is not permitted to kill another whose 
blood is protected (their lives are protected by SharÐÝa), whether he is a 
Muslim or a kÁfir (non-believer). Also, if there is a dead body of a maÝÒÙm 
(a person whose blood is protected), the ÍanbalÐ jurists ruled that the flesh 
cannot be eaten as it is vital to protect his sanctity305. However, the ShÁfiÝÐ 
scholars306 and some ÍanafÐ jurists allowed the consumption of a Muslim 
dead body because to protect the life of a living person is of greater 
importance than protecting the sanctity of a dead person. The first group did 
not approve the consumption of human flesh based on one ÎadÐth of the 
Prophet which states that "Breaking the bones of dead person is much like 
breaking the bones of a living person". They believed this tradition is a 
prohibition on a Muslim damaging the body of a dead Muslim. However, 
the second group disagreed with such an interpretation by arguing that this 
tradition only prohibits the breaking of human bones and not the 
consumption of human's flesh307.  
 
Examining the various sub-topics of the aforementioned food case, it is 
clear that the classical jurists seem consistent in applying the relevant legal 
                                                 
301 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 340 
302 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII,  p. 338 
303 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 339 
304 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ , Vol. IX, p. 44 
305 See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 339 
306 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ,  Vol. IX, p. 44 
307 See Ibn QudÁma,al-MughnÐ, Vol. XIII, p. 339 
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maxims such as lÁ ÃarÁr wa lÁ ÃirÁr and al-ÃarÙra lÁ tubÁÎ Îaqq al-ghayr 
(necessity does not invalidate the right of others). For example, the ÃarÙra 
situation does not permit a person to consume another's meal or tamper with 
a human's sanctity (by eating the deceased’s flesh). However, if a muÃtarr 
has no choice other than another's meal, he is still liable to pay the price. 
The case under review has a similar rule as the case of coercion, where 
someone is forced to damage another’s property. The person should 
compensate the third party for his loss. Even though necessity is a 
justification for committing a sin, it does not justify wasting the property 
without being responsible for making restitution.  
 
3.2.4 Eating a prohibited meal during an extreme situation. Is it wÁjib or 
mubÁÎ?  
 
The jurists discussed whether a Muslim is obliged to eat the unlawful meal 
or not. Is the consumption considered as wÁjib or mubÁÎ? There are two 
points of view308. One opinion is that it is wÁjib to consume mayta during 
such a situation. This is the view of the ÍanafÐs309 and the ShÁfiÝÐs. If the 
person under duress refuses to eat the alternative food and dies, he is 
regarded as a sinner. The second opinion that it is only mubÁÎ (permitted 
but it is not an obligation to do it). The first view concluded their rule based 
on the verse of  
Q2. 195: 
 “Spend in God’s cause; do not contribute to your destruction with your 
own hands, but do good, for God loves those who do good” 
  
Another verse is  Q4. 29 :  
“You who believe, do not wrongfully consume each other’s wealth but 
trade by mutual consent. Do not kill each other, for God is merciful to 
you”   
 
On the basis of these two verses, the jurists argued that if the person in such 
a situation dies as a result of his refusal to eat mayta¸ he is considered a 
sinner, hence breaking the rule in ÃarÙra is considered an obligation. 
Meanwhile the second group310 brought forward two pieces of evidence to 
                                                 
308 See al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ , Vol. IX, p.  43 
309 See al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm Al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 79 
310 al-NawawÐ,al-MajmÙÝ , Vol. IX, p.  43 
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support their view. First, in a report of a Prophet's companion, he was 
captured by the Romans (Byzantine) and he was served al-khamr and pork. 
The companion did not eat or drink the meal for three days, refusing to 
drink the wine and the swine. He was then released and he said "AllÁh has 
permitted me to eat, but I do not want to sacrifice my religion". Should the 
act of consuming the unlawful be an obligation, the companion should have 
eaten the meal during his captivity. Another argument put forward is that 
since eating mayta is a kind of rukhÒa, it cannot be made to be wÁjib. It is 
not an obligation to exercise this facility as it is a matter of personal choice.  
 
3.2.5 Can we consume alcohol during ÃarÙra i.e. to quench thirst? 
This is a vital question that is also related to the Harm Reduction 
Programme. It is widely known that the consumption of the unlawful like 
mayta and blood is permitted to save one’s life, either from threat, hunger or 
choking. However, jurists disputed in the case of the consumption of al-
khamr during necessity. Many jurists311 only permitted the consumption of 
al-khamr in the case of duress (ikrÁh) and choking but not to quench thirst. 
Only the ÍanafÐs permitted the consumption of wine to release pangs of 
hunger.  
The MÁlikÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs did not allow al-khamr to be consumed as an 
alternative to food during necessity312. MÁlik built his argument on several 
pieces of evidence. Firstly, God has made a total prohibition of al-khamr, 
while the prohibition of mayta is made along with the excuse of permitting 
it during ÃarÙra313. Al-khamr was not explicitly mentioned along with pork, 
unslaughtered meat and blood in the Qur’Án. Secondly, MÁlik also argued 
that al-khamr cannot end hunger and thirst but only adds to one's thirst314. 
Hence, al-khamr does not provide a solution for those who are hungry. 
                                                 
311 al-SarakhsÐ, SharÎ al-Siyar al-KabÐr, Vol. IV, p. 1427, see also  al-KasÁnÐ, BadÁiÝ al-
ÑanÁÝi,  Vol. V, p. 113, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. IX, p. 138. The permission to drink -
al-khamr or a person under duress based on a ÎadÐth saying that there are excuses for 
person who is in error (khaÔÁ’), forgetfulness or under duress. And the basis for the 
permission to drink al-khamr to remove one’s choking is the verse of famaniÃturra ghayr 
bÁghin.      
312 Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, Vol. I, p. 84 
313Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, Vol. I, p. 56 
314 But AbÙ Bakr al-AbharÐ says if the muÃtarr sure that al-khamr can quench his thirstiness 
he can drink it. 
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However, some MÁlikÐs permitted al-khamr to help someone who is 
choking on food. Choking on food is different from starvation and thirst. 
They ruled that in the case of choking, wine can relieve the choking. 
However, in order to avoid the Îadd penalty, the choking person has to put 
forward evidence indicating that he was truly choking. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ also 
reaffirmed MÁlik's position by insisting that drinking alcohol can lead to 
insanity and this causes harm to Muslims rather than benefit. For him, the 
only unlawful things that can be consumed during ÃarÙra are mayta, pork, 
blood and non-alcoholic drinks315.   
 
The ÍanafÐs and ÚÁhirÐ jurists316 disagreed with the above opinion. The 
ÍanafÐ jurists’ arguments are; firstly, they rejected MÁlik's argument that al-
khamr cannot remove thirst. They argued that al-khamr can remove thirst at 
the first stage of drinking, before one gets drunk. A muÃtarr will not become 
intoxicated because he is allowed to drink wine only in a limited fashion. 
They further elucidated that that al khamr has two elements, al-ruÔÙba 
(moistness) and al-ÎarÁra (heat). The first element of moistness comes about 
after a person drinks a little al-khamr, and then the second element of heat 
comes after drinking a large amount of wine. The ÍanafÐ jurists also 
opposed the view of the ShÁfiÝÐs who say that al-khamr can only make one 
loses his sanity (yudhhib al-Ýaql).  The ÍanafÐs defended their position by 
arguing that a person in ÃarÙra who consumed al-khamr cannot lose his 
sanity because he is only allowed to drink in a limited fashion. They also 
rejected the opinion of MÁlik who insisted that the permission of al-khamr 
cannot be gained from the permission of eating mayta. The ÍanafÐs strongly 
argued that the verses should be extended to all kinds of unlawful items, 
including wine as well317 as there is no textual evidence that excludes al-
khamr in this matter.  
 
Like the ÍanafÐs, ÚÁhirÐ jurists also permitted the consumption of alcohol 
during times of necessity. They even argued that if a person refused to drink 
alcohol in an extreme situation and this led to his death, he would therefore 
be a sinner. He would be regarded as a person who committed suicide. The 
                                                 
315 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol, II, pp. 276-277 
316  See  Ibn Íazm, al-MuÎallÁ, Vol. VI, p. 106 
317 al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 182 
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ÍanbalÐ jurists, on the other hand, only permitted the consumption of wine 
when it was mixed with other things, in other words, when the quantity of 
other liquids is more than the wine and the mixture is not intoxicating. The 
consumption is limited to what can sustain life. The ÍanbalÐ jurists further 
added that if a person drinks the mixture that has more alcohol than the 
other liquids, or drinks until he loses his sanity; he will be punished by the 
Îadd penalty318.  
 
A MÁlikÐ jurist, Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, made his own conclusion by giving 
preference to the ÍanafÐ view. He contended that the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages is permitted in any extreme situation, including thirst, 
under compulsion or when choking on food. He argued that AllÁh has 
prohibited certain food and drink such as mayta (unslaugtered animal), 
damm (blood), and laÎm al-khinzÐr (pork) in ordinary daily situations 
(awqÁt mutlaqa). However, the general rules are lifted in unusual situations 
(ÃarÙra). Ibn al-ÝArabÐ like other scholars such as AbÙ Bakr al-AbhÁrÐ also 
argued that the permission to consume al-khamr is included in the 
permission for khamr, although the textual evidence does not mention it 
explicitly319.  
 
3.3 DarÙra cases in medication 
 
The usual ÃarÙra issue in medication is whether the unlawful substances can 
be used for medication. The unlawful includes al-khamr, pork, blood and 
religiously impure items320. It is admitted that the issue of using unlawful 
substances (muÎarrama) for medical purposes no longer attracts the 
attention of current writers and readers of Islamic law. This is due to the fact 
that modern Muslim jurists seem to have agreed on the permission to use 
the unlawful for medication due to necessity. However, the analysis of the 
permission to use unlawful substances for medication needs to be re-
                                                 
318 See also Ibn TaymÐyya, al-SiyÁsa al-SharÝiyya fÐ IÒlÁÎ al-RÁÝÐ wa al-RÁÝiyya, no place: 
Maktaba Ibn Taymiyya, p. 145, see Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, IÝlÁm al-MÙqiÝÐn, Vol. IV, p. 
293 
319Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án Vol. I, pp. 56-57 
320 There were great debates among jurists regarding impure items, such as animal’s hair, 
bone etc. See also Ze’ev Maghen, “Impurity in Islam”, in Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 
VI, No. 3,1999, pp. 348-392 
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emphasised as this issue is closely related to the issue of the methadone 
programme in the Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia.  
 
The traditional Muslim jurists discussed at great length the issue of taking 
medication using unlawful substances.  There were two main issues 
discussed: firstly, is taking medicine a necessity? If the answer is in 
affirmative, it leads to the second issue of whether the consumption of 
unlawful substances is permitted to cure an illness which is deemed as a 
necessity. Some jurists did not regard sickness a necessity, therefore, the 
unlawful cannot be taken as medication. This is the position of Ibn 
Taymiyya and al-GhazÁlÐ. Meanwhile, some jurists held that illness and 
sickness are necessity cases in which the rule of ÃarÙra can be applied. 
Although some unlawful medication can be consumed, there is still another 
issue and that is whether alcohol can be used to treat a patient. Some jurists 
only permitted substances other than wine to be used as medicine. The 
second group, however, extended the permission to any unlawful medicine, 
including alcoholic substances, if there is no other lawful alternative. The 
third group went even further, permitting the usage of alcohol even in a 
non-necessity case. They argued that a little amount of liquor consumed for 
medication and liquor is permissible if the lawful alternative does not work 
faster than the alcohol.  
 
3.3.1 Having medical treatment in Islam 
 
The issue of having medical treatment was treated under the central 
question: hal al-tadÁwi aÎsan min tarkuhu (Is seeking treatment better than 
its abandonment)? There are two opinions regarding seeking treatment, an 
issue that was extensively discussed in the middle of the third century AH. 
Many opinions are based on a ÎadÐth reported by al-BukhÁrÐ in bÁb ma 
anzala AllÁh dÁ' illÁ anzal lahu shifÁ'Þ (Allah would not create a disease 
without creating its cure321 .  Ibn Taymiyya, al-GhazÁlÐ and some Sufis were 
of the view that it is better for a sick person to live without treatment as it is 
a sign of a humble acceptance of God’s appreciation (tawakkal) and a sign 
                                                 
321 Nurdeen Dueraseh & Hanisah Yaacob, "Issues on Medical Treatment in Islam", The 
Yale Journal for Humanities in Medicine. Connecticut: The Yale New Haven Medical 
Center, 2005. http://info.med.yale.edu  
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of piousness. This view is based on the following ÎadÐth322: there was a sick 
woman complaining to the Prophet that she had epilepsy and was asking the 
Prophet to pray for her health. The Prophet replied to her by saying: “If you 
prefer to be patient with your illness, you will enter paradise, but if you 
want me to pray for you, I will pray to God to cure your illness”. 
Furthermore, the Prophets’ companions were also reported as not seeking 
for any medical treatment when they were sick323. Hence, for this group, 
having treatment is not obligatory, and hence there is no issue around using 
alcohol as medication.  
 
However, as YÙsuf al-QaraÃÁwÐ argued seeking medical treatment is 
strongly encouraged if one's life is in great danger, such as when one is 
suffering from a serious disease such as cancer and when there is a hope for 
cure324. The rule for seeking medical treatment is a desirable act in any non-
serious case. This view is supported in a ÎadÐth report in which the Prophet 
himself tried to ease his headache by applying some henna to his head and 
he was also reported as saying: “A Muslim has to seek treatment as God has 
made the illness and the cure”325. As long as there is hope in the treatment, 
people have to try whatever means they can to prolong life, as it will 
increase their productivity and help them become a healthy person, enabling 
them to fulfil all their religious and worldly observances. To conclude, the 
general legal rule for seeking medical treatment is permitted and advisable 
but not a compulsory matter. Resorting to ÎarÁm ingredients for cure and 
medicinal purposes is only permitted if no other Îalal medicine is available 
and it is prescribed by a trusted experienced and God-fearing doctor. It is 
also suggested that Ibn Taymiyya and al-GhazalÐ had a positive attitude 
towards health care, even though they insisted that perseverance is better. 
They did not regard having treatment to be something undesirable, only 
insisting that the treatment cannot be made from unlawful substances. If the 
illness does not have a lawful alternative, a Muslim should remain patient 
and bear the illness. This is also the view of the majority of classical jurists 
who did not permit using ÎarÁm ingredients for medical purposes.  
                                                 
322YahyÁ  bin Sharf al-NawawÐ, RiyÁÃ al- ÑÁliÎÐn, Mansoura: DÁr al-WafÁÞ, no date, p. 28 
323 YÙsuf al-QaraÃÁwÐ, FatÁwa MuÝÁÒira, Mansoura: DÁr al-WafÁ, 1994, Vol. II, p. 528   
324 Ibid. 
325 This ÎadÐth was narrated by TirmÐdhÐ and Ibn MÁjah. See al-GhazÁlÐ, IhyÁÞ UlÙm Þil-dÐn,  
Cairo: DÁr al-Fajr lÐ al-TurÁth, no date, Vol. IV, p. 378 
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3.3.2 The consumption of unlawful items for medicinal reasons 
 
The general rule in medication is that a Muslim is prohibited from taking 
any medicine which contains muÎarramÁt (unlawful ingredients) such as 
impure substances, alcohol, pork or non-slaughtered meat326. However, 
there are a few exceptions in this matter since the Prophet himself was 
reported as allowing companions to have treatment using camel’s urine and 
to wearing silk when suffering from scabies. These two pieces of evidence 
had become the basis for jurists for permitting the unlawful in medication. 
This is also the means whereby the Prophet’s prohibition of taking the 
unlawful is limited to when there is a lawful alternative and the illness is not 
severe. In a severe case where there is no lawful alternative, it is permissible 
to consume the unlawful. For instance, some jurists also permitted the 
consumption of poisonous vegetations/plantations that have been proven 
effective and safe to heal a disease327. 
 
The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists328 permitted wearing silk for men in extremely hot or cold 
temperatures as this can be very dangerous (muhlikÐn) to one’s health. They 
made the analogy from the permission granted by the Prophet to allow some 
companions to wear silk. This ÎadÐth was narrated by Shaykhayn (al-
BukhÁrÐ and Muslim), AnÁs reported that the Prophet permitted ÝAbd Al-
RaÎmÁn bin ÝAwf and Zubayr bin al-ÝAwwÁm to wear silk because they 
were suffering from scabies329. Al-IsnÁwÐ further elaborated that this ÃarÙra 
circumstance, where the unlawful act is tolerable, is a case of when the 
person fears danger for his bodily organ or fears unbearable pain. The jurists 
had also approved the silk garment to be worn to prevent people from 
getting lice. The jurists provided some leniency where the silk can be worn 
to cover the unaffected part of the body330. It can be assumed that the reason 
                                                 
326 The basis of this undisputed rule is a ÎadÐth “and do not seek treatment using the 
unlawful”. 
327 al-BuhÙÔÐ, SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt,  Vol. I, p. 431 
328 ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib, vol. I, p.275, see also ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, Gharar 
al-Bahiyya fÐ SharÎ al-Bahja al-Warda, no place: MaÔbaÝa Yamaniyya, Vol. II, p. 48  
329 Ibid. 
330 The jurists permitted the silk to be worn if the silk is not the main material for the 
garment. For example, some scholars permitted the silk if the silk worn is not more than 
three fingers or when the silk is used only for the internal garment. The rule is as same as 
using gold or silver as jewellery for man. When the gold or silver is not excessive in 
amount, it is permitted.  
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for not applying the rule of ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadirihÁ was because it is hard 
for the person to cover only the affected area by silk. The jurists permitted 
the use, as long as the amount is not excessive. It can be further argued that 
the lenient attitude towards the wearing of silk, silver and gold is due to the 
fact that these items are not forbidden as strongly as, for example, wine.  
 
The ÍanbalÐ jurists also agreed that in a case where sickness is severe or the 
life of the patient is endangered, and no ÎalÁl alternative is available, the 
prohibited items or foods can be consumed to heal the sickness. The basis of 
their argument is the same ÎadÐth of the Prophet when he permitted his 
companions to wear silk as they were suffering from scabies331. Another 
ÎadÐth also states that the Prophet permitted a companion to use gold to 
replace his missing nose332. However, the permission to use the unlawful for 
medication purposes is only limited to substances other than wine. As 
discussed previously, al-ShÁfiÝÐ prohibited it.  MÁlik also did not approve of 
wine as a medicine, arguing that the relevant Qur'Ánic verses cannot be used 
to permit al-khamr to ease illness. This is because AllÁh totally prohibited 
the consumption of al-khamr. The MÁlikÐ jurists also forbade even a small 
amount of al-khamr for medication333. This strict view was accepted by the 
majority except the ÍanafÐs.   
 
The ÍanafÐ jurists like other schools, generally agreed that the consumption 
of unlawful substances for medication is fundamentally forbidden unless in 
necessity. It is only permitted to consume the unlawful when there is no 
lawful medicine available. They also held the same view as other jurists in 
the case of permitting silk for men either due to illness or during war334. 
Replacing any missing bodily organ by gold or silver is also permitted 
because they do not rust easily. The permission to consume muharramÁt to 
                                                 
331 al-BÁjÐ, al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Vol. VII, p. 108, QÁÃÐ AbÙ Muhammad stated 
that wearing silk is permitted because of ÃarÙra. 
332 al-RaÎÐbÁnÐ, MaÔÁlib AwlÁ, Vol. II, p. 94. ÝArfajah bin AsÝad cut his nose during the 
battle of al-KilÁb, and he took leaves to replace his nose but apparently the leaves decayed 
and became smelly off and the Prophet ordered him to use gold instead. This ÎadÐth was 
narrated by al-TirmÐzÐ. See also SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt, Vol. I, p. 434 
333 See AbÙ ÝAbd AllÁh  MuÎammad bin MuÎammad al-ÝAbdarÐ (Ibn al-ÍÁjj), al-Madkhal 
lÐ Ibn al-ÍÁjj, no place: DÁr al-TurÁth, no date, Vol. IV, p. 132 
334 KamÁl al-DÐn MuÎammad bin ÞAbd al-WÁÎid al-IskandÁrÐ al-SÐwÁsÐ (Ibn HumÁm), FatÎ 
al-QadÐr, no place: DÁr al-Fikr, Vol. X, p. 9. 
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cure an illness according to ÍanafÐ jurists also includes al-khamr335. They 
strongly argued that this permission is implicitly given in the verses 
permitting one to consume mayta, swine and blood in the Qur'Án. Although 
the majority did not extend this permission to al-khamr, the HanafÐs 
contended that the verses also cover the consumption of al-khamr due to 
necessity. However, the consumption of wine during necessity should meet 
the precondition of ÃarÙra; the consumption is limited to what can save life 
and to when there is no other lawful alternative medicine. The HanafÐ 
position in this matter is not unexpected, as the early ÍanafÐs had a different 
interpretation regarding al-khamr when compared to that of the other 
schools. They argued that the total prohibition of al-khamr only applied to 
intoxicating drinks produced from grapes namely wine. Other intoxicant 
beverages produced from barley, wheat or others are only prohibited if they 
lead to intoxication.  
 
It is also important to review the companions' position in the matters 
concerning using al-khamr as medication. The summary of the reports is as 
below336;  
AbÙ Bakr said that he heard from ShuÝbah from SimÁk from 
ÝAlqamah bin WÁ'il from his father a Îadith about a man from 
JuÝfay. This man said that Suwayd bin ÓÁriq asked the Prophet about 
al-khamr and the Prophet prohibited him from (consuming) it, and 
this man further explained to the Prophet that al-khamr sometimes 
can be used for medication, then the Prophet replied; "It (al-khamr)  
is indeed illness and not a cure". AbÙ Bakr also said he heard from 
JarÐr from ManÒÙr from AbÐ WÁÞil that there was a man suffering 
from Òufr337 and an intoxicant (al-sukar) was prepared to cure him. 
ÝAbd AllÁh was asked about this matter. ÝAbd AllÁh was reported as 
saying that "AllÁh will not make a cure from something that is 
prohibited to you"338. There was also a report about NÁfÐÝ who was 
asked to cure a sick woman using al-khamr, but he refused to do so. 
He then asked Ibn ÝUmÁr about that, Ibn UmÁr replied to him that if 
he did that, he would be punished. A report from AbÙ Bakr stated 
that he heard from ÝAbd al-RaÎÐm from ÝUbaydah from IbrÁhim 
saying that he hated to see people using al-khamr as a cure. A report 
from AbÙ Bakr said that he heard from MuÝÁwiyah bin HishÁm from 
Ibn AbÐ ZiÝb from ÚuhrÐ that AÝishah that anyone who took al- 
                                                 
335 al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn, Vol. I, p. 182, see also al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. XXIV, 
p. 29 
336Ibn AbÐ Shayba, MuÒannaf Ibn AbÐ Shayba, Vol. V, p. 432 
337 It means a thick yellow over taste that is prepared in the liver stone stored in the gall 
bladder, it contributed in the digestion of fatty food, or known as bladder stone 
338 This ÎadÐth was reported from Ibn MasÝÙd in al-MabÒÙÔ,Vol. XXIV, pp. 10-11 
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khamr as medication, would not be cured byAllÁh. A report from 
AbÙ Bakr stated that he heard from Ibn MahdÐ from Al Íakam bin 
ÝAÔiyya, who said that he heard from Al-Íasan who was asked about 
a person who wants to heal his son with a drop of al-khamr and he 
replied in a negative. Drinking al khamr whether in small quantity 
or plenty is subjected to hadd penalty339. 
 
Examining these reports from the companions and the aforementioned 
ÎadÐth, it seems that the drinking and consuming of alcohol to cure an 
illness was not approved. However, the aforementioned reports did not state 
clearly the situation where the lawful was not available. These reports have 
become the basis for the majority of Sunni jurists who strongly opposed the 
consumption of wine for medication. 
 
Although the ÍanafÐ jurists recognised all the aforementioned reports 
concerning the prohibition of al-khamr for medication, they still insisted 
that al-khamr can be used as medicine. They interpreted the above 
prohibitions as only applying to when there is no lawful medicine available 
or when the lawful cannot heal faster than al-khamr 340. It can be said that 
the ÍanafÐ jurists regarded al-khamr as having the same level of prohibition 
as the other unlawful substances. That means the unlawful substances are 
prohibited during ordinary situations but can be consumed under necessity.  
  
Ibn TaymÐyya is among the relentless opponents of the idea of permitting 
al-khamr for medication. He not only ruled that al-khamr  should be banned 
in cases of necessity, he also said that taking any medicine is not a case of 
necessity. He believed that Al-khamr is only allowed to be consumed by a 
person who is choking on food and when there is no lawful alternative. 
Although the ÎadÐth of the Prophet permitting one to drink camel's urine for 
medical reasons341, this permission cannot be extended to wine. He further 
elaborated several arguments in defence of his position. Firstly, he made an 
insightful comparison between the human need for food and medicine. For 
him, medicine is not as important as food to a human being. Many sick 
                                                 
339 Ibn AbÐ Shayba, MuÒannaf  Ibn AbÐ Shayba ,Vol. VI, p. 502 
340 SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙt, Vol, XXIV, pp. 10-11. They argued that the prohibition above is 
similar like the prohibition of visiting graves. Although the Prophet prohibited visiting 
grave, he once permitted a companion, MuÎammad to visit his mother’s grave, although his 
mother was a non-Muslim when she was alive 
341 Ibn TaymÐyya, al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ, Vol. I, pp. 387-391 
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people can heal themselves even without taking any medication due to the 
fact that the human being is endowed by God with the natural ability to 
heal. Clearly, the human body cannot produce their own food, which is why 
food is a necessity to human beings but not medicine. He further added that 
eating during ÃarÙra is wÁjib (compulsory). Taking medication is not an 
obligation as supported by the ÎadÐth where a black woman went to meet 
the Prophet telling about her sickness and asked to Prophet to pray for her 
health.  Instead the Prophet gave her choice: she could remain patient and 
would be rewarded in paradise or the Prophet would pray for her health. 
This woman then chose patience rather than the Prophet’s prayers. 
According to Ibn TaimÐya, if taking medicine is meant to be wÁjib, why did 
the Prophet give her choices? There are also other cases when the people 
were tested with sickness, the Prophet asked them to be patient and he did 
not stress the importance of curing the illness. The Prophet also prayed for 
the members of QubÁ' to be tested by fever, and furthermore, sickness is a 
test from God to His messengers like the Prophet AyÙb. Ibn TaymÐyya also 
argued that he does not think that any of the salaf (earlier scholars) made 
treatment a compulsory issue. Furthermore, he added, another distinctive 
difference between food and medicine concerns the certainty of the result. 
Unlike food, medicines do not always have a beneficial effect on the 
patient. He further described the result of medicine and medical treatment as 
something that is uncertain (lÁ yustayqan). Meanwhile, the effectiveness of 
food is always certain to alleviate hunger and to continue life. The need for 
food is self-evident, unlike medicine.  
 
He further argued that an illness can have many different cures and 
alternatives that are not limited to the unlawful. If the medicine is unlawful, 
the patient should resort to any lawful treatment. For him, it is almost 
impossible not to find a ÎalÁl alternative. Furthermore, as two ÎadÐths state, 
Allah has created for every ill its own medicine, except death and also He 
has not made for His creation a medicine which contains a ÎarÁm ingredient 
(inna AllÁh lam yajÝal shifÁÞ ummatÐ fÐmÁ ÎarramaÝalaiha)342. Hence, 
resorting to muÎarrama medication is not a valid option. 
 
                                                 
342 Ibid. 
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What can be deduced here is that Ibn Taymiyya and other classical jurists 
firmly contended that the prohibition of al-khamr is not similar to other 
muÎarrama. Their reluctance to acknowledge al-khamr was due to several 
factors. Firstly, there is no prohibition in Islam that is as strict as al-khamr, 
as this drink is totally forbidden. All activities related to this drink are also 
cursed by the Prophet. The other unlawful substances/items are less harmful 
than al-khamr. For instance, silk is made forbidden for men not women. 
Mayta is only unlawful to be consumed but the skin of mayta is lawful to be 
used after it has been tanned. Furthermore, there is no punishment for those 
eating mayta or wearing silk. They also defended this position by citing a 
ÎadÐth of the Prophet, which states that al-khamr is not a medicine but it is 
an illness (innahÁ dÁÞ wa laisa bi dawÁ’). They interpreted this ÎadÐth as 
inferring that alcohol cannot be made medicine in any situation, whether 
there is a lawful alternative or not. This is the clear textual evidence 
prohibiting the consumption of alcohol for medical purposes343.  
 
However, as discussed the ÍanafÐ jurists had a totally different view. Unlike 
Ibn TaymÐyya who advocated that medicine does not always provide a 
promising result, the HanafÐ jurists argued otherwise. In the book of al-
FatÁwÁ al-HindÐya344, the HanafÐ jurists carefully categorised medicines into 
three categories depending on the effects; maqtÙÝ (certainly effective), 
maÛnÙn (medicine with a possible effective result but still uncertain) and 
mawhÙm (a medicine with a doubtful result).  According to the ÍanafÐ 
jurists, having a maqtÙÝ  treatment is like eating bread which has the 
promised effect of removing hunger or drinking water which obviously can 
remove thirst. Meanwhile, maÛnÙn medicines are like undergoing treatment 
like cupping, phlebotomy and any other medical treatment. These 
treatments provide a possible chance of healing although there is also a risk 
of them being unsuccessful. Meanwhile the last resort of treatment is of 
mawhÙm type, for instance using magic or a spell where the result is always 
uncertain and ambiguous. The ÍanafÐs believed that abandoning treatment 
with a proven effective result (maqtÙÝ ) is ÎarÁm especially when a person’s 
                                                 
343 However, Ibn Taymiyya like other jurists had a more flexible attitude towards the 
consumption of khamr for other purpose than drinking. For example, it is permissible to 
throw khamr onto fire to stop it. 
344 See al-FatÁwÁ al-Hindiyya, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1991, Vol. V, p. 355 
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life is at stake. However, the mawhÙm treatment is not recommended.  In 
terms of the maÛnÙn type of treatment, the Hanafis saw this as a personal 
choice. For the ÍanafÐs, taking treatment that is maÛnÙn does not conflict 
with tawakkal. They further argued that sometimes it is better to take the 
maÛnÙn treatment when it has been proved effective by others. Ibn 
TaymÐyya himself admitted that some medicine and treatment has a proven 
result, like using silk to prevent scabies. This means that not all treatment 
and medicine have ambiguous results. On this basis, some ÍanafÐ jurists 
permitted the use al-khamr in medication if it is proven to be more effective 
(yaqÐnan) than the other alternative. Blood or mayta are permitted to be 
consumed if the proven result was approved by an experienced Muslim 
doctor and if there is no other ÎalÁl alternative available.  
 
Another important point to consider is the issue of whether the facility to 
consume muÎarramÁt should be dispensed only to a pious person. Many 
jurists held that ÃarÙra can only be exercised by religiously good persons 
and therefore not sinners. The issue has been discussed in Chapter One and 
Chapter Two. This dispensation covers all types of ÃarÙra and rukhÒa 
situations including food, tayammum and shortening prayers. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ, in 
his book al-Umm,345 insisted that the permission to consume muÎarramÁt is 
dispensed only for good persons and excludes those who are labelled  ghayr 
bÁghin, walÁ ÝÁdin, walÁ mutajÁnifin  and mutajÁnifin li ithm. Furthermore, 
a sinner is allowed to exercise this dispensation only after he has repented. 
This is also a vital point to ponder in relation to the methadone programme 
for drug users. The rule of necessity will require the patient in HRP to 
repent prior to obtaining the methadone supply. The importance of 
repentance for the patient is that it encourages good behaviour and prevents 
the drug user from taking illegal drugs.  The repentant patient will be able to 
make a firm resolution not to commit the sin again. Similarly, the rule 
should apply to the case of distribution of free syringes and condoms to 
drug users and sex workers. The details of the philosophy of this 
programme will be elaborated later in Chapter Five. 
 
3.3.3 Analysis and discussion 
                                                 
345 See al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. II, p. 277 
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To conclude, the jurists are divided into three different groups with regard 
to the issue of using muÎarrama as medication. The first group did not 
consider illness a ÃarÙra case, hence, taking medication from muÎarrama is 
prohibited. This is the view of Ibn TaymÐyya and some Sufis. The second 
group, the majority, considered the need for medicine to be equal to that of 
food, as both are necessary for preserving life. However, the permission to 
consume the unlawful for medical reasons is limited to substances other 
than al-khamr. The third view, the view of ÍanafÐ jurists, permitted the 
consumption of any unlawful including al-khamr for medical purposes if 
there is no other alternative, and when the patient’s life is at stake. Many 
contemporary scholars were also inclined to share this view. However, 
receiving medicine containing some unlawful substances is only permissible 
under the following conditions; 
1. The patient's life is endangered if he does not take this medicine 
2. No alternative or substitute medication made from entirely ÎalÁl 
(lawful) sources is available 
3. The medication is prescribed by a Muslim physician who is 
knowledgeable as well as Allah-fearing. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that this principle is applied for cases when a 
Muslim happens to be in a place where he cannot find lawful medication 
and the condition of the patient is verified by a trusted physician. The 
jurisdiction pertaining to the usage of al-khamr is clear. However, the usage 
of drugs and other liquor is still under dispute. Many modern jurists agreed 
that the prohibition of al-khamr is not limited to beverages only and extends 
to drugs, either in solid or liquid forms. Drugs such as ÎashÐsh, opium and 
cocaine which are dangerous to the mind, body and spirit are even worse 
than wine and must be prohibited. If it is not stated by the literal text then it 
can be interpreted according to the general principle that the SharÐÝah aims 
to prevent damage to human body.346  
 
In their meeting on 11-12th April 1984, the Fatawa Committee of Malaysia 
established some important guidelines regarding alcohol: 
                                                 
346 Mahmud Shaltut,  "Wine drinking-al-fatÁwÁ" in Vardit Rispler-Chaim, Islamic Medical 
Ethics in the Twentieth Century , Leiden: Brill, 1993. pp. 116-117 
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1. All liquor contains alcohol but not all alcohol is liquor. Alcohol 
which is derived from the liquor production processes is ÎarÁm and 
considered impure, but alcohol which is derived from non-liquor 
production processes is not impure but harÁm to be drunk as it is 
poisonous and harmful. 
2. Alcohol that is produced from the food production processes is not 
impure and it can be eaten. 
3. Medicine and fragrances which contain alcohol are allowed to be 
used.  
 
This fatwa clearly distinguishes between intoxicant beverages and alcohol. 
The prohibition of liquor cannot be extended to all alcoholic substances. 
The verdict also made it clear that alcohol produced from food production, 
like yeast and bread, is not impure and therefore unlike wine, can be 
consumed. Only alcohol derived from liquor production is ÎarÁm. This 
verdict also means alcohol can be used for medicine and fragrances. 
However, the status of the impurity of alcohol is still ambiguous.  
 
DÁr  Al-IftÁ’ Al-MiÒrÐya347 also tackled the issue of al-khamr for 
medication. This committee regarded any intoxicant drinks (al-nabÐdh al-
muskir) as a kind of al-khamr, hence it is prohibited. However, they 
admitted that some unlawful substances can be taken for medical reasons 
and this includes alcoholic beverages.  In Volume 10 of the fatwÁ 
collection348, the Council made several conditions in relation to taking al-
khamr as medicine. First, the medicine should be prescribed by a trusted 
experienced and a God-fearing Muslim doctor and the second condition is 
that there is no alternative except al-khamr. The committee also added that 
the purpose of taking the unlawful for medication is only due to the 
necessity to protect life. In this matter, we can see that the committee chose 
the view of the ÍanafÐ jurists and one view from the ShÁfiÝÐ School. They 
also ruled that the muÎarrama can only be taken in a limited fashion (al-
ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadriha) to the point that sustains life and cures the 
illness. The permission ceases when lawful treatment is available. With 
                                                 
347 Jumhuriya MiÒr al-ÞArabiyya, WizÁra al-AwqÁf, al-FatÁwÁ al-IslamiyyÁ min DÁr al-IftÁÞ 
al-MiÒrÐya, Vol. VII, p. 2516 
348 Page 349 
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regard to narcotic drugs, the council prohibited the consumption of drugs, in 
particular for recreational purposes. This rule is agreed upon by the 
consensus of contemporary jurists. The prohibition includes drug 
production, plantation and trading. The products cannot be traded and no 
profit can be taken from it.  All drug related business is considered al-kasb 
al-ÎarÁm (forbidden business). However, if drugs need to be taken as 
medicine, the same rule of ÃarÙra as stated above should apply. 
 
Similarly, Sheikh MuÎammad al-MukhtÁr al-ShanqitÐ349, director of the 
Islamic Center of South Plains, stated that alcohol-based medication is 
prohibited when there is an alternative (alcohol free). However, if the 
alternative is not available, the alcohol-based medication is permissible. He 
also stated that seeking medical treatment is necessary. This is also the view 
of Dr. YÙsuf Al-QaradawÐ in his book, The Lawful and the Prohibited in 
Islam350. 
 
What can be concluded from these rulings is that the councils and fatwÁ 
committee made a brief analogy between drugs and al-khamr. For them, 
illegal drugs have the same characteristics as al-khamr.  A small amount of 
prescribed drugs is allowed in medical cases. However, the modern writers 
and jurists did not provide a comprehensive discussion of the drug issue - 
their result is mainly from the rules of wine drinking. Another question 
which needs to be answered is: Is the production of drugs for medicinal 
purposes forbidden? In other words, is there a total analogy between al-
khamr and alcohol-drug issues? This issue can be answered in one of two 
ways. Firstly, if the jurists agreed that al-khamr and drugs share similar 
qualities and characteristics, a total analogy should apply. That means, the 
permission to consume them comes about only under ÃarÙra situations, no 
profit can be taken, all the conditions should be met and they are also 
najÁsa, which can impair someone’s state of purity. They cannot be taken in 
prayer or for other religious purposes. 
 
                                                 
349 See www.islamonline.net/servlet downloading date 29th March 2007 
350 Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1985, pp.50-51 
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Secondly, if the jurists argued that drugs and wine do not share the same 
characteristics, this means that the drug is only forbidden because they can 
cloud a human’s mind or lead to drunkenness. However, the drug itself is 
not impure, unlike al-khamr. This view is similar to the view of the early 
ÍanafÐ jurists. In such a case, drugs and alcohol can be used in a limited 
quantity, either for individual purposes, medicinal reasons or even 
cosmetics. They can also be taken into prayer as they are not najÁsa, unlike 
al-khamr351. The discussion of drugs and wine will be further elaborated in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Another important issue is the consumption of alcohol-based products 
especially, for domestic usage and whether alcohol products are totally 
forbidden like al-khamr. Many modern jurists gave formal legal opinions 
that alcohol is pure when it is not produced as an intoxicant352. That means 
all alcohol-based medicines and products do not bear the same prohibition 
as wine or other alcoholic beverages. The total prohibition is for beverages 
that are intoxicating. There is an aspect of cosmetic alcohol which would 
seem to fundamentally differentiate it from beverages and to place it in a 
different class where the rulings of both the impurity and non-consumption 
of alcoholic beverages do not apply. This is the fact that cosmetic beverages 
are not made for intoxication purposes, nor do they cause it, nor are used for 
it, nor are they made for consumption, nor conducive to consumption, nor 
used for consumption. In other words, cosmetic alcohol is essentially a 
different substance from al-khamr. That is why the position of permitting it 
seems persuasive, some even permitting the consumption of cough syrup 
containing alcohol for the same reason.  
 
Additional issues include whether we can use a ÎarÁm based medicine if it 
works faster than a ÎalÁl-based medicine and whether it is permitted to 
resort to ÎarÁm-based ingredients. Another question is whether ÎarÁm-based 
medicine can be used for non- necessity cases. For example, mild illnesses 
like a headache or daily vitamin supplements seem to require a specific 
                                                 
351 ÍanafÐ jurists stated that khamr can make a Muslim’s prayer invalid according to Q5.90. 
ShÁfiÝÐ, MÁlik and HanbalÐ also considered it najs.  
352 This is the view of Muhammad BakhÐt, the Mufti of Egypt and Badr al-DÐn al-ÍasanÐ of 
Damascus 
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ruling. Having examined the above cases, the jurists did not seem to 
approve the consumption of alcohol-based medication or ÎarÁm-based 
medication more generally if there is another lawful alternative. The 
permissibility is only in a necessity case. However, there is only one view 
from the ÍanafÐs that permits the consumption of a small amount of al-
khamr for mild illness353. The majority of ÍanafÐs also permitted the 
consumption of al-khamr if it is proven to work faster to heal illnesses than 
the lawful. However, it is important to highlight that there is no view 
approving the consumption of the unlawful for the betterment of living.   
 
3.4  ÂarÙra in transaction issues 
The tradition of Muslim fiqh has made it clear that all transactions should 
follow certain rules and conditions to render them valid and conclusive. 
However, certain exemptions can be made on the basis of necessity, 
although those cases are not free of legal dispute among the jurists. 
Generally, the jurists agreed that the commodities that can be traded must be 
of five qualities: religiously pure, with a known price, when the commodity 
is known, with a beneficial use, and finally when the item is deliverable. 
Failure to meet all these conditions will deem the transaction invalid. Jurists 
did not validate354 the transaction of the following items: intoxicants, non-
slaughtered meat, swine and anything related to it, and any un-useful items 
like garbage, insects and poisonous plants355. Buying and selling unlawful 
                                                 
353 See al-FatÁwÁ al-HindÐya, Vol. V, p. 355 
354 Contracts are divided into valid, which satisfies all of its condition and cornerstone and 
invalid, which is where one or more of its conditions and cornerstones are violated, and 
without any consequence. A sale is only bÁÔil (invalid) if and only if is is fÁsid (defective). 
The ÍanafÐs divided contracts into three categories; valid, defective and invalid. The source 
of disagreement is each party’s interpretation of the legal prohibition of certain contracts. In 
this respects, jurists ask the question whether a contracts’ prohibition entails defectiveness 
(i.e lack of validity and committing a sin), or whether in some cases entail committing of 
sin while the contracts remain valid. The majority of jurists ruled that the prohibition of any 
contracts means that it is invalid and what whoever engages in such a contract commits a 
sin. A valid sale is one that us legal in both fundamental and ancillary components, and the 
consequences of valid sale is the exchange of ownership of the object of sale and price. 
Invalid sale is one whose cornerstone and conditions on the object are not satisfied or that 
is illegal in its fundamental and ancillary characteristics. Its religious status is that the 
contract is in effect not concluded, even though its outer appearance may resemble a 
concluded contract, and the exchange of ownership does not result and the owner does not 
benefit by receiving the object. A defective sale is one that is fundamentally legally sound, 
but that has a violating forbidden characteristic. The legal status of this contract is that 
ownership is actualised by receipt with the explicit or implicit permission of the owner. 
This is the ÍanafÐs view while the rest of the jurists said that ownership may not ensue 
from defective sales, just as in the case of an invalid sale.  
355 al-QarÁfÐ, AnwÁr al-BurÙq, Vol. III, pp. 238-239 
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substances including liquor and pig are prohibited by the majority. 
However, the ÍanafÐ jurists recognised the trading of al-khamr and pig for 
non-Muslim communities.  
 
The ÍanbalÐ jurists ruled that the sale of something may not be legally used 
such as an insect is not valid, neither is the sale of items whose use and 
benefits are prohibited, such as wine. They also argued that the sale of 
temporarily permitted items in ÃarÙra circumstances such as mayta in a time 
of famine, or wine when one is choking on food, is not concluded nor valid. 
This means that whatever is permitted to be consumed on the basis of 
necessity is not permitted to be traded.  The jurists also agreed on the point 
that all non-beneficial items cannot be traded (including worms, poisonous 
snakes, or poisons plants).  However, the ÍanbalÐ jurists permitted the 
selling of poisonous snake or poisons extracted from plants if they can be 
used in a small quantity for medicinal benefit. Their point of view is closer 
to the earlier discussion of using drugs as medicine. If such drugs are 
extracted from plants, they are permitted to be sold in a small quantity. It 
seems that the ÍanbalÐ jurists recognised that there are certain poisonous 
plants that are useful for their medicinal effect, and therefore, can be traded 
in a small quantity. They should only be sold in small quantities, as a 
practical matter, and such purchases are only legal after obtaining doctors' 
permission. With regard to methadone treatment, its trading would be 
considered valid according to this school. 
 
According to the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists356, all kinds of trading of impure items such 
as mayta, al-khamr, al-khinzÐr, and any najas al-Ýain  (any item that is 
impure itself) like the skin of an animal which is not slaughtered correctly 
(jild al-mayta), or even guide dogs, and any mÁyÝ mutanajjis (impure liquid) 
are not concluded. The impure items include impure fat and contaminated 
water or religiously impure paint357. It is not possible for a small quantity of 
water to be purified by pouring a large amount of water into it. And even a 
                                                 
356 ZakariyyÁ al- AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib, Vol. II, p. 9. See also Wahbah ZuÎaylÐ, Financial 
Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p43-44 
357 The basis of their argument is the Îadith of the Prophet saying that if a dead mouse 
caught in the ghee, if the ghee is solid, the mouse and the surrounded area of ghee should 
be thrown away and the rest can be eaten, but if the ghee is melted, the ghee should be 
thrown away. The paint that has impure fat is also cannot be traded 
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transaction of a house painted with polluted paint is considered fÁsid. But 
some of the ShÁfiÝÐs scholars permitted the trade of some non-useful items 
such as trees with the worms, and impure clothes if the clothes can be 
cleaned. According to the majority of scholars, the shaÎm al-mayta (fat 
from non-slaughtered meat) is something that does not have any benefit, 
and therefore cannot be traded.  On the other hand, the skin can be used and 
sold.   
 
3.4.1 Trading and using dogs 
Like other impure items, pigs and dogs cannot be traded, although a dog can 
be used for hunting and guarding. The ÍanafÐs permitted the trading of dogs 
that are useful for humans (such as guard dogs, farming dogs, watch dogs or 
hunting dogs). AbÙ ÍanÐfa totally permitted this kind of business. Although 
the dog used for hunting is permitted on the basis of necessity, several 
conditions must be met.  The dog must be trained and it can follow the 
master's order; it should not eat or play with the game, or lick the game’s 
blood. The game captured by an untrained dog also cannot be eaten358. The 
other conditions that should be met when using dogs for hunting purposes 
include that the dog must be sent by a Muslim or a people of the scripture 
(ahl al-kitÁb) and the name of AllÁh must be recited prior to sending the dog 
to catch the game (or in the case of killing game by arrow, the name of God 
is uttered at the point of firing the arrow)359. Failure to fulfil this condition 
will render the use and the trade in the dog prohibited. 
 
Although the other jurists agreed with the ÍanafÐs that the use of dog for 
certain purposes is tolerable, they disputed whether the dog can be traded. 
The majority argued that trading in dogs is forbidden and this includes 
useful dogs. A Muslim cannot gain from the ownership of such temporarily 
allowed objects through a sale, just as he may not from any other 
muÎarramÁ items such as musical instruments or dung.  This is because they 
are not legally beneficial properties360. Hence, the transactions are not valid 
in accordance with the details set out below.  
                                                 
358 al-JaÒÒÁÒ, AÎkÁm al-QurÞÁn , Vol. II, 443, see also al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙt, vol. XI, p. 
223 
359 See al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, vol. XI, p.  239 
360 ZuhailÐ, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 73 
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Although the MÁlikÐs permitted the use of dogs in hunting361, the dog must 
be well-trained and understand and obey its owner’s orders362.  However, 
the MÁlikÐs had different opinions over the sale of dogs for use in hunting 
and the protection of sheep, cheetahs and other predatory beasts that can be 
trained, and have the same rule as hunting dogs363. The MÁlikÐs ruled that if 
a home dog, farming dog, guard dog, and hunting dog is killed accidentally, 
the price must be paid364. However, if someone steals a dog, his hand will 
not be amputated, unlike stealing other valuable items. This was because the 
Prophet prohibited the dog from having a price365. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists also 
ruled that dogs can be trained for hunting purposes, but pigs cannot be kept 
to be trained. They also permitted the training of monkeys, cheetahs, or 
even elephants, if this was for hunting or guarding purposes366. That means 
any beasts can be trained and owned if they are proven to be useful, but not 
pigs as they are not useful for humans in any circumstances.  
 
The game caught by a hunting dog can also be consumed under the 
condition that the dog is well-trained and listens to its owner's instruction. 
As the Prophet prohibited the pricing (for selling and buying) of dogs, the 
ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikÐs ruled that dogs cannot be traded in any situation; be it 
ordinary or ÃarÙra367. Unlike the MÁlikÐs, the ShÁfiÝÐs ruled that whoever 
killed a hunting dog, guarding dog or farming working dog, is not required 
to pay compensation. A Muslim can possess a dog, but cannot buy it368. 
However, MÁlik said buying and selling such a dog is only detested 
(makrÙh). A dog can also be inherited through waÒiyya but it has no 
value369. The same rule applies to pigs; pricing is prohibited and it has no 
value at all.  
 
                                                 
361 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 532. According to ImÁm MÁlik, the permitted dog for 
hunting is a dog that can obey the instruction of the master. 
362 See BÁjÐ, al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Vol. III, p. 124 
363 However, ImÁm MÁlik did not say anything about it. See SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. 
IV, p. 534 
364 See SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. IV, p. 551 
365 See SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. IV, p. 536 
366 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm , Vol. II, p. 254  
367 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm , Vol. II, p.  253  
368 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm , Vol. III, p. 12  
369 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. IV, p. 96 
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The ÍanbalÐ jurists ruled that the sale of a dog is bÁÔil (not concluded), and 
that the price of a dog is prohibited even if it is a trained dog370. However, 
some jurists, such as JÁbir bin ÝAbdullÁh, ÝAÔÁ’ and NakhaÝÐ, had a lenient 
attitude towards the selling of such a dog. They permitted it and consider it 
a rukhÒa. Dog breeding is also prohibited unless it is necessary, according to 
the ÍanbalÐ jurists. This includes hunting dogs, farming dogs or guarding 
dogs. As far as the rules for keeping dogs when their service is not needed 
(such as between two plantation periods) are concerned, the jurists had 
shown some leniency.  Like the ShÁfiÝÐs, the HanbalÐ jurists also agreed that 
a dog does not have a price; and if so it cannot be sold and be bought.  This 
means that the person who destroys or steals a dog is not liable to pay the 
price to the owner. Such a dog is also not valid to be rented371. For 
ÍanbalÐs, dogs can be inherited through waÒiyya or hibba or by any means 
that do not involve the exchange of money. This is also the view of the 
ShÁfiÝÐ and MÁlikÐ jurists372. The ownership of dogs can only be transferred 
without price (naql bil yadd bidÙni ÝiwÁÃ). The HanbalÐ and ShÁfiÝÐ schools 
did not permit killing a trained dog, but if it was killed, there would be no 
compensation due from the killer. However, the MÁlikÐs insisted that the 
killer of a useful dog has to pay gharm373.  
 
 
3.5  DarÙra cases in marriage and divorce 
 
There are many exceptional cases in marriage and divorce case and I shall 
only focus on two issues: leaving the house during the Ýidda and polygamy. 
The original rule is that a Muslim woman is prohibited to leave her house 
during her waiting period. During this period, she has to observe the rules of 
Ýidda. However, under certain emergency circumstances the woman is 
permitted to break the rules of Ýidda. The ShÁfiÝÐ and ÍanbalÐ jurists ruled 
that there is no harm in a divorced woman or a widow going out in the 
daytime to fulfil her daily needs, just as the Prophet permitted the aunt of 
JabÐr to go out plucking the dates374. ShÁfiÝÐ jurists further interpreted this 
                                                 
370 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ,Vol. IV, p. 3154 
371 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. V, p. 322 
372 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. IV, p. 3155 and Vol. VI, p. 4795 
373 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. IV, p. 3156 
374 A ÎadÐth narrated by al-NasÁ’Ð and AbÙ DÁwÙd. See Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. VIII, 
p. 130 and ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, Gharar al-Bahiyya,  Vol. IV, p. 361 
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ÎadÐth as saying that the date plants of AnÒÁr people during the time of the 
Prophet were close to their homes. On this basis, they limited the permitted 
area to that which is close to the woman’s house. They also permitted the 
woman to go out to perform any kind of important activities such as going 
to market or doing necessary business, but only within a limited radius.  
 
The original rule of Ýidda is illustrated by a ÎadÐth narrated by MujÁhid, 
which says that the Prophet prohibited the widowers of the martyrs of UÎÙd 
war from going out during the night or staying overnight in other people’s 
house, except in ÃarÙra. The permission to go out also ceases if the reason 
for leaving the house can be completed by someone else375.  If there is a 
pressing need (for example she has to appear before judge in the court), the 
ShÁfiÝÐ jurists ruled that the judge has to send people to her house instead of 
asking her to come to the court. However, during the day time, it is 
permitted for such a woman to go out to fulfil her needs, such as buying 
foodstuff as previously stated376.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya also held a similar view, stating that it is permissible for a 
woman in her Ýidda period to go out to fulfil her daily needs as long as she 
does not stay overnight in other places377. The ÍanafÐ jurists378 also 
permitted a woman in her Ýidda period to travel if she believes there is a 
possible harm if she stays at home.  In the book of TanqÐh al-FatÁwÁ al- 
Íamidiyya 379, the circumstances which are considered ÃarÙra permitting a 
woman to go out are when the house is damaged, broken or falling apart, or 
if there is a fear of its destruction, or a fear of her losing property, and also 
if there is no food available in the house. She is only allowed to go out to 
the nearest place. The MÁlikÐ jurists380  ruled that during her Ýidda period, a 
widow is not permitted to put on make-up (for instance wearing al-kohl) 
except in ÃarÙra circumstances (for example, for medical reasons). She is 
                                                 
375 ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrÐ, Gharar al-Bahiyya, Vol. IV, p. 361 
376 Ibn Íajar al-HaitamÐ, TuÎfa al-MuÎtÁj, Vol. VIII, p. 262. There is a ÎadÐth narrated by 
Muslim mentioning the permission for a female divorcee of three times to go out to pluck 
date. This permission seems a general permission for other kinds of activities that are 
important to maintain her life.  
377 See Ibn Taimiyya, al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ, Vol. III, p. 346 
378 al-ZailÁÞÐ, TabyÐn al-HaqÁÞiq, Vol. III, p. 37 
379 Ibn ÝÀbidÐn, no place: DÁr al-MaÝrifa, no date, Vol. II, p. 57 
380 al-KharshÐ, SharÎ MukhtaÒar KhalÐl, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, no date, Vol. IV, p. 148,  al-
DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. II, p. 479 
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allowed to put on make-up during the night time but the make-up must be 
washed off during the daytime. Other rules regarding Ýidda include that a 
woman cannot wear fine clothes such as silk, jewelleries and perfumes.  She 
is also prohibited from wearing Îinna to colour her hair. All kinds of make-
up, wearing of fine clothes are prohibited during the day time, unless in 
ÃarÙra. The MÁlikÐs, like the ÍanafÐs, also listed several exemptions to the 
prohibition on going out, such as when the house is falling apart, a fear of 
thieves or notorious/wicked neighbours, or for a woman to fulfil her daily 
needs i.e. taking water or food. However, they insisted that permission to go 
out is only for necessities such as food, and not for other unnecessary 
reasons such as visiting others, attending ceremonies or doing business381.  
 
Another case of ÃarÙra presented by the jurists is regarding a woman in her 
waiting period who has rent overdue. In this case, she needs to stay at home 
if she can afford to pay the rent. However, the prohibition on leaving is 
lifted if the landlord asks for more than what she can pay. The jurists argued 
that in this case, the importance of her protecting her wealth is greater than 
the observing the rule of Ýidda382. It is important to note that the Ýidda is 
intended to ensure that the male parent of any offspring produced after the 
cessation of a marriage would be determined. That is why Islam has 
established the prohibition on going out, wearing cosmetics or accepting 
any marriage proposal during this period. However, this prohibition of 
going out can be tolerated if the woman fears a great danger not only to her 
life, but to her property as well. Another related case383 is that it is ÎarÁm for 
a wife to disobey her husband except in ÃarÙra, such as leaving the house 
without permission. This is illustrated in the example of the wife needing a 
fatwÁ or to go out to study religion that her husband could not provide her.  
 
Another case in which ÃarÙra plays a role in the jurisprudence is polygamy. 
The man who has more than one wife is only allowed to spend the night in 
his wives’ houses according to their turn. It is a sin not to follow this 
                                                 
381 al-ÑÁwÐ, ÍÁshiya al-ÑÁwÐ, Vol. II, p. 687 
382 ÞAlÐ ÑaÝÐdÐ al-ÞAdawÐ, ÍÁshiya  al-ÝAdawÐ  ÝAlÁ KifÁya al-ÓÁlib al-RabbÁnÐ, no place: 
DÁr al-MaÝÁrif, no date, Vol. II, p. 128 
383 Ibn Íajar al-HaitamÐ, al-ZawÁjir al-IqtirÁf al-KabÁÞir, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1994, Vol. II, 
p. 93  
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schedule. However, the ShÁfiÝÐs384 ruled that this schedule can be altered 
due to ÃarÙra if there is serious sickness (marÃ mukhawwif) and a husband 
can break the schedule to look after his sick wife.  In this case, al-GhazÁlÐ 
ruled that a mere suspicious (Ûann or iÎtimÁl) of sickness is accepted in this 
case. Another hypothetical case provided by the jurists is if the wife is 
having a baby or the house is on fire. In both cases, the husband is permitted 
to stay for a while, but not for long and indeed not to have sexual 
intercourse. It is ÎarÁm to have sex with one’s wife when it is not her turn. 
Some of the ShÁfiÝÐs also viewed that the permission to spend time should 
not be more than one third of the night. The majority of jurists also said that 
Ýurf can determine the need and necessity of the required time that needs to 
be spent385. If the sick wife needs more time, it is permitted for  the husband 
to spend more time with her.  
 
Similarly, the ÍanbalÐ jurists also required that a husband follow the 
schedule of spending nights with his wives. He can change the schedule if 
he needs to visit his sick wife, or support a wife and children out of the  
schedule. However, if he only stays for a while, he does not have to 
recompense the other wives.  If he stays for a long period or sleeps with his 
wife out of turn, he has to recompense for the spent night386. The jurists 
explained that taking turn in polygamous marriages for each of the wives is 
fulfilled either by staying overnight or by sleeping with the wife. Therefore, 
even if he stays for a short while but he sleeps with his wife, he has to 
compensate. If, however, he just stays for a while (and does not have sexual 
intercourse), he does not have to recompense. The ZaydÐyya387 also held the 
same view where a husband cannot stay overnight with another wife when it 
is not her turn and he has to make compensation if he does so.  
 
3.5  Conclusions 
                                                 
384 SulaymÁn bin ManÒÙr al-ÝAjÐlÐ al-MiÒrÐ, Íashiya al-JamÁl, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, no date, 
Vol. IV, p. 283. There is a ÎadÐth stating that sometimes the Prophet gave a visit to his 
wives which are not in their turns, he did everything except sexual intercourse.  This ÎadÐth 
was narrated by AbÙ DÁwud and al-ÍÁkim. 
385 TuÎfa al-MuÎtÁj, Vol. VII, p. 446. See also al-QalyÙbÐ and ÝUmayra, HÁshitÁ QalyÙbÐ 
wa ÝUmayra, Vol. III, p. 302 and al-ÝAjÐlÐ, Íashiya al-Jamal, Vol. IV, p. 283 
386 BuhÙÔÐ, SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt, Vol. III, p. 51. As there is a ÎadÐth narrated by ÝÀÞÐsha 
mentioning that once the Prophet had spent one night with her which was not her turn, then 
the Prophet paid back the following night 
387 al-MurtaÃÁ, al-BaÎr al-ZukhÁr,  Vol. IV, p. 93 
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Having examined the various cases of worldly affairs above, we found that 
the jurists were consistent in applying the standard requirements of ÃarÙra. 
A rule is permitted only during the necessity period and the original rule is 
restored once this period is over. The majority also agreed that the ÃarÙra 
act can only be done for a limited time and in a limited fashion so that it can 
achieve its aim, either to save property, life or other necessities. When there 
is more than one alternative, the muÃtarr is required to choose a lesser harm. 
It is also interesting to point out that the jurists made painstaking efforts to 
offer a solution for each ÃarÙra case by providing hypothetical cases. It can 
be argued that the cases may not necessarily happen in reality, but might 
offer a useful solution for future emerging cases. 
 
It can be concluded, then, that with regard to most criminal offences, ÃarÙra 
does not give rise to any form of punishment, although it does not cancel 
any civil responsibility. For instance, stealing food during starvation does 
not lead to the hand of the thief being amputated. However, the thief is still 
liable to pay the price of the item taken. It is also important to note that not 
all forms of criminal acts are allowed, however pressing the need of the 
situation is. Adultery, rape and murder are some of the crimes that are not 
tolerated in any circumstance.  
 
Another important point that can be summarised is that the juristic approach 
to ÃarÙra is not entirely objective, according to the standard version. For 
instance, the assessment of the correct course of action depends on the 
subjective feeling of the muÃtarr. The muÃtarr is given the liberty to verify 
the situation according to his own strength and perseverance. However, 
Islamic jurisprudence also requires a determination of the case according to 
certain legal standards. The subjective feeling of muÃtarr cannot transform a 
non-necessity case into a necessity case when the circumstance fails to meet 
certain conditions. In the next chapter, we will explore the application of 
ÃarÙra in ÝibÁda (devotional acts of worship) matters, such as praying and 
purification and explore whether there is any difference between the ÃarÙra 
application in worldly matters and acts of worship. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ÂARØRA APPLICATION IN DEVOTIONAL ACTS 
OF WORSHIP (ÝIBADA) CASES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we learned that the rule of ÃarÙra permits many 
kinds of prohibition388, including the consumption of mayta, drinking wine 
(according to some jurists) and stealing food from others, though even then, 
some liabilities are not lifted. These cases are categorised as worldly affairs. 
In this chapter, the rule of ÃarÙra concerning devotional acts of worship will 
be analysed. In most cases, ÃarÙra works to delay certain forms of ritual 
acts. For instance, the fasting in the month Ramadan can be postponed for 
those who are very sick. Certain forms of worship can also be modified 
because of ÃarÙra (for instance, prayer in the midst of war). The rules of 
religious observances like purification, prayer,  Îajj (pilgrimage) and funeral 
rites are quite anomalous as they are regarded as ÝumÙr taÝabbud (matters 
relating to worship), where the prohibitions and the obligations in religious 
observances are barely related with cause (sabab or Ýilla), unlike worldly 
affairs. It is almost impossible to investigate the specific cause for such 
obligations or prohibitions in ÝibÁda matters. In addition, it is almost 
impossible to measure the tangible harm and to specify the wisdom behind 
the rules of religious acts like prayers and Îajj. However, in worldly affairs, 
the sabab or cause of the rule is easier to understand: the prohibition of 
murder is to protect human's life and the prohibition of al-khamr is because 
of the intoxicating element which becomes the Ýilla for the prohibition of 
other intoxicant drinks. However, for ÝibÁda matters, the cause for the 
religious obligations is generally associated with the rights of God where a 
Muslim is obliged to perform certain ritual acts as daily obligations like 
prayer, or annual obligations like fasting during ramaÃÁn, or as once-in-a-
life time obligations like Îajj. Furthermore, the jurists also believed that one 
of the “wisdoms” behind these obligations and prohibitions in religious 
observance is to protect one of the most fundamental elements in human 
existence namely, religion389. Performing all kinds of religious obligations 
                                                 
388 We should also bear in mind that ÃarÙra can also prohibit certain permission. 
389 Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law,  pp. 13-25. Al-TirmidhÐ 
al-ÍÁkim had initiated the effort surveying the wisdoms and secrets behind of each of 
prayer acts whilst the later jurists reaffirmed those obligations are to protect one's religion. 
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can ‘renew’ and ‘refresh’ one’s faith in God. Therefore, in ordinary daily 
situations, no amendment whatsoever can be made regarding the 
fundamental rules of worship, unless it is proven necessary to do so. 
 
However, Islamic jurisprudence does recognise that there are many 
situations which impair one's capacity to fulfill religious obligations, and 
one of these impediments is necessity390. Necessity may change certain 
rules in worship, by changing the form of worship, delaying the act or 
lifting the obligation. Like any other ÃarÙra case, only “extreme” reasons 
are accepted as the basis for the change, alteration or deferment of rules in 
devotional acts. It is also important to highlight that such changes also have 
several consequences, either the act has to be repeated or it is subjected to 
certain penalty. These legal consequences imply that a devotional act 
amended because of necessity is considered imperfect compared to one 
performed in a complete form. For example, a complete prayer is better than 
a shortened prayer that is performed out of necessity, according to the 
ShÁfiÝÐs. In many cases of ÃarÙra, the ShÁfiÝis required a repetition for any 
incomplete prayer performed. However, the other schools did not require 
such repetition as for them the prayer is rendered perfect391. 
 
One may ask, what is the significance of the assessment of ÃarÙra cases in 
devotional acts of worship to the assessment of the Harm Reduction 
Programme? Although the HRP can be regarded as one example of worldly 
affairs, I believe the assessment of ÃarÙra application in religious affairs can 
enhance our understanding of how this rule really works generally.  ÂarÙra 
rule works in both religious and worldly affairs in an almost similar manner 
as strict prerequisites should be met. The hypothetical cases of ÝibÁda 
provided in fiqh literature help to clarify some important issues, such as to 
what extent the muÃtarr is required to look for a lawful alternative before he 
can resort to the unlawful choice. This issue is discussed in the case of 
                                                                                                                            
In any non-necessity case, no amendment can be made regarding the rules of worship, 
unless it is proven necessity. 
390 Many jurists agree that the impediments impair Muslim's capacity can be divided into 
two categories; ÝawÁriÃ samawiya (the work of providence) like forgetfulness, ignorance, 
sleeping and ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba (causes created by man) such as compulsion and coercion.  
391 See Zakariyya al-AnsÁri, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib sharÎ RawÃ al-Óalib, Vol. I, p. 136. However 
in the case of khawf prayer performed based on false prediction, all jurists required the 
prayer to be repeated. 
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tayammum. Lengthy arguments regarding the need to search for the lawful 
alternative lead to a conclusion that a muÃtarr has to do the best before 
resorting to any ÃarÙra alternative. He also has to ensure that there is no 
other lawful method available and the only way out is by acting upon 
darÙra. Similarly, in the case of using illegal drugs in the Harm Reduction 
Programme, the patient must be certain that such HRP treatment is a 
necessity for him.   
 
This chapter serves three purposes. Firstly, it will investigate whether ÃarÙra 
works differently in religious matters as compared to worldly affairs. 
Secondly, it aims to verify whether the jurists adapted the same standard of 
rules, policies and limitations used in worldly affairs. Finally, this chapter 
will investigate whether the moral policy taken into consideration as the 
basis for ÃarÙra application in worship matters. For instance, can the right of 
a human being overcome the right of God in ÝibÁda? These three questions 
will be answered in this chapter.  
 
4.2 ÂarÙra cases in ÔahÁra (cleaning and purification) 
 
Purification either through wuÃÙÞ (ablution), ghusl (bath) or tayammum (dry 
ablution) is a basic requirement prior to performing prayer or reciting al-
Qur’Án (according to certain views). In this regard, I have chosen the 
tayammum392 issue, as it is a convenient case study for ÃarÙra based 
problems. All jurists except the ÍanafÐs393 accepted tayammum as a badl 
ÃarÙrÐ  (a substitute which is legalised because of necessity). In this case, the 
permission for recourse to tayammum to purify a Muslim in order to enable 
                                                 
392 There is a disagreement among Muslim jurists as to whether tayammum falls under 
ÝazÐma or rukhÒa category. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists held that tayammum is a kind of rukhÒa, 
meanwhile ImÁm AÎmad distinguished the rules according to the situation. For instance, if 
switching to tayammum is because of a lack of water, it is called rukhÒa, but if it is because 
of Ýudzr (sickness or disability to have water) it is an ÝazÐma. The consequence of this 
dispute is as follows: if we categorise tayammum as a rukhÒa, a traveller who is not on a 
morally good journey who switched to tayammum and performed prayer has to redo his 
prayer as a rukhÒa is only meant for a good person (according to all schools except the 
ÍanafÐ, as they permitted rukhÒa to be exercised by non-pious Muslim). The MālikÐ jurists 
permitted tayammum to be exercised by a good Muslim and not an ÝÁsÐ, except in a case of 
a sick ÝÁsÐ who stays in one place. The difference between a sick ÝÁsÐ  and a sinful traveller 
is that the later has the chance to repent before performing tayammum while the previous 
cannot remove his illness.  
393 al-ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, p. 564. For details see al-KasÁni, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ, 
Vol. I, p. 48, pp. 54-55, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, pp. 313-314. 
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him to pray is because of ÃarÙra. In other words, the conditions of ÃarÙra 
must be met in tayammum like any other ÃarÙra cases. According to this 
view, tayammum does not act completely like wuÃÙÞ, which means 
tayammum is a substitute but subject to certain limits. While wuÃÙÞ enables 
a man to perform all religious observances without limits (as long he does 
not commit any act impairing the status of impurity), tayammum only 
permits a Muslim to perform a certain number of prayers during a specific 
time period394. This means, the tayammum has to be renewed each time 
before performing the obligatory prayer.  The majority of jurists were also 
in agreement that, unlike wuÃÙÞ, the Îadath status cannot be lifted by 
tayammum. Therefore, in this sense, the prayer performed by tayammum is 
considered imperfect, unlike prayers performed by wuÃÙÞ. In certain cases, 
the prayer performed by tayammum has to be repeated when water is 
available. However, tayammum can only be performed once the prayer time 
begins and it cannot be performed outside the specific prayer time. The 
reason for this ruling is because tayammum is only valid during a Ãarura 
period, which is limited to the prescribed time.  Tayammum is only 
permitted for each obligatory prayer and a renewal is necessary to perform 
another obligatory prayer. Other scholars like al-ZuhrÐ (d.742/124) only 
limited tayammum to perform obligatory prayer, whereas tayammum 
cannot be performed to perform non-obligatory prayer (additional prayer) as 
it is not a “necessary” type of prayer for Muslims395.  
 
On the other hand, the attitude of the ÍanafÐs towards tayammum was quite 
different from the majority view. The ÍanafÐs396 were of the view that 
tayammum is a badl muÔlaq (an absolute substitute) that works exactly like 
wuÃÙÞ. They recognised tayammum as an absolute substitution for wuÃÙÞ. 
That means, with a single tayammum, a man can perform as many religious 
acts as he wants. For the ÍanafÐs, tayammum works exactly like wuÃÙÞ until 
religiously clean water has been found. As a pure substitute for wuÃÙÞ, 
                                                 
394 al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p.148, Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of The 
Traveller- A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law,  p.84 
395 al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p.148, Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of The 
Traveller- A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law,  p.84 
396 Their argument is based on a hadÐth of the Prophet which says “Tayammum is a wuÃÙ’ 
for a Muslim, even if he does not find water for ten years, as long as water is unavailable 
and he does not encounter Îadath." 
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tayammum can also be performed before the advent of prayer time. 
However, it is also important to highlight that the ÍanafÐs also required 
certain strict conditions that should be met before one can perform 
tayammum.   
 
As tayammum is legalised due to necessity (except for ÍanafÐs), some 
scholars like the MālikÐs397 did not, for example, permit tayammum to be 
performed by a wife after menstruation in order to enable his husband to 
have sex with her398. In other words, a woman who purified herself from 
janÁba (major sexually related defilement) by tayammum is only allowed to 
pray but is not allowed to have sex until she purifies herself completely with 
water, as having sex is not a necessity. In addition, the MÁlikÐs399 also 
required a husband to ensure there is plenty of water to purify himself and 
his wife before having sex (to avoid have to purify oneself from janÁba by 
tayammum). Even the act of kissing between a couple is prohibited if there 
is no water for wuÃÙ’ as there are fears the act may lead to tayammum.400 
Although tayammum can be performed as a substitute for ghusl in janÁba 
cases401 based on a tradition reported by al-BukharÐ and Muslim402, 
tayammum is not allowed when the cause of Îadath is not inevitable or is 
not of a necessary type such as having sex. Some MÁlikÐ jurists also ruled 
that the wife can even refuse to have sex with the husband if there is not 
sufficient water for them to take a bath afterwards. The MÁlikÐs’ position is 
the toughest one regarding abstaining from actions which can lead to 
tayammum. It can be concluded that according to the MÁlikÐs, a Muslim is 
                                                 
397 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 48 and IbnÐ Juzayy, al-QawÁnin al-Fiqhiyya, p. 30. 
398 al-ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ wa ‘Adillatuh, Vol. I, p. 562  
399 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 48 
400 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 49 
401 However, a companion of the Prophet differed in the permissibility of tayammum to 
purify oneself from major impurity. ÝUmar and Ibn MasÝud did not view it as a substitute 
for it. Meanwhile ÝAlÐ and other companions maintained that tayammum can replace al-
ghusl. The latter view has been accepted by later jurists in general. See ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-
IslÁmÐ wa ‘Adillatuh, Vol. I, p. 562, Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist's Primer,  Vol. I, 
p. 67 
402 "That a man came to ÝUmar and said "I have been involved in janÁba and cannot find 
water (to bathe)." ÝUmar said "Do not pray". ÝAmmÁr said, "Do you not remember O AmÐr 
Al-Mu`minÐn when you and I were tending camels and became junÙb, but did not find 
water. As for you, you did not pray, but I rolled in the earth and prayed. The Prophet (on 
hearing the story) said, "It would have been enough for you to stroke the earth with your 
hands and then to shake (the dust off) them, and then rub your face and hands". ÝUmar said, 
"Fear AllÁh O ÝAmmÁr". ÝAmmÁr said, "If you like I will not relate it" 
 158 
responsible for maintaining his status of purity and for striving not to resort 
to tayammum if he can.  
 
The ShÁfiÝÐs403 and HanbalÐs404 differed on this issue. Using a different 
analogy, the ÍanafÐs405 permitted a husband to have sex with his wife who 
has purified herself with tayammum. They argued that the general meaning 
of the phrase "Aw lÁmastum al-nisÁ`406" also covers the permission to have 
sex, even during the non-existence of water. They further argued that 
restricting someone from acting on his sexual desire may lead to another 
Îaraj (harm) like adultery. In this case, refraining from zinÁ should be 
prioritised over performing prayer by tayammum. However, I tend to 
choose a middle path between these two contradictory views. The subjective 
feelings of the person can verify the situation. That means, in a case where 
water is not sufficient for purification and at the same time the person has a 
need for sexual intercourse, he could make a decision based on his personal 
feeling. If he fears that he cannot endure his sexual desires and fears it may 
lead to another more serious crime such as committing zinÁ or rape, he 
should choose intercourse, even though it definitely leads to tayammum (to 
purify himself from Îadath  status). However, if he has strong self-control, 
he should avoid intercourse and perform prayer in a complete manner, 
which I think is preferable. 
 
The jurists also agreed that the permission to perform tayammum is not 
limited to cases where water is unavailable. It can be extended to other 
reasons, such as sickness or the inability to get water. Based on Q5.5, the 
jurists407 unanimously agreed that the permission for tayammum is due to 
the unavailability of water (Ýadam al-mÁ’) or the person being incapable of 
getting access to water (Ýajz Ýan al-mÁ’). ÝAjz Ýan al-mÁ’ can refer to any 
                                                 
403 See details in al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtaj, 1994, Vol. I, pp. 102-103. The ShÁfÐÝÐ 
jurists however differed in this matter, the earlier scholars permitted a husband to have sex 
with his wife who purified herself by tayammum but the latter scholars prohibited it. 
404 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 354. Some scholars said it is only a detested act 
(makrÙh), but some scholars permitted it. The second view is based on several traditions 
which reported that some companions had consummated with their wives and jÁriya 
(female slaves) even though they did not have access to water.  
405 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. I, p. 117 
406 Q5. 6 
407 Ibn Juzayy, al-QawÁnin al-Fiqhiyya, 29, see also al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, 
p. 147, SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 46 
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situation which impedes a Muslim from using or getting water either 
because of sickness of due to the lack of proper tools. The rule also covers a 
case where water is needed for drinking by the persons or animals’ in one's 
charge, for cooking, cleaning impure bodies (polluted by filth) and any 
other necessary cases which requires water either immediately or in the near 
future408. Having examined the said cases, we can conclude that the priority 
is given to other necessary situations and is not simply reserved for wuÃÙ’. 
This is because water is the only solution for those cases and no other 
alternative is available especially for cooking, drinking or cleaning409. 
 
Some Muslim scholars410 stipulated that tayammum is a special privilege 
for a traveller rather than a muqÐm (a person resides in one place). The 
latter, however, is entitled to perform tayammum but subject to stricter 
conditions. This is because the jurists believed that a muqÐm has a greater 
chance of finding water in his residential area than a traveller.  The jurists 
elaborated in detail on the distinction between a musÁfir and a muqÐm in the 
tayammum case. For instance411, the ShÁfÐÝÐs (who often took the toughest 
stand in some purity cases) ruled that the prayer of a muqÐm by tayammum 
is void when he found water during the prayer time. That means he has to 
redo the prayer with a new wuÃÙÝ. A traveller, however, does not have to 
repeat the prayer by performing new wudÙÝ even when water is available 
during the prayer time412. While a traveller is entitled to enjoy the full 
privilege of tayammum, a muqÐm has to fulfill a set of stricter rules413. This 
different set of rules illustrates how the jurists carefully verified the 
                                                 
408 al-DusÙqÐ,  ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p. 148,  
409 Not only that, the term al-Ýajz also extends to the case of forgetfulness or ignorance of 
the availability of water (however when a traveller remembers the existence of water, he 
has to redo the prayer). Al-Ýajz  also refers to the case where there is no tool to collect the 
water (e.g. water in a deep well), the case of a detained person who lacks of water, or a case 
of sick or weak person who has got no assistant to prepare water for him, see Ibn QudÁma, 
al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, pp. 315-317 
410 The ShÁfiÝis and ÍanafÐs held that tayammum can be exercised easily by a traveler 
rather than a muqÐm. See SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, pp.  43-44, Ibn QudÁma, al-
MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 311 and ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, pp. 578-582 
411 The jurists unanimously agreed that a Muslim does not have to redo prayer if the water 
is found after the prayer time elapsed. 
412 Or even to a musÁfir who has changed his niyya (intention) from being a musÁfir  to a 
muqÐm. 
413 The MÁlikÐs and ÍanbalÐs however did not distinguish between tayammum of a muqÐm 
or of a musÁfir, whether the reason is because the unavailability of water or sickness. See 
SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, pp.  43-44, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 311 and 
ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ wa ‘Adillatuh , Vol. I, pp. 578-582 
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situations according to the different elements in those circumstances. These 
different elements affect the dispensation of the rule of necessity. These 
elements including assumptions, chances and possibilities are being 
weighed up before any Îukm is being made. 
 
4.2.1 The requirement to look for clean water before tayammum 
As in other ÃarÙra cases, a Muslim is required to ensure that there is no 
alternative prior to exercising the ÃarÙra rule. Similarly, in the tayammum 
case, most jurists required a Muslim to verify that clean water is certainly 
not available prior to performing tayammum. All schools except the 
Hanāfis414 stipulated that in a case where water is unavailable, the person is 
obliged to search for water before he is allowed to perform tayammum. The 
act of searching for water is very significant as some scholars made it a 
condition for the validity of tayammum. For instance, a traveller is required 
to ask for water if a residential area is nearby. Although the jurists had 
outlined several alternatives and suggestions for a Muslim in searching for 
water, they recognised that the act (of searching for water) should only be 
done within the capability of a Muslim. For instance, the safety of a Muslim 
should not be compromised in the effort of finding clean water. Although 
the reason for tayammum is due to the lack of water and is a necessity case 
(to protect religion), the jurists also took into account that a Muslim does 
not have to suffer physically in order to find water. This rule is based on the 
notion of dafÝ al Îaraj (preventing difficulties) which means that such an act 
should be bearable and feasible to a Muslim415.  
 
The requirements for looking for water have also been clearly described in 
the book MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn, where al-NawawÐ provided several alternative 
ways for a traveller to look for water. These include searching his luggage, 
making inquiries from companions and searching the neighbourhood416. The 
author describes the efforts that should be made: 
if there is a plain, he should look around him, and if the 
ground is hilly, he should search the vicinity as far as the 
                                                 
414 Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, Vol. I, p. 70,  Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, 
Vol. I, p. 313. 
415 al-KasÁnÐ, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ , Vol. I , pp. 46-47 
416 al-NawawÐ, Minhaj Et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the School 
of Shafii, p. 11 
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horizon. Only if all his efforts are without success, is he 
permitted (to perform tayammum) 
 
The jurists also agreed that deferring prayer until the last moment to look 
for water is better than prayer at an early time by tayammum417. However, 
according to the ShÁfiÝÐs418 and ÍanafÐs419, if it is not a certainty but a mere 
supposition that water is available nearby, it is better for him to perform 
tayammum and pray at the beginning of the prayer time. The MÁlikÐs gave 
a better picture of the level of certainty required in this case.420  If there is 
no hope of finding water, it is better to perform tayammum and pray at the 
early prescribed time, and if he is unsure about the availability, it is also 
recommended to perform tayammum and pray in the middle prescribed 
time. However, if there is a strong hope of finding water, it is 
recommended that a person perform the tayammum at the last moment 
before the end of prayer time.  
 
The HanafÐs required that tayammum is only permitted if water is not 
available at least within one mile upon reach421, or within the radius that the 
voice cannot be heard or the adhÁn (the calling for prayer) cannot be heard. 
The person is also allowed to perform tayammum if there is a possibility 
that he could miss his companions or the convoy if he managed to look for 
water. The promise of water also impedes someone from performing 
tayammum. The case is similar to the case of a promise for a clean cloth to 
perform prayer. In both cases, the person has to wait for the water or cloth 
before a complete and a perfect prayer can be performed. It can also be 
concluded that the jurists took into consideration promise and strong hope in 
ÃarÙra cases. A Muslim is not allowed to exercise ÃarÙra when there is a 
strong hope or a promise that the prayer can be done in a perfect manner. 
Similarly, in other ÃarÙra cases, eating the unlawful is not allowed if there is 
a strong hope and promise that a lawful meal will be available in near future 
or nearby.  
 
                                                 
417 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. I, p. 106, ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, p. 564,  
418 See al-NawawÐ, Minhaj Et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the 
School of Shafii, p. 12 
419 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. I, p. 106 
420 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, pp. 42-43 
421 al-KasÁnÐ, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ  , Vol. I , pp. 46-47 
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4.2.2 How far is a Muslim required to find clean water for wuÃÙÞ? 
The jurists also recognised that there are some risks associated with the 
attempt to look for water, including a risk to life or one’s property. As 
previously mentioned, the attempt to find water must be within one's 
ability, must take place during the prayer time and must not harm the 
person. For instance, the person is only required to look for water during 
the prayer time and he has to ensure that the prayer can be performed 
during the prescribed time. The attempt that should be made does not mean 
that the person has to defer the prayer until the time has elapsed which 
means the person has to perform the prayer after the prescribed time 
(iÝÁda)422.  
 
The person is not allowed to endanger himself in order to discover water. 
For instance, al-NawÁwi423 stipulated that the traveller is not required to 
change his route and thereby endanger his property or his life in order to 
look for water. Similarly, the ÍanbalÐ jurists424 also contended that the 
attempt to look for water can be abandoned if the Muslim faces a dangerous 
obstacle (for example threats from enemies, fire or thieves). The importance 
of protecting his life and property is greater than protecting the religion425. 
The rule also applies to a Muslim woman where she faces a situation where 
the only water available is near a group of fÁsiq (bad persons). In such a 
case, she is allowed to recourse to tayammum to protect her security and 
dignity. These jurisdictions imply that other necessities, especially life, are 
also important to be protected. Therefore, it is clear that the rights of God 
can be compromised (by performing the worship in an imperfect manner) 
because one's life may be threatened.  
 
Similarly, the case of protecting one's wealth also needs to be preserved. 
The issue discussed by the jurists is a case where a Muslim has to buy water 
for wuÃÙÞ. The HanafÐs held that if the price of water is more than mahar 
                                                 
422 al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, pp. 156- 160, al-Nawawī, Minhaj Et Talibin A 
Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the School of Shafii, p. 12, Ibn QudÁma, al-
MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 315 
423 al-NawawÐ, Minhaj Et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the School 
of Shafii, p. 12 
424 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 315 
425 What I mean by the protection of religion here does not imply the protection of his 
belief or faith, rather the protection of his religious obligation.  
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mithl (retail price), the person is allowed to do tayammum. The tayammum 
is also permitted if the only way the Muslim can purchase the water is by 
illegal means or foul play (ghabÁn fÁÎish). However the ÍanafÐs 
distinguished the case according to the status of the person. If for example, 
the retail price is one dirham, and the seller asks for one dirham and half, 
the person has to buy it, even though the price is slightly higher. However, 
if the price asked is too high, for instance, is double the normal price, the 
person can resort to tayammum. However, if a wealthy man can afford to 
buy the water at a higher price, he should do so. This case reveals that the 
ÍanafÐs held that it is a necessity to protect Muslim’s wealth (from being 
cheated) and that wealth is regarded as important as a person’s life426.  The 
position of HanÁfÐs in permitting the buying of water at a slightly higher 
price was also affirmed by ImÁm MÁlik427  and the ÍanbalÐs jurists428; it is 
better if the buyer can afford to buy a slightly higher price of water rather 
than have to recourse to tayammum. The ShÁfiÝÐs, however, did not 
distinguish between a slightly higher price (ghabÁn yasÐr) or an extremely 
higher price for water (ghabÁn fÁÎish). For them, buying water at more than 
retail price for wuÃÙÝ is not necessary. Islam prohibits any kind of ghaban or 
cheating in business, whether it is small or great. The reason behind the 
prohibition of buying extremely expensive water (ziyÁda kathÐra) is due to 
the fact that the harm (Ãarar) to one's wealth should be prevented.  
 
However, the HanbalÐs explained that if a person has sufficient means to 
buy expensive water, it is preferable for him to buy it to perform a perfect 
prayer rather than to have to recourse to tayammum. For them, causing 
harm to one's wealth is a lesser evil than causing harm to one's life or one's 
religion429. This means the HanbalÐs are also of the view that causing harm 
to one’s wealth (where the harm is insignificant) is better than 
compromising God’s right430. In this matter, I agree with this view that 
careful thought and consideration must be given according to the status of a 
person. The case should be judged according to the wealth of the person. A 
wealthy person might not be affected by buying slightly expensive water for 
                                                 
426 al-KasÁnÐ, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ , Vol. I, pp. 48-49 
427 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 46 
428 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p.317 
429 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ,  Vol. I, p. 317 
430 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 317 
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wuÃÙÞ while a needy person might find the price is not reasonable. Hence, 
two different rulings are there for different persons and situations. 
The above discussions give us the idea that a Muslim is required to ensure 
that the alternative rule is the only way to perform the obligation. In 
addition, the reason leading to tayammum must be based on his strong 
assumption. If the necessity rule is exercised based on a false prediction or 
his careless mistakes, tayammum is considered void and the prayer has to be 
repeated. For instance, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists431 required a Muslim who 
misplaced the water for wuÃÙÝ, which consequently leads to tayammum, to 
redo his prayer. This school does not accept forgetfulness as a valid excuse 
to perform tayammum. .  
4.2.3 Other requirements for tayammum 
The jurists differed with regard to the type of sickness that permits 
tayammum. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ and AÎmad Ibn Hanbal432 held that tayammum is 
only for sickness that causes severe damage to the body (khawf halak) while 
the majority of jurists disagreed.  The first group only permitted tayammum 
if a person fears that he may die or lose the use of a limb by using water.433 
The majority, however, is more lenient. This is the view of  the ÍanafÐs434, 
MÁlikÐs435 and the latter scholars of the ÍanbalÐs and the ShÁfiÝÐs436. They 
permitted tayammum if the use of water can prolong a sickness or worsen 
the condition of one's health. They further argued that tayammum is a 
dispensation which could be applied generally to all types of sickness. 
However, they also firmly insisted that if the sickness has nothing to do 
with water, such as a headache or a fever for example, the patient is not 
allowed to abandon wuÃÙÝ and recourse to tayammum.  
                                                 
431 al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtaj, Vol. I, p. 91. However, the HanÁfÐs  and MÁlikÐs did not 
require a person who forgot about the place he keeps the water to redo the prayer. 
Meanwhile AÎmad was silent in this matter. See al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. I, pp. 121-
122, ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, p. 572 and  Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 318 
432 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 336 
433 al-NawawÐ, Minhaj Et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the School 
of Shafii, p. 12 
434 al-KasÁnÐ, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ  , Vol. I, p. 48 
435 al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ , Vol. I, p. 147, IbnÐ Juzayy, al-QawÁnin al-Fiqhiyya, p. 
31 
436 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 336 
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The ShÁfiÝÐs also required that in any injury case where the use of water is 
replaced with tayammum, any healthy or sound area which is not injured or 
not covered by bandages for instance, needs to be washed by water. For 
example, a person who has incurred Îadath ÒaghÐr (a slight or minor 
impurity) must first perform tayammum  (for the injured area), and wash the 
sound area with water afterwards. If a part of the skin is covered over, as by 
splints that cannot be removed, the exposed part of the body must be 
washed, and the rest cleansed. The splints too must be completely 
moistened and wiped437. They have the strictest view with regard to 
tayammum, and required any healthy area should be washed with water. 
That means the use of tayammum is limited to the injured area and 
tayammum does not lift the requirement of cleansing the other areas.  
The MÁlikÐs also held the opinion that a Muslim is required to wash the 
sound limb after performing tayammum for the injured areas438. In janÁba 
cases (grave impurity), if the water is insufficient for a Muslim to have a 
complete bath, the ÍanbalÐ jurists required that the water must be used to 
cleanse as much of the body as possible, and a tayammum should be 
performed for the unwashed part439. The requirement to use water to cleanse 
the sound part or the need to optimise the use of water as much as one can is 
in  parallel with a tradition which states that: "If you were ordered (by the 
religion) to do something, you have to accomplish the task according to 
your capability"440. The same rule applies to the case of insufficient clothes 
to cover one's awra (part of the body that should be covered in front of 
maÎram). A Muslim is still required to cover the body using the available 
cloth, covering as much area of his body as he can.  
 
Having examined the cases above, we can conclude that the tayammum is a 
dispensation legalised only because of necessity. This includes cases where 
water is not available to purify oneself from minor or major impurity and 
sickness. Strict guidelines should be followed before one can recourse to 
tayammum. These guidelines are not only recognised by the madhÁhib, who 
                                                 
437 al-NawawÐ,  Minhaj Et Talibin A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the 
School of Shafii, p. 12 
438 SaÎnÙn, al-Mudawwana, Vol. I, p. 45 
439 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. I, p. 314  
440 Ibid. 
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regard tayammum is of necessity but the ÍanafÐs also adopted the same 
view (although they insisted that tayammum is badl muÔlaq). A Muslim is 
also required to do the best he can to acquire water to perform wuÃÙ or 
ghusl by ensuring that there is clearly no clean water. However, at the same 
time he must ensure that the act of searching for water would not bring 
harm to the other necessities or should not result in a greater injury. The 
similar rule applies to other non-worship cases, where, for instance, in 
famine time, a Muslim is required to search for the lawful food prior to 
consuming the unlawful. However, if the act of searching results in a greater 
loss to any of his necessities, the act should then be terminated and the 
unlawful can be consumed.  
 
 
4.3 ÂarÙra in prayer cases 
The previous chapter of ÃarÙra cases mainly concerns the protection of 
human life, while a ÃarÙra rule in ÝibÁda cases is quite unique as it mainly 
serves the purpose of protecting one’s religion441, the element which some 
jurists ranked as the highest priority among the five essential elements in 
human existence442. Many jurists like al-GhazÁlÐ affirmed that the higher 
order necessity should have a priority over a lower order necessity if they 
generate opposite implications in practical cases. However, from the above 
discussion of tayammum, it is apparent that the protection of one's religion 
does not always receive a higher priority than other necessities. Although 
protecting one's religion by fulfilling religious obligations in a complete and 
perfect manner is regarded as a high necessity, this element can be put aside 
in order to give a priority to the protection of human life. 
  
Similarly, in the case of prayer, a perfect prayer performed according to 
specific rules can be changed and amended when one’s life is in a great 
                                                 
441 The protection of one's religion should not be confined to matters of belief and faith.  It 
should be extended to ÝibÁda areas as well. For example, the importance of prayer for a 
Muslim is like a pillar in Islam. Hence, the importance of fulfilling religious obligations is 
as more or less the same as the importance of protecting one's faith.  
442 al-JuwaynÐ and al-GhazÁlÐ developed the list of necessities. Al-GhazÁlÐ  ordered the 
necessities as; dÐn, hayÁ, Ýaql, nasab and mÁl. Meanwhile ShÁÔibÐ ranked the order as dÐn, 
hayÁ, nasab, mÁl and Ýaql. See Auda, MaqÁsid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, 
pp. 17-18. See also TaqÐ al-DÐn AbÙ al-BaqÁÞ al-FutÙhÐ, SharÎ al-Kawkab al-MunÐr, no 
place: MaÔbaÝa Sunna MuÎammadiyya, no date, p. 661, and Mutairi, Necessity in Islamic 
Law,1997, p.  25 
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danger. Compromising God's right is acceptable in order to protect one's 
life. In this matter, two cases will be analysed: prayer in a dangerous 
situation and praying in dirty clothes. The special rule in these two cases is 
believed to have been derived from necessity.  These issues are presented 
below with some analysis and observations made. 
 
4.3.1 Prayer during battle or dangerous situations 
Another interesting case is performing prayer during a dangerous situation 
such as in a war. In this situation, there are two important interests at risk, 
namely religion and life. The Sunni jurists were all in agreement that the 
obligation to pray does not cease even during a life-threatening situation. 
However, some ordinary rules of prayer may change. The changes include 
the change to the form of prayer to suit the dangerous situation. This 
pressing situation, which definitely presents ÃarÙra, gives a valid licence for 
a Muslim to either shorten prayers443, combine prayers, or alter the details 
and movement in the prayers. The Prophet himself was reported as 
shortening his prayer during the battle of TabÙk444. The jurists were also in 
agreement about the legality of special prayer, namely ÒalÁt al-khawf445 that 
can be performed during war. In order to minimise the risk of being killed, 
ÃarÙra changes some ordinary details and movements of prayer. Safety 
precautions have to be taken while performing the prayer. This includes 
taking turns during such a prayer.  
 
There are many versions of this prayer depending on the situation of the 
enemies and the level of the threats. For example, if the enemy is not in the 
direction of the qibla, the imÁm (the leader of the prayer) should lead a 
group in the performance of one unit (rakÝa) of the prayer, while the other 
group faces the army, after which, the two groups exchange places, and the 
imÁm prays one rakÝa with the second group. The members of each group 
                                                 
443 Ibn ÝAbbÁs said: "AllÁh made the prayer obligatory on your Prophet (in the following 
manner): Four rakÝa while resident, two while traveling and only one during times of fear". 
This ÎadÐth is narrated by Ahmad, Muslim, AbÙ DawÙd and Al-NasÁÞi. 
444 JÁbir bin ÝAbd AllÁh said: The Apostle of Allah stayed at TÁbÙk twenty days; he 
shortened the prayer (during his stay) 
445 There are numerous ÎadÐth recorded on this matter. See Sunan Abu Dawud, Ahmad 
Hasan (tran.), Vol. I, pp. 320-327 
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will complete one rakÝa of their prayer on their own446. If the enemy is in the 
direction of the qibla, then the imÁm leads both groups in prayer at the same 
time and they share in guarding against the enemy, and they follow the 
imÁm in every one of his actions until he performs sajda (prostration), in 
which case one group will make the sajda with him and the other will wait 
until they are finished and then perform their own sajda. After the first rakÝa 
is finished, the people in the front will move to the back and those in the 
back will move to the front447. It is also important to note that this prayer is 
performed in a group, where the situation permits it.  
 
However, the jurists were also in an agreement that if the fear (of the 
enemy) is great or when fighting is taking place, each person is to pray 
individually to the best of his ability, either standing, or riding, facing qibla 
or not, making gestures for the rukÙÝ and sujÙd. That means, prayer in a 
group is no longer a requirement in this situation. A Muslim is also excused 
from any of the acts of the ÒalÁh which he is unable to perform. Some 
movements are compromised in this khawf prayer, such as carrying 
weapons and moving facing the enemy. In normal prayer, excessive 
movements will invalidate one's prayer. Some other ordinary rules are also 
compromised. The ÍanafÐ jurists, for instance, permitted a Muslim not to 
                                                 
446 Ibn ÝUmar says the Messenger of AllÁh prayed one rakÝa with one group while the other 
group faced enemy, (at that point, those who had prayed) took the place of their 
companions facing the enemy and the second group came and prayed one rakÝa with the 
Prophet and then he made the taslim. Then each group made the (remaining) one rakÝa. 
This is narrated by al-BukhÁrÐ, MuslÐm and Ahmad. Anther type of khawf prayer was also 
reported performed by the Prophet. Jabir reported that the Prophet prayed the salÁt al-khawf 
with one group of his companions, and then another two rakÝa with another group and then 
he made taslÐm.  
447 JÁbir said "I prayed salÁt khawf with the Prophet. He arranged us in two rows behind 
him. The enemy was between us and the qibla. The Prophet made the takbÐr  and we all 
made the takbÐr. He performed the rukÙÝ and we all made the rukÙÝ. Then he raised his head 
from the rukÙÝ, and we all raised our heads from the rukÙÝ. Next he went down for sajda as 
well as the closest row to him, while the back row stood facing the enemy until the Prophet 
and the first row had completed their prostrations, after which the back row made sajda and 
then stood. Following this, those in the back row moved to the front while those in the front 
moved to the back. The Prophet performed the rukÙÝ and we all made rukÙÝ. Then he raised 
his head and we raised our heads from rukÙÝ. Afterwards, he made the sajda, and the row 
that was previously in the back during first rakÝa prostrated with him while the (new) back 
row stood facing the enemy. When the Prophet and the (new) front row had completed their 
sujÙd, the new back row made the sujÙd. Finally, the Prophet made the taslÐm, and we all 
made the taslÐm. This is tradition is narrated by Ahmad, Muslim, an-NasÁÞÐ, ÝIbn MÁjah, 
and al-BayÎaqÐ.  
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face the qibla direction while praying in the middle of the battle (when it is 
deemed too dangerous for him to face the qibla direction)448.  
 
However, as in other ÃarÙra cases, this special prayer is only permitted 
during the existence of real danger, which means when the enemy exists or 
when the troop strongly believes the enemy exists. The jurists agreed that 
the existence of enemies represents a ÃarÙra which can amend the rules of 
prayer. However, Muslims who performed khawf prayer based on a false 
prediction have to redo the prayer. If they performed the khawf prayer and 
later discovered that the enemies had gone, for example, they have to repeat 
the prayer by performing a full prayer. Although the majority required only 
the khawf prayer based on a false prediction be repeated, the ShÁfiÝÐ 
jurists449 requested that any khawf prayer be repeated after the war ends. For 
them, the khawf prayer does not lift the original obligation to perform a 
complete prayer.  
 
The MÁlikÐ jurists in particular, had also discussed the prayer in a musÁyafa 
situation (facing the enemy directly)450. Like the ÍanafÐs, the MÁlikÐs also 
compromised certain movements during prayer such as talking, walking, 
stabbing enemies or even not facing the Qibla direction. In addition, ImÁm 
MÁlik also permitted a praying person to look back during prayer because of 
ÃarÙra451. Such permission is not only limited to battle or war, but to any 
pressing dangerous situation. The examples of such situation mentioned 
specifically by the jurists include when one’s swords are crossed, or while 
one’s nose is bleeding452.  
 
Similarly, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists453 also extended the permission to amend the 
normal rules of prayer to other necessity cases. This includes the case of a 
                                                 
448 al-ZailaÝÐ, TabyÐn al-ÍaqÁÞiq, Vol. I, p. 233. The permission is based on the verse “Fain 
khiftum farijÁlan aw rukbÁnan”. See also the discussion in page 251. Praying facing other 
direction than Qibla is void unless in ÃarÙra.  
449 Zakariyya al-AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib SharÎ Raudh al-Óalib, Vol. I, p. 136 
450 The Prophet was reported performing khawf prayers during battles for example in the 
day of DhÁt al-RiqÁÝ. See Ibn al-ÝArabÐ, AÎkÁm al-Qur’Án, Vol. I, pp. 619-623.  
451 al-BÁjÐ, al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Vol. I, pp. 293-294 
452 al-ÑÁwÐ, ÍÁshiya al-ÑÁwÐ , Vol. I, p. 52, al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p. 394, 
MuÎammad bin AÎmad bin MuÎammad (ÝAlÐsh), ManÎ al-JalÐl SharÎ MukhtaÒar al-KhalÐl, 
Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1989, Vol. I, p. 456 
453 Zakariyya al-AnÒÁrÐ, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib, Vol. I, p. 136 
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person who had been crucified or when one is drowning.  In these two 
specific cases, although the person could not perform perfect prayers 
physically, the obligation still does not cease. As in a war situation, the 
crucified person is still requested to perform a prayer to the best of his 
ability in whatever manner he is able to do. This prayer was also recognised 
by the ÍanbalÐ jurists454. They maintained that even during dangerous 
situations, prayers should be performed without delay, either being 
performed on a transport, or while walking. According to the jurists, it is 
also recommended (mustaÎÁb) to carry a weapon while performing ÒalÁt al-
khawf. Even though certain acts of praying cannot be performed in a perfect 
manner, a person can make gestures for the rukÙÝ and sujÙd. The gesture for 
his sujÙd must be lower than that for his rukÙÝ. This prayer is validated 
because of the importance of protecting one’s life, family and wealth from 
dangers455 and at the same time to serve the interest of protecting one’s 
religion.  
 
It is important to point out that, the ordinary rules regarding prayers return 
when the enemy has gone. In other words, a Muslim has to continue his 
prayer in an ordinary way456. This rule is in line with the maxim which says 
that harm is measured in accordance with its true proportion (al-ÃarÙra 
tuqaddar biqadarihÁ). Similarly, in the case of using sand for tayammum, 
the validity of prayer by tayammum ceases when one finds water during the 
prayer time (i.e. the dispensation of tayammum is no longer valid). These 
two rulings are analogous to the case of eating pork, which is only allowed 
only during starvation. 
 
A ÃarÙra situation can also omit the obligation to attend the Friday 
congregation. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists, however, ruled that the obligation is lifted 
when there is severe danger threatening a Muslim. The case includes the 
existence of enemies, unbearable sickness, extreme hot or cold weather or 
even extremely heavy rain457. Some jurists even compromised other cases, 
such as feeding a muÃtarr (a person in dying need) during Friday prayer or 
                                                 
454 al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ , Vol. II, p. 17 
455 al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ , Vol. II, p. 19 
456 ÝAlÐsh, ManÎ al-JalÐl, Vol. I, p. 457 
457 al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-Umm, Vol. I, p. 239. This was also the view of the IbÁÃÐs. See MuÎammad 
binYÙsuf bin ÝIsÁ, SharÎ al-NÐl wa shifÁÞ al-ÝAlÐl, Vol. II, p. 319. 
 171 
buying kafn (white clothing to shroud a dead person). In the latter case, the 
reason to delay the Friday congregation is because of the fear that the dead 
body will change colour. The need to bury a dead person is more important 
than attending Friday congregational prayer where the Friday prayer can be 
substituted by normal Úuhr prayer. This is also the view of the MÁlikÐs458 
and ÍanbalÐs459. The necessity reasons that can allow the omission of the 
Friday congregational prayer also include business transactions if they are 
meant for necessity purposes460. In another example of how ÃarÙra can 
change the rule of ordinary prayer, it is mentioned in the book of al-FurÙÝ by 
Ibn MufliÎ461 that the ÍanbalÐ jurists even recognised business and sickness 
as valid grounds to combine prayer for a muqÐm person. However, it is 
important to note that such a fear must be genuine.  
 
What can we conclude from the discussions presented by the SunnÐ jurists 
above?  Firstly the jurists unanimously agreed that the obligations of prayer 
do not cease, even during extremely dangerous situations, as the Prophet 
was reported performing prayer during such situations. Secondly, the 
ordinary requirements and preconditions for the supererogatory prayer 
might be different in each situation. The acts of the Prophet of shortening 
and combining his prayer during dangerous situations were taken by the 
jurists as legal evidence to amend the ordinary rules of prayer. The jurists 
had extended the permission to other dangerous cases, such as during 
shipwrecks, and fleeing from a flood or fire. It is also important to bear in 
mind that such permission is not limited to what is specifically mentioned 
by jurists in their treatises. Any life-threatening cases or any case posing a 
threat to the five necessities can be valid grounds for altering the prayers.  
 
This also implies that the ÃarÙra rule can be extended to current pressing 
circumstances, for example, if a surgeon cannot perform a complete prayer 
in the operating theatre when the life of a patient is at stake and no other 
                                                 
458 al-ÝAdawÐ, ÍÁshiya al-ÝAdawÐ, 1994, Vol. I, p. 371 
459 al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ , Vol. II, p. 49, Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol.  II, p. 72 
460 Some jurists also accepted non-necessity reason for delaying the jumÝa congregation, 
such as traveling, sickness, taking care of sick person, someone who is blind and has got no 
person to guide him to mosque, someone who caught in muddy terrain. See al-SarakhsÐ, al-
MabÒÙÔ, Vol. II, p. 31, Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 202. 
461 Ibn MufliÎ, al-FurÙÝ, Vol. II, pp. 80-81 
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eligible doctors are available. The rule also applies to someone who is in 
charge doing an extremely important job for the good of the public. This 
includes fire fighters, policemen and women and soldiers.  However the 
permission to delay and combine prayers cannot be extended to non-
necessity business (such as performing a non- necessity transaction or 
playing games). 
 
 
4.3.2 The unavailability of clean clothes to perform prayer 
The second case to be analysed concerns the unavailability of clean 
garments to perform prayer. The jurists unanimously agreed that during 
prayer, covering one's nakedness and praying in clean clothes are necessary 
conditions for the validity of the prayer462. The clothes must be made from 
clean material and should cover one’s Ýawra completely. One should also 
ensure the absence of filth (najÁsa) on one’s body, clothing, anything that 
touches the body and the place on which one stands during prayer. 
However, if a man cannot find any clean garment, which is a precondition 
to perform the ÒalÁh, can he pray in a dirty garment or should he pray 
naked? Is the exception deemed as a necessity? The scholars differed in this 
matter. Some jurists preferred the person to pray without clothes, while 
some preferred praying with dirty garments and some said both acts are 
indifferent. The ÍanafÐs had a dispute about this matter. AbÙ ÍanÐfa and 
AbÙ YÙsuf provided two options, either to pray in a dirty garment or pray 
without clothes.  For them, both acts (the obligation to pray in a clean 
garment and the obligation of covering one's Ýawra in praying) are of equal 
importance. They argued further, saying that if praying naked is prohibited, 
praying in dirty garment is also prohibited. Another view, according to a 
ÍanafÐ jurist, MuÎammad al-ShaybÁnÐ, it is better for a Muslim to pray in a 
polluted garment rather than praying naked. For him, covering the Ýawra is 
more important than wearing clean clothes though both acts are farÃ 
(obligatory). He argued that praying naked leads to a sin of humiliating the 
religion and is an offence to the religion. The second sin is the sin of 
neglecting the requirement of praying in clean clothes. Meanwhile, praying 
                                                 
462 The obligation to cover Ýawra during prayer is deduced from verse 31 sÙra al-AÝraf and 
there is a ÎadÐth narrated by AbÙ DÁwÙd and TirmÐdhÐ regarding this matter. See Ibn 
QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. II, p. 283, Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of The Traveller, p. 121.  
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in a dirty garment only carries one sin and that is the omission of the 
obligation to wear clean clothes but there is no sin for humiliating the 
religion.  Hence, he has added an extra harm to the act of praying naked as 
compared to praying in a dirty garment. Hence, it can be concluded for 
MuÎammad, praying in a dirty garment is not as offensive to Islam as 
praying naked. 
 
Another exemplary case raised by jurists is the permissibility to wear no 
clothes during prayer when a person cannot not find any. Although some 
scholars permitted a Muslim to pray without clothes if no clothes are 
available, they insisted that the harm of revealing one's nakedness should be 
minimised463. This requirement is in line with the legal maxim stating that 
'the harm caused should be reduced'464.  The acts of reducing harm in 
praying naked had been well-discussed in fiqhÐ literature. For instance, the 
ÍanafÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs465 and ÍanbalÐs466 suggested that in a situation where 
clothes cannot be found, one should perform a prayer sitting down, and this 
is better than praying standing up as while sitting, more of a human's private 
parts can be covered when compared to praying standing up (especially 
when one has to bow). The ShÁfÐÝis467 and ÍanafÐs468 also suggested to those 
who do not have clothes to cover their Ýawra with soil. It is also advisable to 
pray in dark water, or pray in the darkness as these will cover one’s private 
parts. The ShÁfÐÝis 469  also recommended that if a Muslim is able to conceal 
part of his nakedness, he must cover the front and rear private parts. If only 
one of these two can be covered, it must be the front. But for the 
ÍanbalÐs470, if the clothes are only sufficient to cover one of the private 
parts, a Muslim can choose either the front or the rear part to be covered as 
both of them are of the same importance to be concealed. The ÍanbalÐs also 
suggested to a Muslim to choose his least dirty garment to be worn in 
                                                 
463 See ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Vol. I, p. 741, see also al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, 
Vol. I, p. 186 
464 Please refer to the Chapter Two regarding the legal maxims of ÃarÙra. 
465 al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtaj, Vol. I, p. 186 
466al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ, Vol. I, p. 271.  
467 al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol. I, p. 186 
468 Ibn al-Humam, FatÎ al-QadÐr, Vol. I, p.182 and al-KasÁnī, al-BadÁiÝ al-ÑanÁiÝ, Vol. I, p. 
117 
469 Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of The Traveller, p. 122 
470 al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ, Vol. I, p. 271. However, some of them said the rear part of 
the private parts should be covered. 
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praying471.  One may find many disagreements between jurists in the above 
cases. The rules seem to vary depending on how the jurists measured the 
harm inflicted. Some jurists might say solution A is better than solution B 
while other jurists thought otherwise. This is so because they thought their 
solution provides the least harm. In this matter, I think freedom should be 
given to the person in the situation to verify the case according to the best of 
his ability. He himself should measure and weigh up the harm inflicted. 
 
Another question concerns whether or not the act of searching for 
alternative clothes for prayer is an obligation for a Muslim. It is apparent 
that the requirement to search for clean clothes is analogous to the case of 
finding water in a tayammum case. The MÁlikÐs472 insisted that searching 
and looking for clothes to perform prayer is wÁjib, either through borrowing 
or buying at the retail price (thaman muÝtad). The rule is the same as 
searching for water before switching to tayammum. However, other jurists 
did not regard the act of looking for clothes as a precondition in any ÃarÙra 
situation. They maintained that the unavailability of clothes is sufficient to 
depart from the original rule of praying with clean clothes. The person is 
only obliged to ensure within the best of his ability that there are no clothes 
at all but he is not obliged to look for them. However, the act of looking for 
clothes is advisable. The MÁlikÐs argued that one cannot be certain about the 
availability of clean clothes unless he looks for them, hence they made such 
an act an obligation as a Muslim has to be sure about his ÃarÙra situation. 
This school had made an additional obligation for a Muslim under duress to 
confirm his situation by asking, looking and searching for the clothes, while 
other schools only made it a complementary rule. It can be speculated that 
the precondition put forward by the MÁlikÐs is to ensure Muslims do not 
violate the concession given only to fulfil his worldly lust.  
 
Another interesting case in prayer is the case of choosing between two dirty 
or religiously unclean garments. Both options contain the same level of 
harm. How can the principle of choosing a lesser harm be applied in this 
                                                 
471 al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ , Vol. I, p. 271 
472 al-DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ,  Vol. I, p. 211 and also see ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, 
Vol. I, p. 741 
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case? The MÁlikÐs473, for example, had discussed three issues; praying in 
silk garments, or in pig-skin-garment or praying with no clothes at all. 
Various opinions were delineated in these issues. Some of the MÁlikÐs ruled 
that praying in pig-skin-garments is better than praying in silk474. The 
reasoning is because wearing silk is prohibited for Muslim men at all times 
whereas wearing dirty clothes is only prohibited during prayer. As the 
prohibition of silk for men is more generally applicable to all situations and 
the pig-skin-garment is limited only during prayer, the former contains more 
harm than the latter. The second view, however, stated the opposite; 
preferring a Muslim man to pray in silk garment rather than pig skin clothes 
for praying. This group took into consideration the level of purity of those 
items. For them, pig skin invalidates one's prayer but the silk does not. 
Hence, wearing silk is better. Furthermore, pig is considered as najis 
mughallaza (grave impurity) as it significantly affects one’s purity status. It 
can be concluded that this group had assessed the act by looking at the legal 
effect of the items. This legal effect was taken as their main consideration in 
justifying the case under review. The third group held that praying naked is 
better than either praying in silk or pig skin. For them, wearing silk or pig 
skin garments are both prohibited and are of the same level of prohibition. 
The acts are thus indifferent. In this case they recommended a Muslim to 
cover his Ýawra with soil or vegetation (ÎashÐsh) rather than choosing 
between najis or mutanajjis clothes.  
 
In another case, the ShÁfiÝÐs had analysed two cases; cleaning the garment 
that would lead to performing prayer after the time elapses and praying in 
time but in dirty clothes. Should we wait for the garment to be cleaned even 
if it makes us pray out of time or should we pray naked?475 The ShÁfiÝÐs 
preferred a Muslim to perform prayer after the time has elapsed in order to 
have a clean garment to pray in. In other words, if a Muslim has to clean his 
garment even if it makes him pray outside of the prescribed time, then this 
is better for him. As for this school, prayer in a clean garment is better, even 
if the prayer is not performed in the required time.  Therefore, the ShÁfiÝÐs 
                                                 
473 al-DusÙqÐ, HÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ , Vol. I, p. 211 and also see ZuhailÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, 
Vol. I, p. 741 
474 This silk-wearing-issue is limited for men as there is no prohibition of wearing silk for 
women at all. 
475 al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, Vol. I, p. 187 
 176 
decided that praying in a complete manner is not only about praying in time, 
but praying with religiously clean clothes. Praying in time but naked is 
considered imperfect and most importantly some jurists described praying 
naked as a great offence to Islam.  
 
Another ÃarÙra case concerns whether or not a Muslim can steal clean 
clothes from others to perform prayer. Some jurists argued that having no 
clothes to pray in is not a license for a Muslim to steal clothes from others. 
The jurists also argued that this case is not analogous to the permission to 
stealing food during famine. The main consideration for this ruling is the 
alternative in each of the cases. In the case of having no clean garment, a 
Muslim has other alternatives to prayer (either performing prayer in dirty 
clothes or praying naked rather than stealing clothes). But in the case of 
food, there is no alternative for food, hence stealing is permitted. However, 
in the case of extreme weather, the jurists ruled that a Muslim is permitted 
to steal another person’s clothes if the clothes can certainly protect him 
from the dangerous weather476.  
 
The other important aspect here is that a Muslim under a pressing situation 
is required to minimise the harm of the act. This requirement can be seen in 
almost all ÃarÙra cases. The same rule is applied to cases of praying without 
clothes or garments as stated above. As the legal maxims state that ‘harm is 
eliminated to the extent that is possible’ (al-Ãararu yudfaÝ bi qadr al-imkÁn) 
and ‘a greater harm is eliminated by means of a lesser harm’ (yuzÁl Ãarar al-
ashadd bi al-Ãarar al-akhaf), efforts have to be taken to minimise the harm. 
In the event of no available clothes, one has to make an effort to cover his 
nakedness as much as he can.  
 
4.4 ÂarÙra cases in funeral rites 
 
 
There are several fundamental rules regarding funerals, including the 
prohibiting of the burial of more than one body in one single grave. But 
under certain circumstances, burying more than one body is permitted, for 
example, if there is a high death toll resulting from a natural disaster, such 
                                                 
476 al-SharbÐnÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, Vol.  I, p. 187 
 177 
as shipwrecks, fire, plague, massacre or battle. Under these circumstances, 
the original rule can be set aside as to minimise the burdens of the people 
who are burying the bodies477. 
 
The ShÁfiÝÐs ruled that it is forbidden to bury more than one body in a grave, 
as the Prophet is reported to have never buried more than one body in one 
grave478. The reason behind its prohibition is stated in FatÁwÁ al-RamlÐ, 
which states that the burial of more than one person in a grave mixes the 
bodies of ‘the god-fearing and the wicked479’. However, this action is in fact 
permitted under darÙra as the Prophet buried together two bodies of the 
martyrs of the UÎÙd battle in one grave. The Prophet was also reported to 
have given preference to a person who remembered al-QurÞÁn the most in 
this case over the heretic480. However, it is preferable if the person 
responsible for burial bury them in separate graves. Putting men and women 
in one grave is also prohibited unless in shiddat al-ÎÁja (extremely dire 
need). Examples of this dire need include if it is not possible to bury them 
except by putting them together, for example, or if they are siblings, or 
husband and wife. The jurists had also listed the perfect order of putting the 
dead bodies in one grave. The most pious person or the most God-fearing 
person will be put in the very front row facing the qibla, then the ordinary 
men's line, the women and finally the children. In the case where one whole 
family has to be buried together, the father is to be put in the front line then 
the children. The elderly are given preference over the young. If they were 
at the same level, a lot is drawn. If some of the bodies appear to be rotting 
more quickly than the others, they are to be buried first and the preference 
list is suspended. If men and women must be buried in the same grave, 
segregation has to be made with soil, and men will be put in front of 
women.  
 
                                                 
477 Ibn  al-Íajr al-HaytamÐ, al-FatÁwa al-Fiqhiyya al-KubrÁ, Vol. II, pp. 13-14 
478 al-Nawawī, al-MajmÙÝ, Vol. V, p. 248,  ZakariyyÁ al-AnÒÁrī, AsnÁ al-MaÔÁlib, Vol. I, p. 
332, al-QalyÙbÐ wa ÝUmayra, HÁshitÁ QalyÙbÐ wa ÝUmayra, Vol. I, p. 400 
479 al-RamlÐ, FatÁwÁ Al-RamlÐ, Vol. II, p. 41 
480 See also the Prophetic tradition in al-SanÝÁnÐ, Subul Al-SalÁm, Vol. I, p. 476 
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The MÁlikÐs481 also held the same opinion concerning the burying of more 
than one dead person in a grave. They rendered it highly abhorrent unless in 
a case of ÃarÙra. The best person will be put first facing the qibla direction. 
The priority in facing the qibla is first men, then children. Between men and 
women must be placed a separator. Some MÁlikÐs elaborated the permission 
to bury more than one person in a grave if the burial place is narrow or if 
there is only limited space available.  
 
According to the HanbalÐ School,482 it is ÎarÁm to bury more than one dead 
body in one grave, except in cases of ÃarÙra. Some believed it is not ÎarÁm 
if the dead are of the same sex. The priority based on religious background 
is also established, as the line in the grave has to follow the line of prayer. It 
is also prohibited to exhume a body unless there is an extreme need- for 
example if the prayer has not been performed on the dead body, or the body 
has not been ritually washed or if the dead person had swallowed precious 
items belonging to someone else. In this case, it is even permitted to cut his 
stomach to take out the items.  
 
Discussions 
Examining the cases of funeral rites, one may ask what is the reason behind 
the permission to bury more than one body in a grave? Is it merely to avoid 
hardship for the grave diggers? Digging one grave each for each dead 
person causes more hardship than digging a single grave. However, if the 
rule is merely to avoid hardship, it is not a necessity case. Instead, the 
reasoning must be that digging a grave for each body when there are many 
bodies, is hardship beyond what would normally be expected for a 
gravedigger to bear. The underlying reason here is the notion of a 
reasonable amount of hardship that one can expect gravediggers to bear, and 
that mass death due to a natural disaster exceeds that level of hardship. 
Similarly, some jurists also permitted burying more than one body due to 
limited space. The reasoning here is to protect the interest of the living 
                                                 
481 al-ÍitÁb, MawÁhib al-JalÐl, BayrÙt: DÁr al-Fikr, 1992, Vol. II, p. 236, see also al-DusÙqÐ, 
ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p. 422 
482 al-MardÁwÐ, al-InÒÁf. See al-ÝAbdarÐ, al-TÁj wa al-IklÐl, Vol. II, p. 48. See also al-BuhÙÔÐ, 
SharÎ MuntahÁ al-IrÁdÁt, vol. I, p. 372 
 179 
persons where the consumption of land for burial is limited, especially when 
the population increases. 
 
The aforementioned cases also reveal something about the functioning of 
ÃarÙra in the jurists' minds; namely, a valid case for the suspension of a 
ruling under ÃarÙra can be made when the implementation of the ruling 
would bring unreasonable hardship to a section of a population483. There is 
no indication here that digging one grave for each individual is impossible, 
or might endanger life (of the living person), merely that the rule makes the 
action unreasonably demanding. However, it is evident that in such cases, 
the lives of the grave digger and other living persons might be in danger if 
the dead persons are not buried as quickly as possible. The jurists in some 
places mentioned that the reason for mass burial is that dead people rot 
quickly. It is clear that it is the health of the living persons that is taken into 
consideration here. Although they did not specifically mention the health 
reasons behind the permission, the ruling implies that a quick action (by 
burying them in one single grave) is deemed imperative. The permission 
here should not be seen as merely reducing a grave digger's burden, but 
most importantly, with regard to public health. 
  
Similarly, exhumation, which is normally prohibited, becomes permitted 
when the dead person was not properly washed or no prayer was offered on 
him. The exhumation is also permitted when an interest of a living person 
has to be protected. However, this case should be treated with a careful 
examination. For example, the exhumation is permitted only if the dead 
person swallowed the valuable property of a living person. However, the 
jurists did not clearly indicate the amount of the money that justifies the 
exhumation. It can be assumed that the permission to exhume a dead body 
to take out the property is given if the value of the property is significant to 
the owner. The permission to cut the belly of a dead person is not a general 
permission, even if the dead had a debt to pay. Although the dead person is 
liable to pay the debt, there should be another way to pay the debt, 
especially if the amount of the money he swallowed was insignificant. This 
                                                 
483 This conclusion was made during a meeting with the supervisor, Prof. Robert Gleave, 
2oth January 2009 
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case is obviously not similar to the case of cutting the belly of a pregnant 
woman in order to save an unborn baby. If cutting the belly of the dead 
pregnant woman is the only way to save the baby, it is permitted, as 
protecting the interest of the unborn baby is greater than protecting the 
sanctity of the dead mother. However, in the case of taking out money from 
the dead person, the case should be treated differently.  
 
4.5 ÂarÙra in  Îajj cases 
Several original rules during Îajj can be suspended because of ÃarÙra, as, 
for instance, when the implementation of certain rulings would bring great 
harm to the pilgrims. Although breaking rules is permitted, the muÎrim is 
required to pay compensation either kaffÁra or damm in most cases. The 
reason for the compensation is because the act of Îajj is rendered imperfect, 
as with praying through tayammum. One example of a situation where a 
rule can be suspended is the case of a muÎrim who has to cover his head 
due to illness or severe hot or cold weather484. 
 
During Îajj, the muÎrim is prohibited from doing certain acts that normally 
would be allowed during ordinary situations, such as hunting, applying 
perfumes, wearing stitched clothes and wearing a face cover for women. 
However, under extreme situations where the muÎrim’s life and health 
might be endangered, the acts are permitted but the doer is still liable to pay 
compensation. For example, it is prohibited for a muÎrim to apply oil to his 
body during the iÎrÁm period unless, because of necessity such as sickness, 
it is necessary.  However, he is subjected to pay the fidya485. Similarly, 
committing other prohibited acts such wearing knitted clothes, or cupping 
are permitted because of ÃarÙra486. The person who has to shave or cut his 
hair before the ÝÐd  (10th of Dhul Hijja) where normally he is prohibited to 
do so, is also required to pay fidya (either fasting for three days, feeding six 
poor people or sacrificing a goat)487. The permission to shave the head due 
to necessity is based on an authority from a ÎadÐth where the Prophet gave 
                                                 
484 It is prohibited for a muÎrim to cover his head throughout iÎrÁm period, like wearing 
turban or hat. 
485 al-DusÙqÐ , ÍÁshiya al-DusÙqÐ, Vol. I, p. 61 
486 al-ÑÁwÐ, HÁshiya al-ÑÁwÐ, Vol. II, p. 77. The jurists however disagreed whether the 
muÎrim has to pay the compensation. 
487 al-BÁjÐ, al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Vol. III, p. 344 
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permission to KaÝab bin Ujra to shave his head and pay a penalty because he 
was suffering from head lice. However, some jurists like MÁlik stated that 
the penalty should only be paid for by those who committed the prohibited 
act without the presence of necessity. Necessity for him lifts the penalty and 
the penalty should only be paid by someone who deliberately broke the 
rules out of necessity. However, if the prohibited acts need to be done 
repeatedly, such as wearing a head cover like a turban during the iÎrÁm, the 
person only has to pay one fidya488. The MÁlikÐs also stated that anyone 
who goes hunting and kills an animal has to pay the fidya, even though he 
did it under necessity489. However, if a muÎrim accidentally kills an animal 
he does not have to pay a fidya. In this matter, we can see that the MÁlikÐs 
excused paying the compensation if breaking the rule was not intentional. 
The ÍanbalÐ jurists also gave permission to a starving muÎrim to kill and 
slaughter an animal and eat until full during ihrÁm490.  
 
The ÍanafÐ jurists also required a muÎrim to pay the compensation for any 
crime committed during Îajj, even if it was committed because of ÃarÙra491. 
However, the ÍanafÐs distinguished the compensation based on the period 
of the crime. The longer the crime is committed, the more severe the 
compensation is to be paid.  If the crime was committed in less than one 
day, for instance wearing, stitched clothes or a turban, the muÎrim is only 
required to pay Òadaqa. If the crime was committed up to one day or more, 
the damm should be paid. Meanwhile, al-ShÁfiÝÐ did not distinguish the 
period, which means the damm has to be paid once the rule was broken 
regardless of the period. The ÍanafÐs also distinguished the degree of the 
crime committed. For instance, if the crime is insignificant, such as only 
covering part of his head, only Òadaqa has to be paid. The HanafÐ was found 
to be the only school imposing differing penalties according to the degree 
and the period of the crime committed492. Different penalties are also 
                                                 
488 Ibn Íajar al-HaytamÐ al-FatÁwa al-Fiqhiyya al-KubrÁ, Vol. II, p. 128 
489 al-BÁjÐ, al-MuntaqÁ SharÎ al-MuwaÔÔÁÞ, Vol. III, p. 73 
490 Ibn QudÁma, al-MughnÐ, Vol. IX, p. 334 
491 Ibn al-HumÁm, FatÎ al-QadÐr, Vol. III, p. 30. See also al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. IV, 
p. 129 
492 Only one damm has to be paid for one illness but if another illness occurs that made the 
muhrÐm breaks the rule, another fine is imposed. But the fine is again assessed for how long 
it was committed.  If it was committed less than one hour, it only requires paying qubda 
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imposed for a woman who is wearing a face cover (niqÁb).  Some jurists 
also distinguished the compensations, namely kaffÁra and damm, where the 
kaffÁra is a compensation for a ÃarÙra case and damm is a compensation for 
a non-necessity case. The jurists distinguished meticulously the penalties for 
every crime committed. For example, the penalty is severe for a rule abused 
more than what was actually needed. For instance, if a sick person only 
needs to wear a stitched shirt, but instead he wore a shirt and a hat, he is 
subjected to extra penalty. He has to pay two different compensations, 
namely kaffÁra for breaking the rule because of necessity and the damm for 
breaking the rule out of a valid reason493.  
 
The jurists had derived compensation rules from the Qur'Án494. It is also 
important to note that the Qur’Án explicitly states that breaking the rules of 
Îajj subjects the person to pay compensation. Based on this verse, the jurists 
decided that breaking the rules because of necessity during this period only 
lifts the sin but not the penalty.  The jurists had also gone into lengthy 
arguments, deciding whether the penalty is imposed for each act and 
distinguishing the penalty based on the type of the crime committed. 
However, not all necessity cases leading to breaking the rules of Îajj require 
compensation. The compulsion to break rules during the iÎrÁm period is 
again is a matter of dispute like other cases. In this case, the ShÁfiÝÐs did not 
regard compulsion and coercion as valid excuses. They maintained that the 
person compelled has to pay compensation whereas  other jurists 
disagreed495.  The ShÁfiÝÐs argued that the compensation has to be paid 
because the Îajj is already damaged, disregarding whether the person 
intentionally committed the act or otherwise. Meanwhile, the other jurists 
who insisted that the person with no will to break the rule should not be 
obliged to pay the compensation.  He committed the crime because of the 
fear of the threat of the compeller and has no other choice.  
 
The case of compulsion that has been discussed in Chapter Two shows us 
that the jurists disagreed in many cases on the consequences of compulsion 
                                                                                                                            
(paying wheat); if less than one day he has to pay sadaqa and up to one day, he has to pay 
damm.  
493 al-SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒÙÔ, Vol. IV,  p. 129 
494 The basis for this rule is Q2:184 
495 al-Jamal, ÍÁshiya al-Jamal, Vol.  II, p. 504.  
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in Muslim acts, including nikÁÎ, ÔalÁq, killing, raping and Îajj as well. 
Should a person take responsibility for a crime committed under threat? Is 
the rule similar to the situation where a person was pushed away from a 
building? In the latter case, he will subsequently fall and he has no power to 
prevent the damage. Meanwhile in the case of a threat from an oppressor, 
the case is quite different as the choice is still there, between endurance and 
submission. The muÃtarr can choose to stick to the rule and receives the 
consequence or commit the crime following the order of the oppressor. The 
case is analogous to the case of breaking the rule to save life in the Îajj case 
where the muÎrim has to pay the damm. Both cases represent the need to 
protect one’s life by breaking the rule although it requires a penalty to be 
paid. On this basis, I support the ShÁfiÝÐ's view that the muÎrim who 
commits a crime during ÎÁjj due to a threat has to pay compensation.  
 
4.6  Conclusions 
It is apparent from the aforementioned discussions that ÃarÙra application 
inÝibÁda cases are quite different when compared to non-ÝibÁda cases. 
Firstly, the different necessities protected. Whereas in non ÝibÁda cases, 
ÃarÙra generally works to protect the life of the muÃtarr in ÝibÁda cases, 
ÃarÙra works to preserve the religion. In worship cases, some basic rules are 
tolerated in order to ensure that the rights of God are fulfilled in the specific 
required time. The tayammum, for instance, which most jurists agreed is 
permitted on the basis of ÃarÙra, allows a Muslim to purify himself to 
perform prayers. Similarly, the rule of praying in religiously unclean clothes 
is only allowed during necessity when clean clothes cannot be found. Both 
cases imply that all religious obligations have to be fulfilled, although the 
preconditions of the validity are lack. The second distinction is that in 
worldly cases, ÃarÙra generally changes prohibition to permission, while in 
ÝibÁda cases it works quite differently. For instance, in worldly examples, 
the prohibition on eating pork changes to permission to save a starving 
Muslim. Meanwhile in ÝibÁda examples, ÃarÙra defers an obligation, 
changes the form of worship or even lifts an obligation. This is evident in 
the case of deferring Friday prayer to save a person's life. ÂarÙra can also 
amend the form of ÝibÁda like the khawf prayer. 
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There are also similarities between worldly and religious cases of ÃarÙra. In 
both categories, the muÃtarr is required to look for an alternative before he 
can exercise the ÃarÙra alternative. As a hungry person is required to look 
for a lawful meal before he can consume mayta, the same requirement 
applies in tayammum cases, where a Muslim is required to find clean water 
before he can resort to tayammum. However, the Muslim jurists agreed that 
a person should not compromise his life or wealth in order to look for a 
better alternative. ÂarÙra cases in both categories also prove that breaking 
the original rule does not end certain liabilities and punishments. In worldly 
cases, the muÃtarr has to pay the damage for the property broken or the 
price of the meal eaten. Meanwhile in the Îajj case, the muÎrim needs to 
pay either fidya or damm for each broken rule. It also important to note that 
the religious obligations amended by necessity are rendered imperfect. In 
certain cases, the acts have to be repeated. The said cases of worldly and 
religious affairs suggest that ÃarÙra only lifts the sin but not the penalty and 
liability.  
 
The application of ÃarÙra rules in ÝibÁda cases also shows that the jurists 
applied both subjective and objective methods in examining the levels of 
harm in the ÃarÙra situations. For instance, in coercion cases, the coerced 
has to carefully verify the threat he received before fulfilling the will of the 
coercer. The coercion case varies according to the person's ability to endure 
the threat. Similarly, careful examination must also be undertaken by 
Muslims troops before khawf prayer can be performed. They have to predict 
the danger as best as they can. However, if their prediction is found to be 
false, they have to redo the prayer. Similarly, in the case of tayammum, if a 
person assumed that there is no clean water for wuÃÙÝ, but later he found his 
prediction to be untrue, he has to redo the prayer. 
 
ÂarÙra cases discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four show us that the 
ÃarÙra maxims were systematically applied by the jurists, for instance, the 
notion of choosing a lesser harm and the notion of eliminating harm as best 
as one can. This notion is evident in the case of choosing between dirty 
clothes and a pig-skin-garment for a prayer. The person is required to 
choose an act that he considers has a lesser harm than the other. This maxim 
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was consistently applied in other ÃarÙra cases in worldly affairs discussed in 
the previous chapter. In all ÃarÙra cases, the person should also believe that 
the harm is imminent from his preponderance of thought and most 
importantly he has to ensure that there is no other lawful alternative to be 
chosen in order to prevent the harm. However, although the general 
standards are given, careful examination must be taken in each case. The 
jurists were found to cultivate meticulous examples in order to distinguish 
ÃarÙra cases, as they are different from each other. Individual Muslims need 
to do to the same to verify their own necessity situation. 
 
The final question is whether the moral policy is also taken into 
consideration in the ÃarÙra case of worship. For instance, can the right of a 
human being overcome the right of God in ÝibÁda? Although it is apparent 
that the rights of God are upheld in worship matters, the jurists were also 
found compromising this right when certain necessities are at stake, 
especially when someone's life is in a great danger. The case is evident 
when the jurists rule that it is preferable for a Muslim to choose tayammum 
when water is available and there is a need to prolong life. The khawf 
prayer also illustrates that the rule of worship can be tolerated in order to 
protect the safety of the community. This suggests that the Sunni jurists 
were of the view that the proper balance of the right of society, religion and 
the individual should be upheld. Although the rights of God needed to be 
fulfilled properly, they can be amended to suit the current pressing needs of 
the individual and the community. Some cases in this chapter also show that 
the interest of living human beings sometimes takes priority over the 
religion. The said cases also contradict the generally accepted doctrine of 
maqÁsid, which is that the protection of the religion should receive the 
highest priority than the other necessities496. However, this does not mean 
the religion is ranked second in priority as compared to other necessities in 
general. The religion should be upheld in whatever pressing situation and 
this should be done as best as a Muslim can. The religion will not be 
sacrificed for whatever reason. In the case of professing kufr does not mean 
one has to sacrifice his religion.  Similarly, the permission to eat mayta in a 
non-Muslim country or the permission to delay prayer because of necessity 
                                                 
496 For further discussion of the theory of maqÁÒid sharÐÝa, please refer to Chapter Two. 
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is not a compromise to the importance of religion. All these cases are 
exempted only because faith still remains in the heart. In addition, Islam as 
a system will not be affected by the unlawful act of one individual Muslim. 
Islam compromises three important elements, faith in the heart, verbal 
acknowledgment and physical obedience. The last two elements can be 
compromised because of necessity as long as the core element, that is the 
firm belief in the heart, remains.  
 
Finally, as ÃarÙra requires almost an identical standard of rules in both 
worldly and religious affairs, as presented in Chapter Three and Four, it is 
therefore suggested that the same standard be applied in any new emerging 
ÃarÙra cases. The subjective and objective approaches used by Muslim 
jurists to identify the level of harm and danger in ÃarÙra cases are also 
deemed significant. A person under duress should examine the situation of 
necessity with his best understanding and at the same time he is required to 
follow the same standard of ÃarÙra rules. In the next chapter, I will be 
investigating the Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia and justify the 
harm using the principle of ÃarÙra. I will be using the general ÃarÙra 
requirements as analysed in Chapter Two, together with the hypothetical 
case study in Chapters Three and Four to justify this programme. Although 
the solution for this programme was not explicitly offered by the classical 
jurists, the general guidelines discussed, with careful observations and 
useful insights, are very useful in assisting modern jurists to deal with 
HIV/AIDS issue. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IS THE HARM REDUCTION PROGRAMME THE 
RIGHT SOLUTION? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to examine the justification of the Harm Reduction 
Programme from a SharÝÐ point of view. This programme has been 
implemented to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS and at the same time to 
reduce drug abuse in Malaysia. There are many programmes under the 
Malaysian Harm Reduction umbrella, including methadone treatment, a 
needle exchange programme and condom distribution. However, I will limit 
the discussion to the methadone drug substitute programme and the needle 
exchange programme. The reason for choosing these two programmes is 
that they have been claimed to be the most effective methods in reducing 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. These two 
programmes can enhance the productivity of drug users, reduce the use of 
illegal street drugs and finally, reduce drug use in general. The programmes 
are described as the best alternatives to conventional methods of combating 
drug abuse, which usually fail to achieve their targets. This chapter begins 
by providing a snapshot of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS cases in Malaysia so 
as to provide the basis of understanding the issues to be discussed. This is 
followed by a discussion of the Harm Reduction Programme, including its 
philosophy, the methods and references to similar programmes in other 
countries. This chapter attempts to assess the disadvantages of the 
programme (as well as the harm reduction it might achieve) and tries to 
assess it using the rule of darÙra outlined in previous chapters.  
 
In the Introductory Chapter, we learned that the drug and HIV/AIDS 
problems in Malaysia are particularly a concern for Malaysian Muslims, as 
the majority of drug addicts and people with HIV/AIDS are Malay 
Muslims. Thus, the central questions, apart from justifying the Harm 
Reduction Programme in general terms, are: what can Islam offer to rectify 
the drug situation in Malaysia? And, what is the best solution from the 
Islamic point of view in this matter?  For example, is the needle exchange 
and methadone programme best suited for Malaysian Muslim drug users 
and, can the programme be justified by the rule of ÃarÙra? As methadone 
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treatment involves the consumption of alternative drugs, this chapter will 
also shed light on the consumption of drugs for recreational purposes and 
medicinal purposes from the classical point of view. 
 
5.2 The Malaysian Drug Context 
Drug addiction in Malaysia has become a problem of epidemic proportions 
since the early 1970s and particularly since 1983, when the drug problem 
was redefined as a security problem and specific laws were promulgated to 
curb the epidemic497. Malaysia is among the countries employing the 
strictest penalties for drug trafficking and drug abuse. However, despite 
these strict laws and penalties, the level of drug abuse continues to rise 
every year. The National Drug Agency (NDA) was set up in 1988 to co-
ordinate all anti-drug activities, including identifying, treating and 
rehabilitating drug users and addicts in the country. A study conducted by 
the Ministry of Health and the Universiti Utara Malaysia in 2003 found that 
as of 2002, Malaysia had recorded a total of 423,574 drug addicts. These 
drug users were captured by NADI  (National Drug Information)498 and 
166,363 completed their treatment and rehabilitation programme. However, 
according to the data, only 25% were recorded as being successfully 
rehabilitated and 73% relapsed. It is clear that the data provided by NADI 
about the numbers of drug users was referring to the official numbers of 
drug users being apprehended by police during raids and similar law 
enforcement activities. The real number of drug users in Malaysia is 
believed to be much higher than the reported figure. Research conducted to 
calculate the actual numbers of drug users in the country has estimated that 
there were over 890,000 drug users in 2002499 with nearly 118,000 needle 
users. The research also estimated that 8 percent of drug users were HIV- 
positive500. Intravenous drug users have been the main source of reported 
                                                 
497 See Ministry of Health Education, Universiti Utara Malaysia and WHO. See also 
“Estimation of Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users in Malaysia, a study by Ministry of 
Health Malaysia, in collaboration with Universiti Utara Malaysia with technical and 
financial support of World Health Organization (WHO), 2003 
498 Data from NADI is the official statistics of drug situation in the country.  
499 Ministry of Health Education, Universiti Utara Malaysia and WHO. See “Estimation of 
Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users in Malaysia" p.32 
500 Annie Freeda Cruez, “Agency to help reduce HIV cases,” News Straits Times, 6th 
October 2007. The study was conducted by the Ministry of Health Education, Universiti 
Utara Malaysia and WHO. See “Estimation of Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users in 
Malaysia”  
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HIV infections in the country for over the past 15 years and the Malaysian 
government has confirmed that 75 percent of those infected with HIV are 
injecting drug users (IDU)501. This research also estimated that if nothing is 
done, one million Malaysians will become drug users and 300, 000 will be 
affected by HIV by 2015.  This frightening estimation also leads to the fear 
of the rise of HIV/AIDS cases in the country. 
 
Table A : Total number of HIV/AIDS cases and AIDS deaths by gender per 
year reported in Malaysia (from 1986 to December 2007) 
 
 
Year HIV Infection AIDS cases AIDS death 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1986 3 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 
1987 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 7 2 9 2 0 2 2 0 2 
1989 197 3 200 2 0 2 1 0 1 
1990 769 9 778 18 0 18 10 0 10 
1991 1741 53 1794 58 2 60 10 9 19 
1992 2443 69 2512 70 3 73 44 2 46 
1993 2441 66 2507 64 7 71 50 5 55 
1994 3289 104 3393 98 7 105 74 6 80 
1995 4037 161 4198 218 15 233 150 15 165 
1996 4406 191 4597 327 20 347 259 12 271 
1997 3727 197 3924 538 30 568 449 24 473 
1998 4327 297 4624 818 57 875 655 34 689 
1999 4312 380 4692 1114 86 1200 824 50 874 
2000 4626 481 5107 1071 97 1168 825 57 882 
2001 5472 466 5938 1188 114 1302 900 75 975 
2002 6349 629 6978 1068 125 1193 823 64 887 
2003 6083 673 6756 939 137 1076 633 67 700 
2004 5731 696 6427 1002 146 1148 951 114 1065 
2005 5383 737 6120 1044 177 1221 882 102 984 
                                                 
501Indra Nadchatram “Experts Gather to Discuss Findings on HIV/AIDS Programs in 
Malaysia”, ,UNICEF Malaysia,  15 December 2006. http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/media 
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2006 4955 875 5830 1620 222 1842 896 80 976 
2007 3804 745 4549 937 193 1130 1048 131 1179 
Total 74104 6834 80938 12197 1438 13635 9487 847 10334 
(soure: AIDS/STI Unit, Ministry of Health Malaysia 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Table B: Total Number of HIV cases reported in Malaysia by age groups, 
ethnic groups, transmission based on risk factor and sector occupation (from 
1986 to December 2007) 
 
Factor Classification HIV infection AIDS  cases 
Sex/gender Male 74,104 12,197 
Female 6,834 1,438 
Age group <2 years 232 66 
2-12 532 132 
13-19 1,140 232 
20-29 27,955 2,649 
20-39 34,770 5,945 
40-49 12,580 3,279 
>50 years 2,895 1,177 
No data 834 155 
Total 80,938 13,635 
Ethnic group Malay 58,267 7,986 
Chinese 11,886 3,656 
Indian 6,532 1,068 
Bumiputra Sarawak 338 166 
Bumiputra Sabah 432 159 
Original 39 0 
Others in Peninsula 528 131 
Foreigners 2722 456 
No information 194 13 
Total 80,938 13,635 
Transmission based 
on risk factor 
IDU 58,135 7,582 
Needle prick 0 0 
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Blood receiver 29 19 
Organ receiver 3 3 
Homo/Bisexual 1,472 421 
Heterosexual 13,038 4,030 
Mother to 
child/vertical 
692 175 
No information 7,569 1,405 
Total 80,938 13,635 
Sector/Occupation Unemployed 14,403 3,775 
Government staff 548 158 
Student 205 48 
Uniformed bodies 647 138 
Fisherman 3,098 389 
Factory 
worker/industry 
3,830 606 
Private sector/staff 2,796 831 
Sex worker 482 58 
Housewife 2,483 497 
Long distance driver 1,955 343 
Other 25,866 3,674 
Odd job 24,670 3,118 
Total 80,938 13,635 
(soure: AIDS/STI Unit, Ministry of Health Malaysia 2007) 
 
According to Table B above, IDUs are the main cause of HIV/AIDS 
transmission, making up 71.82% of reported cases and about 70% of drug 
users are Malay. The data proves that Malays are the largest ethnic group 
infected by HIV/AIDS, and injecting drug users were the main mode of 
HIV/AIDS transmission. From 1986 to December 2007, Malays constituted 
71.9% of people with HIV and 58.5% of those with AIDS. As Malays are 
generally Muslim, immediate action is necessary to control the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and to control drug abuse among Muslims.  
 
The government has also confirmed that the number of women who contract 
HIV/AIDS is increasing every year and it is clear from the above table that 
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more housewives are being infected with HIV/AIDS than sex workers. It is 
likely that the disease was transmitted to the women from their husbands 
who are drug addicts or who used sex workers. Frighteningly, the number of 
infected minors has also increased. It can be reliably predicted that if the 
spread can be controlled among drug users, especially injecting drug users 
(IDUs), the HIV/AIDS cases among minors and women can be reduced and 
kept under control. Research carried out by the Universiti Utara Malaysia502 
in 2003 also found that the percentage of drug users who shared needles was 
85.4%; 76.7% of them did not clean or bleach the needles before use, 53.8% 
of drug users did not use condoms when having sex with their main partner 
and 72 % did not use a condom when having sex with others. The data also 
shows that 76.9% of drug users lived with their partner. This behaviour 
among IDUs has certainly become the major contributor to the increase in 
the transmission of HIV/AIDS, not only to the other drug users but also to 
women and unborn children. About 15,000 children have already been 
made orphans by AIDS in Malaysia while women accounted for 16.3% of 
80, 938 new HIV/AIDS cases in 2007503. According to Health Ministry 
data, 60% HIV/AIDS women were married and 70% of cases contracted 
HIV through heterosexual contact. A new report brought out by the 
Ministry of Health and the United Nation’s Children Fund (UNICEF), 
‘Women and Girls Confronting HIV/AIDS in Malaysia’ reveals that 
infections among married women through sex increased from 5% of total 
cases in 1997 to 16% in 2007. Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu on the 
eastern coast of Peninsula Malaysia are overwhelmingly Muslim-Malay, 
and recorded the highest numbers of infected housewives504. Again many of 
these housewives caught the virus from their drug-user-husbands or 
husbands catching it through unsafe sex with sex workers. Many studies 
also confirmed that condom use is poor among men505, citing drug users and 
                                                 
502 See Mahmood Nazar Mohamed, Slides on “Harm Reduction Program and strategies in 
Malaysia: To what extent is it successful?”(presentation slides), Universiti Utara Malaysia, 
n.d. The research reveals that 85.4% drug users share needles. 
503 Medical News Today, “New HIV/AIDs Task Force Launched in Malaysia to Focus on 
Prevention Among Women”, 19th December 2008. 
504 Baradan Kuppusamy, “Health-Malaysia; Divided over HIV Testing”. Inter Press Service 
Agency, 25th  April 2009 
505 Siti Norazah Zulkifli et al., “Impact of HIV/AIDS on People Living with HIV (PLHIV), 
their families and community in Malaysia” (Seminar paper) Listen to their voices, act on 
the evidence. The United Nations Malaysia HIV/AIDS Theme Group Seminar on 
HIV/AIDS. 
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their resistance to condom use as contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS 
among other family members. The most alarming development in the last 
10 years is that the number of women testing positive for HIV/AIDS each 
year increased from 2.63% in 1993 to 5.02% in 1997 to 9.01% in 2002506.  
 
It is apparent from the above data that the HIV/AIDS is now attacking the 
institution of the family.  Where a family with a drug addict husband suffers 
mentally, physically and financially, efforts must then be taken to stop the 
epidemic from affecting innocent people. The government is very much 
concerned with the escalation in the HIV transmission in Malaysia, 
especially amongst women, young people and injecting drug users.  It notes 
with apprehension the growing impact of HIV on women and other 
vulnerable groups. It is estimated that if nothing is done by 2015, some 
300,000 people could be HIV positive. As for HIV/AIDS cases, as of June 
2006, 73,427507 Malaysians were diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, with an 
average of 17 new cases being reported every day. The number continued to 
rise until the end of 2006 by 76,389508. At the end of 2007, 10334 died 
because of HIV/AIDS509 .  
 
5.3  Malaysian Efforts 
Drug abuse is the recognised major factor of the spread of HIV/AIDS cases 
through sharing needles and unsafe sex. The drug problem contributes not 
only to social ills by increasing HIV/AIDS cases, it also creates financial 
problems, reduces productivity, destroys family life and threatens national 
security. Prior to the launch of the Harm Reduction Programme, Malaysia, 
like many other countries, had developed a set of conservative methods to 
prevent drug abuse, and the Malaysian National Drugs Policy operated on 
                                                 
506 Huang and Hussein, “The HIV/AIDS Epidemic Country Paper:Malaysia”, AIDS 
Education and Prevention, 16, Supplement A, 2004, The Guildford Press, p102 
507 See also Siti Norazah Zulkifli et al., “Impact of HIV/AIDS on People Living with HIV 
(PLHIV), their families and community in Malaysia”. This study reports up to June 2006, 
there were 73429 people have been diagnosed with HIV. 
508 This number was recorded by Unit AIDS/STI, Ministry of Health Malaysia, in Harian 
Metro, 2nd December 2007, pp. 28-29. However,  the number reported by Hamidah Atan is 
76,386. See “Malaysia set to meet UN targets on HIV/AIDS”, Berita Harian, Tuesday 2nd 
October 2007 
509 See official report in “MAC gigih tangani pesakit HIV/AIDS”, Sinar Harian, pp. 16-17, 
19 May 2008 and see also Annie Freeda Cruez, “AIDS affecting more local women”, News 
Straits Times, p. 22, 21st June 2008, source from AIDS/STI Unit, Ministry of Health 
Malaysia 
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the basis of reducing the supply and demand for drugs by adapting methods 
such as prevention, enforcement and rehabilitation . The most popular 
approaches are punitive methods and drug rehabilitation and treatment 
programmes. Malaysia is one of the strictest countries in the world in 
punishing drug-related crime. According to the Malaysian Dangerous Drug 
Act 1952 (revised 1989)510, any person who: 
(a) administered to himself or suffers any other person, contrary to 
the provisions of section 14, to administer to him any dangerous 
drug specified in Parts III and IV of the first schedule; or 
(b) is found in any premises kept or used for any of the purposes 
specified in section 13 in order that any such dangerous drug may 
be administered to or smoked or otherwise consumed by him, 
shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be reliable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand Malaysian 
Ringgit (RM5,000) or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years.  
 
In addition, drug trafficking remains rampant despite provision for a 
mandatory death sentence for those convicted of drug trafficking511.  
 
In addition to the strict approach to prevent drug abuse and smuggling, 
efforts have been made to help the drug users via drug treatment and 
rehabilitation program. In Malaysia, such programmes are under the 
jurisdiction of the National Drugs Agency and the Prison Department512. 
Like other countries, the Malaysian government initially developed a 
conservative method to eliminate drug dependence by reducing the supply 
and demand of the illicit substances. In an effort to reduce the demand for 
drugs, drug users and addicts were apprehended every month and given 
treatment and rehabilitation under the Drug Addiction Act 283 (Treatment 
and Rehabilitation1983). At present, there are 28 Serenti Drug 
Rehabilitation Centres (DRC). However, the relapse rate ranges from 
between 43.9% and 62.1% and that is why many argue that the 
rehabilitation programmes have failed to meet their objectives. James F. 
Scorelli has remarked that Malaysia’s drug rehabilitation programme is not 
                                                 
510 Law of Malaysia Act 368 Sales of Drug Act 1952, Malaysian Dangerous Drug Act 
1985, Act 316.This can be found at www.parlimen.gov.my. See also Raja Shahrom Raja 
Abdullah, “Promoting Public Safety and Controlling Recidivism Using effective 
Interventions Amongs Illicit Drug Offenders: An Examination of Best Practice”, 135th 
International Seminar Participants’ Paper.  
511 See Malaysian Drug Act, Section 39 A and 39 B 
512 Universiti Utara Malaysia, Ministry of Health Malaysia, research on “Estimation of 
Drug Users and Injecting Drug Users in Malaysia”, 2003, p. 5 
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working as the country’s relapse rate is above 50%513. The ratio of drug 
addicts to population from 1998-2001 is 9 per thousand. Apart from the 
failure of the rehabilitation programme, the percentage of IDUs as a 
proportion of the total HIV/AIDS cases rose from 60% in 1990 to a peak of 
82% in 1994, with an average (1990-2001) of 76%. Statistics from NDA 
showed that IDUs primarily use heroin and morphine, and there were 
31,893 heroin and morphine users among apprehended drug users in 2002.  
 
Despite the strict laws and severe punishment, drug problems continue to 
rise and the HIV/AIDS cases was rising every year (before the Harm 
Reduction Programme was launched). That is why many NGOs, such as the 
Malaysian AIDS Council and the Ministry of Health, are trying to adopt the 
Harm Reduction Programme to reduce drug abuse and most importantly to 
stop the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country. The previous method of top-
down multi-agency governance was shown to be unsuccessful, thus a better 
approach of bottom up multi-level agencies was introduced. This included 
the Harm Reduction Programme. This programme was established in 2005.  
 
After the start of the programme, there was a decline in drug abuse and 
HIV/AIDS cases, as illustrated in Table A. In 2007514, 14, 489 addicts were 
seized, compared to 22,811 in 2006. In 2006 and 2007, there appeared to be 
a decline in the number of drug users detected compared to the period 
between 2000 and 2005 when between 30,000 and 35,000 addicts were 
detected every year. Vicknasingam and Narayanan suggest that the decline 
could be a reflection of the widening impact of the Harm Reduction 
Programme that may have dampened the zeal to simply detain addicts. The 
proponents of the Harm Reduction Programme are of the view that the 
Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia has shown some initial success 
with a reduction in the number of HIV/AIDS cases.  
 
However, this programme has ignited controversy among Muslim clerics in 
the country with the majority of them opposing the programme arguing that 
                                                 
513 Bernama, nstonline, “Helping addicts with methadone”, 21/04/2009 www.nst.com.my 
514 See B.Vicknasingam and S.Narayanan, Universiti Sains Malaysia, “Malaysian Illicit 
Drug Policy: Top-Down Multi Agency Governance or Bottom-up Multi Level 
Governance”. In their research, the registered drug users between 1988 and 2006 were 
300,241, constituting 1.1% of the general population.  
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it condones immoral behaviour and further worsens the HIV/AIDS 
programme.  
 
5.4 HIV/AIDS and Muslim councils’ and NGOs’ responses to the 
HIV/AIDS situation 
 
As far as Malaysian Muslim councils and NGOs are concerned, they also 
take seriously the effort to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially 
among innocent people (such as wives of drug users) and unborn children. 
Some Muslim authorities require mandatory HIV/AIDS tests for persons 
intending marriage515. Some human rights organisations strongly oppose 
this testing as they insist that people with HIV/AIDS should be given equal 
rights to consummate a marriage and that their confidentiality and privacy 
should be respected516. However, some like Johore Islamic authority argue 
that there is no objection to people with HIV/AIDS solemnising their 
marriage, but the patients need to inform their partner of their status prior 
the marriage to avoid any misunderstanding after the marriage which might 
lead to fasakh (separation after marriage) after that. If the spouse agrees to 
continue with the marriage, the Islamic council will offer counselling and 
any help regarding their marriage, especially to minimise the risk of 
infection.  
 
The mandatory screening is now becoming a requirement for brides-to-be in 
Perak, Pahang and many other states. Again, human rights organisations see 
this effort as prejudice against people living with the virus. Despite protests 
from HIV/AIDS experts and civil rights activists517 who say mandatory 
screening is a serious violation of individual rights and does not prevent the 
spread of the disease, the government intended to widen the mandatory 
screening rule to all Malaysian couples beginning in 2009. Muslim leaders 
                                                 
515 In Malaysia, the religious affairs fall under state’s list. Although majority of the states 
follow the same ShafiÝÐ School, the regulations may slightly differ especially when it comes 
into technical matters. For instance, at the moment, the requirement for HIV/Test is only 
mandatory for certain states such as the states of Johor and Perak.  
516 See YHM Safian et al., Perlaksanaan Ujian HIV Bagi Bakal Pengantin, (research 
report), Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, Nilai, 2007 
517 Many human right activists and HIV/AIDS experts oppose mandatory testing for 
Muslim couples such as Adeeba Kamaruzzaman and Marina Mahathir. Mahathhir strongly 
opposes the testing by saying this is totally violate the rights of the patients to lead normal 
live like others.  
 197 
have suggested that the people with HIV/AIDS should not be allowed to 
marry and have children as it is unfair for the families and some Muslim 
leaders are even calling for the isolation of people with HIV/AIDS518. 
Human right activists strongly insist that these people should not be isolated 
but that they should be allowed to have careers and must be allowed to 
marry and have sex. Any isolation, quarantine and mandatory testing are 
undoubtedly a punishment for them. The suggestion from Muslim clerics 
that people with HIV/AIDS should be isolated or quarantined is not a fair 
suggestion as these people should have the same right to live as the rest of 
the population. Society and these people in particular, need to be educated 
on how the disease spreads. The people with HIV/AIDS can lead a normal 
life, get married and have safe sex. However, the ignorance among these 
people and the community is the major concern here. They are unaware 
about how HIV/AIDS can spread and that is why HIV/AIDS is seen as a 
death sentence within the community. Ignorance is not the only problem, 
drug users with HIV/AIDS are mostly irresponsible in sharing needles, and 
refuse to wear condoms while having sex with their partners. Despite the 
efforts of the human rights activists in asking the community and 
government to accept people with HIV/AIDS, these people need education 
and to be taught to be responsible especially to others.  
 
The arguments of both parties are based on a lack of understanding and 
ignorance. The human right activists should view the mandatory testing as 
an effort to prevent the HIV/AIDS from spreading to healthy people or 
unborn children. Clearly, there is no impediment to the persons getting 
married even if they are HIV/AIDS positive. Many Islamic authorities in 
Malaysia believe that the spouse should have the right to know his/her 
health condition prior to the solemnisation of the marriage.  Furthermore, 
after marriage, a spouse can ask for divorce if he/she finds that the spouse 
has a serious disease or cannot consummate the marriage. However, if the 
spouse agrees to continue the marriage despite knowing about his/her 
spouse illness, the marriage can be solemnised and the couple will then be 
educated on how to live with the disease. The efforts made by the religious 
                                                 
518 See Baradan Kuppusamy, “Health-Malaysia:Divided over HIV Testing”, Inter Press 
Service News Agency, 25th April  2009 
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councils clearly do not intend to prevent the HIV/AIDS people from getting 
married but to educate people about HIV/AIDS. Confidentiality in the 
process of HIV/AIDS screening test is a great concern and the Islamic 
authorities have said that they will not put pressure on the person with 
HIV/AIDS to inform their partner but that the choice is left to them519. 
 
This programme of Harm Reduction has also received mixed responses 
from local communities, Muslim clerics and Islamic organisations.  The 
former Minister of Religious Affairs, Datuk Dr. Abdullah Muhammad 
Zain,520 gave positive feedback regarding the Harm Reduction Programme. 
He insisted that such a programme can be implemented but within a limited 
capacity, for example, distributing condoms only to drug users who are 
already married. He himself recognised that patients should have a normal 
life despite the several precautions that should be followed to control the 
infections. He again insisted that these programmes of methadone, condoms 
and syringes should be allowed temporarily in order to control the disease.  
 
However, other Muslim organisations such as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia) and some Muslim experts oppose the programme. Dr. 
Muhammad Akram Laldin from the Islamic International University of 
Malaysia argued that the programme is clearly wrong as it contradicts the 
Islamic principle of harm. He argued that this programme only brings more 
harm than benefit to the drug users. For him, such a programme is a waste 
of public money and worsens the current social problems521.  
 
We can see here that the contradictions within the Muslim community are 
derived from differences in Islamic points of view. The proponents of this 
programme see this HRP approach as an exemption from ordinary 
conservative rules as HIV/AIDS have become a national epidemic and the 
                                                 
519 A research on HIV/AIDS mandatory screening test for couples intending marriage in the 
state of Johore found that the Johore Islamic Department does not force any body who is 
HIV/AIDS positive to cancel the marriage, but rather giving the patients and his/her couple 
advices and counseling on how to live with HIV. Johore is the first state in Malaysia that 
makes HIV/AIDS test prior marriage as mandatory. Following the state of Johore, this test 
had been made mandatory in other Islamic Departments of other states.  
520 Al- Islam, Kuala Lumpur, October 2005, p. 28 
521 Al- Islam, Kuala Lumpur, October 2005, p. 31 
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numbers keep soaring every year. The previous Minister of Religious 
Affairs clearly stated that such a programme can be promoted within the 
limited boundaries set down by the SharÐÝa and can be implemented 
temporarily. This can be considered an illegal act which is legalised 
temporarily to preserve human necessities but it can be only done 
temporarily. This is parallel to the rule of ÃarÙra. Whilst ÃarÙra permits a 
prohibited act because of necessity, it should be borne in mind that the act 
has several preconditions and is only allowed to be done temporarily. 
Meanwhile the opponent of the HRP adheres to the original rule in Islamic 
law which clearly indicates that any means which lead to disaster or harm 
should be avoided (sadd al-dharÁÞiÝ) and the programme is considered illegal 
as they will worsen social problems among Muslims. This group opposes 
the HRP but they fail to consider the AIDS/HIV situation in Malaysia as 
ÃarÙra. Meanwhile, the first group indicates the HIV/AIDS problem is a 
case of necessity. 
 
However, before exploring the justification for the HRP under the rule of 
ÃarÙra, it is important to have a clear view of Harm Reduction Programme 
so as to avoid any misunderstanding about the said concepts.  
 
5.5  Harm Reduction Programme 
"Harm reduction" is a term referring to policies, programmes, services, 
projects and actions that work to reduce not only harm to health, but also the 
social and economic harm to individual, communities and society.  It is an 
approach aimed at reducing and minimising the negative consequences 
resulting from negative behaviour such as drinking, driving and substance 
abuse. The aim of this programme is not abstention but instead a reduction 
of the negative effects associated with the negative behaviour.  
This programme can be seen as an alternative to the conservative methods 
controlling negative behaviour, i.e.  punitive methods. The proponents of 
this approach argue that the conservative method is no longer successful as 
crimes such as drink driving and drug abuse are still on the rise. Harm 
reduction works with the pragmatic acknowledgment that the conservative 
methods have failed to combat the drug, nicotine and drink problem and 
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there are no known effective interventions for eliminating drug-related 
crimes and related problems. This method requires a paradigm shift from an 
idealistic to a realistic and pragmatic perspective. Harm reductionists 
recognise the fact that drug abuse and other negative behaviour are 
inevitable and society is unlikely to ever be drug, drink and nicotine free. 
Hence, action must be taken to reduce the harm. For them, harm reduction 
is a more realistic approach where patients are motivated, given the 
opportunity to choose a better alternative to reduce the harm and the 
patients are not forced to undergo treatment unless they are ready522. 
Recognising the reality of drug use, Harm Reduction Programme measures 
success in terms of individual and community quality of life and health and 
not in relation to levels of drug use. This programme also entails a 
prioritisation of goals. Given the high individual and social costs associated 
with AIDS, measures to prevent the spread of HIV are at the forefront of 
harm reduction priorities.  
There are two basic pillars of this programme, one is pragmatic (public 
health) and the other is based on a human rights approach. The harm 
reductionists believe that changing human behaviour must be a facilitative 
and cooperative process, which must preserve and respect human dignity. 
This approach avoids moralistic, stigmatising and judgmental statements 
about people with HIV/AIDS. That is why they use the term of drug user 
instead of drug abuser and they use the term sex worker instead of 
prostitute. This programme also seeks to identify and advocate changes in 
laws, regulations and policies that they believe increase harm, or which 
hinder the introduction of harm reduction interventions. Within the 
pragmatic framework, people are not forced to undergo treatment and they 
can opt out of treatment whenever they feel they want to. This programme 
strongly works to help people be alive and well and at the same time 
motivates the patients, giving them more choices523. 
The principles of harm reduction 
                                                 
522See  Open Society Institute, What is Harm Reduction, 1 January 2001 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/ihrd/articles_publications/articles/what_20010
101 
523 See also Open Society Institute, What is Harm Reduction, 1 January 2001 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/ihrd/articles_publications/articles/what_20010
101 
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To understand more about how this programme works, it is important to be 
acquainted with the principles of this programme. The following principles 
of harm reduction are adapted from those set out by The Canadian Centre 
on Substance Abuse (CCSA 1996), and Lenton and Single (1998)524.  Harm 
reduction: 
1. is pragmatic and accepts that the use of drugs is a common and 
enduring feature of human experience. It acknowledges that, while 
carrying risks, drug use provides the user with benefits that must be 
taken into account if responses to drug use are to be effective. Harm 
reduction recognises that containment and reduction of drug-related 
harms is a more feasible option than efforts to eliminate drug use 
entirely.  
2. Prioritises goals: harm reduction responses to drug use incorporate 
the notion of a hierarchy of goals, with the immediate focus on 
proactively engaging individuals, targeting groups, and communities 
to address their most compelling needs through the provision of 
accessible and user friendly services. Achieving the most immediate 
realistic goals is viewed as an essential first step toward risk-free 
use, or, if appropriate, abstinence. 
3. Has humanist values: the drug user's decision to use drugs is 
accepted as fact. No moral judgment is made either to condemn or to 
support use of drugs. The dignity and rights of the drug user are 
respected, and services endeavor to be ‘user friendly’ in the way 
they operate. Harm reduction approaches also recognise that, for 
many, dependent drug use is a long term feature of their lives and 
that responses to drug use have to accept this.  
4. Focuses on risks and harms: on the basis that by providing responses 
that reduce risk, harms can be reduced or avoided. The focus of risk 
reduction interventions are usually the drug taking behaviour of the 
drug user. However, harm reduction recognises that people’s ability 
to change behaviours is also influenced by the norms held in 
common by drug users, the attitudes and views of the wider 
community Harm reduction interventions may therefore target 
individuals, communities and the wider society. 
5. Does not focus on abstinence: although harm reduction supports 
those who seek to moderate or reduce their drug use, it neither 
excludes nor presumes a treatment goal of abstinence. Harm 
reduction approaches recognise that short-term abstinence oriented 
treatments have low success rates, and, for opiate users, high post-
treatment overdose rates. 
As far as drug users are concerned, the harm reductionists believe that 
offering drug substitutes is an ideal way to reduce illicit street drug use, 
control the illegal drugs trade, minimise overdose problems and any drug 
related deaths and subsequently reduce drug use overall. This method is 
                                                 
524 UK Harm Reduction Alliance, Harm Reduction, 21 April 2009  
http://www.ukhra.org/harm_reduction_definition.html 
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regarded as a bottom-up approach, which contradicts the traditional top-
down method of combating crime. Top-down approaches mean that the 
enforcement of controlling negative behaviour comes from government 
agencies down to the local services. Meanwhile, under a Harm Reduction 
Programme, the approach comes from local initiatives, NGOs and the 
government agencies who can also play their important roles. The harm 
reductionists also treat the patients not as criminals but rather as clients. 
They insist that society and the authorities must stop labelling the patients 
and to end the stigma insisting that people with HIV/AIDS be treated 
equally despite their behaviours. They also do not judge the patients and 
these approaches are claimed as operating more humanely towards the 
patients. The original approach of this programme is a non-abstinence focus 
while some harm reductionists still insist the aim of this programme is 
abstinence.  
This programme525 starts by sorting out specifically the harms associated 
with negative behaviour and trying to offer the best alternative to reduce the 
risks. For example, in drug abuse, if the dug users are facing the risk of 
contracting blood borne viruses, then the answer is to provide clean and 
sterile syringes for the drug users. Similarly, people whose dependants are 
on illicit drugs such as heroin and morphine face the risk of overdose and 
the risk of losing productivity in the work place. In such cases, methadone 
or other substitute drugs will be provided, which can minimise overdose 
problems and can reduce the craving, and hence the drug users can live a 
relatively normal life and go to work. Another example of harm reduction is 
the risk of collision faced by a drunk driver. The harm can be reduced by 
drink driving laws, the provision of public transport, and designated driver 
programmes.  
The programme of Harm Reduction, its philosophy and its strategy are alien 
to SharÐÝa (as claimed by many Muslims)526. This claim is based on several 
reasons: 
                                                 
525 International Harm Reduction Programme, What is Harm Reduction Programme? 
http://www.ihra.net/Whatisharmreduction, 21st April 2009 
526  See Al- Islam, Kuala Lumpur, October 2005, p. 31 
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1. The harm reductionists do not render drug users and prostitutes as 
criminals as they do not make any moral judgement in their 
approach. In Islam, a criminal is considered a criminal, however, the 
status does not deny his right to receive fair treatment from the 
authorities. Despite the crime they committed, it does not mean the 
authorities have the right to disrespect the drug users or prostitutes’ 
rights and dignity.  
2. In Islam, protecting physical public health is as important as 
protecting spiritual health. In this case, social ills like prostitution 
and drug use are crimes and must be stopped. However, the Harm 
Reduction Programme only targets the achievement of a better 
quality of individual life and an improvement in public health, 
despite the crimes that have been committed. The harm reductionist 
approach seems not to care about the quantity of drugs they have 
used or how sinful the prostitutes are.  These do not matter, as long 
as they do not affect the public health. As for the harm reductionists, 
the important thing is that people can stay healthy despite the sin 
they have committed. 
3. The harm reductionists also aim to eliminate the stigma among the 
public about drug users, sex workers and people living with 
HIV/AIDS. That is why they do not use the term ‘drug abuse’ and 
‘prostitute’. This effort can be seen as trying to decriminalise 
negative acts. This again can create confusion among Muslims  
because Muslims are taught that drugs are a national and religious 
enemy and prostitution is a crime and a deadly sin from within 
Islam. 
4. There is also confusion among drug users and former drug users in 
Malaysia especially regarding methadone treatment. For former drug 
users, being given needles and syringes is the same as being given a 
way to become addicted again.  
5. Hence, the Harm Reduction philosophy is alien to Islam and 
contradicts Islamic principles. However, certain approaches in harm 
reduction strategies can be applied under the principles of ÃarÙra to 
temporarily prevent a greater harm. This programme can be altered 
to best suit the Muslim community to achieve the target of reducing 
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HIV/AIDS cases, but implementing this programme as a whole is 
unjustified. The methadone programme can be treated as a treatment 
for drug users. Condoms can be provided for married injecting drug 
users and syringes can be provided temporarily as long as the drug 
users have the determination to come off drugs in the long term.  
6. Another important point is that if the harm reduction can be 
implemented under the rule of ÃarÙra, the majority of Muslim 
schools of law require the person to repent before he can exercise 
the dispensation as rukhÒa and ÃarÙra rules are only meant to help 
devout people.  
It may be concluded that the Harm Reduction Programme was initiated with 
a belief that the conservative methods of preventing negative behaviour, 
especially to combat drug problems, were having no success. The harm 
reductionists also believe that certain negative acts cannot be prevented 
totally so the best one can do is to minimise harm without aiming to prevent 
the negative behaviour itself. It is more pragmatic than the conventional 
method of preventing drug abuse and, it is claimed, more humane towards 
drug addicts and people with HIV/AIDS. The harm reductionists also treat 
the drug users, sex workers, alcoholics as clients rather than criminals. They 
believe that this is a ‘humane’ approach which can reduce the negative 
consequences of drug abuse, alcohol and sexual activities, and further 
reduce the spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the deaths resulting 
from using illegal drugs and can help reduce the number of people using 
illegal street drugs and any drug related crime.  
However, there are fears that the methadone and needle exchange 
programme condones immoral behaviour, only adding to the problem of 
drug use. Many drug producers will often take the opportunity presented in 
these programmes when they see the lenient approach adapted by the 
governments. At the same time, some people, including teenagers, and drug 
users themselves, have became confused about the approach and are 
hesitant to come forward. The abuse of the methadone provided is also 
reported, as some drug users reportedly mix the methadone with the drug, 
making the mix more hazardous. GPs and doctors do not always follow the 
strict guidelines required by the government (sometimes wilfully 
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disregarding them) and sometimes sell the drug to the drug users. Another 
worry is how we can ensure that the needles provided are safely used and 
will not be reused and shared by the drug addicts? 
5.6 Malaysian Harm Reduction Programme 
In Malaysia, this programme was initiated by several NGOs (non-
government organisations) which later were joined by the Ministry of 
Health. The strategies and approaches of harm reduction constitute many 
different programmes including condom distribution, methadone treatment 
and a needle syringe exchange programme. The Harm Reduction 
Programme527 implemented by the Ministry of Health Malaysia since 2006 
have consisted of two components, Methadone Replacement Therapy and 
Needle and Syringe Exchange Activity with the objective of preventing the 
spread of HIV. 
5.7   Malaysian Methadone Programme 
Methadone is a rigorously tested medication that is safe and efficacious for 
the treatment of narcotic withdrawal and dependence. It is a synthetic opiate 
like heroine or morphine but without a strong sedative effect. It can be 
substituted for heroin and is widely used by doctors in the treatment of 
heroin addiction. Methadone appears significantly more effective than non-
pharmacological approaches in retaining patients in treatment. It was first 
produced by German chemists in the early 20th century and it has been 
widely used since the end of World War II. The Malaysian government 
allocated RM1.6 m for the methadone pilot project in 2006528. Until October 
2007, some 5000 individuals were undergoing the methadone replacement 
therapy at 58 locations, including hospitals, health and private clinics529. 
The programme has borne positive results with 66% of those undergoing a 
12 month therapy able to maintain permanent employment while 24.9% 
have taken temporary employment. Methadone drug substitution therapy 
                                                 
527 Malaysian Auditor General’s Report for the Year 2008, pp. 258-276 (Malay Version). 
The English summary can be viewed online www.audit.gov.my 
528 Faridah Hashim, “RM1.6 juta diperuntuk guna metadon bagi program perintis 
pemulihan”, Utusan Malaysia, Saturday 1st  October 2005, p. 14 
529 Mazwin Nik Anis, “Methadone plan to help more drug addicts”, The Star, 2nd  October 
2007, p. 4 
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has been proven effective, and the Malaysian government favours this 
approach because it is cost effective and useful for reducing deaths 
attributed to opiate over-dose530. In government hospitals, directly observed 
therapy, in which a patient is required to take the medicine under the 
observation of a health care professional, is practised. Government hospitals 
also dispense “take away” medicines. Most private clinics prescribe 
methadone for consumption at home.  
In Malaysia531, the methadone treatment programme is intended to improve 
the patients’ health, quality of life and to reduce drug-related deaths. It also 
intended to help patients, assisting them with facilities and advice to 
improve their health and at the same time help to reduce the spread of HIV 
or other blood borne disease that spread through injections as methadone 
does not require syringes or needles. Methadone is also used as a substitute 
for opioids like heroin, as it can reduce cravings. It also aims to stop drug 
abuse or at least minimise drug use until the users can stop. The methadone 
supplement programme is also intended to reduce drug-related crimes such 
as robbery or theft. It also aims to help the patients stabilise their lives and 
reintegrate with general community. Several guidelines have been provided 
by the Ministry of Health that should be observed by the patients. 
Accordingly, the patients are required to fully cooperate in this programme. 
They are also required to attend counselling programmes and to fully 
observe the treatment schedule. Methadone is only prescribed to eligible 
opiate dependents after a clinical assessment is made by a physician. During 
the treatment, they are advised to bring along family or close friends during 
the first week of treatment in case if any problems arise. The patients are 
also not allowed to drive after taking the treatment in the centre and are not 
permitted to take any other drugs or alcoholic drinks during treatment. If a 
patient happens to see another doctor during the treatment, he needs to 
inform the doctor treating him that he is currently receiving methadone 
treatment. If the patients fail to appear twice for treatment continuously, the 
treatment will be re-evaluated and the treatment may be cancelled. The 
                                                 
530 Zaheer-Ud-Din Babar et al., “Harm Reduction Program and Methadone Poisoning: 
Implications for Pediatric Public Health in Malaysia”, Journal of Pharmacy Practice, 
2006:19:5, pp. 280-281 
531 Unit Substans dan Konsultasi, Ministry of Health Malaysia, 7 Maklumat Penting Terapi 
Gantian Dengan Metadon. 2005 
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patients are not allowed to sell or falsely use the methadone and it is only 
for personal consumption. Eligible patients who complete three weeks 
treatment are allowed to bring methadone home for three days 
consumption532.  
However, despite several regulations and precautions, this programme is not 
without risk. Home consumption, for example, may prove to be problematic 
as the drugs may be dispensed without adequate patient education and clear 
instructions on its handling, storage and indication for use. No standard 
guidelines are available and the containers are not child resistant. There was 
a case of a 19 month-old Malay girl who was brought to the hospital after an 
episode of accidental ingestion of methadone533. Many have called for 
appropriate plans of action and community awareness campaigns to inform 
the public as well as health care professionals.  
Research534 was conducted to assess the best methadone programme to suit 
Malaysian local settings, to determine the average dose required and to 
determine problems that can arise from implementing such a program and 
how best to address them. The research found that methadone is a safe and 
effective drug that can be used in the local Malaysian setting. Out of 40 
subjects, 32 of 40 recipients (80%) reported a better relationship with their 
carers, and 7 (17.5%) reported no change. Only 1 (2.5%) reported a 
worsening relationship after the start of the programme. Although the 
number of respondents in this study is small, this research can be deemed 
important as this is among the earliest research on methadone programme in 
Malaysia. The traditional method (that is the rehabilitation programme), 
however, was claimed to be comparatively ineffective, with less than 10% 
of rehabilitated opioid dependence patients being able to eventually stay off 
drugs. 60% of respondents reported an overall improvement in their work 
                                                 
532 See MOE/USM/UNODC/ILO, “Training Course on the Management of Drug Users 
with HIV/AIDS”, (presented paper), Penang, Malaysia,  13-17th September 2004. See also 
Unit Substans dan Konsultasi, Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia, 7 Maklumat Penting 
Terapi Gantian dengan Metadon, Putrajaya: Cawangan Penyakit Berjangkit, Kementerian 
Kesihatan Malaysia, 2005 
533 Zaheer-Ud-Din Babar et al., “Harm Reduction Program and Methadone Poisoning: 
Implications for Pediatric Public Health in Malaysia”, Journal of Pharmacy Practice, 
2006:19:5, pp. 280-281 
534 Jesjeet Sing Gill et al., “The First Methadone Program in Malaysia: overcoming 
obstacles and achieving the impossible”, ASEAN Journal of Psychiatry,  2007;8 (2), pp. 
64-70 
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performance or had gained employment whereas 40% reported no change. 
None reported worsening work performance or losing their job. None of the 
subjects reported that they had been involved in crime or indulged in high 
risk behaviour such as self-injecting or promiscuous unprotected sex since 
the programme began. However, there was a concern about the report as 
this was based on self reporting. The research also found that methadone is 
a safe drug as only two subjects complained of side effects. The retention 
rate was 75% and this result is considered heartening despite the rather short 
duration. This local study proved along with many other studies that 
methadone can eventually lead to abstinence from heroin, and helps reduce 
high risk crime behaviour, and it can improve work performance and 
relationships with carers.  
 
 5.7.1 Is the Malaysian Methadone Programme in compliance with ÃarÙra 
rule? 
Having examined the modus operandi of methadone treatment above, it is 
apparent that the government has made a serious effort to reduce the risk of 
opiate addiction by providing a supply of methadone. Methadone is 
considered as a synthetic narcotic drug similar to morphine but less habit-
forming and lasts a lot longer in the body. As the methadone used is the 
primary subject of this programme, is it lawful to use drug to treat drug 
addiction? 
Chapter Three, highlighted the dispute between Muslim jurists regarding the 
use of illegal substances for medical treatment. Many jurists agreed that all 
unlawful substances except al-khamr can be consumed for medical 
purposes535. However, only a small number of jurists permitted al-khamr for 
medication, whether the disease is severe or mild.  Jurists also agreed that 
the prohibition of al-khamr is due to its intoxicant characteristic and that it 
can lead to drunkenness. Thus, as drugs also carry a similar effect on the 
brain and bodily functions, are they to be forbidden like al-khamr?  If the 
                                                 
535 The series of ÎadÐth prohibiting the use of khamr can also be found in JalÁl Al-DÐn Al-
ÑuyÙÔÐ, Al-Tibb al-NabawÐ, BayrÙt: Muassasa al-Kutub al-ThaqÁfiyya, 1986, pp. 287-288 
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answer is in the positive based on the analogy of al-khamr, do drugs carry a 
total prohibition like al-khamr?  
To justify the methadone programme, the case study of drug consumption 
during the medieval era will be analysed. It is interesting to point out that 
the classical jurists carried out a painstaking task to reveal the exact rule of 
the consumption of drugs especially for recreational purposes and 
medication. The terms frequently used in fiqhÐ literature are ÎashÐsh, banj, 
khÁt, nabÁt majhÙl and mukhaddar. The cases regarding drugs in fiqh 
treatises, however, were found to be limited, especially during the earlier 
period. The drug problem only attracted the jurists’ attention later. In this 
regard, Ibn Taimiyya could be correct claiming that the consumption of 
drugs (among Muslims) only occured during the late 6th and early 7th 
century of Hijra after the Tartars came into power 536. The history of drugs 
in the Muslim world is beyond the scope of this research and thus would not 
be discussed in this study. In addition, the legal discussions among Muslim 
jurists concerning drugs were limited and not comprehensive. It can be 
argued that this is because the Muslims were ignorant about the precise 
usage of this substance either for medical or recreational purposes. The 
majority of the classical jurists already acknowledged that there was a 
certain level of consumption of certain drugs for medication and this fact 
can be found in medical books of Óibb al-nabawÐ. However, the legality of 
the consumption for recreational purposes is disputed between the jurists. 
This problem was not detected among the early jurists such as AbÙ ÍanÐfa, 
MÁlik, al-ShÁfiÝÐ and AÎmad as Ibn Taymiyya537 argued that drug abuse 
started to occur in the Muslim world only in a later period. However, 
Rosenthal discovered that drug abuse started in the Muslim world as early 
as the third century. This statement was based on the rulings of al-MuzÁnÐ 
(d. 264/878) and al-TaÎÁwÐ (d. 321/933) against the use of narcotics538. 
However, it can be assumed that perhaps the early jurists did not record any 
particular rulings about drug abuse for several possible reasons. Firstly, 
during the early formative period of fiqh especially in the first and second 
                                                 
536 See WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, Al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, Vol. 
XI, p. 33 
537Ibn Taymiyya, al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ, vol. III, p. 418 
538 Rosenthal argued that there was ambiguity about the use of the term of banj and ÎashÐsh. 
Some jurists argued that both refer to same substance which prohibited in Islam.  
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centuries, drugs were only known to have beneficial effects, hence it was 
generally considered lawful. Secondly, drug abuse was not significant and 
not widespread, thus the jurist were ignorant about the abuse. However, 
when drug abuse became widespread and many Muslims were found badly 
affected by this substance, it started to attract the jurists’ attention.  
While al-SuyÙÔÐ (d. 1505/911) in his book, al-Óibb al-NabawÐ did not 
mention any particular rulings about drug consumption, he himself 
acknowledged that certain plants and herbs could be used as medicine539. 
The power of drugs was known by experimenting and by testing. A drug 
was classified according to its effect on the human body. A drug that did not 
produce any effect was categorised as a first degree drug, while the second 
degree drug was that which could cause a certain effect which was harmless 
to a human. The example of a second degree drug is poppies, which are 
recognised to have an intoxicating effect and these herbs were placed in the 
category of cold and dry540.The third degree drug was a kind that produced 
harmful effects but was not powerful enough to kill a human being. The 
fourth category of drug was what he called poison and that proved to be 
fatal. The example for this category was euphoria or shabram that was hot 
and dry. A drug was considered dangerous if an overdose of this drug could 
be fatal. Physicians reportedly abandoned its use541. Some herbs like ÒaÝtar 
(thyme) and Òandal (sandal wood) were categorised in the third and second 
degrees: they gave benefits to cure diseases like tapeworm and headache542. 
Brief descriptions of drugs in this treatise demonstrate that early Muslims 
already recognised the benefits and harmful effects of drugs. The drugs that 
could be used for medicinal purposes were generally permissible while the 
dangerous drugs were something that one had to be careful of. The benefits 
of drugs for medicinal purposes were also acknowledged in some fiqh work 
                                                 
539 See Cyril Elgood, "Tibb – ul-nabbi or medicine of the Prophet" in Osiris, Vol. 14, 1962, 
pp. 33-192. The University of Chicago Press, 66-67. See also JalÁl Al-DÐn Al-SuyÙÔÐ, al-
Tibb al-NabawÐ. 
540 See Cyril Elgood, "Tibb – ul-nabbi or medicine of the Prophet" in Osiris, Vol. 14, 1962, 
p. 84 
541 See Cyril Elgood, "Tibb – ul-nabbi or medicine of the Prophet" in Osiris, Vol. 14 
(1962), p. 93 
542 See Cyril Elgood, "Tibb – ul-nabbi or medicine of the Prophet" in Osiris, Vol. 14 
(1962), p. 94 
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with the jurists permitting the selling and buying of certain of plants that can 
be used as medicine543.  
Whilst most jurists agreed that drugs were permitted for medication, they 
did disagree over the consumption of drugs for other than medication 
purposes. Some jurists prohibited drug consumption for recreational use, 
while some permitted it and some left the matter undecided. Serious legal 
discussions of drugs are found in the books of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Íajar 
al-HaitamÐ (d.1567/974). For instance, in his treatise, al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ al-
Fiqhiyya544, Ibn Íajar al-HaitamÐ admitted that the ignorance of the real 
understanding of drugs, inadequate research and the unavailability of trusted 
reports from experts regarding drug had led to a misconception concerning 
drugs among jurists in his times. Drugs were a grey area which the jurists 
disagreed about, particularly the regular consumption of drugs. Due to a 
lack of reliable reports about drugs, some jurists were reported as testing 
certain drugs on themselves to investigate the effects of the drugs and then 
they made the ruling accordingly.  
For instance, there was a report regarding a jurist known as ImÁm Sufiyy al-
Muzajjad545, who changed his fatwÁ on drugs based on his self-experiment. 
He withdrew his previous fatwÁ prohibiting the consumption after making a 
simple self-experiment. He found that the drug (ÎashÐsh) he tested made 
him feel energetic which he claimed to be a good effect for those who want 
to perform ÝibÁda. On this basis, he ruled that ÎashÐsh should be permitted as 
it had a beneficial effect for Muslims when fulfilling religious 
obligations546. However, this simple self-experiment was not sufficient to 
persuade the other jurists to accept the legality of ÎashÐsh for non-medical 
reasons. This reluctance was confirmed by other reports regarding the 
negative effects of drugs such as losing one’s appetite and making the user 
pale and sick. The mixed reports of drug effects made the decision quite 
difficult and uncertain. The jurists also relied on several contradictory 
                                                 
543 One of the preconditions of saleable article is that the article must be useful, which 
means non-beneficial items such poisonous animals, musical instruments, herbs, bugs and 
junk are rendered unfit by some jurists for transaction. However, for medical purposes, 
some plants can be bought or sold. 
544 This collection of his fatwas was compiled by one of his disciples. It includes several 
lengthy treatises with separate titles, 23 Rajab 974/3 February 1567. 
545 Ibn al-Íajr al-HaitamÐ, al-FatÁwÁ al-Fiqhiyya al-KubrÁ, vol. II, p.14 
546 The benefits of drugs were recorded as nashÁÞat and taqwiyya 
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reports on the effect of drugs. The drugs were also known during Ibn Íajar 
al-HaitamÐ's era as al-nabÁt al-majhÙl, (literally means the unknown herbs), 
as the effects and the benefits of such herbs were unknown. Some jurists left 
the matter undecided. They also recognised certain characteristics of drug 
such as the ability of a drug to cover one's mind and leading to hallucination 
(mukhaddar and mughÐb). They also agreed that drugs had different effects 
on the body depend on the type of the substance consumed. Although this 
was the grey area for the jurists during the medieval period, they did agree 
on one issue; if the herb consumed led to serious harm, the herb was then 
forbidden, and the herb was considered lawful if it did not have an 
intoxicant and harmful effect. Thus, the rulings of drugs differed according 
to the effect of the drug used.  
The most widely used narcotic drug by medieval Muslims was ÎashÐsh547 . 
The other drugs that were consumed were banj and opium. . Rosenthal 
traced back the fatÁwÁ of the jurists regarding the use of ÎashÐsh and 
discovered that there is no authoritative text regarding the use of ÎashÐsh, 
and this fact was exploited by a pro-hashish faction to legalise it while 
others strongly prohibited it. According to Rosenthal, the banj or hemp 
tended to be considered dishonourable. It was used to seduce innocent 
people or as a prelude to murder and robbery. ÍashÐsh, on the other hand, 
might have been used for pleasure and enjoyment, although Rosenthal did 
not have evidence to this effect from the first four or five centuries in Islam 
and al-ZarkashÐ (d.1373/774) also revealed that ÎashÐsh affected many 
lower classes of people. Al-MuzÁnÐ (d. 264/878) and al-TaÎÁwÐ (d. 321/933) 
were against the use of narcotics. Although there was some problem 
regarding the terms used for narcotic drugs with jurists not knowing the 
newly coined slang terms, Rosenthal assumed that ÎashÐsh was already a 
social and legal problem during ShirÁzÐ’s period (d. 476/1083) in ShirÁz and 
BaghdÁd. It can also be argued that when the drug became popular among 
the Arabs for illegal consumption, especially for recreational use, it was to 
achieve hallucinatory effects. In these cases, the jurists adopted a stricter 
                                                 
547 Rosenthal argued that there was ambiguity about the use of the term of banj and ÎashÐsh. 
Some jurists were reported arguing that both refer to same substance which prohibited in 
Islam. See See Franz Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, 
Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1971, p.19 
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view towards narcotic drugs. As drugs have similar characteristics to al-
khamr, the jurists had debated about the use of both substances. These are 
summarised in Table C below: 
 
Table C: Comparison of characteristics between al-khamr and narcotic 
drugs according to Muslim jurists. 
 
Narcotic drugs Al-khamr Characteristics 
Muslim jurists, especially 
the ancient authorities, 
were in dispute regarding 
the rule of narcotic 
consumption 
All Muslim jurists are in 
unanimous agreement 
that al-khamr is totally 
prohibited 
Jurists attitude 
towards the 
substance 
Majority of jurists held 
that drugs do not carry 
total prohibition like al-
khamr. Only prohibited 
when it is fatal and 
intoxicant.  
Al-khamr is totally 
prohibited, including its 
trading, buying, selling, 
transporting and serving  
Degree of 
prohibition 
Muslim jurists disputed 
the cause of the 
prohibition of drugs. 
Some like Ibn Taimiyya 
argued that drugs are 
prohibited because of its 
intoxicant effect which 
made the prohibition total 
like al-khamr. Al-QarafÐ 
argued that some drugs 
like ÎashÐsh only carry 
the corruptive effects, 
and are not intoxicants.  
They unanimously 
agreed that the Ýilla of 
the prohibition is that it 
is an intoxicant. Some 
also added that another 
cause of the prohibition 
was because it is 
considered najas. Others 
associated the 
aggressive behaviour 
resulting from wine 
drinking with the thing 
that makes the drink 
prohibited 
The cause (Ýilla) of 
prohibition 
 
The status of purity of the 
narcotic drugs is 
disputed. The majority 
ruled that drugs or herbs 
are clean. However, Ibn 
Taimiyya ruled that it 
they are ritually unclean 
like al-khamr. 
Al-khamr  itself is 
considered as a 
religiously impure item, 
which cannot be taken to 
perform prayer 
The purity status of 
the item 
Muslim jurists were not 
in agreement over the 
punishment. 
 Ibn Taimiyya ruled that 
the sentence for drug 
consumption is Îadd 
punishment, while the 
others viewed that the 
The punishment for 
wine drinking is Îadd 
punishment, regardless 
of whether consumption 
leads to intoxication or 
not. The ÍanafÐs only 
confined the Îadd for 
wine drinker.   
The punishment 
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punishments should only 
be taÝzÐr or taÞdÐb. 
It differs according to 
different types of drugs 
and the persons. The 
negative consequences; 
losing appetite, losing 
mind and 
unconsciousness. The 
effects ; people getting 
high, happy, releasing 
from pressure, feeling 
energetic 
It causes people to lose 
their mind, and become 
intoxicated 
The effects on body 
and physiology 
No aggressive behaviour 
reported among drug 
users. However, drugs 
users were commonly 
found begging or stealing 
from others.  
Social effects: getting 
aggressive as a result of 
drunkenness, causing 
violence against others 
etc 
The effects on the 
surrounding 
environment  
Many jurists agreed that a 
person under influence of 
legal drug consumption is 
not responsible for all 
acts. However, the person 
is responsible for his 
actions if the drug taken 
was illegal.  
People are responsible 
for all acts done under 
influence of al-khamr as 
losing consciousness 
because of al-khamr is 
not considered as a valid 
excuse 
The effects of action 
of the person under 
influence of the 
substance 
Some jurists insisted that 
the same rule applies to 
drugs. The majority 
maintained that drugs can 
be consumed in small 
quantities especially for 
medical treatment, but 
they cannot be consumed 
for recreational purposes. 
Wine cannot be 
consumed regardless of 
the volume. Early 
ÍanafÐ authorities 
permitted drinking small 
amount of other than al-
khamr when it does not 
lead to intoxication 
The volume of 
permitted 
consumption 
The majority prohibited 
it. 
Totally forbidden The consumption of 
seeking for pleasure 
and joy 
The majority argued 
drugs can be used in this 
situation.  
The majority prohibited 
it in all ÃarÙra situations 
except to release 
someone from choking 
The consumption in 
ÃarÙra situation 
Majority agreed with the 
permissibility especially 
when there is no other 
lawful alternative. 
Majority of Muslim 
disagreed. Only ÍanafÐs 
permitted it. 
The consumption for 
medication. 
 
Although the basic rule for drugs was made from the analogy of al-khamr, 
the majority of jurists believed that drugs should not carry a total 
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prohibition like al-khamr548. While al-khamr is prohibited due to its 
intoxicant element and its impure status, drugs are only prohibited because 
of the intoxicant element. This meant that the drugs are not technically 
impure, unlike al-khamr. The impure status of al-khamr is deduced 
explicitly from the nuÒÙÒ549 which made the prohibition of al-khamr total, 
absolute and undoubted. The prohibition covers all kind of consumption 
regardless of the quantity of the wine consumed and it is considered impure 
like pigs and dogs. However, drugs are only prohibited because of its 
intoxicant effect, when they act like poison, causing serious harm to one’s 
body, and impairing one's judgment. Most importantly, drugs are prohibited 
as they can easily lead to addiction.  
As compared to wine, the Muslim jurists’ attitudes towards the consumption 
of drug were less definite550. Unlike wine, where the characteristic of 
unlawfulness is divinely established, many argue that the dispute regarding 
narcotic consumption is mainly due to the non-existence of an authoritative 
text. The medieval jurists, especially the ÍanafÐs, had a lenient view 
towards some narcotic drugs such as ÎashÐsh. For instance, a ÍanafÐ judge, 
JamÁl al-DÐn al-MalaÔÐ (d. 803/1400) permitted the use of ÎashÐsh 551.  
However, later authorities, such as al-MuzanÐ and al-TaÎawÐ552, started to 
outlaw narcotic drugs. In the book of “risÁla Îurmat al-banj”, the writer 
argued that nobody after the time of al-MuzanÐ and al-TaÎawÐ ever said that 
banj and ÎashÐsh were permitted, especially when they are consumed for the 
purpose of becoming intoxicants and for amusement.  
The sternest attitude towards narcotic especially towards ÎashÐsh was 
upheld by Ibn Taymiyya, affirming that the narcotic drugs carry the same 
prohibition as wine.  He firmly asserted that the total analogy applies553. 
This also means that narcotic drugs like ÎashÐsh are prohibited whether the 
consumption leads to intoxication or not. The users have to repent and Ibn 
Taymiyya went further by condemning the people who disagree with this 
rule and regarding them as non-believers (kÁfir). If they do not repent before 
                                                 
548 This is the accepted view nowadays. 
549 Q5.90: Q12.36,41:Q2.219: Q5.91 and Q47.15 
550 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, pp. 100-103.  
551 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 104 
552 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p.113 
553 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-FatÁwÁ al-kubrÁ, vol. III, p. 424 
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death, the prayer will not be performed over them and they will not be 
buried in a Muslim graveyard. However, Ibn Taimiyya limited the strict 
prohibition only to ÎashÐsh but not to other drugs such as banj (hemp). 
According to him, banj is not an intoxicant, and therefore, it is lawful. It can 
be argued that the relentlessly negative view of Ibn Taymiyya is not 
generally applied to all drugs. It is only limited to what intoxicates and is 
harmful. According to Ibn Taymiyya, other harmless and useful drugs can 
be consumed.  
Other illegal drugs were also known among the jurists as mukhaddir554.  
Although the majority of jurists agreed that the prohibition of mukhaddir is 
similar to that relating to ÎashÐsh due to its intoxicant effect, they insisted 
that the analogy of wine cannot be applied here entirely. The basis of the 
prohibition of mukhaddir is the ÎadÐth saying that every intoxicant is 
prohibited, which means every intoxicant regardless of whether the name is 
ÎarÁm. On the basis of this saying, every substance that intoxicates is 
unlawful. However, if intoxication is the fundamental characteristic leading 
to the prohibition of a substance, several questions must be answered. One 
of the questions raised by Rosenthal was whether intoxication when listed 
as a cause of the ruling was to be understood as potentially intoxicating or 
refers to the actual condition of intoxication. However, this question was 
left unanswered by the jurists. Some jurists like al-QarÁfÐ (d. 1285/684) and 
al-ZarkashÐ made remarkable efforts to distinguish the characteristics of 
drugs and wine. Al-QarÁfÐ, for instance, claimed that ÎashÐsh is only 
classified as mufsid (corruptive), and it is not an intoxicant. According to 
him, this drug is less harmful than wine. He categorised the effects of drugs 
and wine into several different effects555. Firstly; muftir is the effect of 
laziness. Secondly, ighmÁÞ is unconsciousness that makes the person lose 
his ability to move or to think. Fourthly, murqid is losing one’s mind and 
movement or the state of losing the five senses. Fifthly, mufsid is whatever 
befuddles the intellect without primarily generating joy. According to him, 
wine makes someone lose his mind and at the same time generates nashwa, 
                                                 
554 al-ÑuyÙÔÐ, al-Tibb al-NabawÐ, p. 33. All substances regarded as mukhaddirÁt and 
mufattirÁt are prohibited. 
555 WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, Al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, vol. XI, 
p.33 
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joy. Analysing these effects, he reached the conclusion that ÎashÐsh is not 
totally similar to wine. Some jurists like al-QarÁfÐ also claimed that drugs 
are not similar to wine. While wine drinkers were commonly associated 
with aggressive behaviour against others, the drug users were found having 
a totally different attitude. Heavy wine drinkers can easily become violent 
towards others and cause chaos. These effects made the wine more harmful 
than drugs. On this basis, the jurists reached the conclusion that ÎasÎÐsh is 
less harmful than wine.  
However, some jurists like Ibn Taymiyya disagreed with the above claim. 
They argued that like wine, ÎasÎÐsh should be banned as it carries a similar 
negative effect. The intoxicating effects of ÎasÎÐsh as highlighted by al-
ZarkashÐ (d. 1392/794) are; someone whose orderly speech is confused, 
who spills his hidden secrets, or someone who does not know heaven from 
earth556.  He also added that both wine and ÎasÎÐsh are something desired by 
humans. Modern Muslim jurists also agreed that it is not only the issue of 
intoxication that should be taken into consideration.  The harm a drug 
causes and most importantly the effects of self-destruction are also relevant. 
The preservation of mental health is an imperative. Drug related problem 
not only concerns the transgression of the law, the addict is mainly held 
responsible for the effects he causes by consuming drugs. This position is 
largely accepted by the modern jurists. However, although they agreed with 
the prohibition, they only limited the prohibition to what intoxicates and 
prohibit the consumption for non-necessity cases. 
Some scholars provided a more clear-cut legal decision with respect to the 
drug and wine cases. Below is the discussion pertaining to the distinctions 
between drug and al-khamr made by the jurists: 
The punishment:  All Sunni jurists were in agreement that the consumption 
of wine regardless of the quantity consumed subjects the drinker to Îadd 
punishment. Conversely, they disputed whether the consumption of drugs 
will also lead to the same sentence. Ibn Taymiyya insisted that narcotic 
drugs like ÎashÐsh carry the same prohibition as wine557. The sentence is 
                                                 
556 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p.107 
557 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-FatÁwÁ al-kubrÁ, Vol. III, pp. 419-424 
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either being whipped by 40 or 80 lashes. |However, he held that banj 
consumption does not carry the same punishment as it is not intoxicating; it 
only leads the person to receive taÝzÐr (a punishment decided by the ruler). 
Al-QarafÐ, on the other hand, disagreed with the Îadd punishment for 
ÎashÐsh users, as he argued that ÎashÐsh is not an intoxicant, unlike wine558. 
He agreed with the ShÁfiÝÐs that the illegal consumption of narcotics such as 
ÎashÐsh and opium should only be punished by taÝzÐr or (some said) by 
taÝdÐb (punishment by teaching moral values). Some other ShafiÝÐs, however, 
reaffirmed the view of Ibn Taymiyya’s ruling that the Îadd punishment 
should be the sentence for drug users. Those who agreed with Îadd 
punishment also classified drugs as religiously unclean items like al-khamr.  
The majority of jurists did not agree with this strict view, however. It is also 
important to highlight that the consumption of mukhaddar (narcotic drug) 
for legal reasons such as medication will not subject the person to any form 
of punishment, either Îadd or ÔaÝzÐr, even if the consumption leads to 
intoxication559.  
 
The effect of actions of person under influence of al-khamr. The majority of 
scholars held that the person under the influence of wine is responsible for 
all his actions, as losing consciousness from wine drinking is not considered 
a valid excuse (to lift a punishment). For instance, a person stealing under 
the influence of wine is subjected to Îadd punishment and his hand will be 
cut off. Conversely, the majority of Muslim jurists held that the person 
under the influence of legal drugs is not responsible for his acts560. 
However, the jurists were not in agreement regarding the consequence of 
actions performed by a person under influence of illegal drug. The ÍanafÐs 
held that if the consumption of opium was for pleasure and joy (lahw), the 
actions are taken seriously and legally binding such as in buying and selling. 
However, the self-confession of a person under the influence of illegal 
drugs for ÎuÃÙd cases is rejected. 
 
                                                 
558 Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 110. See also al-
FatÁwa al-Hindiyya, vol. II, p. 160 
559 WizÁra al-AwqÁf wa ShuÝÙn al-IslÁmiyya bi Þl-Kuwait, Al-MausÙÝa al-fiqhiyya, vol. XI, 
p. 38 
560  MausÙÝa Fiqhiyya, vol. XI, p. 37 
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 Some ÍanafÐs also held that the divorce statement made by an unconscious 
person due to medical treatment by using opium or banj is valid. The 
MÁlikÐs also held the same view. They argued that a person under the 
influence of an illegal drug is accountable for any pronouncement of 
divorce or Ýitq (setting slaves free) and he will be rendered fully responsible 
for any ÎudÙd or property related crime. However, his transaction, marital 
solemnisation and self-confession are not counted.  The ShafiÝÐs also ruled 
that all business pronouncements made by a person under the influence of 
illegal substances are valid, as the consumption is regarded as a sin 
(maÝsiyya). However, the ÍanbalÐs regarded the state of a person consuming 
banj even for an invalid reason as similar to an insane person, which means 
the divorce would not be effective. However, Ibn Taymiyya disagreed with 
this position stating that the divorce is valid. Modern jurists generally 
agreed with the majority of medieval scholars on this point, that the 
unconsciousness caused by illegal drug use would make the user 
responsible for all his actions. To sum up, the majority of jurists held that 
the consequences of action of a person under influence of illegal drugs are 
similar to those for the person under influence of wine. Losing one’s mind 
due to illegal substance use is not accepted as a valid excuse in transactions, 
marriage or other contracts. The jurists held that the state of 
unconsciousness here is different from one that is caused by a  natural cause 
such as insanity. These later cases impede a person from being a mukallaf 
who is obliged to fulfil his religious obligations. 
 
The questions of the amount of narcotic drugs that can be taken.  
Some jurists, including Ibn Taymiyya, who had a strict view regarding 
illegal drugs, contended that illegal substances cannot be taken as medicine 
as the prohibition is total, similar to wine. This also means any consumption 
of a drug like ÎashÐsh is forbidden like al-khamr. Al-NawawÐ, on the other 
hand, held that ÎashÐsh being a plant is a clean item, and using a little 
ÎashÐsh, which does not cause intoxication, is acceptable. However, this 
position was criticised by al-ZarkashÐ who ruled that any use of illegal drugs 
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whatsoever is prohibited561. Al-QarÁfÐ reaffirmed the position of al-NawawÐ 
when he considered the consumption of a small quantity of ÎashÐsh.  Unlike 
al-NawawÐ, who contended that hashÐsh is intoxicating, al-QarafÐ only 
classified ÎashÐsh as merely corruptive, hence, it is not intoxicating. He also 
permitted the use of opium, banj and saykaran if the amount used is not of 
such quantity that it exercises an influence upon the mind and the senses. It 
can be said that the jurists who permitted the consumption of a little amount 
of ÎashÐsh allowed it due to the argument that the prohibition is only for the 
amount that leads to intoxification. Therefore, it was lawful to use it if one 
was not intoxicated. This means, they forbade the substance by judging the 
end result. Conversely, those who held that ÎashÐsh is prohibited disregard 
the amount used, and prohibited it because it is not a necessity making a 
similar analogy to a wine case. 
The most important issue here concerns the use of narcotic drugs for 
medical reasons, and whether this is lawful and permitted in Islam. Some 
jurists, like the writer of the risÁla fi Îurmat al-banj, did not legalise the 
consumption of drug for medical reasons562. For them, drugs, like wine, 
cannot be consumed for any reason, including medication. However, the 
other jurists who compromised, and allowed the use of small amounts of 
drug, and those who claimed ÎashÐsh was not similar to al-khamr, permitted 
the consumption of drugs for medical reasons. This is the popular view of 
the ÍanafÐs563. Their position in permitting the consumption of banj or 
ÎashÐsh is not unexpected, as the early ÍanafÐs acknowledged the 
consumption of intoxicant drinks other than wine for medical reasons. The  
ÍanafÐs further ruled that if one loses one’s mind because of the use of banj 
and opium for medication, he is not held responsible for his actions564. They 
also ruled that the use of banj is permitted for medication purposes unless it 
leads to mental disturbance.  
A ShÁfiÝÐ jurist, al-MarwarrÙdhÐ (d. 462/1069) and al-ZarkashÐ were also 
reported to have held the same opinion regarding banj and opium. Al-
                                                 
561 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 111 
562 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society , p. 114 
563 Such as al-BazzÁzÐ and KhwÁharzadeh, see Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus 
medieval Muslim Society, p. 113.  
564 al-BukhÁrÐ, Kashf Al-AsrÁr,  vol. IV, p. 351 
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ZarkashÐ further argued that these substances can be used for medical 
purposes if the effectiveness is proven and well-established. The 
consumption was also permitted by al-ZarkashÐ to alleviate pangs of 
hunger565. Unlike other ShÁfiÝis’ view, he believed that ÎashÐsh does not 
cause more hunger, unlike wine which leads to thirst. According to him, 
hashÐsh has a significant potential benefit namely, its anaesthetising abilities 
during, for instance, the amputation of a gangrenous hand566.  The important 
conclusion reached by al-ZarkashÐ with respect to the circumstances under 
which the use of ÎashÐsh could be considered lawful, are five; firstly, when 
it is consumed in a small quantity; secondly if the user is immune to the 
intoxicating effect of ÎashÐsh; thirdly, if it is consumed for medical 
purposes; fourthly, if it is used to produce anaesthesia in connection with an 
amputation; and finally, if it is consumed to relieve a great hunger. Al-
Zarkashi’s position in this matter can be seen as crucial with regard to the 
Harm Reduction Programme. 
Other ShafiÝÐ jurists also reaffirmed the position of al-ZarkashÐ.  Al-
RuyanÐ567, for instance, permitted drug consumption for medical reasons, 
even if the process led to intoxication. Although many jurists agreed with 
the permissibility of using narcotic drugs for medication purposes, they did 
not clearly indicate the type of diseases concerned. Only al-ZarkashÐ 
mentioned that drugs are lawful for anaesthetic purposes. He also made the 
point clear by stating that the consumption of narcotics is only for the 
necessity of preserving human’s life.  As drugs are permitted for medical 
reasons, the buying and selling of narcotic drugs are also considered lawful 
by the majority568.  
The disagreement between jurists regarding drugs is also found regarding 
the purity status of drugs. The later jurists agreed that due to its intoxicant 
                                                 
565 The text of ZarkashÐ's work can also be found in Rosenthal, p. 190 
566 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 115 and A. 
Rippin, “Al-ZarkashÐ, AbÙ ÝAbd AllÁh Badr al-DÐn MuÎammad b. BahÁdur”. 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Brill, 2010. Brill Online. 
EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed date 19th  January 2010 
http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-8945  
567 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society , pp. 115-118 
568 MausÙÝa Fiqhiyya, vol. XI, p. 36. According to ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikis,  buying and selling 
mukhaddar not for medication is ÎarÁm, while Íanafis only classified such a transaction as 
makrÙh (detestable) 
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character, ÎashÐsh is rendered impure, but to what extent is this plant 
impure? There are two different views; the first group of jurists regarded 
ÎashÐsh in its solid form as impure as this is the form used by common 
people to get intoxicated. The second group stated that ÎashÐsh was pure 
unless it was soaked with water. This water is rendered impure as it leads to 
intoxication.  
To sum up, although the preliminary experiments and works initiated by 
Muslim jurists did not construct a precise definition of narcotic drugs, and 
most importantly did not produce a definite ruling on drugs, drugs were 
actually understood well by Muslim jurists. Their understanding of these 
substances was not far from the modern jurists’ definition of a drug.  That 
is, any substance that alters normal bodily function is classed as a drug and 
drugs can be used for medicinal or leisure purposes. The form of illegal 
drugs nowadays include pills, liquids or parts of plants that people take to 
become intoxicated and can cause serious harm to the individual when 
consumed. 
It can be further suggested that the preliminary studies on drugs completed 
by the early jurists made the decision easier for contemporary jurists. 
Furthermore, with the advent of modern research on drugs, the modern 
jurists can make a more precise and persuasive decision pertaining to the 
legality of particular drugs. Modern scientific research can provide more 
accurate information on the effects of illegal drugs. The modern jurists 
reaffirmed the position of the classical jurists by stating that the prohibition 
of illegal drug is made based on the analogy of al-khamr. Drug production, 
distribution and trading are thus forbidden. Some modern jurists, for 
instance, the Egyptian Board of Fatwa, have accepted the strict view of Ibn 
Taymiyya569. This board states that drugs are illegal and forbidden unless in 
the case of necessity. That means the consumption must meet all 
preconditions of necessity. First, the medicine should be prescribed by a 
trusted experienced and a God-fearing Muslim doctor and the second 
condition is that there should be no alternative except drugs. The committee 
has also added that the purpose of taking an unlawful drug for medication 
                                                 
569 Jumhuriya MiÒr al-ÞArabiyya, WizÁra al-AwqÁf, al-FatÁwÁ al-IslamiyyÁ min DÁr al-IftÁÞ 
al-MiÒrÐya, Vol. X, p. 3518.  
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can only be due to the necessity to protect life. In this regard, the committee 
supports the position of Ibn Íajar al-HaitamÐ, who insisted the consumption 
must be limited to what can save life.  
Examining the medieval Muslim jurists’ view regarding narcotic drugs, it 
appears that Muslim jurists were divided into three groups. The early Sunni 
jurists and Sufis maintained that narcotic drugs should be entirely permitted 
(al-ibÁÎa al-aÒliyya) despite some negative effects associated with the 
substance. There are several assumptions behind this lenient conclusion. 
Firstly, there was no authoritative text pertaining to drug consumption; 
secondly, there was the ignorance of early Muslim jurists about the plant; 
thirdly, drug abuse was rarely reported during that time; fourthly, the plants 
during that time were mainly consumed for medical purposes which were 
generally permitted; finally, the jurists themselves consumed the drugs on 
regular basis570.  This lenient attitude towards drugs, however, gradually 
changed when the abuse of narcotic drugs became widespread, and when 
ÎashÐsh in particular became a social problem within the Muslim 
community. This consumption was frequently associated with immoral 
behaviour such as homosexuality and wine drinking. As a result, the need to 
examine the real potency of the plant in order to clarify the precise ruling 
became the central focus of Muslim jurists living in the community 
corrupted with drug abuse. Some jurists, like al-QarÁfi and al-ZarkashÐ, 
understood the real potency of the plant. As a result, new legal rulings 
pertaining to narcotic drugs were reached. The majority of Muslim jurists 
agreed with the opinion of al-QarÁfi and al-ZarkashÐ that any substance 
which carries the effect of muskir and muftir should be banned.  
Some disagreement was indicated as to whether the full analogy of wine 
should apply. On this matter, only a small number of jurists held that the 
full analogy should apply. The hesitation of the rest to accept the full wine-
analogy can be assumed to be to due to several factors. The majority’s 
attitude towards narcotic drugs was mainly brought about by the prevalent 
perception that narcotic drugs were useful for medical purposes. If a 
                                                 
570 Some of these assumptions were indicated by Rosenthal in his book The Herb- Hashish 
versus medieval Muslim Society and Ibn al-Íajr al-HaitamÐ in his collection of fatÁwÁ,  al-
FatÁwÁ al-Fiqhiyya al-KubrÁ, 
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complete full analogy was accepted, that would mean that the ability of 
drugs to act as medicine was denied and forbidden. They also argued that 
the full wine analogy cannot be applied as each varies in producing effects 
on a human’s bodily functions. Historically, drugs were widely known to 
have medical benefits, and therefore, the rule is not similar to wine. Drugs 
are only prohibited when they are abused. Wine, on the other hand, is a 
different matter as wine production is mainly for drinking and leisure. The 
benefit of wine for medication was rarely reported. Most importantly, as the 
unlawful character of wine was divinely established leading to this 
unanimous undebated position among the jurists, the lack of divine 
prohibition on drugs makes it less harmful and more acceptable in the case 
of necessity.  
Is the prohibition of drugs limited only to ÎashÐsh? The consumption of 
drugs which is not for reasons of necessity should be made forbidden and 
this should not be limited to ÎashÐsh. The early jurists only explicitly 
prohibited ÎashÐsh because it was closely connected to its negative effects 
and immoral behaviour, relating to popular drugs consumed for recreational 
use. Meanwhile, other drugs were considered legal at that time, perhaps due 
to a low level of abuse or that the consumption was simply for medication. 
However, the legality of hemp, banj and opium established by the early 
jurists should not be read as a general permission to consume them illegally 
and not for reasons of necessity.  It should be limited to medical purposes. 
At that time, opium, banj, hemp and other narcotics drugs were commonly 
known for their effective medical benefits571. The raw material of drugs like 
opium and hemp is considered lawful as they are considered to be an 
ordinary plant. However, nowadays when drugs are cultivated and 
chemically processed for illegal consumption, they cease to be permissible 
and they should be banned as they definitely lead to addiction.  
                                                 
571 See Rosenthal The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 21, See Cyril 
Elgood, "Tibb – ul-nabbi or medicine of the Prophet" in Osiris, 1962, Vol. 14 , pp. 33-192. 
See also al-SuyÙÔÐ, al-Tibb al-NabawÐ, and n.a, “The history of opium, opium eating and 
smoking”, The Jurnal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1892, 
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though the Greeks were claimed discovering the opium, the Arabs were believed 
introducing the medical benefit of this plant. They made it known to Persia, subsequently to 
India and China. The opium is also known as afiyÙn in Arabic books of medicine. The 
history of opium was not known in India until the Arab influence. The Chinese works also 
reported that Arab traders exchanging poppies for Chinese merchandise.  
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However, narcotic drugs used for surgery or other medical purposes remain 
generally lawful. This is what al-ZarkashÐ recognised as the consumption of 
drugs used on the basis of necessity. According to al-ZarkashÐ, this medical 
consumption was in line with the rule of ÃarÙra. This also means that all the 
preconditions of ÃarÙra should be met. Strict regulations should apply for 
those who consume these drugs as they can prove fatal if an overdose is 
taken. This fact was already recognised by the classical jurists and 
reaffirmed by modern medical research.  
The other issue is whether or not the use of narcotic drugs is limited to what 
can save life, as was proposed by al-ZarkashÐ. What about non-necessity 
cases? In this matter, the drugs could be consumed for other non-necessity 
cases if the quantity is insignificant and if it does not lead to intoxication or 
serious harm. Al-ZarkashÐ himself recognised the use of drugs for 
medication if it was a better alternative than other medicine. However, the 
drugs can only be taken after obtaining an expert’s prescription. Modern 
scientific research held that certain drug medication can heal faster than 
non-drug medicine. In this matter, some jurists asserted that an insignificant 
amount of narcotics can be used for medical purposes when the lawful 
alternative is not as effective as the drugs. However, this case must be 
verified individually and the amount of drugs consumed should be judged 
according to the seriousness of the disease. 
However, the consumption of drugs for other purposes, especially for 
recreational use, ceases to be lawful regardless of the quantity of the drug 
consumed, as these drugs can be addictive and their consumption leads to 
many harmful effects. The harmful effects of illegal drugs use are not 
limited to the users but also to the community. Muslim jurists agreed that a 
Muslim is not allowed to place himself in a situation that impedes him from 
remembering God, where he can easily neglect his religious responsibilities 
such as prayer and fasting. Drug users who are under the influence of illegal 
drugs are not productive and they become a burden on society. The end 
result of wine drinking and illegal drug consumption is in this sense similar. 
Wine drinkers tend to be more aggressive towards others, and are 
responsible for increasing numbers of accidents, rape and physical assaults, 
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while illegal drug use increases unemployment and the number of burglary 
cases.  
With regard to the methadone programme, methadone is lawful if it is 
treated as medication on the basis of the above fiqh analysis. The rule of 
methadone is not similar to that for wine drinking. Methadone should be 
made lawful if it is a better alternative to improve the health and life of the 
drug users. However, the treatment must follow the preconditions of ÃarÙra. 
From the previous discussion on ÃarÙra cases in Chapters Three and Four, 
the case of methadone should meet certain conditions. 
 
Firstly, with regard to methadone treatment, there must be no other lawful 
substance that can be used as medicine and it must be proven effective for 
the patients. As previously stated the efficiency of methadone has been 
proven by a series of medical studies and reports. Local preliminary 
research572 conducted found that methadone is a safe and effective drug that 
can be used in the local Malaysian setting. 60% of respondents reported an 
overall improvement in their work performance or had gained employment 
and the retention rate was 75%.  This local study affirmed the results of 
previous studies, demonstrating the effectiveness of this substance. The 
consumption of methadone can eventually lead to abstinence from illegal 
street drugs such as heroin, and decreases high risk crime behaviour. It also 
improves work performance and relationship with carers. This report is also 
reaffirmed by the Malaysian General Auditor, who stated that the 
programme had reduced the number of illegal drug users significantly. At 
the same time, the employment rate among drug users has also increased. A 
higher quality of life of the drug users who underwent methadone treatment 
was also reported. Research indicates that methadone is a better alternative 
at the moment for drug users; hence, this has become the basis for the 
legality of the use of this drug. 
 
The other moral question that needs to be answered is whether we can 
eliminate harm by providing another harm, as there is a legal notion, lÁ 
                                                 
572 Jesjeet Sing Gill et al., “The First Methadone Program in Malaysia: overcoming 
obstacles and achieving the impossible”, ASEAN Journal of Psychiatry,  2007;8 (2),pp. 64-
70 
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Ãarar walÁ ÃirÁr. However, the case of drug addiction is unique. Drug 
addiction cannot be halted immediately, especially for hardcore users. As 
addiction is typically a chronic disease, people cannot simply stop using 
drugs for a few days and be cured. Most patients require long-term 
treatment or repeated episodes of care to achieve the ultimate goal of 
sustained abstinence and full recovery. On this basis, Ibn Íajar al-MakkÐ573 
permitted the consumption of illegal drugs for chronic drug users when it is 
believed that their life is in extreme danger without the drug. He gave 
permission for drug consumption based on the analogy of mayta to alleviate 
the pangs for a hunger. He argued that the need for this in the case of drug 
users is similar to the need for food in the case of famine. Thus, drug users 
can consume this drug in a limited fashion during the treatment period but 
the user has to gradually be made to be independent from the drug. 
However, he insisted that the permission to consume the drug should be 
limited to whatever can eliminate grievous harm and the situation must be 
verified by a trusted Muslim physician574. Therefore, if the methadone 
treatment is treated as a medicine during this treatment period, its 
consumption is legal, as this is a process to assist the drug users to help 
them with their addiction. 
 
The second ÃarÙra condition that should be met is that the methadone 
supplied must be limited to whatever can eliminate harm. In other words, 
methadone cannot be supplied more than at the level that is needed by the 
patient. The Malaysian Ministry of Health have ruled that the government 
and private clinics should follow a series of strict regulations for the 
methadone programme. However, some basic regulations are not fully 
observed by the clinics. The permission to use methadone ceases to be 
lawful (under the SharÐÝa), if the programme is not monitored carefully. The 
Auditor General’s Report for the year 2008575 also indicated that the 
methadone procedures were not fully observed by several government 
hospitals. For instance, methadone was reportedly being supplied to drug 
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users who only attended a week’s treatment. Another report stated that in 
some cases, methadone was supplied for more than the maximum allowed 
period. In most private clinics, where the dispensation of methadone is 
much less restricted, serious problems were detected. Unsupervised 
methadone treatment led to its abuse with drug users reportedly selling the 
drugs and mixing the legal drugs with illegal street drugs to get a ‘better’ 
result576. 
 
The table below indicates that several hospitals did not follow the 
government regulations pertaining to “take away” methadone, where a 
patient is only allowed to bring methadone home after completing four 
weeks treatment at the clinic. 
 
Table D: Total number of drug users allowed bringing methadone home 
before finishing the four week treatment 
 
 
Methadone Treatment Centre Period of treatment 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
Hospital Sultan Ahmad Shah, 
Pahang 
5 4 3 
Hospital Permai, Johor 2 - 1 
Hospital Bukit Mertajam, Penang - 1 3 
Total 7 5 7 
 
Although the cases are relatively low for the entire country, the cases must 
be treated seriously.  Failure to follow the strict regulation results not only 
violates the SharÐÝa principle, but it can result in great dangers for the patient 
and related people.    
 
As far as the principle of ÃarÙra is concerned, the ÃarÙra case should be 
verified individually as different people have different needs for the drug. 
This individual need for methadone can only be determined by trusted 
physicians or medical practitioners. In Malaysia, prior to giving a 
methadone prescription, the drug users undergo a strict health check. The 
drug is only dispensed after this process. The patients' progress will be 
monitored and he is required to attend certain appointments. During early 
treatment, methadone can only be taken in the presence of a medical officer 
                                                 
576 Newspaper report. See “Koktel Metadon”, Kosmo, 31st December 2006, pp. 1 and 3. 
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for several weeks, which will ensure that the drug is taken appropriately. 
However, the drug can only be taken home after four weeks of treatment. 
This procedure is designed  to ensure there is no violation during the 
methadone treatment.  
 
To sum up, examining the philosophy, the modus operandi, regulations and 
procedures of methadone treatment in Malaysia, it can be suggested that it is 
broadly in line with ÃarÙra rule. The blue prints of the programmes seem to 
fulfil all the conditions of necessity from a sharÝÐ perspective. It can be said 
that methadone is justified as a necessary alternative for opiate users. At the 
same time, methadone is dispensed only for those who are eligible and the 
amount dispensed is appropriate for each patient. However, the problems 
appear with the practice of methadone supply. Although some argue that the 
numbers of procedure violation cases are insignificant, serious efforts must 
be made to rectify the problem. As the problem is justified under necessity, 
any violation of the regulation not only makes the programme illegal from 
the perspective of the SharÐÝa but endangers patients as well. As the 
violation of the programme not only renders the patient a sinner in the eyes 
of God, according to Muslims, it also leads to serious harm of others (i.e the 
case of ingestion by minors). There is another fear that drug users will 
become addicted to methadone and mix the substance with other drugs. This 
abuse was reported in daily newspapers. The violation of methadone supply 
cannot be tolerated and it violates the principle of ÃarÙra.  Finally, it is 
important to note that the legality of this programme is temporary. The 
methadone supply should stop immediately once the patient becomes drug 
free. This requirement is stated in the maxim of ÃarÙra, al-ÃarÙra tuqaddar 
biqadriha (necessity estimated by the extent thereof).  
 
 
 
5.8  The Needle and Syringe Exchange Programme 
As HIV/AIDS cases in Malaysia have largely been driven by ongoing 
transmission from and among injecting drug users, the Needle and Syringe 
Exchange Programme has been introduced to control the spread. In 
Malaysia, the programme aims at minimising the transmission of HIV, 
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Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C and other blood borne viruses among IDUs, 
their sexual partners and children, and from them to the non-injecting 
community. It also has several additional objectives which are: to establish 
a framework for a comprehensive nationwide needle syringe exchange 
program (NESP), to promote safe retrieval and disposal of used and needles 
and syringes, to improve access to health and welfare services including 
drug treatment and rehabilitation, and finally, to facilitate awareness and 
education about IDU issues and blood borne viruses577. This programme is 
also vital to increase the opportunities for interaction between injecting drug 
users and health officers. This programme was initiated not only for the 
betterment of the hard-to-reach drug users, but it was also driven by a public 
health perspective. The prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS is more 
important than preventing any potential drug users from injecting.  
 
However, the Malaysian Ministry of Health has admitted that this NSEP 
programme would not be accepted by most Malaysian Muslims. As a result, 
the NSEP has been administered and operated by non-government 
organisations such as the Malaysian AIDS Council (MAC). The 
government health officers admitted that the government cannot be seen as 
an advocate of condom use as well as needle syringe distribution578. The 
usual response of a Muslim country for protection against HIV infection is a 
major focus on propagating abstention from illicit drugs and sexual practice. 
However, this conventional prevention is unable to reduce HIV infection. 
Most importantly,  two realities that must be admitted are: that the high risk 
behaviour is largely practised by IDUs and their total abstinence from drug 
use is almost impossible to achieve. At the same time, traditional drug 
treatment has not demonstrated high levels of client success. As a result, the 
government believes drastic measures must be taken, changing from a 
policy of propagating abstention, to the method of reducing the risk of 
addiction. High risk behaviour, such as sharing injecting paraphernalia and 
using illegal drugs, should be targeted in order to minimise the risk of HIV 
                                                 
577 See Ministry of Health Malaysia, Needle Syringe Exchange Program-Standard 
Operating Policy & Guidelines, Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2006, p. 9 
578 “Malaysia Health Ministry Cannot Promote Condom Use to Prevent Spread of HIV, 
Official Says”, Medical News Today.  www.medicalnewstoday.com They admit that the 
HRP must be done carefully due to the fact that Malaysia is a Muslim Country. 24th May 
2007 
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transmission and deaths from drug overdoses. Most importantly, the spread 
of HIV to the public can be controlled. This programme received a positive 
response in Muslim countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence such as 
Uganda and Senegal. The Muslim scholars in Uganda and Indonesia,579 for 
instance, reported that the HRP can be used as a short term measure. They 
argued that the sanctity of life is greater than the sin of condom use and 
needles and syringes, and it is permissible under the state of emergency. 
Conversely, in Muslim countries with a low incidence and prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, religious leaders believed that the syringes programme implied 
approval and promotion of drug use. Many have agreed that in order to 
ensure this programme is successful, collaboration with religious scholars 
and leaders is a key element. In Malaysia, the Muslims are still divided on 
this issue. This research, therefore, also aims to inform the Malaysian 
Muslim community about the HIV/AIDS reality. Most importantly it aims 
to achieve a better understanding in the collaboration to determine the best 
possible program for the local setting in order to achieve a drug and 
HIV/AIDS free country target.  
 
5.8.1 Modus operandi of the programme 
The NSEP is funded by the Government of Malaysia and coordinated 
through multi-corporation approaches. During 2006-2008, the government 
allocated RM10.91 million just for this programme580. The argument that 
has always been used to justify the NSEP is that the cost of distribution is 
far cheaper than the cost of HIV/AIDS treatment. It is also argued that the 
savings to the health care system in reducing treatment costs for HIV is 
more than 20 times the cost of running the NSEP581. In 2007, the 
government allocated RM14.4 million for methadone replacement therapy 
and RM7 million for the needle exchange programme582.  
 
                                                 
579 Memoona Hasnain, “Cultural Approach to HIV/AIDS Harm Reduction in Muslim 
Countries”, Harm Reduction Journal 2005, 2:23. Published on 27th  October 2005. 
www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/2/1/23  
580 See Ketua Audit Negara,  Laporan Ketua Audit Negara 2008, p. 267 
581 See “NSP: needle and syringe programs: 2005- your questions answered”. 
www.mac.org.my 15th June 2007 
582 Hamidah Atan, “Malaysia set to meet UN targets on HIV/AIDS”, The News Straits 
Times, Tuesday, 2nd October 2007 
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This programme operates in two ways, firstly, through the distribution of 
clean syringes and secondly, with the disposal of used needles and syringes. 
The package distributed includes sterile needles, syringes, and other 
injecting equipment such as alcohol swabs583. The material is issued on the 
basis of the frequency of use. From the start, equipment for four days will 
be provided in a pack based on assessed average needs, which indicate that 
most users inject 4-5 times each day584. The packs will be routinely 
provided and the clients are encouraged to take additional needles and 
syringes as required. Educational materials and a booklet directory of 
services are also provided. The educational materials, including information 
on safe handling and disposal of needles and syringes, safer injecting 
practices, vein and wound care, safer sex, drug overdose and 'needles stick' 
injuries are also provided in the sites. 
 
The programme also emphasises the return of used needles and syringes by 
the IDUs, which means the programme is not merely a distribution of the 
clean injecting kit but importantly it is also an exchange programme. The 
patients are encouraged to return the used needles and syringes in order to 
ensure the kits will be disposed of safely. Among the mechanisms used to 
increase the return rates include the emphasis on return by the outreach 
workers, teaching IDUs to return the used needles, providing disposal units, 
cleaning of  disposal unit by the outreach workers and monitoring activities 
to collect information on what clients do with used needles. The staff are 
also required to follow a list of strict regulations in handling the used 
needles and syringes, which mainly aims to prevent the risk of being 
infected by possible blood borne viruses585.  
 
In May 2007, a report by the Malaysian AIDS Council revealed several 
outcomes of the programme. The report highlighted that the IDUs’ 
behaviour changed significantly and their knowledge about blood borne 
virus increased. The return rate increased from 57.9% in 2006 t0 63.6% in 
                                                 
583 Among standard services offered in the sites are safe disposal unit, printed health 
information and condoms and counselling service.  
584 This starter pack contains 4 needles, 4 syringes, 16 alcohol swabs, 1 cotton role and 1 
bottle of iodine.  
585 See Ministry of Health Malaysia, Needle Syringe Exchange Program-Standard 
Operating Policy & Guidelines, 2006, pp. 16-17 
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2008586. Although the feedback given by IDUs indicates that their 
knowledge about health and their self-confidence increase, about 58.9% of 
the respondents admitted that they never attended any counselling or 
education programme.   
 
5.8.2 Is the Malaysian Needles and Syringes Exchange in compliance with 
the ÃarÙra rule?  
 
It is not an easy task to assess whether the Malaysian Needle and Syringe 
Programme is justified under the rule of necessity. The assessment includes 
the careful examination of the details of the programme including its 
philosophy, its objective, modus operandi and the final results. All these 
elements of the programme have to meet the preconditions of ÃarÙra.  
 
The philosophy and aims of the NSEP: The philosophy of this programme 
is already questioned by Malaysian Muslims authorities and NGOs587. They 
accused the programme as an effort to legalise illicit drug use and further 
promote sinful acts. Some religious councils and state Muftis588, however, 
have showed a positive attitude towards this programme on the condition 
that this programme should be monitored and controlled thoroughly.  
Although the religious authorities did not provide clear arguments for their 
support, this NSEP should be supported by the rest of Malaysian Muslims 
on several bases:  
1) The distribution of the clean injecting kits to drug addicts is part of a 
controlled and monitored programme. The distribution is limited to 
addicted drugs users, which means non-IDUs do not have access to 
this supply. Thus, this programme cannot be labelled as condoning 
immoral behaviour as it only targets the high risk group that is the 
IDUs. However, the programme could be described as condoning 
and promoting immoral behaviour if the distribution included non-
                                                 
586 See Ketua Audit Negara,  Laporan Ketua Audit Negara 2008, p. 267 
587 See Mahmood Nazar Mohamed, Harm Reduction Program and strategies in Malaysia: 
To what extent it is successful? (power point presentation). A Perak State Mufti has issued 
a statement regarding the needle syringe program,  29th July 2005  
588 Among supporters of this program include The former Minister of religious affair, 
Datuk Dr. Abdullah Muhammad Zain, The Perak State Mufti, Datuk Seri Harussani 
Zakaria, and the Former Chairman of the National Board of Fatwa, Dato’ Dr. Ismail 
Ibrahim 
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IDUs, such as schoolchildren and non-addicted persons. The staff 
are also trained to deal with any possibilities regarding abuse of the 
equipment by the drug users. For instance, drug users are not 
allowed to sell the kits and any extra demands for the kits are 
carefully handled. 
2) The programme can be justified under the maxim of choosing a 
lesser harm (akhaf al-Ãarar). It is apparent that the drug addicts are 
most likely to be infected by blood borne viruses through sharing the 
injecting materials. The drug addicts normally find it hard to stay 
away from drugs because of the powerful cravings they feel and it is 
very hard for them to break the vicious cycle of addiction. As a 
result, they continue injecting drugs despite knowing the high risks 
associated with the behaviour.  These people who are addicted will 
find themselves doing things they would never have contemplated 
before. They become desperate for drugs and are even willing to 
share the injection paraphernalia with other drug users. This leads to 
the risk of contracting and spreading HIV/AIDS to others. 
Recognising the possible harmful behaviour of drug addicts, the 
NSEP aims to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS infection by distributing 
clean syringes. The permissibility of this programme can be derived 
from the analogy of the permission to masturbate for those who have 
insufficient provision to get married. The original rule is that 
masturbation is prohibited. However, if a person finds it is difficult 
to control his sexual urges and is not able to get married, he is 
permitted to masturbate. Both cases (NSEP and masturbation) which 
are usually rendered forbidden become permissible on the basis of 
necessity to remove the greater harm. However, it is important to 
highlight that not all prohibition can be allowed under this analogy. 
For instance, a strong urge for sexual desire does not permit a man 
to commit unlawful intercourse or rape. In other words, a strong 
sexual need is not a valid excuse for a person to force someone else 
to have sex. Similarly, a woman is not allowed to become a 
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prostitute even when she is in a dire need of food. In such a case, 
mayta or another unlawful meal is better for her589.  
3) Prolonging drug use impairs the body’s ability to produce certain 
chemicals. Subsequently, the body perceives that it needs the drug to 
function and demands drugs through physical cravings. The need for 
the drug becomes overpowering and the addict’s behaviour becomes 
increasingly compulsive590. The physical and psychological drugs 
cravings are very powerful and many have agreed as the drug 
addiction is like a complex illness, there is no single treatment 
appropriate for everyone. Ibn Íajar al-MakkÐ has permitted the 
consumption of a small amount of drugs for hardcore drug users 
who fear destruction591. He argued that the need for drugs is similar 
to the need for food. Hence, it can be suggested that during the 
treatment process, the IDUs can be supplied with clean injecting 
materials to help them control the cravings and at the same time 
reduce the risk of infection. The NSEP can be regarded as a case of 
necessity when the distribution is limited to the target group and to a 
specific time. Similarly, the condom supply can be distributed only 
to married drug users. 
4) Most importantly, the harm to the public health (HIV/AIDS 
transmission) is greater than the harm from drug injection. HIV 
transmission from and among drug users are highly likely to be 
through sharing infected needles and subsequently passing the 
disease to innocent peoples such as partners and unborn children. 
The high risk behaviour among IDUs therefore puts public health at 
risk. Hence, this drastic measure (the NSEP) is justified by the 
ÃarÙra principle to protect the sanctity of human life. The needles 
and condoms are distributed not only to minimise the risk among 
drug users but also the rest of the community. The dangers include 
the possibility of death from a drug overdose and the danger of drug 
                                                 
589 In  Chapter Two, we have discussed the permission to steal for a hunger Muslim when 
there is no fear of the punishment.  However, when there is a risk of his hand getting 
chopped, it is better for him to eat mayta.  
590 William McCall, “Brain Build Up Causes Addiction” in 
http://biopsychiatry.com/cocaine/index.htm 
591 It can be assumed here, the permission is given to a craved drug user who is seriously 
ill. It can be assumed  that what Ibn Íajar meant by 'destruction' is the pain of  cravings. 
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dependency. As the IDUs are regarded as a hard-to-reach-group, this 
programme also aims to maintain a good relationship with this target 
group, to educate them in order to eliminate high risk behaviour and 
achieve the end result that is the total abstinence from drugs. The 
gradual process of altering drug behaviour is an important element 
to help the patients become drug independent. As compared to the 
conventional drug rehabilitation programme, many patients returned 
to the previous drug habit as there was no sufficient support from the 
public and the government. The HRP policy, on the other hand, 
maintains that continuous communication and good relations 
between staff and drug users are vital, not only to show empathy but 
also to assist them in creating a better life. On this basis, the 
philosophy of the HRP in general and NSEP in particular meets not 
only the ÃarÙra condition, but the maÒlaÎa of the public (the public 
interest).   
 
It has been suggested that the aims and the philosophy of the Malaysian 
NSEP are in compliance with the principles of ÃarÙra on the basis of the 
necessity to protect public health. However, there are several ambiguities 
that might impair the legality of this programme, particularly regarding the 
modus operandi of the programme and the possibilities of abuse of the 
material provided. The jurists  held that the necessity rule can only operate 
over a limited period, which means that the HRP programme is lawful only 
as a short term measure. Regarding NSEP, there is no indication whether 
the needles and syringes are distributed for a limited period or for an 
unlimited time. Also, this programme does not limit the amount of clean 
syringe needle packages distributed to the drug users, extra packages are 
also available for those who need them. One question this raises is for how 
long can public money be spent on a drug addict’s expenses? It is important 
to highlight that the distribution of the clean injecting kits on the basis of 
necessity is not an unlimited permission like the permission to eat mayta or 
praying during battle. The rules granted are specified only during the ÃarÙra 
period. The ÃarÙra period can be defined either as long as the cause of 
ÃarÙra exists or until the harm is removed. Harm reduction strategies such 
as the distribution of syringes and needles or methadone treatment are 
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allowed to operate on an emergency basis, which means to help reduce the 
drug cravings and improve the quality of health of the IDUs on a short term 
basis. 
 
The ÃarÙra period differs from one patient to another and therefore, as 
rehabilitation takes time, the process of treatment differs with each patient. 
A patient with a long history of drug addiction takes a longer time to be 
treated that a new drug user. Similarly, a patient who takes the substance on 
regular basis differs from a person who consumes drugs sparingly. The 
ability to control drug addiction depends on many factors. The needles and 
syringes can be supplied for those who are still unable to control their 
addiction. Their health record will be scrutinised by the HRP staff which 
means their demands for needles and syringes are controlled.  
 
There are also concerns about the possibilities of the needles and syringes 
provided being abused. Abuse includes sharing the needles syringes or 
reselling them to make a profit. The NSEP does not operate in the same way 
as the methadone programme as the methadone is taken in front of the 
medical officer. As a result, the abuse is less likely to occur. The injecting 
activity, on the other hand, is not observed by a staff member and therefore, 
the possibility of abuse of the provided syringes in NSEP is greater than in 
the methadone programme. Some former drug users admitted that they 
shared the needles and syringes given by the Ministry of Health. At the 
same time, the free distribution is described by former drug users as an open 
invitation for them to return to their  behaviour592. However, this minor 
factor does not totally impair the legality of the needle and syringe 
programme. This is because the drug users themselves have the 
responsibilities to adhere to the regulations and procedures. 
 
 
5.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia is 
justified under the rule of ÃarÙra. From the above discussion, it is apparent 
                                                 
592 Many former drug users were reported against this idea. Roslan Yunus, 50 and Zulkifli 
Abdullah, 40 were among them. See Mingguan Wasilah, 23/9/2007 
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that HIV/AIDS poses a serious threat to Malaysia with the alarming number 
of cases reported each year. The HRP that has been implemented in other 
countries is seen as the last resort for Malaysia to reduce the case of 
HIV/AIDS transmission among drug users. The HRP mainly aims to control 
the harm associated with the behaviour rather than eliminating the negative 
behaviour and it did not require commitment to an abstinence goal. This 
philosophy generally contradicts the Islamic conservative approach, in 
which negative behaviours are solved by abstinence. On this basis, many 
argue that this programme is alien to Islamic tradition, as it does not aim to 
stop the addiction immediately. However, it is imperative to highlight that 
the gradual process in behaviour changing was actually adopted in the 
period of the Prophet in the case of the gradual prohibition of an intoxicant 
(al-khamr). The Muslims during the Prophet’s time used to consume al-
khamr on regular basis. It was impossible for people who addicted to 
drinking to simply stop overnight, hence, the prohibition was made 
gradually. The first generation was permitted to come off drinking slowly. 
As a result, the people only consumed the intoxicant sparingly and not on a 
regular basis and when the people were ready, the total prohibition of al-
khamr was finally made.  This is similar to the case of drug addiction; many 
recognise the fact that it is hard for a drug user to stop addiction 
immediately, a gradual treatment is preferable. The analysis of classical 
discussions on drugs demonstrates that many jurists agreed that this 
addiction should be treated carefully. For instance,  Ibn Íajar al-MakkÐ 
argued that the consumption of drugs should be permitted during the 
treatment period. Thus, by extending his view, methadone can be treated as 
a medicine because of necessity. In addition, al-ZarkashÐ also held that 
drugs are permitted in the case of necessity. On the basis of these two 
arguments, harm reduction can be proposed as a necessity measure to 
control the spread of HIV/AIDS (which constitutes a grave danger under the 
rules of ÃarÙra) and to protect the greater interest of society and the drug 
users. 
 
Having examined the Malaysian Harm Reduction Programme, it is 
recognised that it is the best method at the moment to tackle drug addiction 
and control HIV/AIDS spread. The HRP operates not only for the best 
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interest of the drug users but most importantly, for the best interest of the 
public. As drug addiction poses a threat to public health by increasing the 
number of unemployed, increasing crime and spreading a deadly disease, 
drastic measures via HRP need to be taken into consideration when other 
means have failed. The threat to public health is greater than the harm of 
injecting drugs.  
 
Currently, the HRP implemented in Malaysia has proven successful, as 
shown by the decline in the HIV/AIDS cases reported from 2005-2007. 
 
Table E: Total Number of HIV Cases reported in Malaysia from 2005-2006 
Year HIV Infection AIDS cases AIDS death 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
2005 5383 737 6120 1044 177 1221 882 102 984
2006 4955 875 5830 1620 222 1842 896 80 976
2007 3804 745 4549 937 193 1130 1048 131 1179
Total 74104 6834 80938 12197 1438 13635 9487 847 10334
 
The table above proves that the HRP implemented is a successful short-term 
measure to control HIV/AIDS cases. Although the HRP only aims to 
eliminate harm associated with drug abuse, total abstinence from drugs is 
still possible to achieve. For instance, the methadone treatment can 
eventually lead to abstinence from heroin and reduce high risk behaviour 
and crime. In addition, many of the patients reported an overall 
improvement in their work or had gained employment. This is a striking 
result when compared to their past disruptive and disorganised nature of 
lifestyle they lead.  
 
However, the Malaysian Harm Reduction Programme needs to be 
continuously monitored and the strict regulations must be met. The success 
of this programme also depends on the patients themselves. As the key 
players in this programme, the clients have the responsibility to ensure that 
they do not violate the principle of necessity. The Muslim clients 
themselves are totally responsible for complying with the ÃarÙra conditions, 
i.e. not to abuse the distribution of syringes by sharing them with other 
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IDUs and to use the materials responsibly. The awareness of the patients 
can be developed through counselling sessions and meetings with the staff 
and this will help reduce any possible abuse.  As the drugs users are 
considered to be the-hard-to-reach-group, this HRP opens a positive space 
for them to interact with the staff, get the help needed and most importantly 
for them to get help to stop the addiction.  
 
Collaboration between the government and religious leaders and groups is 
also important to ensure the success of this programme. As the religious 
leaders occupy a critical position and role in the Malaysian community, 
their response and support for this programme are deemed crucial to gain 
public support. It is vital to educate Muslims that this programme does not 
promote immoral behaviour and it is important to be cognizant with the 
reality. As HIV/AIDS has become a national concern it is indeed a case of 
necessity. Serious efforts from every corner of the society are needed. 
Although the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Malaysia is not as serious as in 
many African countries, this is the best time for Muslim leaders to act. Let 
us not wait until the Friday sermons in Malaysia start to focus on HIV/AIDS 
every week like in Uganda and Senegal!  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This research mainly aimed to examine the principle of ÃarÙra in Islamic 
law and to study the possibility of its application to justify the Harm 
Reduction Programme in Malaysia. From the foregoing discussions, it is 
apparent that the principle of ÃarÙra had been applied by Sunni jurists in a 
state of emergency in order to put aside an established order to protect one 
or more of five necessities. These preserved necessities are life, religion, 
reason, lineage and wealth. However, the Muslim jurists held that this rule 
must only be applied according to the extent required by the exigencies of 
the situation. This research was therefore divided into three sections, 
namely, the theoretical analysis, the fiqhÐ cases analysis and the justification 
for the Harm Reduction Programme. 
 
Chapter One and Chapter Two offered a general theoretical framework 
concerning the principle of ÃarÙra in Islamic legal discussions and a critique 
of prevalent perspectives that exercise influence on the study of ÃarÙra in 
Muslim academies. The theoretical discussion of ÃarÙra presented in 
Chapter One demonstrates that Muslim jurists believed that the notion of 
ÃarÙra in Islamic law originated in several examples of textual evidence. 
The basic understanding derived from the relevant nuÒÙÒ was gradually 
developed into a systematic theory of law, which functions to amend, lift 
and change the character of certain established rules. With a strong belief 
that SharÐa laws are something that cannot easily be amended, the jurists 
believed that under certain pressing situations, a change of law is 
unavoidable to avoid greater danger to a person's necessities. Chapter One 
also showed us that, based on the relevant ÃarÙra divine texts, the uÒÙliyyÙn 
formulated a systematic foundation for the application of ÃarÙra, including 
its definition, preconditions and the legal maxims. Although the texts are 
limited to certain individual cases, the jurists believed that this rule can be 
applied to any other emergency situations where the religion, life, family, 
reason or wealth of a person is at stake. The case, however, should be 
verified carefully in order to prevent possible abuse. The Prophet himself 
was found to have investigated the intensity and the genuineness of certain 
situations before such a rule was applied. 
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Chapter Two demonstrated how the Sunni jurists formulated a list of 
requirements that should be fulfilled in every ÃarÙra case.  These 
requirements can be regarded as an objective approach to necessity 
situations. These requirements outlined by the jurists show us that the jurists 
insisted that the rule can only be applied during an emergency, where no 
other lawful alternative available and the person fears imminent danger. 
However, the jurists also admitted that the approach to a ÃarÙra situation is 
not merely objective, the subjective feeling of the person should also be 
taken into consideration. This fact is demonstrated in ÃarÙra cases presented 
in fiqhÐ literature.  
 
Chapters Three and Four further demonstrated that the Islamic approach to 
ÃarÙra is not entirely objective, as discussed in the theoretical framework. 
The subjective approach can also be applied by giving freedom to the 
person in such a situation to verify the case. The case should be judged 
individually, as each necessity case is unique. The uniqueness of the case 
depends on two elements, both internal and external elements. The internal 
element is the capability of the person to endure difficulties that differ from 
one person to another. The jurists gave a freedom to a person to verify the 
case according to his or her level of perseverance. On the other hand, the 
external element is the intensity of the case that contributed by other than 
the person under duress.  This external element is beyond anyone's control 
(for example, unexpected danger or the existence of a coercer). These 
chapters also highlighted some important findings. Firstly, they showed that 
ÃarÙra was applied widely in fiqhÐ treatises when compared to that which 
was outlined in the theoretical discussion. As the theoretical study of ÃarÙra 
limits the application of ÃarÙra to certain personal matters, the fiqhÐ treatises 
suggest otherwise. A wider sense of application was found in other cases 
such as transactions and jinÁza. These chapters also showed that ÃarÙra was 
found to be frequently used interchangeably with other terms such maÒlaÎa, 
istiÎsÁn or sadd dharÁÞiÝ. One should realise that the major distinction 
between ÃarÙra and other rules in Islamic law is that the ÃarÙra application 
requires a strict list of conditions that need to be met. Some preconditions 
include the fear of losing life or causing grievous harm to one of the five 
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essential elements of existence, and this fear is only to be overcome by 
altering the original rules. The alteration of the rule includes committing a 
prohibition or delaying an obligation. Many jurists also held that the 
situations of necessity require the application of certain legal maxims 
including “the necessity is limited to what could eliminate harm” (al-ÃarÙra 
tuqaddar biqadriha). This maxim implies that the permission of exercising 
the darÙra rule is limited as long as the cause of harm exists. In other words, 
once the fear of harm has gone, the original rule is restored. There is also a 
requirement to look for the best possible alternative and the danger must be 
certain. Merely whim and weak assumption cannot be accepted in ÃarÙra 
cases. Another maxim is that a person in such a situation (muÃtarr) needs to 
choose a lesser harm (akhaf al-Ãarar) in a case where more than one option 
is available in order to eliminate the imminent harm. Having examined the 
fiqhÐ cases, the jurists were generally consistent in applying the 
preconditions and relevant legal maxims formulated by the uÒÙliyyÙn. 
 
Generally, the Muslim jurists held that the rule can be amended as long as 
one believes that it can enable the individual to eliminate imminent grievous 
harm. It is also important to bear in mind that ÃarÙra does not relieve the 
individual from certain responsibilities and liabilities. Many cases in 
Chapters Three and Four demonstrated that the person under such a 
situation is also socially responsible for his action. Penalty and 
compensation in some cases must be paid by the person who broke the rule. 
Amendment or change in ÝibÁda cases also leads to penalty or demand a 
repetition of the imperfect religious act. In addition, the person under duress 
is also responsible to minimise the harm caused. . It is also important to 
highlight that not all crimes are permitted on the basis of necessity. Crimes 
such as murder, rape and adultery remain prohibited.  
The final part of this thesis aimed to justify the Harm Reduction Programme 
in Malaysia by using the rule of ÃarÙra. The justification of this programme 
is made in Chapter Five. As the programme involves the dispensation of 
controversial tools that include an alternative drug, namely methadone, and 
also needles, Malaysian Muslims are divided on this issue. The proponents 
of this programme argued that the previous methods to control HIV/AIDS 
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failed to reduce the case. As a result, the numbers of HIV/AIDS cases have 
increased dramatically in the past ten years. They further argued that the 
need to implement this programme because the main factor contributing to 
HIV/AIDS cases in Malaysia is needle sharing among drug users.  The 
opponents of this programme on the other hand argued that this programme 
condones and promoted immoral behaviour. They further argued that 
methadone treatment is an illegal drug which is generally prohibited by 
Islamic law. The methadone is not an answer to stop drug abuse. They also 
rejected the idea of needle distribution because it only promotes drug use.  
It is clear that the ÃarÙra rule is only applicable during an emergency when 
there is no other legal means to eliminate the harm and this rule is only 
allowed on a temporary basis. Examining the notion of harm reduction that 
operates for the good of public health, it seems that this programme is a 
necessity for the Malaysian government to control the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
especially as the previous conservatives’ methods failed. It can therefore be 
accepted as a short term measure to control the spread of HIV among the 
high risk groups and reduce the use of dangerous street drugs. The 
methadone can also prolong cravings and most importantly helps the drug 
users to improve his health and lifestyle. The risk of AIDS/HIV 
transmission is reduced as the treatment does not include any injecting 
paraphernalia like that needed for heroin use. Hence, the infection to other 
drug users and low risk groups such as housewives and unborn babies can 
be minimised through methadone treatment. Reports also indicate that the 
disruptive nature of drug addicts due to illegal drug consumption can 
change due to methadone treatment, thus, the patients can go to work to 
support themselves.  The methadone treatment can be seen as a necessary 
measure that is strictly controlled by the government. The methadone is 
only taken in front of the medical officer and only patients with improving 
health records are allowed to take methadone home. When public health is 
in great danger, drastic action must be taken by the government. The 
question is, are all the benefits of the Harm Reduction Programme as 
claimed above sufficient enough to make the programme legitimate in the 
eye of SharÐÝa?  
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The permissibility of methadone treatment and syringes distribution was 
deduced from the the jurists’ discussions on wine and drug use. They had 
discussed the issue of a widely-consumed drug during the medieval era that 
was called ÎashÐsh. As this substance has a similar effect like wine that is 
intoxicant, the jurists had analysed critically both ÎashÐsh and wine. 
However, the majority of jurists did not treat drug addiction as similar to the 
wine problem. As wine is widely known for its intoxicating effect, the 
prohibition is made total and absolute including its production, trading and 
drinking. However, the rule for drug consumption is more complex as drugs 
were historically known for their medicinal effects rather than merely 
intoxicating effects. Hence, the original rule was permissible. However, 
when Muslims started abusing drugs, these substances were then made 
forbidden. The prohibition of drugs is limited to recreational purposes, as 
most jurists held that it is permissible to consume drugs for medication 
purpose. As the drug problem worsened, the jurists treated this problem in a 
stricter manner. Some jurists held that strong penalties should be imposed 
for drug users while some disagreed. However, some jurists like Ibn Íajar 
al-MakkÐ also suggested that small amounts of a drug can be given to a 
hardcore drug user. He believed that drug addiction is something hard to 
stop immediately. He argued that the permission to use drugs was analogous 
to the case of eating mayta for the starving. According to Ibn Íajar al-
MakkÐ, in these cases, both the drug user and the starving man are in dire 
need of either food or drugs, hence, the unlawful becomes permissible. This 
implies that the harm of craving is similar to the harm of starvation. On the 
basis of above argument, it is therefore can be suggested that the Harm 
Reduction Programme should be made permissible. This appears to be the 
best way to help IDUs as drugs need to be withdrawn gradually. Hence, 
during this treatment period, not only drugs such as methadone, syringes 
and other injecting paraphernalia should also be considered lawful to the 
patients. 
In addition, with regard to drugs that are considered lawful to be consumed, 
ZarkashÐ had made a significant conclusion. He concluded that there are 
five situations where the drugs particularly ÎashÐsh  are permitted to be 
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consumed593. The insightful thoughts of al-ZarkashÐ's pertaining to ÎashÐsh 
can be regarded as an important solution to the modern drug problem. As 
far as the Harm Reduction Programme is concerned, al-ZarkashÐ and Ibn 
Íajar al-MakkÐ provided two important answers: Firstly, drugs (in this case, 
methadone) can be regarded as a “necessity” medicine for a drug user in 
order to help him stop the addiction and achieve a better life. Secondly, the 
drug treatment is a gradual process. A step-by-step approach needs to be 
employed by the patient. In addition, during this treatment period, drugs, 
clean needles, syringes and condoms can be dispensed to the IDUs until he 
become totally independent from drugs. In this matter, we can conclude that 
they treated drug addiction as a necessity case. However, if we treat HRP as 
a necessity case according to this parameter, that means all preconditions of 
ÃarÙra should be met. The methadone and needles should be distributed 
according to the specific need of the patient. In addition, the supply can only 
be dispensed to genuine patients. For example, the distribution can only be 
made to hardcore drug users who are highly dependent on narcotic drugs.  
The other precondition that should be met is that the distribution of 
methadone and syringes should be temporary like other ÃarÙra cases. The 
rules granted are specified only during ÃarÙra period. The ÃarÙra period can 
be defined either as long as the cause of ÃarÙra exists or until the harm is 
removed. Harm reduction strategies, either the distribution of syringes and 
needles or methadone treatment, are allowed to operate on an emergency 
basis, which means reducing the drug cravings and improving the quality of 
health of the IDUs on a short term basis. As the drug user needs time to halt 
the addiction, this process of treatment differs according to the individual 
user. A user with a long history of drug addiction takes a longer time to be 
treated than a new drug user. A user who takes drugs on regular basis has a 
different treatment from the person who uses drugs sparingly. The ability to 
control a drug addiction also depends on many factors which affect the 
duration of the treatment. It is clear that the needles and syringes can only 
                                                 
593 See Rosenthal, The Herb- Hashish versus medieval Muslim Society, p. 115 and A. 
Rippin, “Al-ZarkashÐ, AbÙ ÝAbd AllÁh Badr Al-DÐn MuÎammad b. BahÁdur”. 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 2010. Brill 
Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed date 19th  January 2010 
http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-8945  
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be supplied for those who are still unable to control their addiction. During 
the treatment, their health records are scrutinised by the HRP staff, which 
means their demands for needles and syringes are controlled. These 
precaution measures taken by the government demonstrate that this 
programme is strictly controlled and meant only to help the drug users. It 
also shows that the programme does not condone immoral behaviour as the 
supply is not distributed generally to the public. 
 
There are other benefits of the Harm Reduction Programme that might 
support the legality of this programme. This programme is also justified by 
the necessity to protect the public's health. Clean needles and condoms are 
necessary to prevent the spread of the disease to people such as wives and 
unborn children. In this case, the harm of HIV/AIDS infection to the public 
is greater than the harm of drug consumption. The risks associated with 
drug consumption include possible death due to overdose use and possible 
HIV/AIDS infections. These risks can be minimised via the Harm 
Reduction Programme where continuous information is given to the patients 
regarding drug use and the patients are supplied with clean injecting 
paraphernalia. The drug users can also be educated via a series of 
counselling sessions in drop-in-centres which can increase the level of 
awareness about the dangers of sharing needles and using illegal drugs. 
Total abstinence from drug abuse can be realised through this programme.  
As many believe that the drug users are regarded as a hard-to-reach group, 
this programme is crucial to setting up and maintaining good relations 
between the health officers and the patients. Serial contacts with the staff 
will lead to a positive environment for the patients, which can increase self-
confidence to stop the addiction and become a more responsible person.  
 
However, it is important to note that the legality of methadone, needles and 
condoms programmes cannot be made general to other components of Harm 
Reduction Programmes (for example, a Harm Reduction Programme for 
alcoholism). It should be made clear that the original philosophy of harm 
reduction is contradicted by the fundamental concept of sin in Islam. Harm 
reduction strategies do not aim to stop negative behaviour but rather focus 
on alleviating the negative consequence of the act. That means, a negative 
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act is tolerated as long as the negative effect is eliminated. This concept is 
alien to Islam as negative behaviour is always condemned, no matter what 
the result is. For instance, harm reductionists never condemn sexual 
relationships outside marriage as long as the harm is controlled, i.e. sexual 
diseases or unwanted pregnancies. On the other hand, Islam never 
decriminalises zinÁ even under extreme situations. There is no record of 
jurists’ ijtihÁd or fatwÁ permitting sexual relationships outside marriage. In 
addition, there is no policy, such as drinking responsibly, or using drugs 
responsibly in Islam.  On this basis, distributing condoms openly to public 
would be immoral under sharÝÐ rules, as it openly condones promiscuity. 
Although illicit sexual behaviour in Malaysia has become the second main 
factor for HIV/AIDS infections, the distribution of condoms cannot be made 
legitimate.  However, the distribution of condoms to married drug users is 
tolerable as it does not promote zinÁ. In this matter, the former Malaysian 
Minister of Health, Dr Chua has given an assurance that condoms would 
only be given to drug users under close supervision594. We should also bear 
in mind that the Harm Reduction Programme can easily be accepted by non-
religious communities, as in western countries where drug use and sexual 
relationships outside marriage are tolerated (although drug trafficking is 
condemned and punished). Conversely, this programme struggles to receive 
a wide public endorsement in a more religious society, not only with 
Muslims, but Buddhists, Hindus and Christians as well. The influence of 
religious culture on stakeholders' opinions concerning harm reduction 
interventions was evidenced by discussions of social values, stigma, and 
resulting policies.  
 
However, although the original philosophy of harm reduction programme is 
contradicted by the conventional Islamic method of preventing negative 
behaviour, it does not mean the whole idea of this programme should be 
rejected. Harm reduction programmes for drug users can be tolerated on the 
basis that drug addiction is a difficult behaviour to stop unlike other 
negative behaviour. People may also ask, how about the risks of HIV/AIDS 
                                                 
594 See Zubaidah Abu Bakar, “PM supports move to supply needles, condoms”, in Adeeba 
Kamarulzaman, Experiences on Harm Reduction of Substance Abuse in Malaysia, 
(PowerPoint presentation, University Malaya of Medical Center), p. 12  
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infections among sex workers and the public? Don't they have the same 
right to be protected against HIV/AIDS? These groups should not be treated 
as drug users. It is not necessary to provide condoms, methadone and 
syringes for them as their situation is totally different from drug users. This 
is due to two reasons. Firstly, drug addiction is a 'disease' while illicit sexual 
relations are not an addiction or a serious disease. Islam has provided a 
lawful measure for sexual urges that is through nikÁÎ. Only married couples 
can, therefore, obtain condoms. Secondly, the need of sex workers to 
continue their 'job' cannot justify the distribution of condoms. This is due to 
the fact that there are many lawful alternatives for sex workers to make a 
living. On the other hand, there is no alternative for drug users for their 
addiction at that moment. Although sex workers and the public have the 
same rights to be protected from HIV/AIDS, there are many lawful 
alternatives for them as compared to the drug users. Hence, condoms and 
drug supply are not regarded as necessary for those other than drug users.  
Finally, although methadone, syringes and condoms programmes are 
permitted on the basis of ÃarÙra, strict precautions and observations must be 
continuously employed. Collaboration between the Malaysian government 
and religious groups is also important to create a better model for the Harm 
Reduction Programme. Adapting western approaches to combating social 
problems is not without challenges, as Muslim communities have a different 
set of moral values when compared to their western counterparts. However, 
the Harm Reduction Programme can be altered to suit a Malaysian Muslim 
setting. The religious requirements should also be considered whilst 
recognising the reality of the situation. It is hoped that the target to become 
a drug-free-country can be realised without sacrificing Malaysians' moral 
and religious beliefs.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
aghlabiyya predominant 
ahl al-kitÁb People of the Book; the Jews and the Christians 
aÎkÁm sharÝiyya legal rules 
ajnabÐ  foreigner, outsider 
al-Þamr bi al-maÝrÙf wa al-nahy Ýan al-
munkar 
commanding rights and forbidding wrongs 
al-Ãarar yuzÁl harm must be eliminated 
al-Ãararu yudfaÝ bi qadr al-imkÁn harm is eliminated to the extent that is possible 
al-ÃarÙra lÁ tubÁÎ Îaqq al-ghayr necessity does not invalidate the right of others 
al-ÃarÙra tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙra necessities permit prohibitions 
al-ÃarÙra tuqaddar biqadriÎa  necessity estimated by the extend thereof 
al-iljÁ' the state in which one is being forced to do something 
al-khamr wine 
al-mashaqqa tajlib al-taysÐr hardship begets facility 
al-nabÐdh al-muskir intoxicant beverages  
al-naqÒ al-ÔabÐÝÐ natural defect 
al-rukhaÒ lÁ tunÁlu bi al-maÝÁÒÐ   the dispensation is not meant for the sinner 
al-sukar drunkenness, intoxicated 
al-umÙr bi maqÁÒidihÁ acts are judged according to the attention 
al-ÝÁdat muÎakkama custom is the basis of judgment 
al-yaqÐn lÁ yazÙl bi al-shakk certainty is not overruled by doubt 
al-Ýusr hardship 
Ámir   A coercer (in coercion case), this term also  means a ruler 
awqÁt muÔlaqa ordinary daily situation 
ayÁt aÎkÁm  legal QurÞÁnic citations 
ÝazÐma established rules 
bÁÔil invalid, not concluded 
dafÝ al-sÁ’il  legitimate defense 
dalÐl the proof of sharÐÝa 
damm a type of compensation, also means blood 
dÁr al-Îarb non-Muslim country 
dÐn religion 
dhimmÐ  non-Muslim in Muslim country that is protected by the state 
difÁÝ sharÝÐ the lawful defense 
diyÁt  striving to promote for the cause of Islam 
ÃamÁn guarantee 
Ãarar harm 
ÃarÙra necessity 
ÃÁrÙra al-Ôifl the necessity of baby 
ÃarÙriyyÁt necessities, essentials 
farÃ obligatory 
fÁsid defective 
fatwÁ  legal opinion, verdict 
fidya a type of compensation 
fiqh Islamic law 
furÙÝ the elaborated precepts of positive law 
ghalba al-Ûan something that we confirm within the general customs, probably pre-
dominance pre-tested by experience 
gharm penalty 
ghayr bÁghin or ÝÁdin person who has willful disobedience and who transgresses due limits 
ghayr ÔÁlib sharran person who does not intend to commit a sin 
halak destruction 
hibba gift 
Îadd, plural ÎudÙd prescribed punishments 
ÎÁja, ÎÁjiya need 
Îajj pilgrimage 
ÎalÁl permissible, lawful 
ÎaqÐqÐ  real meaning 
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ÎarÁm forbidden 
ÎashÐsh herb (drug) commonly known for illicit consumption 
ibÁÎa permission 
ÎÐla legal stratagem 
ighlÁq  duress 
Îikma wisdom 
iÎrÁm the state of pilgrimage that limits one's normal activities 
iÎtimÁl suspicious 
ijÁra hire 
ijtihÁd independent legal reasoning, legal solution 
ikrÁh coercion 
ikrÁh nÁqiÒ or ghayr muljÐÞ non-compelling coercion 
ikrah tÁmm complete compulsion, full compulsion 
istiÒÎÁb presumption of continuity 
istiÎsÁn juristic preference 
Îukm taklÐfÐ prescriptive command, defining law 
ÎuqÙq AllÁh the rights of God, public rights 
jihÁd striving for the good cause of religion 
jild al-mayta skin of dead animal that was not slaughtered according to Islamic 
rules 
juzÞiyyÁt particular cases 
karÁhat al-taÎrÐm disapproval on the basis on the basis of a probable evidence 
kufr non-believing 
kullu mÁl aÒluhu amÁna all property is originally regarded as a trust  
lÁ Ãarar walÁ ÃirÁr no harm should be inflicted or reciprocated 
lÁ ijtihÁd  maÝa an-naÒÒ  there is no ijtihÁd with the availability of text 
mÁ yasudd al-ramaq what can prolong life 
mÁ yufsid al-thawb falÁ yufsid al-mÁ’ what damages a clothes cannot damage the purity of water 
madhhab School of law 
mafÁsid harm 
mahr dowry 
mÁiÝ mutanajjis impure liquid 
majÁzÐ metaphorical 
makhmaÒa  continuous state of hunger 
makrÙh reprehensible, disapproved 
mÁl wealth 
manÁfiÝ benefit 
mandÙb recommended 
maÒlaÎa public interest 
maÒlaÎa mulgha discredited interest, unrecognised interests 
maÒlaÎa mursala unrestricted interests, interests which are free from textual evidences 
maÒlaÎa muÝtabara  recognised interests 
maqÁÒid SharÐÝa objectives of the law 
maqtÙÝ certain 
marÃ mukahwwif serious sickness 
mashaqqa difficulties and hardship 
mashhÙr majority view 
mawhÙm  doubtful 
maÝÒÙm  the person whom the blood is protected 
mayta dead meat that was not slaughtered according to Islamic ritual 
maÝtÙh incompetent person 
maÛnÙn  possible, probable 
muÃÁraba investment 
muÃtarr person in dire need situation 
mubÁÎ indifferent, permissible 
mubÁshir The compelled, coerced (in coercion case) 
mufassirÙn QurÞÁnic commentators 
muftÐ legally competent person to issue legal verdict 
muhlikÐn dangerous situation 
muÎarramÁ unlawful items 
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mukallaf subject of law, a person under legal obligation, legally 
commissioned person 
murÙna flexible 
musÁqÁt sharecropping by the lease of plantation 
musta’man Non-Muslim in Muslim country that declares peace with the state 
muÝÁmala personal relationship 
nÁdir unusual state/ rare case 
nafs life 
najas al-Ýain impure item 
naql bil yadd bidÙni ÝiwÁÃ exchanging items without price 
nasab lineage 
naskh abrogation 
nikÁÎ marriage 
nisyÁn forgetfulness 
nuÒÙÒ textual evidence 
Òadaqa gifts or charity 
ÔalÁq dissolution of marriage 
Òawm al-wiÒÁl continuous fasting for 24 hours 
qawÁÝid fiqhiyya Islamic legal maxims 
qÁÝida collection of rules, maxim, principle 
qiÒÁÒ  law of equality, retaliation 
qirÁÃ investment 
qiyÁs analogy 
quwwa al-qÁhira force majeure 
rafÝ al-Îaraj lifting a burden 
riÃÁ consent 
 rujÝ  reconciliation of marriage 
rukhÒa concessionary law, literally, rukhÒa means ease and convenience 
saÃÃ dzarÁiÝ  blocking the means 
salaf earlier scholars lived before 300H 
salam  future trading 
shahwa desire or lust 
shaÎm al-mayta fat of dead animal that was not slaughtered according to Islamic 
rules 
shakk  knowledge gained with 50% certainty 
SharÐÝa Islamic law, divine law 
sharf sanctity 
shiddat al-ÎÁja dire need for something 
shubhÁt suspicions, doubts 
salÁt al-khawf special prayer performed during a battle 
tafsÐr Qur’anic commentary 
taÎrÐm forbidden 
taÎsÐniyya embellishments, adornments 
takhfÐf to ease or to lease the burden 
takhÒÐÒ specification 
taklÐf legal obligation 
talaf  destruction 
tawakkal a humble acceptance of God’s appreciation 
tayammum dry ablution 
Þamr al-sulÔÁn order from the superior 
Ûann  presumption, probability, knowledge gained with 75 percent 
certainty 
uÒÙl the theoretical study 
uÒÙl al-fiqh the science of Islamic jurisprudence 
waham suspicion; knowledge gained with only 25% certainty 
wÁjib  obligatory 
walÐ ul-amrÐ  ruler 
waÒiyya will 
wasq  Measurement normally used to weigh staple food i.e wheat, corn, 
barley or rice. One wasq is equivalent to sixty or thirty sÁÝs 
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wuÃÙ’ ablution 
wujÙb obligation 
yaqÐn  knowledge gain with hundred percent certainty 
Ýaql reason 
ÝarÁyÁ special trading exchanging fresh dates for dried dates 
ÝawÁriÃ ahliyya impediments to legal capacity 
ÝawÁriÃ muktasaba  human symptoms affecting the legal capacity 
ÝawÁriÃ samÁwiya  the work of providence 
Ýawra parts of human body that have to be covered (either in prayer or in 
front of others) 
ÝibÁda devotional acts of worship 
Ýidda waiting period for a female divorcee or a widower that has to be 
observed before she can remarry 
Ýilla  effective cause/ ratio decidendi 
ÝumÙm al-balwÁ necessitated prevelation or common plight 
Ýurf customary laws 
yutaÎammul al-Ãarar al-khÁÒ li dafÝ Ãarar 
al-ÝÁmm 
specific harm is tolerated in order to prevent a more general one 
yuzÁl Ãarar al-ashadd bi al-Ãarar al-akhaf a greater harm is eliminated by means of a lesser harm 
yuzhib al-Ýaql losing sanity 
Ýuzr excuse 
Ýuzr shaqq severe excuse 
 zihÁr a form of divorce consisting in the words of repudiation: "you are 
like my mother's back" 
zinÁ adultery 
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 ﻭﺍﻟﹾﻤﻨﺨﻨﹺﻘﹶﺔﹸ ﻭﺍﻟﹾﻤﻮﻗﹸﻮﺫﹶﺓﹸ ﺣﺮﻣﺖ ﻋﻠﹶﻴﻜﹸﻢ ﺍﻟﹾﻤﻴﺘﺔﹸ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻡ ﻭﻟﹶﺤﻢ ﺍﻟﹾﺨﻨﺰﹺﻳﺮﹺ ﻭﻣۤﺎ ﺍﹸﻫﻞﱠ ﻟﻐﻴﺮﹺ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﺑﹺﻪ
ﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺼﺐﹺ ﻭﺍﹶﻥﹾ ﺗﺴﺘﻘﹾِﺴﻤﻮﺍ ﻭﺍﻟﹾﻤﺘﺮﺩﻳﺔﹸ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻄﻴﺤﺔﹸ ﻭﻣۤﺎ ﺍﹶﻛﹶﻞﹶ ﺍﻟﺴﺒﻊ ﺍﻟﱠﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺫﹶﻛﱠﻴﺘﻢ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺫﹸﺑﹺﺢ ﻋﻠﹶ
ﺍﹶﻟﹾﻴﻮﻡ   ﺩﻳـﻨﹺﻜﹸﻢ ﻓﹶﻠﹶﺎ ﺗﺨﺸﻮﻫﻢ ﻭﺍﺧﺸﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﹾﻴﻮﻡ ﻳﺌﺲ ﺍﻟﱠﺬﻳﻦ ﻛﹶﻔﹶﺮﻭﺍ ﻣﻦ  ٰﺫﻟﻜﹸﻢ ﻓﺴﻖ  ﺑﹺﺎﻟﹾﺎﹶﺯﻟﹶﺎﻡﹺ
ﻓﹶﻤﻦﹺ ﺍﺿﻄﹸﺮ ﻓﻰ   ﻠﹶﺎﻡ ﺩﻳﻨﺎﺩﻳﻨﻜﹸﻢ ﻭﺍﹶﺗﻤﻤﺖ ﻋﻠﹶﻴﻜﹸﻢ ﻧﹺﻌﻤﺘﻰ ﻭﺭﺿﻴﺖ ﻟﹶﻜﹸﻢ ﺍﻟﹾﺎﺳ ﺍﹶﻛﹾﻤﻠﹾﺖ ﻟﹶـﻜﹸﻢ
  ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﻏﹶﻔﹸﻮﺭ ﺭﺣﻴﻢ ﻓﹶﺎﻥﱠ ۙ ﻣﺨﻤﺼﺔ ﻏﹶﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺠﺎﻧﹺﻒ ﻟّﺎﺛﹾﻢﹴ
 
 
 :911.6Q
ﺎ ﻭﻣﺎ ﻟﹶـﻜﹸﻢ ﺍﹶﻟﱠﺎ ﺗﺎﹾﻛﹸﻠﹸﻮﺍ ﻣﻤﺎ ﺫﹸﻛﺮ ﺍﺳﻢ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﻋﻠﹶﻴﻪ ﻭﻗﹶﺪ ﻓﹶﺼﻞﹶ ﻟﹶـﻜﹸﻢ ﻣﺎ ﺣﺮﻡ ﻋﻠﹶﻴﻜﹸﻢ ﺍﻟﱠﺎ ﻣ
   ﺍﻥﱠ ﺭﺑﻚ ﻫﻮ ﺍﹶﻋﻠﹶﻢ ﺑﹺﺎﻟﹾﻤﻌﺘﺪﻳﻦ  ﺋﻬﻢ ﺑﹺﻐﻴﺮﹺ ﻋﻠﹾﻢﹴﺁﻭﺍﻥﱠ ﻛﹶﺜﻴﺮﺍ ﻟﱠﻴﻀﻠﱡﻮﻥﹶ ﺑﹺﺎﹶﻫﻮ ﺮﹺﺭﺗﻢ ﺍﻟﹶﻴﻪﺍﺿﻄﹸ
 
 
 
 :541.6Q
 
ﻭ ﺩﻣﺎ ﻣﺴﻔﹸﻮﺣﺎ ﺍﻟﱠۤﺎ ﺍﹶﻥﹾ ﻳﻜﹸﻮﻥﹶ ﻣﻴﺘﺔﹰ ﺍﹶ ﻗﹸﻞ ﻟﱠۤﺎ ﺍﹶﺟﹺﺪ ﻓﻰ ﻣۤﺎ ﺍﹸﻭﺣﻰ ﺍﻟﹶﻰ ﻣﺤﺮﻣﺎ ﻋٰﻠﻰ ﻃﹶﺎﻋﻢﹴ ﻳﻄﹾﻌﻤۤﻪ 
ﺍﺿﻄﹸﺮ ﻏﹶﻴﺮ ﺑﺎﻍﹴ ﻭﻟﹶﺎ ﻋﺎﺩ ﻓﹶﺎﻥﱠ ﺭﺑﻚ  ﻓﹶﻤﻦﹺ ۚ ﺭﹺﺟﺲ ﺍﹶﻭ ﻓﺴﻘﹰﺎ ﺍﹸﻫﻞﱠ ﻟﻐﻴﺮﹺ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﺑﹺﻪ ﺧﻨﺰﹺﻳﺮﹴ ﻓﹶﺎﻧﻪ ﺍﹶﻭ ﻟﹶﺤﻢ
  ﻏﹶﻔﹸﻮﺭ ﺭﺣﻴﻢ
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 ;511.61Q 
ﻓﹶﻤﻦﹺ ﺍﺿﻄﹸﺮ ﻏﹶﻴﺮ ﺑﺎﻍﹴ ﻭﻟﹶﺎ  ۚ ﻢ ﺍﻟﹾﺨﻨﺰﹺﻳﺮﹺ ﻭﻣۤﺎ ﺍﹸﻫﻞﱠ ﻟﻐﻴﺮﹺ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﺑﹺﻪﺍﻧﻤﺎ ﺣﺮﻡ ﻋﻠﹶﻴﻜﹸﻢ ﺍﻟﹾﻤﻴﺘﺔﹶ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺪﻡ ﻭﻟﹶﺤ
   ﻓﹶﺎﻥﱠ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﻏﹶﻔﹸﻮﺭ ﺭﺣﻴﻢ ﻋﺎﺩ
 
  ;601.61Q
 ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮﺡ ﺑﹺﺎﻟﹾﻜﹸﻔﹾﺮﹺ ًﻣﻄﻤﺌﻦ ﺑﹺﺎﻟﹾﺎﻳﻤﺎﻥ ﻭٰﻟـﻜﻦ ﻭﻗﹶﻠﹾﺒﻪ ﺍﻟﱠﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍﹸﻛﹾﺮﹺﻩ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﻳﻤﺎﻧﹺۤﻪ ۢﻣﻦ ﻛﹶﻔﹶﺮ ﺑﹺﺎﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ ﻣﻦ
   ﻭﻟﹶﻬﻢ ﻋﺬﹶﺍﺏ ﻋﻈﻴﻢ ۚ ﺻﺪﺭﺍ ﻓﹶﻌﻠﹶﻴﻬﹺﻢ ﻏﹶﻀﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻠٰﹼﻪ
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List of ÍadÐth texts: 
 
 
ÍadÐth one595: 
ﺏﺎﺑ ﺔﺘﻴﳌﺍ ﱃﺇ ﺮﻄﻀﳌﺍ :ﺎﻘﻓ ﻩﺪﻟﻭﻭ ﻪﻠﻫﺃ ﻪﻌﻣﻭ ﺓﺮﳊﺍ ﻝﺰﻧ ﻼﺟﺭ ﻥﺃ ﺓﺮﲰ ﻦﺑ ﺮﺑﺎﺟ ﻦﻋ ﻞﺟﺭ ﻝ
 ﻪﺗﺃﺮﻣﺇ ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﺖﺿﺮﻤﻓ ﺎﻬﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﺪﳚ ﻢﻠﻓ ﺎﻫﺪﺟﻮﻓ ﺎﻬﻜﺴﻣﺄﻓ ﺎﺪﺟﻭ ﻥﺈﻓ ﺖﻠﺿ ﱃ ﺔﻗﺎﻧ ﻥﺇ
 ﻝﺄـﺳﺃ ﻰﺘﺣ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﺎﻬﻠﻛﺄﻧﻭ ﺎﻬﻤﳊﻭ ﺎﻬﻤﺤﺷ ﺩﺪﻘﻧ ﻰﺘﺣ ﺎﻬﺨﻠﺳﺍ ﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ ﺖﻘﻔﻨﻓ ﰉﺄﻓ ﺎﻫﺮﳓﺍ
 ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ)ﺹ ( ﺀﺎـﺠﻓ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﻫﻮﻠﻜﻓ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻻ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻚﻴﻨﻐﻳ ﲎﻏ ﻙﺪﻨﻋ ﻞﻫ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﻪﻟﺄﺴﻓ ﻩﺎﺗﺄﻓ
ﻓ ﱪﳋﺍ ﻩﱪﺧﺄﻓﺎﻬﺒﺣﺎﺻﻚﻨﻣ ﺖﻴﻴﺤﺘﺳﺍ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺎﺮﳓ ﺖﻨﻛ ﹼﻼﻫ ﻝﺎﻘ  
 
 
ÍadÐth two596: 
 ﹸﻔﻟﺍ ﻦﻋﻊﻴﺠ  ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ ﻰﺗﺃ ﻪﻧﺃ ﻯﺮﻣﺎﻌﻟﺍ)ﺹ ( ﻖـﺒﺘﻐﻧ ﺎـﻨﻠﻗ ﻢﻜﻣﺎﻌﻃ ﺎﻣ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺔﺘﻴﳌﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻨﻟ ﹼﻞﳛ ﺎﻣ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ
 ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺘﻴﳌﺍ ﻢﳍ ﹼﻞﺣﺄﻓ ﻉﻮﳉﺍ ﰉﺃﻭ ﻙﺍﺫ ﻝﺎﻗ ﹰﺔﻴﺸﻋ ﺡﺪﻗﻭ ﹰﺓﻭﺪﻏ ﺡﺪﻗ ﺔﺒﻘﻋ ﱄ ﻩﺮﺴﻓ ﻢﻴﻌﻧ ﻮﺑﺃ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺢﺒﻄﺼﻧﻭ
ﻝﺎﳊﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ  
 
 
ÍadÐth three597:  
 ﱯﻧ ﹼﻥﺃ ﺏﺪﻨﺟ ﻦﺑ ﺓﺮﲰ ﻦﻋ)ﺹ ( ﻥﺫﺃ ﻥﺈﻓ ﻪﻧﺫﺄﺘﺴﻴﻠﻓ ﺎﻬﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﻥﺎﻛ ﻥﺈﻓ ﺔﻴﺷﺎﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻢﻛﺪﺣﺃ ﻰﺗﺍ ﺍﺫﺇ ﻝﺎﻗ
 ﻻﻭ ﺏﺮﺸﻴﻟﻭ ﺐﻠﺘﺤﻴﻠﻓ ﻻﺇﻭ ﻪﻧﺫﺄﺘﺴﻴﻠﻓ ﻪﺑﺎﺟﺃ ﻥﺈﻓ ﹰﺎﺛﻼﺛ ﺕﻮﺼﻴﻠﻓ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻦﻜﻳ ﱂ ﻥﺈﻓ ﺏﺮﺸﻴﻟﻭ ﺐﻠﺤﻴﻠﻓ ﻪﻟ
ﻞﻤﳛ 
                                                 
595 ÍadÐth no 3818 in the chapter of al-muÃtarr  ilÁ al-mayta in AbÙ DawÙd SulaymÁn Ibn 
al-AshÝath,  Sunan AbÐ Dawud, vol. II, p. 645, Vaduz Leichestein: JamÝiyya al-Maknaz al-
IslÁmÐ, 2000. See also ÎadÐth number 3807 in AbÙ DawÙd SulaymÁn Ibn al-AshÝath, Sunan 
Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984, vol. III, p. 
1074. According to AÎmad Íassan, there is no defined limit of necessity as it differs from 
man to man. 
596 ÍadÐth no 3819 in the chapter of fÐ al-muÃtarr ilÁ al-mayta, vol. II, p. 645 in Sunan AbÐ 
Dawud, Vaduz Leichestein: JamÝiya al-maknaz al-Islami, 2000 
597ÍadÐth no. 2621 in the chapter of fÐ ibn sabÐl yaÞkul min al-tamar wa yashrab min al-
laban idhÁ marra bihÐ, Sunan Abi Dawud, vol. II, p. 447. See also ÎadÐth number 2613 in 
Sunan Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Vol. II, p. 724.  
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ÍadÐth four598:  
ﹲﺔﻨﺳ ﲎﺘﺑﺎﺻﺃ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻞﻴﺒﺣﺮﺷ ﻦﺑ ﺩﺎﺒﻋ ﻦﻋ  ﺖﻠﻛﺄﻓ ﹰﻼﺒﻨﺳ ﺖﻛﺮﻔﻓ ﺔﻨﻳﺪﳌﺍ ﻥﺎﻄﻴﺣ ﻦﻣ ﹰﺎﻄﺋﺎﺣ ﺖﻠﺧﺪﻓ
 ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ ﺖﻴﺗﺄﻓ ﰊﻮﺛ ﺬﺧﺃﻭ ﲎﺑﺮﻀﻓ ﻪﺒﺣﺎﺻ ﺀﺎﺠﻓ ﰉﻮﺛ ﰲ ﺖﻠﲪﻭ)ﺹ ( ﻥﺎﻛ ﺫﺇ ﺖﻤﹼﻠﻋ ﻪﻟ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ
 ﻖﺳﻭ ﻒﺼﻧ ﻭﺃ ﹰﺎﻘﺳﻭ ﱏﺎﻄﻋﺃﻭ ﰉﻮﺛ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺮﻓ ﻩﺮﻣﺃﻭ ﹰﺎﺒﻏﺎﺳ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻭﺃ ﹰﺎﻌﺋﺎﺟ ﻥﺎﻛ ﺫﺇ ﺖﻤﻌﻃﺃ ﻻﻭ ﹰﻼﻫﺎﺟ
ﹴﻡﺎﻌﻃ ﻦﻣ  
 
ÍadÐth five599: 
 
ﻗ ﻦﻋ ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ ﺖﻴﺗﺄﻓ ﹰﺔﻟﺎﲪ ﺖﻠﻤﲢ ﻝﺎﻗ ﱄﻼﳍﺍ ﻕﺭﺎﳐ ﻦﺑ ﺔﺼﻴﺒ)ﺹ ( ﺎـﻨﻴﺗﺄﺗ ﱴﺣ ﻢﻗﺃ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻪﻟﺄﺳﺃ
 ﻪﻟ ﺖﹼﻠﺤﻓ ﹰﺔﻟﺎﲪ ﻞﻤﲢ ﹴﻞﺟﺭ ﺔﺛﻼﺛ ﺪﺣﻷ ﻻﺇ ﹼﻞﲢ ﻻ ﺔﻟﺄﺴﳌﺍ ﻥﺇ ﺔﺼﻴﺒﻗ ﺎﻳ ﻝﺎﻗ ﹼﰒ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺎ ﻚﻟ ﺮﻣﺄﻨﻓ ﹸﺔﻗﺪﺼﻟﺍ
ﺎﻣ ﺖﺣﺎﺘﺟﺍ ﹲﺔﺤﺋﺎﺟ ﻪﺘﺑﺎﺻﺃ ﹴﻞﺟﺭﻭ ﻚﺴﳝ ﹼﰒ ﺎﻬﺒﻴﺼﻳ ﻰﺘﺣ ﺔﻟﺄﺴﳌﺍ ﹰﺎﻣﺍﻮﻗ ﺐﻴﺼﻳ ﱴﺣ ﺔﻟﺄﺴﳌﺍ ﻪﻟ ﺖﹼﻠﺤﻓ ﻪﻟ
 ﹴﻞﺟﺭﻭ ﹴﺶﻴﻋ ﻦﻣ ﹰﺍﺩﺍﺪﺳ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻭﺃ ﹴﺶﻴﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺪـﻘﻟ ﻪـﻣﻮﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺎﺠﳊﺍ ﻯﻭﺫ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺛﻼﺛ ﻡﻮﻘﻳ ﱴﺣ ﹸﺔﻗﺎﻓ ﻪﺘﺑﺎﺻﺃ
 ﺔﻟﺄﺴﳌﺍ ﻪﻟ ﺖﹼﻠﺤﻓ ﹸﺔﻗﺎﻓ ﹰﺎﻧﻼﻓ ﺖﺑﺎﺻﺃ ﻦﻣ ﻦﻫﺍﻮﺳ ﺎﻤﻓ ﹴﺶﻴﻋ ﻦﻣ ﹰﺍﺩﺍﺪﺳ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻭﺃ ﹴﺶﻴﻋ ﻦﻣ ﹰﺎﻣﺍﻮﻗ ﺐﻴﺼﻳ ﱴﺣ
ﺔﻟﺄﺴﳌﺍ ﺣﺎﺻ ﺎﻬﻠﻛﺄﻳ ﹰﺎﺘﺤﺳ ﺔﺼﻴﺒﻗ ﺎﻳﺎﻬﺒ ﺎﺘﺤﺳ  
 
HadÐth six600:  
 ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ ﱃﺇ ﹲﻞﺟﺭ ﺀﺎﺟ ﻝﺎﻗ ﺓﺮﻳﺮﻫ ﰉﺃ ﻦﻋ)ﺹ ( ﺬـﺧﺃ ﺪﻳﺮﻳ ﹲﻞﺟﺭ ﺀﺎﺟ ﻥﺇ ﺖﻳﺃﺭﺃ ﷲﺍ ﻝﻮﺳﺭ ﺎﻳ ﻝﺎﻘﻓ
 ﻝﺎـﻗ ﺪﻴﻬـﺷ ﺖﻧﺄﻓ ﻝﺎﻗ ﲎﻠﺘﻗ ﻥﺇ ﺖﻳﺃﺭﺃ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻪﻠﺗﺎﻗ ﻝﺎﻗ ﲎﻠﺗﺎﻗ ﻥﺇ ﺖﻳﺃﺭﺃ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻚﻟﺎﻣ ﻪﻄﻌﺗ ﻼﻓ ﻝﺎﻗ ﱃﺎﻣ
ﺭﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻮﻫ ﻝﺎﻗ ﻪﺘﻠﺘﻗ ﻥﺇ ﺖﻳﺃﺭﺃ  
                                                 
598ÍadÐth no. 2622 in the chapter of fÐ ibn sabÐl yaÞkul min al-tamar wa yashrab min al-
laban idhÁ marra bihÐ, Sunan Abi Dawud, vol. II, p. 447. See also ÎadÐth number 2614 in 
Sunan Abu Dawud, AÎmad Íassan (tran.), Vol. II, p. 724 
599ÍadÐth no. 2451 in the chapter of who is permitted to beg (man taÎillu lahu al-masÞalatu), 
AbÐ al-Íusayn Muslim Ibn al-ÍajjÁj al-QushayrÐ al-NisÁbÙrÐ, ÑaÎÐÎ Muslim, Vaduz:  
Leichestein JamÝiya al-Maknaz al-IslÁmÐ , 2000, vol. I, p. 409 
600ÍadÐth no. 377 in the chapter of  al-dalÐl ÝalÁ anna man qaÒada akhdha mÁli ghayrihi bi 
ghayri Îaqqin kÁna al-qÁÒidu muhdarra al-dammi fÐ Îaqqihi in  ÑaÎÐÎ Muslim, Vaduz: 
Leichestein JamÝiya al-Maknaz al-IslÁmÐ, vol. I, p. 71-72. See also another  hadÐth no. 378 
and 379 from the authority of ÝAbd AllÁh bin ÝAmr and Ibn Jurayh respectively, vol. I, p. 
72. See also HadÐth Muslim 259, SaÎÐÎ Muslim Abdul Hamid Siddiqi (tran.), vol. I, p. 80, 
in the chapter of faith (the chapter concerning the fact that violable blood of one who 
makes an attempt to take possession of the property of another without any legitimate right, 
is such a man is killed his abode is fire and he who dies in protecting his property is a 
martyr).  
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